The Supreme Court Says Cannabis Use Alone Cannot Disarm You. What Does that Mean for California Cops?

California peace officers now stand at the intersection of two bodies of law that pull in opposite directions. State law shields their right to use cannabis when they are not on duty, while federal law forbids anyone who uses cannabis from possessing the very firearm that their profession demands. The Supreme Court has just unsettled the federal side of that equation in United States v. Hemani, and its decision invites a fresh look at whether an officer who lawfully uses cannabis away from work may still be denied the badge and the gun. United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026) The answer is not yet clear, and the competing arguments deserve careful attention.

The Legislature spoke plainly when it enacted Assembly Bill 2188 and Senate Bill 700, which amended Government Code section 12954 and took effect on January 1, 2024. That statute makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to penalize a worker for using cannabis off the job and away from the workplace, and it forbids reliance on a drug test that detects only the nonpsychoactive cannabis metabolites that linger in the body long after any effect has passed. Gov Code § 12954. The Legislature exempted only employees in the building and construction trades, and it said nothing at all about peace officers. Because the Legislature expressly excluded one occupation and left every other unmentioned, officers possess a legitimate argument that the omission of their profession was deliberate and that the new protection reaches them. The statute therefore begins from a position that appears to favor the officer who uses cannabis on personal time.

That favorable starting point gives way, however, to several exemptions that may prove decisive for law enforcement. Section 12954 does not permit an employee to use or to be impaired by cannabis on the job, it preserves an employer's authority to maintain a drug free workplace, and it expressly leaves intact any other rights or obligations that state or federal law places on the employer. The statute also declines to preempt any state or federal law that requires controlled substance testing as a condition of employment, and it removes from its protection any position that requires a federal government background investigation or security clearance. The difficulty is that the ordinary municipal or county officer completes a state background investigation for good moral character under Government Code section 1031, not the federal investigation that the exemption describes, and Government Code section 1029 disqualifies only those convicted of a felony rather than those who use cannabis. Whether these provisions carve officers out of the statute or leave them comfortably within it remains genuinely uncertain.

The sharpest tension arises not from the employment statute but from the firearm that every sworn officer must carry. Federal law makes it unlawful for any person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance to possess a firearm, and cannabis remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law no matter how completely California has legalized it. An officer who uses cannabis therefore appears, at least on the face of the statute, to be a person whom Congress has forbidden to hold a tool that the job requires. That same officer who buys a personal weapon must attest truthfully on the federal firearms transaction record that he is not an unlawful user of marijuana, and a false answer carries federal criminal exposure. The firearm requirement, far more than anything in the employment code, is what has long threatened to place cannabis-using officers outside the protection that Assembly Bill 2188 seems to promise.

For years the governing federal authority in California cut sharply against the officer. The Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016) applied a two-step inquiry and intermediate scrutiny and upheld the federal restrictions that keep marijuana users, including the holders of a state medical marijuana card, from acquiring firearms. The court reasoned that these laws burden the Second Amendment only minimally and incidentally, and it concluded that the Constitution tolerates such modest collateral burdens. Wilson supplied a straightforward answer that a cannabis user could be kept from the firearm and therefore from the job. That answer, however, rested on the Ninth Circuit’s Second Amendment analysis that the Supreme Court has rejected.

The ground shifted when the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen and directed courts to measure firearm regulations against the Nation's historical tradition rather than against tiers of scrutiny. United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026), decided on June 18, 2026, applied that framework to the very statute at issue here. Ali Hemani used marijuana a few times a week, and the government sought to imprison and permanently disarm him on that basis alone, without any claim that he was an addict, that he was intoxicated while armed, or that he had ever posed a danger to anyone. The Court held that the prosecution could not stand, because the historical laws the government invoked, the old regimes that restrained habitual drunkards through vagrancy, civil commitment, and surety bonds, targeted persons whose intoxication left them incapacitated and operated only after some form of legal process. Section 922(g)(3), by contrast, automatically disarms any regular user of any controlled substance without proof of incapacity, intoxication, or dangerousness, and the Court concluded that this automatic and status driven ban does not fit within the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Applying the statute to Hemani on those facts therefore violated the Second Amendment.

The Court took evident care to confine its ruling. It did not decide whether Congress may disarm those who are addicted or presently intoxicated, it did not disturb the separate prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons, and, most importantly for officers, it did not resolve whether the government may proceed under the statute when it offers individualized proof that a person's drug use renders him a danger to himself or others. The holding thus dismantles one categorical justification for disarming cannabis users while expressly preserving room for a narrower approach that rests on individualized findings.

