Ninth Circuit Ruling Confirms Constitutional Limits on State Regulation of Federal Law Enforcement Operations

The Ninth Circuit enjoined California’s attempt to regulate federal officers, affirming Supremacy Clause protections PORAC warned were at stake. 

California State Senator Scott Wiener authored and championed Senate Bill 627, known as the No Secret Police Act, along with its companion legislation, Senate Bill 805, the No Vigilantes Act. Enacted on September 20, 2025, in direct response to the federal government’s expanded immigration enforcement operations, these bills were presented as efforts to promote greater transparency and prevent so-called “secret police” tactics by prohibiting law enforcement officers from wearing facial coverings and requiring non-uniformed officers to visibly display identification while performing their duties. Unfortunitly, Senator Weiner chose to extend these restrictions to California's peace officers, who have no role in immigation enfrocement.  

In a decisive opinion issued April 22, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the United States an injunction pending appeal in United States v. State of California, No. 26-926. The panel, speaking through Judge Bennett, enjoined the State of California, Governor Gavin Newsom, and Attorney General Rob Bonta from enforcing Section 10 of the No Vigilantes Act—codified at California Penal Code § 13654—against federal agencies and officers. That provision requires non-uniformed federal law enforcement officers to visibly display agency identification, including a name or badge number or both, while performing enforcement duties, subject to misdemeanor penalties for willful violations. The court held that the statute impermissibly attempts to regulate the United States directly in the performance of its sovereign governmental functions, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning rests on foundational precedent. States lack authority to impose operational mandates on federal officers that interfere with the execution of federal duties, even when the legislation is framed as generally applicable. The panel emphasized that the Supremacy Clause shields federal operations from such state interference. The remaining preliminary-injunction factors—irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest—likewise favored the United States. Accordingly, the injunction remains in force pending further proceedings.

This ruling powerfully confirms the advocacy of the Peace Officers Research Association of Californiaand the testimony David E. Mastagni delivered on behalf of  PORAC before the California Senate Public Safety Committee on September 11, 2025, in opposition to Senate Bill 627, the so-called No Secret Police Act, and related measures. At that hearing, Mr. Mastagni warned that legislation of this character was blatantly unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause when applied to federal officers. He explained that the bills could not lawfully regulate federal law enforcement activities yet their severability clauses would leave California’s local peace officers to bear the full brunt of poorly drafted, reactionary restrictions. Despite this ruling, California officers, who play no role in federal immigration enforcement, still face impaired operational flexibility, compromised safety protocols, and the unwarranted stripping of essential immunities, all while the federal government secured an easy victory in court.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision carries immediate and substantial implications for Senate Bill 627. Although the opinion addresses the identification mandate in the No Vigilantes Act, its Supremacy Clause and intergovernmental-immunity analysis applies with equal force to SB 627’s prohibitions on facial coverings by law enforcement officers. The district court had already preliminarily enjoined enforcement of those provisions against federal officers, a ruling California elected not to appeal. The district court found no Supremcy Clause violation, but held the exclusion of Califoria State officers violated intergovernmental immunities by discriminating againt federal officers. 

Following the district court’s earlier ruling, Senator Wiener publicly cheered the decision as “very good news” in light of the judge’s conclusion that “masking is not necessary for law enforcement.” In the same vein, he described the ruling as “a huge win,” asserting that California possessed the power to ban federal agents from wearing masks and that the only adjustment required was to extend the prohibition equally to state officers. He  moved quickly to introduce SB 1004 to extend the facial covering ban to state officers. 

However, the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent analysis demonstrates the futrility of SB 1004, as the core constitutional defects run far deeper than any drafting fix can cure. Extending these operational mandates to more California officers will only compound SB 6727's harm to California’s public safety officers. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s clear articulation of the governing SUpremecy Clause principles, any remaining uncertainty regarding SB 627’s application to federal operations has effectively been resolved in favor of federal supremacy. Notwithstanding the facial neutrality of the statute, it directly regulates how federal agencies conduct their operations and therefore cannot stand as applied to them.

For California’s state and local peace officers, however, the consequences are far less favorable. The severability clauses embedded in these measures ensure that the restrictions, narrow and vaguely worded exceptions, criminal penalties, and—most troubling—the wholesale stripping of critical civil immunities remain fully operative against them. Officers confronting legitimate needs for facial coverings in gang-related operations, riot control, hazardous-materials scenes, or protective details now operate under the constant threat of personal liability and loss of protections long afforded by statutes such as Penal Code §§ 836, 847, and Government Code §§ 820.2, 820.4, and 821.6. The “knowing and willful” standard, as Mr. Mastagni carefully explained in his testimony, attaches to the act of covering one’s face rather than to any intent to violate the law, thereby eliminating good-faith mistake defenses and exposing officers to statutory damages of at least $10,000 even in the absence of actual harm.

