Ninth Circuit Holds Officer’s Use of Less-Lethal Force That Injured Bystander During Protest Not Excessive

In Cheairs v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that an officer’s deployment of a blast ball during a chaotic protest, which injured a nearby bystander, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscores the challenges officers face in managing volatile crowds and highlights key considerations for use-of-force policies in public safety operations.

Background

The case stems from protests in Seattle following George Floyd’s death in 2020. On June 7, demonstrators escalated actions by breaching police barricades, throwing projectiles, shining lasers at officers, and threatening to burn precincts. Seattle Police Department officers, equipped with less-lethal munitions like OC blast balls, issued multiple dispersal orders and warnings via public address.

Officer Carl Anderson, leading the chemical agent response team, threw several blast balls to protect officers and disperse the crowd. One device bounced off the pavement and struck Taylor Cheairs, a bystander filming from the sidewalk near the front of the protesters. Cheairs suffered serious injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and First Amendment retaliation.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Cheairs appealed.

Legal Ruling

The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Cheairs was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. Citing Torres v. Madrid, the court noted that force applied with intent to restrain can constitute a seizure. Here, a jury could find the blast ball’s use manifested such intent, given its design and deployment.

Turning to reasonableness, the court applied the Graham v. Connor factors: severity of the crime, immediate threat to safety, and resistance or evasion. The most critical factor—immediate threat—weighed heavily in favor of the officer. Video evidence showed protesters near Cheairs assaulting officers with rocks, bottles, fireworks, and lasers amid escalating violence. The crowd ignored dispersal orders, creating probable cause for arrests related to assault or failure to disperse.

The court balanced the intrusion (serious injury from a less-lethal device) against the government’s interest in protecting officers, citizens, and property. Officer Anderson followed department policy, throwing the device at the ground rather than at head height, reducing lethality risk. Under the totality of circumstances, viewed from the officer’s on-scene perspective, the force was deemed reasonable.

On the First Amendment claim, Cheairs failed to show retaliation for filming. No evidence indicated Officer Anderson knew Cheairs was recording or targeted him; the officer’s view was obstructed by the police line.

Implications for Public Safety Officers

This ruling offers valuable guidance for California peace officers and firefighters handling protests or crowd control. It affirms that less-lethal force can be justified when crowds pose objective threats, even if bystanders are inadvertently harmed. Agencies should review policies on munitions deployment, emphasizing ground-level throws to minimize injury risks, and officers should document threats via body cams and reports to support reasonableness claims.

If you have questions about this case or its application to your department, contact your representatives.   

Appellate Ruling Severely Limits Public Employees' Legal Recourse for Improperly Disclosed Personnel Records

    In the ever-evolving landscape of public safety labor law, protecting the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records remains a critical issue. A recent California Court of Appeal decision, Santa Ana Police Officers Association et al. v. City of Santa Ana (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 296, limits the remedies available to public employees when such records are improperly disclosed. This ruling exposes the rising tensions between CPRA transparency goals and the erosion of public employees' due process rights to protect their privacy. For public employee labor organizations, this ruling sets forth the procedural hurdles they face and the need for legislative reform to balance transparency interests with a meaningful process for employees to enforce their privacy rights.  

A CPRA Response Gone Wrong

    The case stems from a 2021 incident where the City of Santa Ana inadvertently disclosed confidential personnel records of over 100 police officers to the media outlet Voice of OC in response to a CPRA request. These records included sensitive information about prior complaints and disciplinary investigations that were not subject to disclosure under S.B. 1421 or 16. In fact, the materials were confidential under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (the "Pitchess" statutes).

    The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA), along with anonymous "Doe" officers, sued the City, alleging violations of these confidentiality laws, negligence per se, failure to investigate their subsequent complaint about the disclosure (under Penal Code section 832.5), and denial of a request for information relating to the disclosures in violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The plaintiffs sought relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and mandamus.

    The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, delivering a mixed bag of outcomes with significant labor implications.

Court Holdings:

    The appellate court's decision, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Sanchez, addressed several core issues relevant to public safety unions and officers:

No Private Right of Action for Improper Disclosure

    The court held that Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not create a private cause of action for officers or unions seeking damages or other relief for the unauthorized release of confidential records. Rather, these statutes primarily establish procedures for protecting against improper disclosures but don't authorize lawsuits against public entities who violate the statutes and improperly disclose confidential material. 

    Related negligence claims were also dismissed, as they relied on the same statutes for a "duty of care." This ruling effectively strips public employees of any meaningful remedy for violation of these statutes or the disclosure of sensitive materials that violate their right to privacy. The court recognized the violation of mandated confidentiality laws but limited the employees' remedies to administrative or mandamus relief rather than civil damages. 

    These remedies are woefully inadequate because at most they seek to prevent future violations. The CPRA does not contain any mechanism for retraction of improperly disclosed materials and once disclosed and publicized, and injection against further disclosures by the employer provides little comfort. Moreover, public employees often discovery improper disclosures once they are publicized, because public agencies often disclose the records without notifying employees or providing them an opportunity to object. 

    Even if afforded notice, filing an action to prevent the disclosure is costly and risky. If the court rules against the employee, the requester, typically a media entity, is often awarded attorneys' fees and cost. If successful, the employee still suffers litigation costs with no hopes of monetary damages. This system urgently needs rebalancing. 

Anonymity in Litigation: A High Bar

    Officers suing anonymously (as "Does") must obtain court approval after a hearing balancing their privacy interests against the public's First Amendment right to access court proceedings. Here, the Doe officers failed to seek such authorization, leading to dismissal of their claims. Officers dealing with sensitive personnel matters can't assume anonymity will be granted. They must proactively justify it, or risk procedural dismissal.

Mootness of Injunctive and Mandamus Relief for Past Disclosures

    Claims for injunctive relief to prevent disclosure or mandamus to compel non-disclosure were deemed moot, as the records had already been released years earlier in response to the CPRA request. The court noted that once disclosure occurs, a public entity lacks the ability to "undo" it, rendering such remedies ineffective.

Mandamus Available for Failure to Investigate Complaints

    In a win for the union, the court reversed on the cause of action for failure to investigate its complaints. Penal Code section 832.5 requires agencies to investigate citizen complaints against personnel, including staff involved in disclosures, and notify complainants of the disposition within 30 days. The SAPOA adequately alleged the City never investigated or reported on their complaint about the disclosure, creating a ministerial duty enforceable via mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. This "win" still cannot undo the violation of the employees' privacy rights.

Exhaustion Required for MMBA Claims

    The cause of action alleging the City violated the MMBA by denying the union's information requests  was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court confirmed the SAPOA's associational standing to represent its members but dismissed the claims. While individual peace officers are exempt from PERB jurisdiction, unions like the SAPOA are not.

Conclusion

    This decision has many negative effects for public employee labor organizations.  Unions must focus on prevention. With limited remedies post-disclosure, unions should bargain for protections against agency negligence to avoid accidental releases of exempt records. Procedures that require agencies to notify the recognized labor representative and employee before any personnel record is released would at least provide an opportunity to object or even commence a reverse CPRA action to prevent disclosure.