Arguably, if the federal firearm ban cannot constitutionally reach a person merely because he uses cannabis, then an agency can no longer prohibit marijuana use based on the contention that such an officer is legally incapable of possessing their duty weapon. Under this argument, the exemptions from section 12954 may not apply, because they preserve only employer obligations that federal law genuinely imposes, and under Hemani federal law may not impose a firearm disability based on cannabis use alone. The earlier Ninth Circuit rule in Wilson, resting on a repudiated legal framework, looks increasingly invalid after Hemani. Thus, an officer disciplined solely because he or she uses cannabis may run afoul of the categorical prohibition that the Supreme Court has now rejected. Read together, Assembly Bill 2188 and Hemani suggest the officer may be protected from discipline.

However, the application of Assembly Bill 2188 to peace officers remains unclear. Hemani decided only an as applied challenge that turned on the complete absence of any individualized showing, and the Court pointedly left open a prosecution supported by individualized proof of dangerousness. An agency may contend that an officer who carries a loaded firearm in public every single day presents exactly the individualized safety concern that the Court declined to reach, so that the reasoning of Hemani may provide officers no shelter at all.

Section 12954 independently preserves the employer's right to maintain a drug free workplace and to honor any obligation that federal law and regulation impose, and Government Code section 1031 must be read and applied consistently with federal law. Cannabis also remains unlawful under federal law even where a prosecution under section 922(g)(3) would fail, and the officer who purchases a personal firearm still confronts the sworn federal form and the criminal exposure that a false answer invites. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922. Wilson, while legally suspect, remains binding in the Ninth Circuit until that appellate court or the Supreme Court squarely overrules it, and an agency may reasonably continue to rely upon it.  

The honest conclusion is that the law has not settled and that officers and their employers alike should proceed with caution. Hemani has weakened the categorical federal bar that once made this analysis simple, yet it has deliberately left open the individualized path to enforcement. More importantly, the California exemptions remain untested in any court.

Public safety unions should resist any suggestion that their members must surrender the protections that the Legislature extended, and they should insist that any adverse action rest on an individualized assessment of fitness and risk rather than on cannabis using status alone. Officers, for their part, should remember that cannabis remains unlawful under federal law and should weigh that stubborn reality before they place their careers in the hands of an unsettled disciplinary dispute. Until the Legislature or the courts clarify this issue, prudent officers should tread lightly regarding off-duty cannabis use. 

A Published Victory for Proportionality in California Highway Patrol v. California State Personnel Board

The California Court of Appeal has handed California peace officers a rare and valuable published decision holding that a single, isolated act of dishonesty does not compel termination and does not, by itself, brand an officer as unfit to serve. In California Highway Patrol v. California State Personnel Board, No. B336135 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2026, ordered published Aug. 5, 2026), the Second Appellate District affirmed the State Personnel Board's decision reducing an officer's dismissal to a suspension, and it did so in an opinion that peace officers and the unions who represent them will cite for years to come. Mastagni Holstedt represented the officer, and the published result confirms a principle that agencies too often ignore. Not every act of dishonesty is the same, and the penalty must fit the misconduct and the officer who committed it.

The facts illustrate why proportionality matters. Officer Nathaniel Partridge joined the California Highway Patrol in 2006, compiled a record free of prior discipline, and earned excellent and proficient performance ratings that described him as conscientious, dependable, and ready for promotion. He worked overtime details under the Maintenance Zone Enhanced Enforcement Program, an arrangement through which the Department of Transportation reimbursed the Highway Patrol for enforcement services on highway maintenance projects. A local standard operating procedure required officers released early by Caltrans to remain at the East Los Angeles station for the balance of the scheduled shift. On September 17, 2017, after his detail ended early, Partridge went home rather than remaining at the station, yet he received the full scheduled overtime (roughly three hours and forty five minutes) pay. The agency also faulted him for failing to record the return time of his patrol vehicle on eight occasions over a six month period.

The State Personnel Board sustained a charge of dishonesty against Partridge, and it did not minimize his conduct. The Board held that theft of public funds and the falsification of official forms, even on a single occasion, constitute serious misconduct for a sworn peace officer. The Board nevertheless reversed his dismissal because the evidence established one isolated event rather than a pattern or a disposition to deceive. The Board contrasted Partridge with officers who had engaged in systematic overtime abuses and concluded that a single lapse by an officer with a long and unblemished career did not demonstrate a propensity to lie, cheat, or deceive. Applying the factors articulated in Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194, 218 (1975), which direct the decision maker to weigh the harm to the public service, the circumstances surrounding the misconduct, and the likelihood of recurrence, the Board imposed a suspension that cost Partridge a full year of salary.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. A reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative body on the question of penalty, and it will disturb the chosen discipline only in the exceptional case in which reasonable minds cannot differ. See Barber v. State Personnel Board, 18 Cal. 3d 395, 404 (1976). The Highway Patrol argued that dishonesty is a continuing trait of character and that any sustained finding of dishonesty therefore requires dismissal. The court rejected that categorical position and held that dismissal is not required in every case of dishonesty. See County of Siskiyou v. State Personnel Board, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1606, 1617 (2010). Reasonable minds could differ about the appropriate consequence for the officers' conduct, and the existence of that reasonable disagreement fortified rather than undermined the Board's exercise of discretion.

