In the evolving landscape of police transparency laws, California's peace officers are facing a critical debate over what constitutes "great bodily injury" (GBI) under Penal Code Section 832.7. This provision, amended by Senate Bill 1421 in 2018, mandates the disclosure of personnel records related to use-of-force incidents that result in death or GBI. Without a clear statutory definition, agencies and courts have been left to interpret GBI, leading to a divide between broad and narrow views. A recent California Supreme Court ruling in In re Cabrera (2023) offers crucial guidance, suggesting GBI sets a higher bar than "serious bodily injury" (SBI), which could limit unnecessary disclosures and protect officer confidentiality.
The problem stems from SB 1421's push for accountability. Before the bill, officer records were largely confidential under Section 832.7(a), accessible only through Pitchess motions. Now, agencies must release records on specific misconduct, including force causing GBI, firearm discharges, sexual assault, or dishonesty. The lack of a GBI definition has sparked confusion. Some courts and transparency advocates favor a broad interpretation based on Penal Code Section 12022.7(f), which calls GBI a "significant or substantial physical injury" greater than minor or moderate harm. This could include bruises, lacerations, or abrasions—common in routine arrests.
Imagine an officer involved in a standard takedown where a suspect sustains a bruise or minor cut. Under a broad view, that incident's records might be disclosed via a Public Records Act request, overwhelming agencies with CPRA disclosures and inviting litigation. We've seen this play out in cases like People v. Cross (2008), where the Supreme Court held that GBI doesn't require permanent damage but can cover physical pain or contusions. Appellate decisions have upheld GBI for injuries like swollen jaws, sore ribs, or multiple bruises, as in People v. Corona (1989) or People v. Jaramillo (1979). Groups like the First Amendment Coalition argue this broadens transparency, aligning with the California Constitution's mandate to favor disclosure.
But this expansive approach creates real burdens. Agencies could be flooded with requests for records on everyday encounters, straining resources for redaction and review. For peace officers, it means more exposure, potentially chilling their ability to perform duties without fear of constant second-guessing.
Enter the narrower interpretation, which ties GBI to something at least as severe as SBI under Penal Code Section 243(f)(4). SBI includes loss of consciousness, concussions, bone fractures, wounds needing sutures, or serious disfigurement—harms that require medical intervention and pose substantial risks. Federal definitions in statutes like 18 U.S.C. Section 1365(h)(3) echo this, focusing on risks of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impaired function.
SB 1421's legislative history supports this view. Initially drafted with SBI, it switched to GBI to clarify a higher threshold, influenced by law enforcement groups. The ACLU even described the bill's intent as covering incidents where officers "seriously injure" the public. A broad GBI would undermine this by capturing relatively minor injuries and overwhelming departments with CPRA obligations.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Cabrera provides potentially game-changing relief. In that case, a defendant was convicted of battery with SBI (brief unconsciousness, a head laceration needing stitches, dizziness) but the jury deadlocked on GBI enhancements. The trial court imposed a GBI enhancement anyway, assuming SBI implied GBI. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that SBI and GBI are "essentially equivalent" but not interchangeable as a matter of law. Crucially, the Court noted that GBI requires a more demanding severity threshold. It cited examples like People v. Taylor (2004), where a bone fracture was SBI but not GBI because it was deemed moderate, and People v. Thomas (2019), involving a broken jaw with permanent damage—SBI yes, GBI no.
The Court emphasized that while overlaps exist, juries decide factually where injuries fall on a continuum. A hairline fracture might be SBI but not "significant or substantial" enough for GBI. This disapproved prior cases equating the two and essentially assumed that all GBI qualifies as SBI, but not vice versa. For Section 832.7, this means agencies may not have to disclose records unless injuries meet this elevated GBI standard, reducing the scope of mandatory releases.
The impacts for California law enforcement are profound. A narrower GBI interpretation eases administrative burdens, allowing agencies to focus on serious incidents rather than minor ones. It aligns disclosures with existing SBI reporting under Government Code Section 12525.2, promoting uniformity. For officers, it safeguards privacy in routine duties, preventing overbroad scrutiny that could deter necessary force. However, without appellate precedent directly on Section 832.7, superior courts have varied—some broadening GBI in non-binding rulings like Richmond Police Officers’ Association v. City of Richmond (2020).
Looking ahead, ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition's 2025 suit against San Diego over a beanbag and dog attack incident, will test Cabrera's application. Agencies currently apply varied standards for responding to GBI request. Peace officers and unions can now cite Cabrera to argue for narrower lens in court and push for legislative clarity, perhaps defining GBI akin to federal standards: substantial risk of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.
This debate highlights the tension in striking the proper balance between transparency and functionality. Mastagni Holstedt, APC has been at the forefront, representing PORAC in analyzing bills like SB 1421. For a deeper dive, look for David E. Mastagni's upcoming full-length article in the PORAC Law Enforcement News and Review, where he'll unpack court rulings, agency practices, and advocacy strategies in detail.
