Supreme Court Overturns 9th Circuit Anti-Officer Use of Force Rule

In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez et al., the United States Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit to put an end to a rule that let people bring lawsuits against officers even when the officers' use of force was reasonable.  Under the so-called "Provocation Rule," officers whose use of force is deemed reasonable, could still be held liable if they did something else, in violation of the 4th Amendment, to make the suspect respond in a way that required force.  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this theory.

In the Mendez case, two deputies were looking for a wanted parolee when they entered a shack in the backyard of a home without knocking or announcing.  They did not have a warrant to enter the shack. It turned out Mendez lived in the shack.  Mendez got up with a gun in his hand when the officers entered and the officers reasonably believed their lives were in danger and fired in self-defense.  Mendez, who survived, sued, arguing that even if it was reasonable for the officers to shoot him, they should still be liable since they did not have a warrant to search his shack.  The Ninth Circuit agreed, applying its "Provocation Rule."

The Supreme Court, however, held, "The rule’s fundamental flaw is that it uses another constitutional violation to manufacture an excessive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.”  The Court explained "the provocation rule... instructs courts to look back in time to see if a different Fourth Amendment violation was somehow tied to the eventual use of force, an approach that mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth Amendment claims." As a result, the Court concluded, "the provocation rule is incompatible with this Court's excessive force jurisprudence."

Ninth Circuit Upholds Public Officials' Right to Respond to Public Smears

In Mulligan v. Nichols et al., the Ninth Circuit upheld public officials' right to respond to disparaging public comments against them. The court's opinion reaffirmed that public officials' speech, by itself, is insufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation claim.

In Mulligan, a former Deutsche Bank executive, who had ties to the entertainment industry, was arrested during a drug-induced tirade. The executive filed an administrative complaint against the arresting officers claiming, in part, that they had used excessive force. Given the executive's former position, the administrative complaint attracted significant media attention. In response, the Los Angeles Police Protective League ("LAPPL") issued a press release exposing the executive as a frequent user of bath salts. Because of the press release and associated negative media coverage, the executive lost his job at Deutsche Bank.

The executive sued the City of Los Angeles, the officers, and LAPPL claiming they had retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment Right to file an administrative claim against the City. The court denied his First Amendment retaliation claim. In support of its finding, the court stated:

"Retaliation claims involving government speech warrant a cautious approach by courts. Restricting the ability of government decisionmakers to engage in speech risks interfering with their ability to effectively perform their duties. It also ignores the competing First Amendment rights to the officials themselves. The First Amendment is intended to 'preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.' McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). That marketplace of ideas is undermined if public officials are prevented from responding to speech of citizens with speech of their own. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) ('The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators.')"

The court held that public officials' speech, by itself, is insufficiently adverse to give rise to a First Amendment retaliation claim. The executive was unable to show the City, the officers, or LAPPL took any action which affected his rights, benefits, relationship or status with the state. The court expanded, "As we stated in Nunez, '[i]t would be the height of irony, indeed, if mere speech, in response to speech, could constitute a First Amendment violation."

Ninth Circuit Affirms Arbitration Award

The Ninth Circuit clarified the limited role courts play in reviewing labor arbitration awards. (Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters v. Drywall Dynamics, Inc. (9th Cir., May 19, 2016, No. 14-55250)2016 WL 2909241.) The court held the district court exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether an arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.”

Drywall Dynamics (“Drywall”), the employer, entered into a labor agreement with the Union, the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters. Under the agreement, Drywall assigned its authority to bargain to a contractors’ association (“Association”). Years later, Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, only to discover the Union and the Association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held Drywall was bound by the MOU. The district court, however, vacated the arbitration award, holding the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and “contrary to public policy.”

The Ninth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that an arbitration award must be upheld as long as the arbitrator even arguably construed or applied the contract. According to the court, the appropriate and singular question to ask when determining whether to enforce an arbitration award is: “Did the arbitrator look at and construe the contract, or did he not?” The district court should not have considered whether the arbitrator’s interpretation was “plausible.” Moreover, a court can only vacate an arbitration award if it runs contrary to explicit, well-defined, and dominate public policy.” The Ninth Circuit determined there were two “competing interests” – the employer’s interest to withdraw from a multiemployer unit and the interest in stable multiemployer units. Because there were competing interests, neither could be “dominant” policy.