    Legislation is also need to balance public employee due process rights. The state could mandate these pre-disclosure notification and process for the employee to object. The one-sided attorneys' fees structure in favor of requestors needs rebalancing so public employees can seek judicial relief without the fear of being subject to excessive attorneys' fees being awarded to deep pocketed media organizations.   

    Overall, Santa Ana narrows direct paths to compensation for privacy breaches. While the SAPOA scored a partial victory on the investigation front, the case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the limited protections of confidentiality statutes.  

Sacramento Police Officers Association Wins Interest Arbitration Award: 5% Retroactive Raise, Enhanced Longevity, and 14 Month Term

The Sacramento Police Officers Association (SPOA) obtained an Interest Arbitration Award from Arbitrator John LaRocco effective August 8, 2025, adopting SPOA's last best offer on a 5% salary adjustment for all members retroactive to January 25, 2025. The Award runs through April 17, 2026, and also provides all unit members additional longevity at 10 years and 17 years of service, and well as an additional 4% increase for Dispatcher IIIs. 

Binding under the Sacramento City Charter, this Award provides SPOA members substantial and immediate increases, while also allowing the parties to promptly return to negations to bargain over a long-term agreement. The City had initially refused to bargain, forcing the SPOA to file an unfair labor practice in December of 2024 and ultimately resulting in members working for over six (6) months without a contract. Unable to reach a long-term agreement, the SPOA and the City agreed to an expedited arbitration process of over a limited number of proposals. The issuance of this Award and its immediate financial relief illustrates the value of interest arbitration in resolving difficult negotiations.

The Interest Arbitration Process: Binding Impasse Resolution Under the City Charter

The Sacramento City Charter, Article XVIII, Section 503, mandates interest arbitration to break deadlocks in negotiations over wages, hours, benefits, and terms of employment. Unlike the advisory fact-finding under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which often leaves disputes unresolved due to its advisory nature, impasse arbitration provides for a neutral arbitrator to select from the last best offer of each party that best matches traditional factors: consumer price changes, comparable compensation in similar classifications (based on the local market and similarly sized cities throughout the state), the City's financial condition and ability to pay, staffing/recruitment/retention data, and other relevant information.

Here, the parties stipulated to an expedited mediation-arbitration (med-arb) process before a single arbitrator, limiting the issues to salary, pay differentials for Dispatcher III, longevity pay, and term. This strategic move narrowed the scope of proposals and relaxed the arbitration procedures to allow for a swift award while preserving the ability to quickly return to formal negotiations to address additional proposals and seek a longer-term contract.

 The Award

Arbitrator LaRocco selected a blend of proposals, favoring SPOA on core economic issues:

Salary Adjustments: Adopted SPOA's proposal for a 5% increase across all classifications, effective retroactively to January 25, 2025 (the expiration of the prior contract). The Award rejected the City's 2.5% offer without retroactivity, based on the parties' history of retroactive increases and SPOA's evidence showing City police salaries lagging below market comparators. Even the City's compensation survey (which used a controversial ERI cost-of-living adjustment for comparator cities) showed officers fell below market means and medians, as well as below Sacramento County deputies for the first time.

Dispatcher III Differential: Adopted SPOA's proposal to raise the salary benchmark from 17% to 21% above Dispatcher II top step, effective upon Award implementation. This proposal brings Dispatcher IIIs up to the sergeant-officer differentials and addresses chronic staffing problems within the dispatcher classifications. 

Longevity Pay: Established new 1.5% incentive at 10 years of service and increasing the existing 3% at 17 years to 4.5%, effective July 1, 2025. Although the Award selected the City's Longevity proposal due primarily to the overall cost of the increases provided by the Award over a short amount of time, the arbitrator noted importance of increasing retention incentives for mid-career officers. The arbitrator suggested that future contracts should both increase longevity pays and provide them sooner. 

Demonstrating the importance of interest arbitration, the City's submitted its first formal proposal to increase longevity in arbitration when faced with the prospect of the arbitrator adopting the SPOA proposal for a 3% increase at 10 and 17 years of service. Because the arbitrator selects the most reasonable offer, the City had to increase its proposals or risk losing on this issue.  

Contract Term: The arbitrator selected the City's proposed term from January 25, 2025, to April 17, 2026, over the SPOA proposed term to January 24, 2026. The arbitrator reasoned that the City's proposal provided more breathing room for comprehensive negotiations on unresolved issues. 

The award also incorporates four tentative agreements reached pre-arbitration and retains jurisdiction for implementation disputes.

City's Budget Deficit Claims

The City argued inability to pay, citing a structural deficit projected at $50 million for FY 2025-2026, escalating to $130 million by FY 2028-2029, driven by past policy decisions like expanded services funded by temporary revenues. The arbitrator acknowledged the deficit's ongoing nature but distinguished it from external shocks like recessions. The City admitted that its revenues were growing at a healthy rate, but argued that spending priorities were outpacing the revenue growth. 

As detailed in the award, the City's Finance Director testified that "the City is experiencing a severe structural budget deficit of an ongoing nature" originating several years ago, with an initial February 2025 projection of "$62 million for fiscal year 2025-2026" updated to "$50 million" by July. The director acknowledged that "the structural budget deficit was caused by past City and voter decisions," including "long-run expenditure commitments based on one-time or two-time funding," resulting in a "continuing imbalance between revenues and expenditures." While "economic externalities, like inflation, contributed to the deficit," they "did not play a major role in causing the severe structural deficit."

Future projections included "$93.6 million for fiscal year 2026-2027; $110.1 million for fiscal year 2027-2028; and, $130.3 million for fiscal year 2028-2029." The City noted that "about 50% of City expenditures go toward employee salaries" and "every 1% salary increase for City employees costs $4.8 million," alongside unfunded liabilities like PERS contribution increases.

SPOA countered with expert analyses challenging these claims. Beacon Economics forecasted higher tax revenues, concluding "the City remains fiscally healthy because City employment, real estate transactions and business activities continue to thrive," with "property taxes will rise 4% to 8% over the next three fiscal years." Harvey M. Rose Associates reviewed historical data, finding that "for the past four fiscal years, the City projected General Fund deficits of $78.8 million to $160.5 million while the actual deficits were $5.6 million to $21.4 million." Applying this pattern, Rose estimated the FY 2025-2026 deficit at "approximately $34 million" and noted "the City has sufficient reserves to absorb the shortfall." Rose further observed that "the City's General Fund balance rose from $225.4 million to $326.4 million between fiscal year 2019-2020 and fiscal year 2023-2024," concluding "the General Fund is relatively healthy" and criticizing the City's "history of grossly overstating expected budget deficits."

The arbitrator acknowledged the deficits but found they did not preclude funding reasonable increases given the City's healthy reserves and the need for public safety. The arbitrator stated, "the City is experiencing a structural budget deficit and unfortunately, the evidence does not disclose how long the deficit might endure. It cannot be indefinite." However, he found the City's projections "exaggerated" even if SPOA's predictions were "overly optimistic," emphasizing that "if the City's projections are accurate, City inaction could prolong the deficit, which would precipitate fiscal chaos." Critically, he distinguished policy-driven shortfalls from external factors, holding that "a 5% wage increase cannot be nullified by diverse and contradictory evidence concerning the City's ability to pay." Employees "were not responsible for causing the deficit," and public safety "should be a top priority." With tax revenues expected to rise, the City "has the ability to fund a 5% salary increase."