Most significant for officers facing discipline is the way the court distinguished degrees of dishonesty. The court confronted the authorities that agencies routinely invoke to demand termination and confined each of them to its facts. It explained that Kolender v. San Diego Civil Service Commission, 132 Cal. App. 4th 716, 721 (2005), described dishonesty as a continuing trait of character only in the context of an officer who lied to conceal the physical abuse of an inmate and refused to tell the truth until investigators exposed the falsehood. It viewed Cate v. State Personnel Board, 204 Cal. App. 4th 270 (2012), as a case in which dishonesty accompanied far more egregious misconduct, including the encouragement of a mentally ill patient to commit suicide, the intimidation of a witness, and an abuse of official power. Measured against that conduct, Partridge's isolated overtime claim occupied a different place on the spectrum, and the court refused to treat every falsehood as the equivalent of the aggravated dishonesty that had justified dismissal elsewhere. Degrees of dishonesty exist, and the law recognizes them.

The publication of this opinion carries independent importance. The published decisions in this area have generally sustained dismissals, and agencies have marshaled those cases to argue that any dishonesty finding ends an officer's career as a matter of law. A published opinion that affirms a proportional penalty for an isolated act of dishonesty now stands as citable precedent for the opposite and correct proposition. Officers and their representatives no longer need to rely on unpublished dispositions or on the bare language of Skelly. They can point to a binding appellate holding that an isolated lapse, committed by an officer whose integrity had never before been questioned, may warrant discipline short of termination. The decision restores balance to a body of law that had tilted heavily toward the agency.

The opinion also speaks to the decertification regime that now governs California peace officers. Senate Bill 2 empowered the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training to suspend or revoke the certification of an officer who engages in serious misconduct, and it defined serious misconduct to include dishonesty relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime or the investigation of officer misconduct. See Cal. Penal Code § 13510.8(b)(1). Nothing in that statute makes decertification automatic. The Commission possesses discretion, for the statute provides that it may suspend or revoke certification rather than that it must. See Cal. Penal Code § 13510.8(a)(2). The implementing regulation confirms that the analysis is individualized, for in deciding whether revocation is proper the Commission considers the extent to which the dishonesty related to a material or significant fact and whether the officer acted willfully and with the intent to deceive. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 1205(a)(1). The Commission may recommend revocation only when serious misconduct is established by clear and convincing evidence. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 1212(b)(2).

This case demonstrates that a sustained dishonesty charge should not trigger a presumption of decertification. The very factors that persuaded the State Personnel Board to impose a suspension rather than dismissal are the factors that the certification regulation directs the Commission to weigh. An isolated act, the absence of any pattern, the materiality and intent behind the conduct, and the officer's overall record all bear on whether the extraordinary sanction of decertification is warranted. An officer who commits a single lapse presents a fundamentally different case from an officer who lies repeatedly to conceal abuse or to defeat an investigation. Agencies and the Commission that read this opinion faithfully will understand that a dishonesty label, standing alone, does not resolve the proportionality question that both the disciplinary and the certification frameworks require them to answer.

Conclusion

For California public safety unions and their members, the practical lesson is clear and encouraging. When an agency seeks to terminate an officer for an isolated act of dishonesty, the decision maker should weigh the full circumstances, including the officer's career, the isolated character of the conduct, and the materiality and intent behind it. 

When an agency invokes Kolender or Cate to demand automatic dismissal, the officer may answer that those cases turned on aggravated misconduct far removed from an isolated error. And when the specter of decertification arises, the officer may remind the Commission that Senate Bill 2 and its regulations call for an individualized assessment rather than a reflexive revocation. 

The published opinion in California Highway Patrol v. California State Personnel Board gives officers and their advocates the authority to make each of these arguments with confidence. It affirms that fairness and proportionality remain the law, and that a single mistake need not end a career of honorable service.

Appellate Court Affirms Broad Make Whole Remedy for Violation of Duty to Engage in Effects Bargaining Over Pension Reciprocity

On July 30, 2026, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, Division Seven, issued an unpublished decision in City of Los Angeles v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Nos. B336981 and B340065. The court affirmed the Los Angeles Employee Relations Board order requiring the City to engage in effects bargaining and to make whole Coalition represented employees who suffered reduced pension and other benefits after the City suspended reciprocity between the Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System and the Water and Power Employees Retirement Plan. Although the Employee Relations Board exercises jurisdiction limited to the City of Los Angeles, the Court of Appeal expressly construed the Meyers Milias Brown Act in reaching its conclusions. That construction carries significant weight for every public employer and exclusive representative subject to the Act statewide. The decision confirms that when a public employer implements a nonnegotiable change that foreseeably affects retirement benefits, it must still bargain the effects of that change, and that make whole relief for resulting pension losses remains an available and appropriate remedy under the Meyers Milias Brown Act.