This decision reaffirms the extremely deferential standard by which a court will review an arbitration award. 

Cash-in-Lieu of Health Benefits is Included in Rate Calculations Under FLSA

If you receive cash in lieu of healthcare benefits, you may be entitled to additional overtime compensation from your employer.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal recently ruled that cash payments made to employees who declined medical coverage had to be included in the regular rate used to calculate the employees’ overtime compensation.

In Flores v. City of San Gabriel, the Ninth Circuit ruled the City of San Gabriel willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by failing to include cash payments for unused medical benefits in police officers’ overtime calculations. The court also ruled that money the City paid out to third parties for officers’ benefits had to be included in their overtime rate. Under 29 U.S.C. section 207(e)(4), payments to third parties or trustees made pursuant to a “bona fide plan” for providing health insurance benefits could be excluded from the regular rate used to calculate overtime. The court found that the City’s plan was not a “bona fide plan” because approximately 40% of the City’s total contributions were paid directly to employees, rather than received as benefits.

Many public employers give employees a cash incentive for opting out of employer-provided medical coverage. The court’s ruling in Flores establishes that such incentives must be included in the regular rate used to calculate overtime for employees who receive them.  Not many employers do this.

If your agency offers cash in lieu of medical benefits, you may have a claim for unpaid overtime and liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime (e.g. double damages) under the FLSA. While your agency may fix this issue going forward, you will likely need to file a lawsuit to recover backpay. Under the FLSA, an employee can only recover damages for unpaid wages that occurred within the last three years. As such, it is important to pursue an FLSA claim immediately.

If you are represented by our office and your agency offers cash in lieu of medical benefits, you should call our office or your union immediately to discuss the matter.

Ninth Circuit Clarifies Standards for Reasonable Force

In Lowry v. City of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit clarified some of the standards for determining the reasonableness of the force used. In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit held a reasonable jury could find the San Diego Police Department’s (“SFPD”) K9 “bite and hold” policy was a severe use of force.  

After a night of drinking with her friends, the plaintiff, Sara Lowry, returned to her workplace and fell asleep on her office couch. Lowry unknowingly triggered the building’s burglar alarm when she got up to use the restroom.

SFPD were called to investigate. Sgt. Bill Nulton and his police dog, Bak, along with two other officers, found the door to Lowry’s office suite open. Sgt. Nulton yelled, “This is the San Diego Police Department! Come out now or I’m sending in a police dog! You may be bitten!” Nulton waited 30-60 seconds, but received no response. He repeated the warnings, but eventually released Bak “off lead” (without a leash). Bak made her way to Lowry’s office and bit Lowry’s lip. Nulton immediately commanded the dog to release her hold.

Lowry brought a § 1983 action against the City, alleging the City’s policy of training its police dogs to bite and hold resulted in a violation of her Forth Amendment rights.  According to the Ninth Circuit, a court must consider both the type of force used and the potential harm it may cause. The district court erred in only considering Lowry’s actual harm rather than the potential harm the K9 could inflict. As Sgt. Nulton told Lowry after the incident, “I just can’t believe that’s the only damage. You’re very lucky. She could have ripped your face off.”

The Ninth Circuit also considered whether other tactics would be appropriate in the circumstances. The court believed Sgt. Nulton could have kept Bak on lead to maintain control. While the court did find Nulton’s multiple warnings were helpful in showing the force was reasonable, it was only minimally so because Lowry did not hear the commands.

Law enforcement agencies may look to the Lowry decision when determining whether an officer used reasonable force in a disciplinary case.

Ninth Circuit Rules Peace Officer's ADHD is Not a Disability Under the ADA

On August 15, 2014 in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, the Ninth Circuit ruled a police officer's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder was not a "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court upheld the officer's termination for work-related problems caused by his ADHD.

In Weaving, the City terminated an officer for not getting along with peers and subordinates. The City alleged he "created and fostered a hostile work environment" and had problems with interpersonal communication. The officer argued his ADHD impaired his ability to work and interact with others, and qualified as disability under the ADA. He argued the City terminated him for his disability in violation of the ADA.