Vacancies and Retention Challenges

The arbitrator noted the significance of the City's police officer vacancies, which were directly relevant to the parties proposals. The arbitrator noted, "the evidence reveals that the City's Police Department is confronted with a retention problem." The data presented revealed stark declines. "In June, 2025, there were 619 budgeted police officer positions, but only 470.5 were filled and only 373 were working. The number of working officers was just 60% of the budget positions." For context, "as of January, 2021, 94% (533.5) of the 569 budget positions were filled and 84% (479) of the positions were working." The arbitrator observed that "the percent of officers working as compared to budget positions had not been at or below 60% since 2015-2017" and that "except for a short upward bump in early 2022, the percentage of budgeted positions filled and working has steadily declined since 2021 indicating that police officer retention is a problem which must be addressed albeit, it cannot be cured in this agreement." 

The arbitrator emphasized the importance of early longevity steps and competitive salaries. "Commencing longevity pay at 10 years will begin to alleviate the problem" by establishing "a foundation for possible greater longevity pay in future contracts, especially if the parties collect more data about the reasons for the retention problem and where the departing officers are landing." He suggested flexibility for future adjustments, noting "during their upcoming negotiations, the parties may find that it might be more beneficial to start longevity pay before 10 years of service as opposed to raising longevity pay at 17 years of service."

Future Impacts 

This Award strengthens SPOA's position and provides the parties guidance to address the growing problem of officer vacancies by enhancing mid-term longevity as a retention tool. The arbitrator noted  growing vacancies of 20% of authorized positions and declining fill rates of working officers from 84% in 2021 to 60% by June of 2025. He noted that starting longevity at 10 years lays the groundwork for expansions, potentially before 10 years if data shows earlier incentives curb attrition more effectively. 

This Award also demonstrates the power of interest arbitration to provide binding decisions based on data-driven evidence and prevents endless stalemates. The analysis highlights the importance of comparable data, recruitment and retention data, and ability to pay evidence in any negotiations or impasse proceedings. Further, it provides insights regarding differences in how arbitrators view budget deficits cited as a basis to deny raises depending upon whether the deficit is policy driven , e.g. other spending priorities, or caused by external factors, e.g. recessions.

Mastagni Labor Representative Jose Cuervo was SPOA's lead negotiator during these negotiations and David E. Mastagni represented the SPOA during the Interest Arbitration.  

CLICK HERE TO READ THE INTEREST ARBITRATION AWARD.

Recent Appellate Decisions Erode Pitchess Protections for California Peace Officers

Two new Court of Appeal decisions are chipping away at the confidentiality safeguards for peace officers' personnel files under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. These rulings expand disclosure requirements and limit protective orders, potentially exposing officers to broader scrutiny and misuse of sensitive information. For public safety unions and officers, this signals a shifting landscape where traditional protections are giving way to demands for transparency. Below, we break down the cases and their combined implications.

Schneider v. Superior Court (2025): Full Disclosure of IA Investigation if  Brady Material, Not Just Witness Info

In Schneider v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 613, the Second District Court of Appeal addressed a murder defendant's motion for discovery of Brady material in the personnel files of six LASD deputies involved in the investigation. The trial court found Brady material in four files but limited disclosure to names, addresses, and phone numbers of complainants and witnesses—standard under classic Pitchess practice.

The appellate court reversed, holding that when material qualifies as Brady (favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment), the prosecution must disclose the full records, including documents, reports, and audio-visual evidence. This bypasses the usual Pitchess limitation, as Brady's constitutional mandate trumps officers' privacy interests in such cases.

The court reasoned that Brady materiality is higher than Pitchess relevance, so once identified, full access is essential for the defense to build a case. Protective measures like sealing transcripts still apply, but the ruling opens the door to verbatim records rather than summaries.

For officers, this means personnel files (e.g. IA investigations and disciplinary actions) containing impeachment evidence (e.g., dishonesty or excessive force) could be handed over wholesale in criminal cases where deputies are witnesses. What started as a targeted Pitchess motion now risks broader exposure, especially since most motions seek Brady-type material.

Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024): No Protective Order for Pitchess Disclosures of  Serious Misconduct Records Deemed  Public Records Under Penal Code § 832.7

The Second District's decision in Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 542 further weakens Pitchess by eliminating protective orders for records made public under Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(C), which mandates disclosure of sustained findings of dishonesty.

Here, a murder defendant sought records of an Azusa PD officer's dishonesty finding via a CPRA request and a parallel Pitchess motion. The trial court ordered disclosure after an in-camera review but imposed a protective order under Evidence Code § 1045(e), restricting use to the criminal proceeding.

The appellate court vacated the order, ruling that since § 832.7 deems these records nonconfidential and subject to public inspection, no protective order applies, even if obtained through Pitchess. This builds on ALADS v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, which separated Pitchess from CPRA but didn't address overlapping disclosures.

The impacts are significant. Officers' records of sustained serious misconduct, such as dishonesty, can now be freely shared beyond the courtroom, blurring the lines between Pitchess disclosures and public record requests. Defense teams can now disseminate this subset of Pitchess materials widely, increasing risks of reputational harm.

Combined Impact: A Weakening of Privacy Rights for Peace Officers

Together, Schneider and Banuelos accelerate the erosion of Pitchess protections. By expanding Brady to require full documents and stripping protective orders for § 832.7 records, these rulings prioritize defendants' rights and police transparency over officers' privacy. These rulings will lead to much more invasive criminal discovery and the more wide spread use of those materials beyond the specific criminal case.

Ninth Circuit Vindicates Second Amendment Rights in Two Recent Rulings: Ammo Background Checks & One-Gun-A-Month Law

Ninth Circuit Upholds Ruling Against California's Ammo Background Check Law

In a closely watched decision today, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that California's ammunition background check requirements, enacted through voter-approved Proposition 63 in 2016, violate the Second Amendment. The case, Rhode v. Bonta, brought by Olympic gold medalist Kim Rhode and other firearm owners, underscores ongoing tensions between state gun regulations and constitutional protections

Court's Decision

The majority opinion, authored by Judge Sandra S. Ikuta and joined by Judge Bridget S. Bade, applied the Supreme Court's framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) to evaluate the law's constitutionality. California's system mandates face-to-face purchases through licensed vendors, with background checks required for every ammunition transaction. Options include a quick $1 standard check for those with existing firearm records, a $19 basic check for others, or annual certificate verifications processes that the court found impose unnecessary fees, potential delays, and geographic restrictions on law-abiding citizens.