In the midst of California’s ongoing law-enforcement staffing crisis, these burdens exacerbate recruitment and retention challenges and chill proactive policing. Public safety unions and their members have long understood that legislation born of political impulse rather than careful drafting ultimately harms the very officers charged with protecting our communities. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling should serve as a cautionary signal to the Legislature that further efforts to extend similar operational mandates against federal officers will will meet the same constitutional fate, i.e. only land on state and local officers and further compromise officer safety and effectiveness.

Mastagni Holstedt's representation of PORAC and California’s public safety unions remains unwavering. We will continue to monitor this litigation closely and support constitutionally sound policies that enhance rather than undermine the ability of law enforcement to perform their vital duties. 

California Court of Appeal Rules Public Safety Union Did Not Waive Right to Bargain Over Outsourcing

    In a published opinion that will resonate throughout California’s public safety labor community, the Court of Appeal has reversed a trial court decision and ruled that the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association retained its statutory right to meet and confer over the County’s plan to outsource security work to a private contractor. Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association v. County of Los Angeles (2026) B338182 (certified for publication April 10, 2026), held that the union did not clearly and unmistakably waive its right to bargain over the County’s decision to transfer bargaining-unit security work to a private contractor.

    The dispute centered on Article 16 of the parties’ Memorandum of Understanding, titled “Employee Rights in the Event of Transfer of Functions.” That article provided, in pertinent part:

“In the event the County enters into any agreement with another public employer or private entity which involves the transfer of functions now being performed by employees in this representation Unit or the law provides for the transfer of functions now being performed by employees in this Unit to another public or private agency, the County will advise such public or private entity of the existence and terms of this Memorandum of Understanding and will immediately advise PPOA of such agreement or law. In addition, the County will consult with the employer absorbing a County function to encourage utilization of affected employees by the new employer. When a Department’s Request for Proposal is approved by the Chief Executive Officer, the Labor Relations Office will arrange to meet with representatives of PPOA to advise them of this action within five (5) days.

When advance knowledge of the impact of pending changes in function, organization, or operations is available which will result in the abolishment of positions or when there is any major reassignment of functions from one department to another or to another agency, Management will make an intensive effort to either reassign or transfer affected employees to other position for which they qualify, or train affected employees for new positions in order to retain their services.

It is understood and agreed that Management shall have no obligation to negotiate the decision of any reorganization by the County during the life of this agreement.”

    When the County announced its intention to contract out security services at the Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration, it refused the union’s request to meet and confer on the decision itself. The County asserted that the final sentence of Article 16 constituted a waiver of any obligation to negotiate the decision of any reorganization, which it interpreted to include outsourcing.

    The appellate court carefully examined both the contract language and the governing legal standard under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. It reaffirmed that outsourcing decisions affecting terms and conditions of employment constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. The court reiterated that any claimed waiver of a union’s bargaining rights must be clear and unmistakable. After reviewing the full context of the Memorandum of Understanding provisions, the court concluded that neither the transfer-of-functions language nor the general reorganization clause satisfied this demanding standard.

    The court explained that the notice and consultation provisions in Article 16, while addressing the consequences of a transfer, say nothing about waiving the statutory right to meet and confer. The court further observed that the management rights clause’s reference to “any reorganization” is vague and ambiguous. It could reasonably be read to memorialize only the County’s right under Government Code section 3504 to make fundamental management decisions, such as internal reorganizations or layoffs, without bargaining. The clause does not expressly mention outsourcing or the statutory meet-and-confer obligation.

    The decision underscores a principle of enduring importance in public sector labor law. General management rights clauses serve to preserve traditional managerial prerogatives rather than to operate as silent waivers of the duty to bargain over matters such as subcontracting that directly impact wages, hours, and working conditions. Silence or ambiguous language is insufficient to relinquish important statutory protections. In the court’s view, the County simply failed to carry its burden to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable waiver under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding.

    This ruling therefore provides valuable guidance for public safety unions negotiating memoranda of understanding throughout the state. Agencies will frequently attempt to rely on broad contract language to bypass the meet-and-confer process on critical issues such as outsourcing. PERB is in accord, scrutinizing such claims rigorously and requiring explicit, unmistakable waiver language before finding that a union has surrendered its rights.