Factual Background

Beginning in 1980 the City and the Department of Water and Power maintained a reciprocal arrangement that permitted employees transferring between the two systems to carry pension service credit. In 2010 the Water and Power Employees Retirement Plan Board voted to suspend reciprocity after determining that net transfers from City service into the Department of Water and Power increased the Plan unfunded liability by approximately one hundred eighty three million dollars. After litigation and settlement in Romero et al. v. City Council of the City of Los Angeles, the City Council in December 2013 adopted Ordinance No. 182824, effective January 1, 2014. The Ordinance ceased crediting prior Water and Power Employees Retirement Plan service for benefit calculation purposes under the Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System, although such service continued to count solely for eligibility to retire. The Coalition of City of Los Angeles Unions, which includes the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and several other organizations representing Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System members, demanded bargaining. The City provided information but refused formal meet and confer obligations.

LA ERB Ruling

The Coalition filed unfair employee relations practice charges. After extensive hearings the Employee Relations Board concluded that the City possessed no duty to bargain the underlying decision to suspend reciprocity yet retained a clear duty to bargain the effects of that decision. Those effects included disability retirement calculations, retiree health subsidies, protected leave return rights, and transfer practices. The Board ordered the City to meet and confer in good faith over those subjects. It further ordered the City to make whole any Coalition represented employee who sustained losses, including reduced pension or other benefits, from January 1, 2014, until the parties reached agreement or impasse or the Coalition failed to bargain in good faith. The Board also directed the City to cease and desist from applying the post 2013 Administrative Code provisions governing treatment of Water and Power Employees Retirement Plan service until that bargaining obligation was satisfied.

Superior Court Ruling

The trial court denied the City petition for writ of mandate and granted the Coalition cross petition seeking enforcement. The court further awarded the Coalition attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The City appealed both the judgment and the fee order. On appeal the City conceded its duty to engage in effects bargaining yet challenged only the remedy. It argued that the Employee Relations Board lacked statutory authority to order make whole relief, that the particular remedy failed to restore the status quo and conflicted with other provisions of law, that the order was vague and overbroad, that it violated separation of powers principles, and that the fee award was improper.

Court of Appeal Ruling

The Court of Appeal rejected each contention. It first held that Employee Relations Ordinance section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), which authorizes the Board to perform such other duties as may be necessary to carry out its responsibilities, empowers the Board to award retroactive make whole relief. The court reasoned that local rules implementing the Meyers Milias Brown Act must remain consistent with the policies of that Act. Government Code section 3509, subdivision (d), expressly grants the Employee Relations Board power to issue determinations and orders it deems necessary consistent with and pursuant to the policies of the Meyers Milias Brown Act. The Public Employment Relations Board has long recognized that make whole relief serves the dual purposes of compensating employees for harm caused by an unfair practice and deterring future violations. Because the Employee Relations Board interpretation of its remedial authority was not clearly erroneous, the court deferred to it.

The court next confirmed that make whole relief constitutes an appropriate and customary remedy for effects bargaining violations. Effects bargaining stands on equal footing with decision bargaining. Both protect the principle of bilateralism that forms the centerpiece of the Meyers Milias Brown Act. The usual remedy directs the employer to bargain over effects and awards limited back pay, understood to encompass all forms of economic loss including reduced pension and medical benefits, until the parties reach agreement or impasse. The Employee Relations Board remedy in this case tracked that established framework. The make whole obligation terminated upon completion of the bargaining process. The court distinguished the earlier decision in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. City of Los Angeles, 109 Cal. App. 5th 179 (2025), which held that employees possessed no vested contractual right to continued reciprocity. Absence of a vested right does not eliminate the distinct statutory right under the Meyers Milias Brown Act to bargain the effects of terminating reciprocity and to receive interim relief that restores the parties as nearly as practicable to the position they occupied when the bargaining duty arose.

This distinction is critical for bargaining rights over pension changes. Public employers frequently retain the unilateral right to alter retirement plan design, contribution rates, or reciprocal arrangements so long as those changes do not impair vested contractual rights. The Court of Appeal made clear that the absence of a vested right does not extinguish the concurrent duty under the Meyers Milias Brown Act to meet and confer over the effects of such changes on represented employees. Pension calculations, service credit recognition, disability retirement eligibility, and retiree medical subsidies all fall within the scope of effects bargaining when a nonnegotiable decision foreseeably impacts them. The make whole remedy, which can include the difference between the pension benefits employees would have received and the benefits they actually received, remains available until the employer satisfies that bargaining obligation. Because the Court of Appeal grounded its analysis in the policies of the Meyers Milias Brown Act rather than in unique features of the Los Angeles Employee Relations Ordinance, the reasoning applies with equal force to every public agency and exclusive representative subject to the Act.