The panel determined that the Second Amendment's plain text covers the right to "operable arms," which inherently includes ammunition. They argued that the regime "meaningfully constrains" this right by creating barriers not just for casual buyers but for anyone needing regular access, such as competitive shooters or off-duty officers maintaining proficiency. Critically, California failed to provide sufficient historical analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras (focusing on 1791 and 1868 eras) to justify the repeated checks. Analogues like loyalty oaths, concealed carry permits, surety laws, and vendor licensing were deemed not "relevantly similar" in "how" (burden imposed) and "why" (purpose, e.g., public safety vs. disloyalty). No historical precedent for repeated background checks on every ammo purchase.

This facial challenge succeeded, meaning the law was deemed invalid in all applications, leading the court to uphold a permanent injunction against enforcement. The decision did not address related claims under the dormant Commerce Clause or federal preemption, focusing squarely on Second Amendment grounds.

Judge Jay S. Bybee dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority overlooked Bruen's endorsement of "shall-issue" licensing regimes with modest fees and delays. He pointed out that most checks under California's system cost just $1 and process in under a minute, hardly a "meaningful constraint" on access. Bybee warned that the ruling could undermine practical regulations that help ensure ammunition doesn't fall into the wrong hands.

Governor Newsom's Response

Governor Gavin Newsom, a prominent figure in national gun control efforts, quickly issued a statement criticizing the ruling as a setback for public safety initiatives. He emphasized the voter-approved nature of the law, stating:

“Strong gun laws save lives – and today’s decision is a slap in the face to the progress California has made in recent years to keep its communities safer from gun violence. Californians voted to require background checks on ammunition and their voices should matter.”

Conclusion

Many first responders value streamlined access to ammunition for training, home defense, or off-duty carry, viewing excessive red tape as an added burden in an already demanding profession. While supporters of the law argue it enhances community safety, critics contend it disproportionately affects responsible owners without clear historical precedent.

This ruling could prompt California to seek en banc review or Supreme Court intervention, especially given the split panel and Bruen's evolving application. In the meantime, this ruling removes a layer of regulation that some see as overly restrictive.

Ninth Circuit Declares California's One-Gun-A-Month Law Unconstitutional: Implications for Peace Officers and Public Safety

In a significant victory for Second Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down California's longstanding one-gun-a-month purchase restriction, ruling it facially unconstitutional. The unanimous decision in Nguyen v. Bonta, handed down on June 20, 2025, rejects the state's attempt to limit firearm acquisitions without historical precedent, emphasizing the plural nature of the right to "keep and bear Arms." For California peace officers and public safety professionals, this ruling not only expands access to firearms but also underscores the evolving landscape of gun regulations post-Bruen, potentially affecting training, personal protection, and enforcement duties.

The case challenged California's 1999 law, which prohibited most residents from purchasing more than one handgun or semiautomatic centerfire rifle within any 30-day period. Plaintiffs, backed by groups like the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and California Rifle & Pistol Association (CRPA), argued it infringed on the Second Amendment's core protections. The Ninth Circuit panel—Judges Danielle J. Forrest (Trump appointee), John B. Owens (Obama appointee), and Bridget S. Bade (Trump appointee)—agreed, finding no basis in America's founding-era traditions for such metering of constitutional rights. 

Judge Forrest's opinion dismantled the state's defenses. California claimed the Second Amendment doesn't protect acquiring multiple firearms, as the law allowed initial purchases. The court rebuffed this: "The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to 'keep and bear Arms,' plural," Forrest wrote. "This 'guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons.' And not only is 'Arms' stated in the plural, but this term refers to more than just guns." She drew analogies to other rights: "We are not aware of any circumstance where government may temporarily meter the exercise of constitutional rights in this manner... [like] limit[ing] citizens’ free-speech right to one protest a month." 

The state invoked historical analogues, such as colonial-era laws on arms sales to Native Americans or intoxicated persons, but the panel found them inapplicable. "Many of California’s proposed historical analogues impose no burden on an individual’s ability to acquire, keep, or bear arms," Forrest noted. Distinguishing from a Fifth Circuit case upholding enhanced background checks for young adults, the court highlighted that delay here was the purpose, not a byproduct of valid scrutiny.

Judge Owens concurred, clarifying the ruling doesn't preclude other measures against bulk or straw purchases if historically supported. The decision halts enforcement in Ninth Circuit states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.

Many first responders are already exempt from the limit, but retired officers may benefit from easier access for personal defense or training. The court's reasoning follow post-Bruen trends scrutinizing restrictions, potentially easing burdens on law enforcement implementing such laws.  

Gun-rights advocates hailed the win. "We have a right to buy more than one gun at a time just as we have a right to buy more than one bible at a time," FPC President Brandon Combs said. SAF echoed: "This is a unanimous decision... in favor of SAF and its partners." 

Governor Newsom called the decision a "slap in the face," while Attorney General Bonta emphasized that the ruling undermines the state's efforts to reduce gun violence. Bonta's office hasn't commented on appeals, but en banc review is possible.

Navigating "Great Bodily Injury" Disclosures under PC 832.7: CA Supreme Court's Cabrera Decision Raises the Bar

In the evolving landscape of police transparency laws, California's peace officers are facing a critical debate over what constitutes "great bodily injury" (GBI) under Penal Code Section 832.7. This provision, amended by Senate Bill 1421 in 2018, mandates the disclosure of personnel records related to use-of-force incidents that result in death or GBI. Without a clear statutory definition, agencies and courts have been left to interpret GBI, leading to a divide between broad and narrow views. A recent California Supreme Court ruling in In re Cabrera (2023) offers crucial guidance, suggesting GBI sets a higher bar than "serious bodily injury" (SBI), which could limit unnecessary disclosures and protect officer confidentiality.

The problem stems from SB 1421's push for accountability. Before the bill, officer records were largely confidential under Section 832.7(a), accessible only through Pitchess motions. Now, agencies must release records on specific misconduct, including force causing GBI, firearm discharges, sexual assault, or dishonesty. The lack of a GBI definition has sparked confusion. Some courts and transparency advocates favor a broad interpretation based on Penal Code Section 12022.7(f), which calls GBI a "significant or substantial physical injury" greater than minor or moderate harm. This could include bruises, lacerations, or abrasions—common in routine arrests.

Imagine an officer involved in a standard takedown where a suspect sustains a bruise or minor cut. Under a broad view, that incident's records might be disclosed via a Public Records Act request, overwhelming agencies with CPRA disclosures and inviting litigation. We've seen this play out in cases like People v. Cross (2008), where the Supreme Court held that GBI doesn't require permanent damage but can cover physical pain or contusions. Appellate decisions have upheld GBI for injuries like swollen jaws, sore ribs, or multiple bruises, as in People v. Corona (1989) or People v. Jaramillo (1979). Groups like the First Amendment Coalition argue this broadens transparency, aligning with the California Constitution's mandate to favor disclosure.

But this expansive approach creates real burdens. Agencies could be flooded with requests for records on everyday encounters, straining resources for redaction and review. For peace officers, it means more exposure, potentially chilling their ability to perform duties without fear of constant second-guessing.

Enter the narrower interpretation, which ties GBI to something at least as severe as SBI under Penal Code Section 243(f)(4). SBI includes loss of consciousness, concussions, bone fractures, wounds needing sutures, or serious disfigurement—harms that require medical intervention and pose substantial risks. Federal definitions in statutes like 18 U.S.C. Section 1365(h)(3) echo this, focusing on risks of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impaired function.