    California public employee unions can take confidence from the outcome, which reinforces the fundamental protections of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and serves as a timely reminder that vigilant negotiation and careful review of proposed contract terms remain essential to safeguarding bargaining-unit work.

To read the Court's full Opinion, click here. 

AB 1564 Advances to Protect Confidential Union Communications for California Public Safety Officers

Assembly Bill 1564 (Ahrens), sponsored by the Peace Officers Research Association of California, protects confidential communications between public sector union representatives and their members relating to matters within the scope of representation. The legislation codifies longstanding Public Employment Relations Board precedents, including William S. Hart Union High School District (2018) PERB Decision No. 2595 and County of Merced (2014) PERB Decision No. 2361-M. 

The bill establishes that it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer to question a public employee, a representative of a recognized employee organization, or an exclusive representative regarding communications made in confidence between an employee and the representative in connection with representation relating to any matter within the scope of the recognized employee organization’s representation. This protection covers grievances, disciplinary proceedings, and working conditions. The bill has been previously introduced in prior sessions as AB 340 and AB 2421.

On March 18, 2026, David E. Mastagni of Mastagni Holstedt testified before the Assembly Committee on Public Employment and Retirement, which advanced AB 1564 with bipartisan support. During his testimony, David responded directly to critics of the bill explaining the bill safeguards only those secondhand representational discussions that possess no legitimate evidentiary value yet serve only to chill protected activity and invade the essential trust in the representation relationship. The narrowly tailored legislation does not even create a new evidentiary privilege under the Evidence Code. 

Rather, he explained, it applies solely to public employers, and its violations are enforceable only as unfair labor practices through the Public Employment Relations Board. The protections do not extend to criminal investigations and does not supersede Government Code Section 3303. Public employers remain free to question any percipient witness about the facts of an incident or firsthand observations. 

Critics, including certain school administrators and local government employers, have suggested that the bill would hinder workplace investigations or conflict with obligations such as those arising under AB 218, which extends time for childhood sexual assault victims to file civil claims. These concerns are unfounded. AB 218 addresses statutes of limitations in civil litigation and does not dictate or restrict legitimate investigative tactics. Public employers, including schools, may still interview any witnesses who possess firsthand knowledge of alleged events, ensuring that investigations remain robust and thorough. 

AB 1564 protects only representation-related communications, such as pre-interview advice or grievance strategy discussions between an employee and union representative. Compelling disclosure of such secondhand information would unlawfully deputize union representatives to impeach their own members, eroding the core functions of employee organizations and undermining employee willingness to seek candid guidance.

California public employees deserve the assurance that they can communicate fully and frankly with their union representatives without fear of employer intrusion. The measure strengthens the foundational trust between public employees, their unions, and their employers while preserving legitimate investigative authority where it truly matters.

The bill continues to draw increasing attention as it advances through the Legislature, including recent media coverage by the Sacramento Bee quoting partner David E. Mastagni in relation to his testimony at the capitol.

Mastagni Holstedt, APC is proud to have assisted in the drafting of this important legislation and will continue to monitor the progress of AB 1564 closely as it moves through the legislative process. This bill represents a significant step forward in reinforcing the protection of representation rights in California. 

You can also view David E. Mastagni's testimony at this link. 

SB 1105 Could Undermine California's Most Effective Public Safety Partnerships

California peace officers have long relied on seamless interagency cooperation to confront the most dangerous threats facing our communities. A new proposal now before the Legislature, SB 1105 authored by Senator Sasha Renée Pérez, imperials public safety. Although the bill is framed as a safeguard against racial profiling and a protector of constitutional rights, its actual provisions would fracture the collaborative networks that have repeatedly delivered results in human trafficking investigations, illegal firearms interdictions, child abductions, fentanyl suppression, and counterterrorism planning. The consequences will be preventable harm to Californians.

The legislation would impose two structural barriers that are incompatible with the realities of modern law enforcement. It would bar California agencies from any joint task force or interagency agreement involving a federal or out-of-state partner previously associated with certain conduct, regardless of whether the specific personnel or unit in question played any role in that earlier matter. In addition, the measure would require written approval from the Attorney General before any such operation could begin, with reauthorization mandated every two years. These blanket restrictions ignore the fluid, time-sensitive nature of investigations where delays of even hours can determine whether a victim is recovered alive or a network is dismantled before it claims more lives.