The court ruled his ADHD did not constitute a "disability" under the ADA because his condition did not severely impair his ability to work and interact with others. The court found he was a skilled police officer and supervisors had selected him for high-level assignments. Also, his problems interacting with others did not rise to the level of a disability. Asserting a disability on this basis requires such severe impairment that the subject is barely functional and essentially housebound. For these reasons, the court ruled his termination did not violate the ADA.

9th Circuit: LAPD Retaliated Against Officer for FLSA Testimony

In Avila v. LAPD, the Ninth Circuit ruled the Los Angeles Police Department violated the FLSA’s anti-retaliation clause when it fired a “model” officer after testifying against the department in a fellow officer’s FLSA case. The FLSA anti-retaliation provision protects employees from discharge or discrimination based on giving testimony in any FLSA proceeding.

LAPD terminated Avila after he testified in a FLSA lawsuit brought by fellow officer, Edward Maciel, who sought overtime pay for working through his lunch hours. Avila testified he periodically worked through his lunch break and did not claim overtime because it was a common practice in the department. After an investigation, the LAPD Board of Rights recommended termination. Avila had no record of discipline.

The court emphasized the sole issue before the jury was whether LAPD’s reason for firing Officer Avila was pretext, not whether LAPD could fire the officer for failing to report overtime or whether Avila’s testimony could be used in an administrative hearing. Thus, the court determined LAPD could not support any viable argument that Avila would not have been terminated if he had not testified at Maciel’s trial. However, the court stated it would not decide whether the use of an employee’s trial testimony was entirely forbidden in an adverse action where the employer has other evidence of the alleged infraction.

Ultimately, the decision confirms the protection afforded to public employees who enforce the FLSA. Avila was awarded $579,400 in attorney fees and $50,000 in liquidated damages.

Ninth Circuit Rules Fire Department Dispatchers and Aeromedical Technicians Are Entitled to Standard Overtime Pay Under FLSA

On March 18, 2014, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Haro v. City of Los Angeles. The Ninth Circuit found standard overtime rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply to fire department dispatchers and aeromedical technicians. This case distinguishes fire department dispatchers and aeromedical technicians from firefighters in calculating overtime.

Under the FLSA, employees who work more than 40 hours in a workweek are entitled to overtime pay. However, Section 207(k) exempts certain job classifications from this general rule. Section 207(k) requires certain employees, such as firefighters, to work a total of 212 hours in a 28-day period before earning overtime pay. In this case, the City of Los Angeles classified dispatchers and aeromedical technicians as employees “engaged in fire protection.” Classifying dispatchers and aeromedical technicians as employees “engaged in fire protection” subjected them to the same overtime rules as firefighters.

L.A. City dispatchers and aeromedical technicians filed suit. They argued that they are not actively engaged in fire protection as defined by the FLSA, and should receive standard overtime pay. The City argued because dispatchers and aeromedical technicians contribute in a direct and vital manner to the fire department’s suppression of fires, Section 207(k) applies.

Although dispatchers and aeromedical technicians occupy a vital role in fighting fires, they are not employees “engaged in fire protection” as defined by the FLSA. The Court pointed out dispatchers do not actively engage in fire suppression. Rather, dispatchers send firefighters to the scene to suppress the fire. Similarly, the Section 207(k) exemption does not apply to aeromedical technicians. Their duties include medical support, setting up equipment, loading hoses and fittings onto helicopters, filling helicopters with water, and establishing secure landing sites. These are not duties of an employee “engaged in fire protection.” Since dispatchers and aeromedical technicians are not exempt under the FLSA, they were awarded backpay for unpaid overtime.

The City has participated in much FLSA litigation in recent years. The litigation caused the City to reconsider its pay practices for many employees, but the City never investigated its pay practices for dispatchers and aeromedical technicians. The Court concluded the City willfully violated the FLSA by failing to investigate whether dispatchers and aeromedical technicians were exempt under Section 207(k).