SB 1421's legislative history supports this view. Initially drafted with SBI, it switched to GBI to clarify a higher threshold, influenced by law enforcement groups. The ACLU even described the bill's intent as covering incidents where officers "seriously injure" the public. A broad GBI would undermine this by capturing relatively minor injuries and overwhelming departments with CPRA obligations.

The California Supreme Court's decision in Cabrera provides potentially game-changing relief. In that case, a defendant was convicted of battery with SBI (brief unconsciousness, a head laceration needing stitches, dizziness) but the jury deadlocked on GBI enhancements. The trial court imposed a GBI enhancement anyway, assuming SBI implied GBI. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that SBI and GBI are "essentially equivalent" but not interchangeable as a matter of law. Crucially, the Court noted that GBI requires a more demanding severity threshold. It cited examples like People v. Taylor (2004), where a bone fracture was SBI but not GBI because it was deemed moderate, and People v. Thomas (2019), involving a broken jaw with permanent damage—SBI yes, GBI no.

The Court emphasized that while overlaps exist, juries decide factually where injuries fall on a continuum. A hairline fracture might be SBI but not "significant or substantial" enough for GBI. This disapproved prior cases equating the two and essentially assumed that all GBI qualifies as SBI, but not vice versa. For Section 832.7, this means agencies may not have to disclose records unless injuries meet this elevated GBI standard, reducing the scope of mandatory releases.

The impacts for California law enforcement are profound. A narrower GBI interpretation eases administrative burdens, allowing agencies to focus on serious incidents rather than minor ones. It aligns disclosures with existing SBI reporting under Government Code Section 12525.2, promoting uniformity. For officers, it safeguards privacy in routine duties, preventing overbroad scrutiny that could deter necessary force. However, without appellate precedent directly on Section 832.7, superior courts have varied—some broadening GBI in non-binding rulings like Richmond Police Officers’ Association v. City of Richmond (2020).

Looking ahead, ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition's 2025 suit against San Diego over a beanbag and dog attack incident, will test Cabrera's application. Agencies currently apply varied standards for responding to GBI request. Peace officers and unions can now cite Cabrera to argue for narrower lens in court and push for legislative clarity, perhaps defining GBI akin to federal standards: substantial risk of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.

This debate highlights the tension in striking the proper balance between transparency and functionality. Mastagni Holstedt, APC has been at the forefront, representing PORAC in analyzing bills like SB 1421. For a deeper dive, look for David E. Mastagni's upcoming full-length article in the PORAC Law Enforcement News and Review, where he'll unpack court rulings, agency practices, and advocacy strategies in detail.

Watch David E. Mastagni Testifying for AB 340: PORAC Sponsored Legislation to Protect Confidential Union Communications

    On July 15, 2025, David E. Mastagni of Mastagni Holstedt, APC testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of AB 340 (Ahrens), a vital bill sponsored by PORAC that codifies existing PERB precedent to protect confidential communications between public employees and their union representatives. This legislation closes a statutory gap, ensuring workers—from teachers and firefighters to peace officers—can discuss grievances, safety concerns, or discipline without fear of employer intrusion. It's particularly important for public safety officers, who depend on candid union advice to navigate high-stakes investigations while fulfilling their duties.

    AB 340 prohibits public employers from questioning or compelling disclosure of these confidential representational communications, enforceable as an unfair labor practice through PERB. It exempts criminal investigations and aligns with the Peace Officers' Bill of Rights (Gov. Code § 3303), balancing accountability with representation rights. No evidentiary privilege is created—civil or criminal proceedings remain unaffected. This bill levels the playing field across PERB-jurisdictional employers, fostering trust and reducing litigation over coercive inquiries that chill protected activities.

    During the opening statement, Mastagni emphasized the bill's role in codifying PERB precedent and addressed opposition claims, explaining that AB 340 does not hinder investigations like those under AB 218 for childhood sexual assault. He noted that schools can question witnesses about firsthand knowledge, as the bill protects only representation-related communications lacking evidentiary value.

    In the Q&A session, committee members inquired about how employers would recognize confidential communications and the consequences of accidental intrusions. Mastagni explained that confidentiality is obvious in 99.9% of cases, such as when employers ask what a member told their representative during interview preparation. If an employer accidentally intrudes, the representative or member must object. PERB liability typically only arises if the employer compels disclosure after such an objection.

    The video of the hearing Q&A session is available here: Watch the Testimony.

    The bill passed the Judiciary Committee 10-2 and now heads to Appropriations, chaired by Senator Caballero, who voted yes in Judiciary. This momentum is reflective of the strong support from public employees and their unions for this bill.

    Thank you to the Judiciary Committee for advancing AB 340 and Assembly Member Patrick Ahrens for carrying this bill on behalf of PORAC. Mr. Mastagni is grateful for the opportunity to assist PORAC and work with their legislative advocate Randy Perry in drafting and advancing this bill. To drive final enactment, contact your legislators and Governor Newsome to urge their support—California's public employees deserve this safeguard.

    The video of the entire hearing is available here: Watch the Full Hearing.

Michigan Jury Acquits State Police Sergeant in Off-Duty Accidental Firearm Discharge Case

 In a notable victory for law enforcement, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer of reckless firearm use charges stemming from an accidental discharge while she shopped off-duty at a Costco. The case highlights the challenges of proving criminal negligence in firearm mishaps, especially when officers follow departmental policies on off-duty carry. While this occurred in Michigan, it offers valuable insights for California peace officers on liability risks, training, and the importance of robust departmental protocols to defend against similar allegations.

Facts

In February 2025, Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer was shopping off-duty at a Costco in Oshtemo Township, Kalamazoo County. As she checked out at the cash register, she placed her wallet back into her purse. At that moment, her department-issued Sig P365 firearm, which she carried in an Uncle Mike's foam holster inside the purse, discharged a round. The bullet passed through the holster, the purse, and the officer's hand. It then grazed another customer's ankle. Additionally, a third customer fainted due to distress from the loud noise and witnessing the injury.

Following an internal investigation and public outcry, the Kalamazoo County Prosecutor's Office charged Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer with Reckless Use of a Firearm Causing Injury, a misdemeanor under Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) 752.861.

In July 2025, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer. The jury concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding

The Constitution and relevant statutes require careful scrutiny in cases involving accidental firearm discharges by law enforcement officers. Michigan Compiled Laws 752.861 states: "Any person who, by carelessness, recklessness, or negligence, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause or allow any firearm under his immediate control to be discharged so as to injure or endanger any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

This statute criminalizes non-willful but negligent discharges that result in injury or endangerment. The key terms—carelessness, recklessness, or negligence—must be interpreted based on their ordinary meanings: carelessness as a lack of attention to safety, negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care, and recklessness as a conscious disregard of a known risk.

Michigan courts apply the plain meaning rule to statutory language. For conviction, the prosecution must show that the defendant's conduct deviated from what a reasonable person would do in handling a loaded firearm. The mens rea requires proof of fault beyond a mere accident, amounting to culpable negligence, as held in People v. Orr, 242 Mich. App. 694 (2000).