The court found no separation of powers violation. The remedy did not compel the City Council to enact or rescind legislation. It merely maintained the economic status quo on a temporary basis until the City satisfied its statutory bargaining obligation. Nor was the cease and desist directive vague or overbroad. The order identified the clear category of post 2013 Administrative Code provisions governing treatment of Water and Power Employees Retirement Plan service for employees moving into Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System covered positions. Read in light of the Board findings identifying the specific effects subjects, the order provided sufficient notice of the conduct enjoined.

Finally, the court upheld the attorney fee award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Coalition was the successful party because it achieved the core objectives of securing an effects bargaining order and make whole relief. The litigation enforced an important public right, namely compliance with the duty to bargain under the Meyers Milias Brown Act, and conferred a significant benefit on a large class of City employees and on other bargaining units that may confront similar unilateral changes. The Coalition is likewise entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.

State-wide Impacts

Although the Employee Relations Board exercises jurisdiction only within the City of Los Angeles, a Court of Appeal decision that construes the Meyers Milias Brown Act itself benefits all public employee organizations operating under that statute. The Public Employment Relations Board and reviewing courts consistently look to appellate interpretations of the Act when resolving effects bargaining disputes. This decision reinforces that pension related impacts remain fully subject to effects bargaining even when the underlying decision to change a retirement system is nonnegotiable. It further confirms that make whole relief measured by the difference in pension benefits is an ordinary and available remedy designed both to compensate employees and to restore the parties to a more balanced bargaining position. Unions throughout California therefore gain a clearer statement of the rights their members hold when employers alter reciprocal service credit arrangements, contribution formulas, or related retirement features without first addressing the foreseeable effects.

Public employee unions and their members should take careful note of the temporal limits the court endorsed. Make whole relief is not permanent restoration of reciprocity. It functions as a temporary bridge that preserves bargaining leverage and compensates for delay caused by the employer unlawful refusal. Associations therefore should remember to request effects bargaining promptly when management announces nonnegotiable changes that will foreseeably affect retirement service credit, disability benefits, leave rights, or transfer opportunities. Failure to request bargaining or to bargain in good faith can terminate the make whole period. Conversely, employers that ignore the duty face the prospect of years of retroactive liability measured from the date employees first experience harm.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and the attorney fees orders. Although the opinion is not certified for publication, its careful synthesis of Employee Relations Board authority, Public Employment Relations Board remedial doctrine, and the policies of the Meyers Milias Brown Act will inform future disputes involving effects bargaining over pension and benefit changes throughout California. 

Conclusion

Where management retains unilateral authority to alter certain arrangements, associations should prepare written demands for effects bargaining and document the economic consequences that will flow from any suspension. The make whole remedy affirmed in this case supplies a potent tool for restoring balance when that duty is ignored.

A Narrow Reading with Wide Consequences: The California Supreme Court Limits Leave Cashout Credit Under PEPRA

Every public safety professional who has banked unused leave across a long career understands the quiet promise embedded in that ledger. Those hours represent time not taken with family, shifts covered for colleagues, and holidays spent in uniform. The expectation has always been that those hours would count when the pension calculation finally arrived. On July 27, 2026, the California Supreme Court unsettled that expectation for legacy members of the state’s county retirement systems. In Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Ass'n v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Ass'n of Ventura County, No. S283978 (Cal. July 27, 2026) (“Ventura”), the Court held that the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (“PEPRA”) bars a retiring employee from counting leave cashouts above the annual limit fixed by the terms of employment, even when the employee designates a final compensation period that spans two calendar years. The decision affirms the Court of Appeal (see 98 Cal.App.5th 1119 (2024)), and it deserves the close attention of every association that negotiates leave and retirement terms on behalf of California’s peace officers, public sector attorneys, and other impacted public sector employees.

The Issue the Court Decided

The dispute turned on a single sentence in Government Code section 31461(b)(2). That provision excludes from compensation earnable any payment for unused leave “in an amount that exceeds that which may be earned and payable in each 12-month period during the final average salary period, regardless of when reported or paid.” (Cal. Gov’t Code § 31461(b)(2).) The retirement system read the phrase to incorporate the annual cashout cap set by an employee’s terms of employment, so that a member who may cash out 200 hours in a calendar year cannot inflate that figure by straddling two calendar years within a single final compensation window. The employee associations read the same phrase to permit inclusion of every hour cashed out during the elected final compensation period, subject only to what the period itself allowed. The Court adopted the retirement system’s reading and confirmed that section 31461(b)(2) caps includable cashouts at the annual allowance no matter how the final compensation period is drawn.