Ninth Circuit: Officers' Use of Taser 22 Times Was Justified, Despite Death of Suspect

In Marquez v. City of Phoenix (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1167, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that officers’ repeated and prolonged use of a taser against the suspect, both in “probe mode” and in “drive-stun mode,” which resulted in the suspect’s death, did not amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The case started when two Phoenix, Arizona, police officers arrived at a suspect's family home. They learned that the male suspect was attempting to perform an exorcism on his three-year old granddaughter. Upon entering the bedroom, which had been barricaded, the officers found chaos. The walls and furniture were smeared with blood, the suspect was reclining on the bed with a silent and motionless victim in a choke-hold, and the suspect’s adult daughter was naked in the corner screaming with evidence on her face of a recent beating. One officer ordered the suspect to let the child go or he was going to be tased. The suspect did not comply and, the officer deployed his TASER X26 ECD in “probe mode.” The taser was ineffective and the suspect continued to actively resist arrest, even kicking one officer in the groin.

After the victim was removed, the suspect continued to resist. Officers were eventually able to wrestle Ronald into submission after using the taser multiple times. At that point, the officers found that he had a weak pulse. Despite resuscitation efforts, the suspect went into cardiac arrest and died. The cause of death was listed as “excited delirium” and records found that the suspect received nine five-second cycles from the X26; two while it was ineffectively deployed in “probe mode” and seven when it was deployed in “drive-stun mode.” In all, the officers pulled the X26's trigger a combined 22 times.

While the Court found that considerable force was used, the force was not excessive. Interestingly, the Court was “not convinced that the use of an X26 involves deadly force” but even if it did, under the totality of the circumstances, the force was reasonable. The Court highlighted the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving. In this situation, officers were responding to a domestic violence call in which the suspect would not release his granddaughter from a choke-hold and then struggled viciously in close quarters against the officers attempting to restrain him while his daughter, who had also been the victim of his attacks, remained in the room throughout.

Court Limits Protections for Peace Officers Accusing Other Officers of Misconduct

In Dahlia v. Rodriguez (9th Cir., Aug. 7, 2012, 10-55978) 2012 WL 3185693, the Ninth Circuit decided the First Amendment does not protect a police officer who told an outside agency some of his colleagues went too far during interrogations.

Angelo Dahlia, a detective for the Burbank Police Department, accused other officers of excessive interrogation tactics. He told the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department that officers squeezed a suspect’s throat and placing the barrel of a gun directly under the suspect’s eye. Dahlia also claimed he heard noises coming from the interrogation rooms including yelling and the sounds of someone being hit. Dahlia was later placed in administrative leave.

Dahlia filed a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging unconstitutional retaliation. The Court concluded Dahlia's actions, as a part of his public employment, were not protected by the First Amendment because he failed to establish that: 1) his speech was “spoken in the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee”; and 2) that placement on administrative leave constitutes an adverse employment action. The Court relied heavily on Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3d 696.

The Ninth Circuit looked at the precedent setting case of Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410, which held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Under Garcetti, the protection of the First Amendment is thus limited where the speech is “part of the core tasks that the employee is ‘paid to perform,’” but not where the speech is merely related to the speaker’s public employment.” Huppert, decided after Garcetti, went further. There, the Court held police officers have a duty to blow the whistle because they must disclose information regarding alleged misconduct and corruption. The Court criticized the Huppert, but it was required to follow the rule. Thus, the Court held Dahlia was acting within his professional duties, and not as a public citizen, when he accused other officers of abusive interrogation tactics, and his speech was not protected under the First Amendment.

The Ninth Circuit did make one favorable ruling to police officers suing for retaliation. The Court decided “under some circumstances, placement on administrative leave can constitute an adverse employment action.”  Importantly, the appeal was just about First Amendment rights. Other parts of the case dealt with state laws that also protect whistleblowers.

9th Circuit: Assistant Chief Personally Liable for Retaliation

In Martha Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace (9th Cir. May 8, 2012) No.11-35343, the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled "it was clearly established ... that a supervisor cannot retaliate against a public employee for his or her subpoenaed deposition testimony offered as a citizen in the context of a civil rights lawsuit."  As a result, the court held the local assistant chief of police could be personally liable for retaliation and is not entitled to qualified immunity.

The case started when a peace officer sued the city, alleging he was fired for being outspoken about the war on drugs.  Martha Karl was called as a witness in the officer's lawsuit and testified at a deposition that the assistant chief wanted to terminate the officer because of his political opinions and that the assistant chief "had a reputation as a 'smooth talker' and a “'back stabber.'”  When the assistant chief found out what Karl said, he told others she couldn't be trusted and that he would find a way to get rid of her.