Law enforcement officers do not receive separate criminal immunity for off-duty carry in Michigan, but courts may consider professional training, expectations, and departmental policies in assessing reasonableness.

In this case, the prosecution argued that Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer was reckless because she entered a crowded store with a firearm lacking an external safety, carried a round in the chamber and a full magazine, and used a foam holster in her purse.

The defense countered that the Sig P365 and Uncle Mike's holster were department-issued. Michigan State Police require officers to carry firearms off-duty in approved holsters, loaded with a round chambered. The firearm features an internal safety preventing discharge without trigger pull. The defense portrayed the incident as a rare mechanical failure, not a foreseeable result of negligence.

The jury found that the prosecution failed to prove negligence under the circumstances. It entered a not guilty verdict, emphasizing that mere accident or mechanical issues do not suffice for liability. Although not precedential, this case is a reminder that prosecutors must prove a clear deviation from reasonable care. Accidental discharges tied to policy compliant carry may not meet this threshold.

Ninth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity to CHP officer Who Mistook Stroke for DUI: Must Officers Now Play Doctor? Implications for Officers' Medical Response Duties

 In a significant ruling for California law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of qualified immunity to a CHP officer who delayed medical care for a motorist suffering a stroke, after mistaking symptoms for drug impairment. D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol underscores officers' obligations to provide prompt medical aid to detainees showing signs of distress, regardless of suspected causes. In light of this decision officers should consider how they assess and respond to medical needs in the field.

Facts

On June 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., CHP Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo responded to a single-vehicle crash on a freeway onramp in Orange County. The driver, 55-year-old Steven D’Braunstein, had totaled his car in a near head-on collision with a concrete wall. D’Braunstein told the officer he "didn’t know what happened" and that "the car did something." He exhibited signs of distress, such as dry mouth, slurred and slow speech, profuse sweating, confusion, poor balance, slow reaction time, and constricted pupils. He struggled to answer simple questions and interjected random comments during their conversation.

Suspecting impairment, Officer Durazo conducted field sobriety tests, which D’Braunstein failed due to his condition. His breathalyzer showed a BAC of 0.00, and Durazo noted he had a serious condition. However, she was not a drug recognition expert and did not call for one. Instead of summoning an ambulance, she arrested him for suspected DUI and transported him to jail about 45 minutes after arriving on scene—roughly an hour after the crash.

At the jail, a nurse refused to admit D’Braunstein after examination. After two hours there (about 3.5 hours post-crash), Durazo took him to a hospital, where doctors diagnosed a stroke. The delay allegedly prevented timely treatment that could have mitigated brain damage. D’Braunstein spent weeks in the hospital and now resides in a long-term care facility, unable to care for himself due to lasting injuries.

D’Braunstein’s son sued Officer Durazo and the CHP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for deprivation of medical care. The district court found a constitutional violation but granted summary judgment and qualified immunity, ruling the right was not "clearly established."

Holding

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard for post-arrest care, which requires officers to seek necessary medical attention for injured detainees by promptly summoning help or transporting them to a hospital. This duty stems from the Constitution's requirement that state actors provide adequate medical care when confining individuals, as established in cases like County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) and DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989). For pretrial detainees, it also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, but both use an objective reasonableness test.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find Durazo's actions objectively unreasonable. Despite the serious crash and D’Braunstein's symptoms (disorientation, profuse sweating, poor balance, and slurred speech), Durazo delayed care for hours. Her suspicion of drug use, unsupported by evidence, did not excuse the failure to act, as the crash and distress signals warranted emergency evaluation. The court emphasized, that the reason for the crash did not change the need for emergency medical evaluation.

On qualified immunity, the court rejected Durazo's argument that the duty applies only to injuries caused by officers. Existing precedent clearly establishes that officers must provide reasonable medical care for any serious medical need, regardless of cause. Citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) and others, the panel noted it doesn't require "unusual foresight" to recognize that a major accident victim showing distress needs prompt aid. Officers aren't expected to diagnose conditions but must assess if the situation calls for immediate help. The violation was clearly established, so qualified immunity was denied. The case was reversed and remanded.

Judge Lee partially dissented, arguing no clearly established law required distinguishing symptoms without obvious injury signs, but the majority held the duty was plain.

Takeaways for California Public Safety Employees

The Court found a broad duty to provide care. Officers must deliver objectively reasonable medical aid to detainees displaying need, irrespective of whether the issue stems from arrest, accident, or other causes. Mistaking medical emergencies for impairment won't shield from liability if signs of distress are ignored.

No diagnosis is required, but assessment is key. Officers don't need to pinpoint the ailment (e.g., stroke vs. drugs), but must evaluate if prompt medical attention is warranted based on observable facts like crash severity and symptoms.

This ruling may prompt agencies to enhance training on recognizing medical vs. impairment signs, encouraging earlier calls for paramedics or drug experts in ambiguous cases. The case highlights the risks in delaying care post-accident.

Expect more § 1983 claims challenging medical response delays. Document observations thoroughly and err toward summoning aid to demonstrate reasonableness.

This decision reinforces that protecting detainee well-being is paramount, even in high-pressure field scenarios.  

Major Victory for the Los Angeles City Attorneys Association: Court Upholds Right to Arbitrate

    On July 8, 2025, the Los Angeles City Attorneys Association (LACAA) achieved a significant legal triumph in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, in the case of Los Angeles City Attorneys Association, et al. vs. City of Los Angeles, et al. (Case No. 24STCP03479). The court granted LACAA’s petition to compel arbitration, affirming the right of our members to utilize the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to address workplace disputes, including allegations of discrimination. This ruling, obtained by Steven Welch of Mastagni Holstedt, APC, affirms LACAA’s commitment to protecting the rights of Deputy City Attorneys and ensuring fair treatment in the workplace.

The Case: Jacquelyn Lawson’s Grievance

    The case centered on LACAA member Jacquelyn Lawson, a Deputy City Attorney over 40 years old, who initiated a grievance under Article 21 of MOU #29, alleging age-based discrimination in violation of Article 3, the MOU’s non-discrimination provision. Lawson claimed that on April 30, 2024, her supervisor inquired about her retirement plans, a comment she viewed as part of a pattern of age bias that led to her being passed over for deserved promotions. When the grievance was not resolved through the initial steps of the MOU’s four-step process, LACAA and Lawson petitioned to compel binding arbitration, as provided for in Article 21. The City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office (collectively, “the City”) opposed the petition, seeking to severely limit the scope of grievances that LACAA members could pursue under MOU #29.

The City’s Opposition: A Threat to Grievance Rights

    The City’s opposition was a broad attempt to curtail the grievance and arbitration rights guaranteed to LACAA members. They argued that only a very limited set of issues, such as disputes over sick pay or holiday pay, are subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures under Article 21, asserting that Lawson’s discrimination-based grievance fell outside this scope. Additionally, the City contended that the grievance was both substantively and procedurally non-arbitrable, claiming that Article 3’s non-discrimination policy does not create an arbitrable right and that the grievance was untimely, particularly regarding incidents predating the MOU’s effective date of January 1, 2024. The City further argued that discrimination allegations should be handled through their “MyVoiceLA” procedure, not the MOU’s grievance process. They also claimed that arbitrating Lawson’s grievance would infringe on their discretionary authority to make workplace decisions, violating public policy and potentially leading to “absurd results” where any workplace comment could trigger arbitration. Finally, the City downplayed the April 30, 2024, incident, suggesting that a single remark about retirement could not justify an arbitrable grievance.