The facts illustrate the stakes with unusual clarity. The retired member accrued 368.16 hours of leave each year, and his terms of employment permitted him to cash out 200 hours in any single calendar year. He designated October 10, 2019 through October 10, 2020 as his final compensation period, and within that window he cashed out 40 hours in December 2019 and another 200 hours in February 2020, for a total of 240 hours. He asked the system to include all 240 hours in his final compensation. The system included only 200, and the Supreme Court agreed that the 40 additional hours fell outside compensation earnable because they exceeded the annual allowance that governed a single calendar year per the terms of his employment.

The Court Conceded Ambiguity and Then Resolved It Against the Member

The most consequential feature of the opinion is not the result but the route the Court traveled to reach it. The Court did not hold that the statute plainly compelled the retirement system’s position. It acknowledged instead that the system’s construction “may not be the most immediately obvious or intuitive reading of the statutory text,” and it described that construction as merely “plausible.” (Ventura, slip op. at p. 22.) Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal had likewise found the language ambiguous. Confronting genuine ambiguity, the Court turned to legislative purpose and concluded that “[c]onsiderations of statutory purpose conclusively resolve the issue” in the retirement system’s favor because the competing reading would reopen the door to the pension spiking that the Legislature enacted the statute to close. (Id. at p. 23.)

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Guerrero underscored the divergence from the actual text. She wrote to explain that the majority’s interpretation is not apparent on the face of the statute, that the ordinary use of the word “during” is inconsistent with the majority’s construction, and that the reading survives only because a latent ambiguity emerges once the statute’s anti-spiking purpose is considered. (Ventura, Guerrero, C.J., concurring op. at pp. 2-4.) Her concurrence is candid confirmation that the words the Legislature chose pointed one way while the result points another.

The Court’s analytical move carries real significance for public employees because it required the Court to set aside a rule that has long favored pensioners. For decades, California courts have construed pension statutes liberally and resolved ambiguities in favor of the applicant. (See Barrett v. Stanislaus Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass'n (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) The employee associations pressed that principle here, and it pointed squarely toward the broader reading. The Court answered that liberal construction “must be consistent with the clear language and purpose of the statute,” and it held that the pensioner favoring canon must yield here because it conflicts with the Legislature’s overarching anti-spiking design. (See Ventura Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Bd. of Ret. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 490.) In other words, the tie no longer runs to the employee once a court identifies a countervailing legislative purpose, and pension spiking supplies a purpose that a reviewing court can invoke across a wide range of compensation disputes.

Why the Reasoning Matters Beyond Leave Cashouts

The holding governs a discrete question about leave cashouts in a final compensation period that straddles two calendar years, yet its method reaches much further. PEPRA is a sprawling statute enacted quickly, and many of its provisions have given rise to disputes and are likely to continue doing so in the future. Every one of those provisions is now subject to interpretation under the framework this Ventura decision reaffirms, and that framework instructs courts to consult the anti-spiking purpose whenever the words admit more than one reasonable meaning. A retirement association that wishes to exclude a category of pay will attempt to frame inclusion as a potential avenue for spiking, and after this decision, that framing will carry substantial weight. Members should therefore expect systems to press expansive exclusions in future disputes over on-call pay, specialty premiums, uniform and equipment allowances, and other items whose treatment PEPRA did not spell out with precision.

The decision also weakens a tool that member advocates have relied upon for a generation. When a pension statute was ambiguous, the liberal construction canon gave employees a thumb on the scale, and it often proved decisive in close cases. This opinion subordinates that canon to legislative purpose and thereby shifts the balance of interpretive advantage toward the systems in exactly the situations where the statute is least clear. Associations litigating future ambiguities will need to build their arguments on text and structure rather than on the presumption that ambiguity favors the applicant, because the Court has now signaled that the presumption gives way whenever the anti-spiking rationale is available. 

The Signal to the Legislature

The opinion carries a further lesson for those who shape pension policy in Sacramento. The Court repeatedly grounded its reading in the practical concerns of plan administration and funding, observing that the retirement system’s interpretation allows counties to anticipate their obligations rather than absorb liabilities that swing between one hundred and two hundred percent of the annual cashout limit depending on how a member elects a final compensation period. (Ventura, slip op. at p. 24.) Legislation should be assessed against this backdrop in which courts will fill statutory gaps with cost containment and anti-spiking assumptions rather than with the older presumption favoring the pensioner. If the Legislature intends a benefit to be included, it will need to say so with precision, because ambiguity will no longer be construed generously in the member’s favor. Associations that seek legislative clarification of favorable treatment for particular pay items should draft proposed amendments with that reality in mind and should not assume that silence or generality will be read to their advantage.