The practical effects are already clear. Task forces that have rescued numerous victims, including children, from human trafficking operations would face dissolution because of routine participation by federal partners. Partnerships that allow local agencies to trace and intercept illegal firearms through established federal tracing systems would be curtailed, leaving more prohibited weapons circulating in California communities. In abduction cases, where the first hours are decisive for survival, local officers would be forced to pause critical coordination while awaiting formal bureaucratic consent. Efforts to disrupt fentanyl distribution networks, which continue to claim thousands of Californians annually, would lose the integrated support that has proven essential to breaking supply chains.

These risks extend beyond daily operations to the security of major events on the horizon. California is scheduled to host the FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games, all of which represent high-profile targets for terrorism and transnational crime. Credible threats to venues such as the Rose Bowl would require instantaneous coordination with federal intelligence and joint terrorism resources. Under the terms of SB 1105, that coordination could be delayed or entirely blocked while agencies seek written approvals, creating vulnerabilities that minutes could otherwise prevent.

Beyond the operational disruptions, the bill would strip local departments of resources they cannot duplicate internally. Real-time national intelligence databases embedded federal expertise, advanced technical equipment, and the financial reimbursements that help offset local expenditures would all disappear from California operations. The legislation itself recognizes this burden by classifying the measure as a state-mandated local program, yet it offers no assurance that the state, already confronting significant budget pressures, will fully fund the resulting obligations. Unfunded mandates inevitably shift costs onto cities and counties, and ultimately onto the taxpayers who expect their public safety professionals to have every available tool.

It is important to note that California peace officers already operate under clear restrictions that prevent any involvement in federal immigration enforcement. SB 1105 would therefore change nothing in that arena. Instead, it would obstruct precisely the partnerships needed to address terrorism, violent crime, drug trafficking, and human exploitation. Criminal organizations thrive precisely because they exploit jurisdictional gaps, and the task force model was designed to close those gaps. This proposal would reopen them.

California law enforcement agencies and public safety employees should watch this legislation closely and start developing plans to mitigate the dangers posed by its enactment. 

Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh: A Timely Blueprint for California Public Safety Unions on Representation Rights in Witness Interviews

    California’s Public Employment Relations Board has steadily expanded representational protections under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act beyond classic disciplinary interrogations to encompass a broader range of employer meetings where employee statements may carry workplace consequences. This development intersects directly with the proposed decision issued by the Pennsylvania Public Labor Relations Board in Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 57 PPER ¶ 32 (Proposed Decision and Order, 2025). That ruling offers valuable guidance for California police and fire unions when members are summoned as witnesses in grievance arbitrations or related pre-hearing interviews, ensuring that the label of “witness” does not become a vehicle for intimidation or coercion.

    In the Pittsburgh case, Sergeant Jeffrey Tagmyer of the Pittsburgh Police Department was subpoenaed by his union, the Fraternal Order of Police, to testify in a disciplinary grievance arbitration on behalf of another officer. After the hearing was continued, the city arranged a pre-arbitration interview with an assistant solicitor. Tagmyer received a direct order from an assistant police chief to attend the meeting. He arrived accompanied by his union attorney, yet the solicitor refused to permit the attorney to participate. The solicitor repeatedly emphasized that Tagmyer faced no disciplinary exposure from his answers and was appearing solely as a witness. When Tagmyer and his counsel pressed for clarification on whether refusal to answer without representation could result in discipline for insubordination, the solicitor confirmed that it could and threatened to report Tagmyer to command staff as insubordinate if he declined to proceed unrepresented. The interview did not occur, and Tagmyer faced no discipline for his refusal. A later session ultimately allowed limited union presence.

    The Pennsylvania board’s hearing examiner rejected the claim that Tagmyer enjoyed Weingarten rights, concluding that the objective circumstances did not support a reasonable belief that the interview could lead to discipline against him personally. All communications had clearly identified him as a witness to events that did not directly implicate his own conduct. Nevertheless, the examiner found an independent violation of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act through coercive interference with protected rights. Participating as a union witness in a grievance arbitration constitutes protected concerted activity. The city impermissibly conditioned that protected participation on an unrepresented interview backed by the explicit threat of insubordination discipline. The solicitor’s statement that she preferred unfiltered answers without union “interference” provided no legitimate justification sufficient to override the chilling effect on protected activity.

    This distinction between the absence of classic Weingarten protections and the presence of coercive interference aligns closely with the trajectory of California PERB decisions. PERB has long held that representational rights arise not only in strictly investigatory interviews where discipline is reasonably feared but also in meetings that may significantly affect the employment relationship or where questioning carries foreseeable consequences, even absent an initial disciplinary label. Recent clarifications reinforce that a meeting styled as non-disciplinary can transform if the employer probes potential misconduct, that employees need not use magic words to request representation, and that employer assurances do not automatically eliminate a reasonable belief in potential adverse outcomes. In the public safety context, pre-hearing witness interviews conducted by internal affairs, command staff, city attorneys, or outside counsel frequently involve topics that could expose a member to impeachment risk, policy violations, or derivative scrutiny. PERB’s emphasis on substantive reality over formal labels means that California unions can invoke protections in precisely the circumstances the Pittsburgh decision identifies as coercive.