The Court’s Ruling: A Resounding Win for LACAA

    Presided over by Judge Michael Small, the Superior Court rejected the City’s arguments and granted LACAA’s petition. The court held that Article 3’s non-discrimination policies can form the basis of a grievance under Article 21, as the provision explicitly prohibits discrimination based on protected characteristics, including age. Lawson’s allegations of age bias clearly fall within this framework. The court rejected the City’s attempt to limit grievances to minor administrative issues. The court also found no basis in the MOU for the City’s claim that discrimination grievances must be channeled through MyVoiceLA, ensuring that LACAA members can pursue such claims through arbitration. Additionally, the court clarified that Lawson’s grievance concerns the broader implications of alleged age discrimination, not just a single remark, rebuffing the City’s attempt to trivialize the issue. The court dismissed the City’s public policy argument as overly broad, noting that it would effectively render all grievances non-arbitrable, and declined to address procedural objections about timeliness, leaving such disputes for arbitration. The case was stayed pending binding arbitration, with a status conference scheduled for July 9, 2026.

Long-term Implication of this Victory

    This ruling is a landmark win for LACAA and its members, preserving a critical mechanism for Deputy City Attorneys to address workplace injustices, including discrimination. Over the last several years, the City had engaged in a pattern of contesting the arbitrability or various grievances involving a variety of issues, including appeals of discipline. The City’s attempt to confine arbitrable grievances to narrow issues like pay or benefits was a direct threat to the protections LACAA has fought to secure. Had the City prevailed, it would have undermined the MOU’s grievance process, leaving members with limited recourse for serious workplace issues.

    Through the dedicated efforts of LACAA and Mastagni Holstedt, APC, this ruling prevents the City of Los Angels from unilaterally limiting the scope of LACAA’s collective bargaining agreement. It affirms that Article 3’s non-discrimination protections are enforceable rights, not mere platitudes, and that allegations of discrimination will be addressed through the fair, impartial process outlined in the MOU.

Los AngelesCity Attorneys Association

Understanding the No Tax on Tips and Overtime Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) 

On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) into law, introducing significant tax relief for workers, including public safety labor union members like firefighters, police officers, and paramedics. Among its key provisions are deductions for qualified tips and overtime pay, designed to increase the take-home pay for those who rely on these income sources. This blog post explains how these deductions work, how they enhance the value of overtime (OT), and what they mean for joint filers earning over $300,000, including details on the phase-out and expiration date.

No Tax on Tips: What It Means for Union Members 

The OBBB allows workers in tipped occupations to deduct up to $25,000 of qualified tip income from their federal taxable income for tax years 2025 through 2028. Here’s how it works:

• Eligibility: The deduction applies to tips received in industries where tipping is customary, such as food service or hospitality. The IRS will provide further guidance on qualifying occupations.

• Deduction Amount: Up to $25,000 per year can be deducted, regardless of whether you itemize or take the standard deduction.

• Reporting: Tips must be reported on Form W-2 or Form 1099, and employers must separately report the total amount of cash tips.

• Payroll Taxes: The deduction applies only to federal income taxes, not Social Security or Medicare taxes.

For tipped employees, this deduction could save up to $3,000–$6,000 annually, depending on their tax bracket. For example, an employee earning $15,000 in tips from a part-time restaurant job could deduct that entire amount, reducing their taxable income and potentially saving $1,800–$3,300 in federal income taxes (assuming a 12%–22% tax bracket).

No Tax on Overtime: Boosting the Value of OT for Public Safety Employees

The OBBB’s “No Tax on Overtime” provision is particularly relevant for peace officers and firefighter, who often rely on overtime to meet staffing demands. This provision allows workers to deduct up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of qualified overtime compensation from their federal taxable income for tax years 2025 through 2028. Here’s a breakdown:

• Eligibility: The deduction applies to overtime pay required under Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandates time-and-a-half pay for hours worked over 40 per week for non-exempt employees. Most public safety workers, such as firefighters and police officers, qualify as non-exempt under FLSA.

• Deduction Amount: Single filers can deduct up to $12,500, while joint filers can deduct up to $25,000 of qualified overtime pay. Only the overtime premium (the amount exceeding the regular rate) qualifies. For example, if you earn $30/hour and work 10 overtime hours at $45/hour, only the $15/hour premium ($150 total) counts toward the deduction, not the full $450.

• Reporting: Employers must report qualified overtime separately on Form W-2, and the deduction is only available for reported amounts.

• Payroll Taxes: Like the tip deduction, this applies only to federal income taxes, not Social Security or Medicare taxes.

How It Increases the Value of Overtime

For public safety employees, overtime is a critical income source, often comprising 20–30% of annual earnings. By exempting up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of overtime pay from federal income taxes, the OBBB effectively increases the after-tax value of OT. For example:

• Scenario: A police officer earns $150,000 in regular wages and $30,000 in overtime premium pay. Without the deduction, the $30,000 is taxed at their marginal rate (e.g., 24%, or $7,200 in taxes). With the OBBB deduction, $12,500 of the $30,000 is tax-free for federal income tax purposes for single filers (or $25,000 for joint filers), saving $3,000 (single, 24% bracket) or $6,000 (joint, 24% bracket).

• Impact: This tax savings increases the officer’s take-home pay, making overtime shifts more financially rewarding. The White House estimates average savings of up to $2,000 annually for qualifying workers, though the Tax Policy Center estimates average savings of $1,800.

For union members, this provision incentivizes taking on overtime shifts, especially in high-demand public safety roles, while boosting financial security.

Joint Filers Earning Over $300,000: Phase-Out Calculation

For joint filers with modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) exceeding $300,000, both the tip and overtime deductions phase out. MAGI is calculated as adjusted gross income (AGI) plus certain exclusions (e.g., foreign income under Code sections 911, 931, or 933). Here’s how the phase-out works:

• Phase-Out Mechanism: The deduction is reduced by $100 for every $1,000 of MAGI above $300,000 for joint filers.

• Calculation Example:

  • A firefighter and their spouse file jointly with a MAGI of $350,000, including $20,000 in qualified overtime pay.

  • Excess MAGI: $350,000 – $300,000 = $50,000.

  • Reduction: ($50,000 ÷ $1,000) × $100 = $5,000.

  • Deduction: $25,000 (max for joint filers) – $5,000 = $20,000.

  • Result: They can deduct $20,000 of the $20,000 overtime pay, fully eliminating federal income tax on it.

• Complete Phase-Out: The deduction is fully phased out when MAGI reaches $550,000 ($300,000 + $250,000, as $25,000 ÷ $100 × 1,000 = $250,000). At this point, no deduction is available.