What This Means for Your Members

The immediate practical consequence is straightforward. Legacy members who plan to cash out substantial accrued leave near retirement can no longer increase their final compensation by designating a final compensation period that reaches into a second calendar year in order to stack two annual allowances. The annual cap set by the terms of employment now controls the entire 12-month final compensation period regardless of when it falls in relation to calendar years. Associations should review their memoranda of understanding and their members’ retirement planning materials so that no member approaches retirement expecting credit for cashouts that this decision now excludes.

The larger consequence is strategic. This case reflects a determined and well-resourced effort to secure the broader reading for public employees. Nevertheless, that effort did not prevail before the state’s highest court despite thoughtful advocacy and a serious textual argument that even the Chief Justice found more faithful to the statute’s words. The outcome confirms that the interpretive terrain has shifted and that future gains for members will come from careful bargaining and precise legislative drafting rather than from favorable canons of construction. We stand ready to help our client associations reassess their leave and retirement provisions, to model the effect of this ruling on individual members nearing retirement, and to press for the statutory clarity that will protect the benefits our public safety professionals have earned through decades of service.

When the Verdict Second Guesses the Officer: Appellate Reversal Affirms Officers’ Right to Defend Themselves

Every officer who has ever cleared a doorway understands the arithmetic of a fraction of a second. The decision to use force is made in the moment, on the information then available, against a threat that does not pause to let anyone deliberate. California law honors that reality, yet officers know that courtrooms and juries are frequently invited to second-guess split-second decisions against a leisurely reconstruction that no officer on the scene ever had. A recent Texas reversal of a verdict against an officer illustrates the point. The court’s reasoning is a timely reminder of the constitutional and statutory protections that govern peace officers in California. Although the decision is not binding here, its reasoning is persuasive in holding that a conviction built on hindsight analysis cannot survive when the governing standard is properly applied.

A Dangerous Encounter

In an appeal decided by a Texas appellate court, a police officer had responded with three colleagues to a report that a man was roaming the halls of a downtown building with a knife held to his own throat and threatening suicide. The officers were told the man had a history of mental health crises and was on an upper floor with a large kitchen knife. When the officers reached that floor by elevator, the man was facing a mirror with the knife at his throat. When the doors opened, he turned toward the officers, reoriented the knife away from himself and toward them, and advanced in close quarters while ignoring the commands shouted at him. The officers fired, and the man died. The officer was convicted of a firearm offense and sentenced to prison, notwithstanding testimony from fellow officers that they would not have acted differently, expert testimony that the use of force was justified, and the conclusion of the department’s own investigators that the conduct did not warrant criminal charges. The appellate court reversed and rendered a judgment of acquittal, holding that the prosecution never carried its burden of disproving justification once the objective evidence was examined at the only moment that mattered. Taylor v. State, 729 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App. 2025).

Reviewing the body worn camera footage, it found that the officers were confined with no meaningful avenue of retreat, that the man turned toward them and advanced with the knife oriented in their direction, and that this presented an immediate and potentially lethal threat. The prosecution’s theory, by contrast, rested almost entirely on what the officers supposedly should have done differently, including waiting, using the stairs, or relying on less lethal options.

The court held that this evidence, even if accepted in full, did not answer the dispositive question, because it showed at most that different decisions could have been made. As the court explained, could have, would have, and should have do not disprove justification, and tactical misjudgments or hindsight critiques do not render an otherwise reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force unreasonable. The court further rejected the notion that a subject who advances with a weapon is demonstrating compliance, holding that the law does not require officers to treat such conduct as surrender or to wait until an attack is completed before responding. Finally, it observed that a mental health crisis is dynamic, so that a person who is a danger only to himself in one moment may become an immediate threat to others in the next, and that reasonableness is measured on what the officer perceived at the moment force was used rather than on earlier assurances or missed opportunities to de-escalate.

The California Framework

California officers enjoy the same core protection, secured by both the federal Constitution and state statute. As the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, the reasonableness of a use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight, and the analysis must make allowance for the fact that officers are forced to make split second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. That inquiry turns on whether the person confronting the officer posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.

The Legislature wrote these principles into Penal Code Section 835a, which states that the decision to use force be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation, based on the totality of the circumstances known to or perceived by the officer at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight, and it expressly accounts for the reality that officers must sometimes make quick judgments about using force. The statute permits deadly force when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. A threat is imminent when a reasonable officer would believe the person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury, a harm that must be instantly confronted rather than a mere fear of future harm. The same section confirms that an officer need not retreat and is not rendered an aggressor, nor deprived of the right of self-defense, by using objectively reasonable force.

California courts have applied this framework with a clear eye toward the dangers of hindsight analysis. Applying AB 392, Koussaya v. City of Stockton, (2020) 54 Cal. App. 5th 909, confirmed that the reasonableness of force is still judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than hindsight, and the standard provides deference to the split second decisions of an officer who, unlike a private citizen, is charged with acting affirmatively and using force. Critically, so long as an officer’s conduct falls within the range of conduct that is reasonable under the circumstances, there is no requirement that the officer choose the most reasonable available action or the conduct least likely to cause harm.