According the court, the evidence showed the assistant chief had Karl transferred to a new position and set her up to fail during her probation period.  He then had her fired.  She sued for retaliation, naming the city and the assistant chief personally.

The court ruled the assistant chief was not entitled to qualified immunity, meaning he could be sued in his personal capacity.  Qualified immunity is the principle that protects peace officers from personal liability in federal civil rights cases unless their conduct clearly violates established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  Here, the court decided it was clearly established that law enforcement supervisors cannot retaliate against employees called as witnesses in civil rights cases on account of their testimony and the assistant chief should have known that.

Court Reaffirms Peace Officers' Constitutionally-Protected Right to Privacy While Partially Undressed

Following the Ninth Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found a female deputy sheriff had a reasonable expectation of privacy while partially undressed and undergoing a decontamination process.  Doe, a deputy sheriff in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania was surreptitiously filmed by a male officer while undergoing decontamination. The male officer uploaded the video onto his work computer and called several officers into his office to view the footage.   He then put in on a county-wide server.  Doe filed a 1983 action against the county and the officer, alleging violations of her right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and her right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed on the Fourteenth Amendment claim and affirmed on the search and seizure claim.  After looking to other circuits, the court concluded a deputy sheriff has a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in his/her partially clothed body. The court noted:

Although the issue of whether one may have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body is a matter of first impression in this circuit, other circuits—including the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits—have held that such a right exists. See, e.g., Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136–39 (2d Cir.2002) (finding that plaintiff, a female civilian who was participating in a police training video, alleged sufficient facts to raise a triable issue of whether her constitutional right to privacy was violated where the male police officer surreptitiously filmed her in the dressing room while topless and without a bra); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454–56 (9th Cir.1963) (finding that the plaintiff properly stated a claim for a violation of her constitutional right to privacy where she alleged that, while reporting a sexual assault, a male police officer deceived her into permitting him to photograph her genitals and exposed breasts under the pretext of an investigation), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939, 84 S.Ct. 794, 11 L.Ed.2d 659 (1964); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 497–98 (6th Cir.2008) (finding a privacy violation where a middle school's surveillance cameras recorded the plaintiff students in their undergarments while in the school locker room)
(Doe v. Luzerne County (3d Cir., Oct. 12, 2011, 10-3921) 2011 WL 4823387.)

The court concluded the male deputy’s filming did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted for personal reasons.

Ninth Circuit: Employers Must Prove Workplace Disruption Claims in Employee Speech Cases

In Nichols v. Dancer (9th Cir., Sept. 15, 2011, 10-15359) 2011 WL 4090676, the Ninth Circuit held that under the Pickering balancing test, employers must prove an employee's speech causes workplace disruption to justify subjecting an employee to an adverse employment action.  Following the Fifth Circuit, the Court rejected the employer's claim that it is sufficient to merely assert a potential disruption.

Kathleen Nichols worked in the General Counsel's office of the Washoe County School District.  She went to a school board meeting about whether her boss would be fired and sat next to him during the meeting. When she returned to work, a manager told her there were questions about her loyalty to the District. The manager told Nichols that she could remain in Human Resources, where her salary would be frozen, or take early retirement. She opted for the latter and sued for a violation of her First Amendment rights.

The case turns on whether Ms. Nichols' conduct caused sufficient interruption to trigger the employer's right to preserve workplace efficiency.  Balancing Nichols' rights against workplace efficiency is part of the Pickering balancing test, the analytic framework used by courts to evaluate public employee free speech claims.   In this case, the District asserted Nichols' association with her former boss met its burden under the test.  The Court rejected that claim.

The Court explained "engaging in Pickering balancing is not like performing rational basis review, where we uphold government action as long as there is some imaginable legitimate basis for it."  (Id. quoting Kinney v. Weaver (5th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3d 337, 363.) The Court went on to explain, "An employer may not interfere with an employee's First Amendment rights unless there is evidence that the employee's actions have actually disrupted the workplace or are reasonably likely to do so in the future. Simply saying that there has been or will be disruption, without supporting evidence, is not enough.  In the face of Pickering, the “because I said so” approach is insufficient to establish a reasonable prediction of disruption, let alone actual disruption." (Id.)