    California public safety unions should therefore treat every request for a member to appear as a witness in such settings with the same vigilance applied to disciplinary interviews. The union should promptly demand written confirmation of the interview’s purpose, the specific topics to be covered, the identity of the questioner, and whether attendance is compelled. Where compulsion is involved, the union must secure appropriate Garrity or Lybarger advisements and use restrictions in advance. A careful assessment of potential exposure is essential, focusing on any policy areas the member’s observations or actions might implicate, such as use of force, report writing, scene management, or chain-of-command obligations.

    Unions should anticipate and prepare for common employer tactics. When an employer asserts that representation is unnecessary because the session is merely a witness interview, the response should remind the employer that the reasonable-consequence standard governs and that representation will be present before any questioning proceeds. Once exposure is identified, the union should insist upon reasonable scheduling to permit a representative or counsel to attend and should place on the record that the member appears as a witness while invoking representation because of reasonably foreseeable employment consequences.

    When an employer delays or refuses to clarify compulsion or use protections, the union should insist that such advisements be provided before any potentially incriminating questions are posed. When an employer demands immediate commencement, the union should counter with the legal entitlement to reasonable delay for securing representation and propose specific alternative times.

    The Pittsburgh decision reinforces a principle that California public safety unions have long championed: employers may not convert protected participation in the grievance process into an opportunity for unrepresented, coercive questioning. By systematically invoking and exercising meaningful representation in witness interviews, unions protect individual members from intimidation while preserving the integrity of the collective bargaining relationship and the willingness of officers and firefighters to come forward as witnesses on behalf of their colleagues. Public safety unions and their members facing these recurring situations should consult experienced counsel promptly to evaluate the specific facts, preserve the record, and pursue any available remedies through PERB unfair practice proceedings. The firm remains committed to providing the strategic guidance necessary to safeguard these essential rights.

Conclusions:

Key Takeaways from Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 bearing directly on current California standards:

1. Witness status does not nullify representation rights. The label “witness” cannot be used to deny a reasonable request for union representation where the interview’s context or questioning could reasonably lead to adverse employment consequences.
2. Employer control of the interview has limits. While the employer may control who asks questions and the scope of inquiry, it may not exclude a union representative from meaningfully participating in ways reasonably necessary to protect the member’s interests, including clarifying questions, lodging objections to coercive tactics, and offering brief consultations.
3. No intimidation or coercion. The employer may not condition cooperation on waiver of representation or employ tactics that would reasonably deter an employee from invoking representation, including pretextual “witness-only” framing where potential exposure exists.
4. Process matters. Clear notice of purpose, respect for reasonable delays to secure representation, and preservation of the representative’s ability to advise are essential safeguards.
5. If the interview could foreseeably touch the member’s conduct, judgment, or compliance with policy—even as a bystander—the member may reasonably request representation. 
6. Pre-hearing witness interviews by Internal Affairs, command staff, city attorneys, or outside counsel, though framed as “fact-gathering,” often carry foreseeable employment consequences, including impeachment risk, policy-violation exposure, or derivative discipline.
7. Representational participation is meaningful, not ceremonial. California law, like the Pittsburgh proposed decision, recognizes that representation must permit real-time consultation and non-obstructive advocacy to prevent intimidation and preserve the integrity of the process. 

Parallels with California PERB’s Expanded Protections

    PERB’s recent decisions have emphasized substantive realities over labels. Meetings need not be styled as “disciplinary interrogations” to trigger representational rights where (a) the employee reasonably believes discipline could result, or (b) the employer’s questioning seeks information that could materially affect working conditions, job status, or future disciplinary exposure. In practice, this means:

1. If the interview could foreseeably touch the member’s conduct, judgment, or compliance with policy—even as a bystander—the member may reasonably request representation.
2. Pre-hearing witness interviews by Internal Affairs, command staff, city attorneys, or outside counsel, though framed as “fact-gathering,” often carry foreseeable employment consequences, including impeachment risk, policy-violation exposure, or derivative discipline.
3. Representational participation is meaningful, not ceremonial. California law, like the Pittsburgh proposed decision, recognizes that representation must permit real-time consultation and non-obstructive advocacy to prevent intimidation and preserve the integrity of the process