California decisions confronting the knife wielding advancer have reached the same conclusion the Texas court reached, holding that where deadly force is otherwise justified there is no constitutional duty to use less forceful or non-deadly alternatives first, and that the proper inquiry is whether the officer acted reasonably, not whether some less intrusive alternative was theoretically available. Martinez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (1996). The focus remains on the vantage of the reasonable officer, not on the after the fact opinions of bystanders who did not perceive a threat.

Why a No Reasonable Alternative Standard Cannot Be Squared With the Constitution

This settled framework is the measure against which the earlier legislative proposals to rewrite California’s deadly force law must be judged. As those proposals were originally introduced, they would have gone considerably further than any jury in the case discussed above, restricting an officer’s use of deadly force to circumstances in which it was strictly necessary and in which no reasonable alternative existed. Such a standard would unreasonably invite the factfinder to convict an officer whenever some other course could later be described as available. Representing the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), our firm opposed that approach because it would have transformed the objective reasonable officer inquiry into an impossible mandate to exhaust every conceivable option before acting. In holding such a standard unconstitutional, our Ninth Circuit has recognized, “(r)equiring officers to find and choose the least intrusive alternative would require them to exercise superhuman judgment. Scott v. Henrich (9th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 912, 915.” Our firm was privileged to assist the law enforcement advocacythat ultimately helped secure the amendments to Assembly Bill 392 that removedthe most punitive features of the introduced language and preserved thereasonable officer standard in the law as enacted.  

The reversal of the Texas conviction reenforces the point that such a standard, had it been enacted in California as introduced, would be constitutionally infirm. A criminal conviction may rest only on evidence from which a rational factfinder could find every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and in a justification case that necessarily includes proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer did not reasonably believe force was necessary in the moment.

A no reasonable alternative standard collapses that inquiry. It permits conviction not because the officer’s real time perception was unreasonable, but because a prosecutor, working backward from a known outcome, can always describe another path not taken. The Texas court rejected this reasoning when it held that could have and should have do not disprove justification. It is also precisely what California law already forecloses, because there is no constitutional duty to resort to the least forceful alternative where deadly force is justified. An officer is not required to select the least harmful option to avoid liability. A statute or instruction that made the availability of a hypothetical alternative dispositive would nullify those protections and convert the reasonable officer standard into a strict liability regime, judged in the calm of a courtroom rather than from the position of the officer on the scene. Koussaya, supra. 

When jurors are told to ask whether any reasonable alternative existed, and to measure that question against a reconstruction assembled after the danger has passed, they are no longer deciding whether the officer’s belief was reasonable at the instant of the threat. They are grading the officer against an idealized response that the moment never permitted. That is the very danger the reasonable officer standard exists to prevent, because it refuses to let a sanitized reconstruction assembled after the fact displace the dangerous and rapidly evolving reality the officer actually confronted. An instruction that operationalizes hindsight in this way threatens the due process guarantee that a conviction rest on proof of an actual element of the offense, and it departs from the constitutional command of Graham that force be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than hindsight.  

It is worth emphasizing that the deadly force statute the Legislature ultimately enacted, as shaped by the amendments described above, stopped far short of the standard the original proposals contemplated. Section 835a expresses the intent that officers use deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life and that they use other available resources and techniques, but it qualifies that expectation by requiring only what is reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer, and it preserves throughout the reasonable officer perspective and the rejection of hindsight. SB 230 also codifies the legal definition of "feasible” is defined as "reasonably capable of being done or carried out under the circumstances to successfully achieve the arrest or lawful objective without increasing risk to the officer or another person." (emphasis added.)  This definition clarifies that tactics increasing the risk to officers are not "feasible." 

In other words, the enacted law retains the constitutional anchor that the introduced version would have disgaurded. That distinction is the difference between a statute that channels officer discretion and one that would punish officers for failing to achieve a perfection the law has never demanded.

Practical Significance of Taylor for California Officers

For officers and the agencies that stand behind them, several lessons follow. Justification is assessed on the threat as it reasonably appeared at the instant of the decision, and neither a prosecutor nor a jury may substitute a menu of tactical alternatives for proof that the officer’s belief was unreasonable. A subject who advances with a weapon and disregards commands is not demonstrating compliance merely because no blow has yet landed, and officers are not required to absorb the first strike before responding. Prior information that a person is troubled or suicidal does not freeze the threat assessment, because the encounter is judged as it evolves. Where objective evidence such as body worn camera footage confirms the threat, that evidence can be decisive. And under existing California law, an officer who acts within the range of reasonable conduct has no separate duty to have chosen the least forceful option that a later critic might prefer.