9th Circuit: Felony Charges Alone Do Not Justify Peace Officers' Suspension Without Pay

In Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (Aug. 12, 2011, 08-56283) 2011 WL 3524129, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the County of Los Angeles violated peace officers’ constitutional rights by denying them a meaningful appeal of suspensions without pay. The Court found the mere fact an officer is charged with a felony is not enough to justify unpaid suspensions. Instead, a peace officer should be permitted a post-suspension appeal to challenge whether the charges are supported by valid allegations and to determine if the particular felony allegations against a suspended deputy justify suspension.

The case arose after four deputy sheriffs were charged with felonies and suspended without pay. The charges against some of them were later dropped and the others were exonerated by juries. The deputies challenged their suspensions and sought back pay, but the County refused, arguing unpaid suspensions were proper because felony charges, whether supported by valid allegations or not, were pending at the time of the suspensions. The deputies appealed, arguing they were entitled to challenge more than just the mere fact they had been charged with felonies.

Normally, peace officers are entitled to challenge discipline before it is implemented. However, courts look at felony charges somewhat differently than other types of alleged misconduct because whenever there are felony charges an independent third party has determined there is probable cause to believe the employee committed a serious crime. As a result, some courts have held employees who occupy positions of public trust and high visibility, such as peace officers, can be temporarily suspended without pre-suspension due process if felony charges are filed against them.

However, even though pre-suspension hearings may not be required under some circumstances, meaningful post-suspension hearings are required. The dispute in this case was about what the deputies had a right to challenge in their post-suspension appeal.

The County argued it did not have to let the officers challenge the basis for the felony charges because merely being charged with a felony meant the deputies could not do their jobs. The County relied on a rule allowing it to suspend employees based on a “condition which impairs an employee's qualifications for his or her position.” The Court, however, rejected this claim noting “nowhere does the rule state that a felony charge is necessarily such a ‘condition’—indeed, the rule does not mention felonies or felony charges at all.”

The Court therefore concluded the County “rendered the post-suspension hearings redundant and meaningless [and this kind of] “meaningless hearing is no hearing at all, and does not satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.”

9th Circuit: Last Chance Agreement Did Not Waive Right to Skelly Hearing

In Walls v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (9th Cir., Aug. 3, 2011, 10-15967) 2011 WL 3319442, the Ninth Circuit ruled a public employee’s Last Chance Agreement did not waive his right to a pre-termination (Skelly) hearing. Some employers use Last Chance Agreements to discipline employees and give them a “last chance.” Such agreements usually contain a provision which states if the employee violates any condition of employment, such as coming in to work late or missing a day without calling in, the employee can be terminated.

In this case, the Last Chance Agreement read in part, “non-compliance with the stipulations [of the Last Chance Agreement] will result in your immediate and final termination.” After agreeing to the Last Chance Agreement, the employee allegedly had an unexcused absence from work. The employer then moved to terminate him and did not give him a pre-termination hearing, claiming the Last Chance Agreement rendered the employee “at will,” meaning he could be terminated without just cause and the normal procedural protections that go along with it.

The Court rejected the employer’s claim. The Court recognized public employees have a property interest in their continued employment and must be provided with notice of the charges against them, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present their side of the story. In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined the Last Chance Agreement and concluded “[it] specifies and modifies what constitutes “just cause” for [] termination, [but] it does not otherwise alter the employment terms of [the employee’s] collective bargaining agreement [and] accordingly, there is no basis on which to conclude that he had become an at-will employee.”

New Department of Labor App Allows Employees to Track Hours Worked and Wages

The US Department of Labor has released a free application for iPhones and iTouch that will assist employees in tracking their hours worked, meal periods and rest breaks, overtime and wages owed. The application is titled "DOL-Timesheet" and is available for free on the apple website, and is expected to be released soon for other phones. This application will provide workers a valuable tool to establish their wage and hour claims where the employer has failed to keep accurate records. Under the FLSA and California labor law, employees can establish wage claims by reasonable inference where accurate records are not available.

In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946) the court recognized that employees may establish their claims by reasonable estimates and averages. The court found, "Where the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes ... the solution ... is not to penalize the employee ... on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would place a premium on an employer's failure to keep proper records ... it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee's labors without paying due compensation as contemplated by the [FLSA]." Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).

This application will provide a much more accurate record of hours worked and strong evidence for courts to estimate the claims of other employees. Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis stated "This app will help empower workers to understand and stand up for their rights when employers have denied their hard-earned pay." The Labor Department indicated the calculator will be updated to allow workers to keep track of their tips, commissions, bonuses, deductions, holiday pay, pay for weekends, shift differentials and pay for regular days of rest. The application can be found at http://www.dol.gov/whd/ or on itunes.

Ninth Circuit Sets Limits on "Policymaker Exception" to Public Employee First Amendment Protections

In Bardzik v. County Of Orange (Mar. 28, 2011) --- F.3d ---, Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3692, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified when the “policymaker exception” applies to public employees’ First Amendment claims. The case concerned Jeff Bardzik, a Lieutenant with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. Lt. Bardzik was the Department’s Reserve Division Commander in 2005, in charge of 600 reserve deputies. Then he endorsed the incumbent Sheriff’s rival in an upcoming election. Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff allegedly retaliated by transferring him to a position in Court Operations where he only supervised three people. He was denied pay increases and promotional opportunities even after his transfer.

Normally, an elected official cannot retaliate against a public employee for his or her political beliefs or activities. However, the “policymaker exception” allows elected officials to appoint “some high-level, personally and politically loyal officials who will help him implement the policies that the public voted for.” As a result, if an employee is a policymaker, an elected official can retaliate against him for political activity.

Lieutenants are not automatically policymakers. Instead, whether the policymaker exception applies depends on nine factors: 1) breadth of responsibilities; 2) relative pay; 3) technical competence; 4) power to control others; 5) authority to speak for policymakers; 6) public perception; 7) influence on programs; 8) contact with elected officials; and 9) responsiveness to partisan politics. The Court also suggested a tenth factor, the ability to thwart the elected official’s agenda, was relevant to its analysis.

The Court applied these factors one-by-one to decide whether Lt. Bardzik counted as a policymaker when he was Reserve Division Commander. The Court held four of the factors favored Bardzik: he did not have a relatively high salary; he had to go through superiors before sending official memoranda to reserves; the public was unaware of his role; and it was unclear if he was responsive to partisan politics.

However, the Court found the other five factors warranted applying the policymaker exception. Engaging in a fact-intensive inquiry, the Court found Bardzik had broad discretion over the Reserve Division and often reported directly to the Sheriff. The Court also decided he had special skills and extensive authority over members of the Reserve division. Finally, the Court held Bardzik had significant influence over specific programs in the Division, a distinction the Court identified as “the most critical factor,” citing Walker v. City of Lakewood (9th Cir. 2001) 272 F.3d 1114, for authority. As a result, the Court decided the Sheriff was allowed to retaliate against Bardzik when he served as Division Commander.

The Court stressed, however, the retaliation crossed the line after the transfer to Court Operations. In Court Operations, Bardzik‘s job duties were limited to implementing, rather than making policy. As a result, the Court held his First Amendment rights prohibited continued retaliation for his political activity.

In his partial dissent, Judge Pregerson recast the facts and argued the evidence of Bardzik’s supervisory responsibilities as Division Commander did not support the majority’s conclusion he had significant control of others. Pregerson also questioned the majority’s reliance on Walker, arguing though “influence on programs” was the most critical factor in that case, the Court did not hold it would be in every case. As a result, the dissent contends, Bardzik was not a policymaker in either capacity.

Though the Court applied the "policymaker exception" on these facts, its holding is no victory for management. The holding sets a limit on "policymaker" retaliation where some retaliation renders the employee a non-policymaker. Thus, an elected official may quickly cross this line and incur liability with a series of retaliatory actions. Also, as Judge Pregerson’s dissent illustrates, whether the “policymaker exception” applies to a particular employee is a highly factual question which evades clear rank-based distinctions. Because this is a fact-intensive issue, employers will likely face significant burdens regardless of the ultimate outcome in litigation. Indeed, the Court heard Bardzik on an appeal from summary judgment after substantial discovery, press coverage and a District Court ruling for the employee.