For high-earning joint filers, the phase-out limits the benefit, but partial deductions can still provide significant savings. For example, a couple with $400,000 MAGI could deduct $15,000 of overtime pay, saving $3,300–$5,550 in taxes (assuming a 22%–37% tax bracket).

Expiration Date

Both the tip and overtime deductions are temporary, effective for tax years 2025 through 2028. They expire on December 31, 2028, unless Congress extends them. This means the last tax returns to claim these deductions will be filed in early 2029. Union members should plan accordingly, as the tax benefits may not persist beyond 2028.

Practical Implications for Public Safety Union Members

1. Increased Take-Home Pay: The overtime deduction directly boosts the value of OT shifts, making them more lucrative. This is especially beneficial for public safety employees facing mandatory overtime due to staffing shortages.

2. Reporting Requirements: Ensure your employer correctly reports overtime pay on Form W-2. Check pay stubs and W-2s for separate reporting of qualified overtime to maximize your deduction.

3. Tax Planning: Consult a tax professional to understand how these deductions interact with your overall tax situation, especially if you’re a joint filer nearing or exceeding $300,000 MAGI.

4. Side Gigs: If you work a tipped side job, such as ridesharing, track your tips meticulously to claim the full $25,000 deduction.

Caveats and Considerations

• Limited Benefit for Low-Income Workers: Workers with incomes below the standard deduction ($15,750 for single filers, $31,500 for joint filers in 2025) may see little benefit, as their federal tax liability is already low.

• Payroll Tax Burden: Social Security and Medicare taxes still apply, reducing the net benefit. For example, $10,000 in overtime incurs $765 in payroll taxes (7.65%).

• Potential Labor Market Effects: Some analysts warn that the overtime deduction could encourage employers to rely more on OT rather than hiring additional staff, potentially increasing workload pressures.

Conclusion

The OBBB’s no tax on tips and overtime provisions offer meaningful tax relief for public safety labor union members, particularly those earning significant overtime. By deducting up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of overtime pay, workers can save up to $2,000–$5,550 annually, depending on their tax bracket and income. For joint filers earning over $300,000, the phase-out reduces the deduction, but partial benefits remain until MAGI reaches $550,000. These deductions, effective through 2028, enhance the financial value of overtime, providing financial support to the hardworking men and women who keep our communities safe.

For personalized advice, consult a tax professional to maximize these benefits.  

Headless PAGA Actions Upheld in California Appeals Court Ruling

In a significant decision for California labor law, the Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal has ruled that workers can pursue "headless" claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) solely on behalf of other aggrieved employees, even after dismissing their individual claims. The case, CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2025), clarifies the scope of PAGA and reinforces its role as a unique enforcement mechanism for labor code violations.

Background

Espiridon Sanchez, a former tire maintenance technician, filed a lawsuit in September 2019 against CRST Expedited, Inc., doing business as Transportation Solution Inc., and its predecessor, Gardner Trucking Inc. Sanchez alleged multiple labor code violations, including failure to provide meal and rest breaks, unpaid overtime wages, unreimbursed business expenses, and untimely payment of wages upon termination. The lawsuit was brought under PAGA, which allows aggrieved employees to act as representatives of the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) to recover civil penalties for labor code violations.

In March 2019, Sanchez’s attorney sent a notice to the LWDA, as required by PAGA, outlining nine types of labor code violations experienced by nonexempt employees. After the LWDA did not respond within the 65-day statutory period, Sanchez was authorized to pursue a civil action as the state’s representative. In May 2023, the trial court granted CRST’s motion to compel arbitration of Sanchez’s individual PAGA claims but initially dismissed his nonindividual claims. However, following the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023), the trial court reinstated the nonindividual claims. CRST then moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Sanchez lacked standing to pursue nonindividual claims after dismissing his individual claims. The trial court denied this motion, prompting CRST’s petition for a writ of mandate.

Appellate Court’s Ruling

In a unanimous 51-page opinion written by Justice Donald R. Franson Jr., the Fifth Appellate District rejected CRST’s petition, affirming that PAGA allows "headless" actions—claims brought solely on behalf of other employees without pursuing individual claims. The court’s analysis hinged on the interpretation of Section 2699 of the Labor Code, particularly the phrase allowing an aggrieved employee to bring a civil action “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.”

Key Points of the Ruling

Ambiguity in Statutory Language 

The court found the word “and” in Section 2699 to be ambiguous. While CRST argued that “and” conjunctively requires an employee to pursue both individual and nonindividual claims together, Sanchez contended that the permissive nature of “may” in the statute allows flexibility. The court agreed with Sanchez, citing historical precedent that “and” can sometimes be read disjunctively as “or” to align with legislative intent (People v. Pool, 1865).

Legislative Intent and PAGA’s Purpose

PAGA was enacted in 2003 to address inadequate enforcement of labor code provisions due to limited government resources. The court emphasized that PAGA empowers employees to act as proxies for the state, recovering civil penalties (75% to the LWDA, 25% to aggrieved employees) to deter violations. Allowing headless PAGA actions aligns with this purpose by ensuring robust enforcement without requiring individual claims to be litigated first.

Impact of Viking River and Adolph

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana held that individual PAGA claims are arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but nonindividual claims may remain in court. The California Supreme Court’s Adolph decision clarified that an employee retains standing to pursue nonindividual claims in court even after individual claims are sent to arbitration. The CRST court built on Adolph, rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s suggestion in Viking River that nonindividual claims should be dismissed, and affirming that headless actions are permissible.

Practical Implications

The court noted that bifurcating PAGA claims (individual claims to arbitration, nonindividual to court) creates delays and procedural hurdles that undermine PAGA’s enforcement goals. Headless actions avoid these delays, allowing faster prosecution of claims affecting larger groups of employees. The court dismissed CRST’s argument that headless actions enable “gamesmanship” by plaintiffs’ attorneys, emphasizing that such actions still serve the public interest by enforcing labor laws.

Broader Implications

The CRST decision strengthens employees’ ability to enforce California’s labor laws through PAGA, particularly in cases where arbitration agreements might otherwise limit their claims. By allowing headless actions, the court ensures that employees can act as effective representatives of the state without being forced to pursue individual claims that may be subject to arbitration. This ruling also highlights the tension between federal arbitration policies and California’s labor enforcement framework, a conflict that continues to evolve post-Viking River.

The decision aligns with other California appellate rulings, such as Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) and Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (2023), which similarly upheld standing for nonindividual PAGA claims. However, the issue remains unsettled, as the California Supreme Court is set to address the same question in Leeper v. Shipt Inc. (2025). The outcome of Leeper could provide further clarity on headless PAGA actions.

Conclusion

The CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court of Fresno County ruling is a victory for workers seeking to enforce labor code violations on behalf of others. By interpreting PAGA’s language flexibly and prioritizing its enforcement objectives, the Fifth Appellate District has reinforced the statute’s role as a powerful tool for addressing workplace violations. As the legal landscape continues to evolve, this decision underscores the importance of balancing arbitration agreements with the public policy goals of labor law enforcement.

PAGA does not typically cover public employees due to exemptions for public entities under most Labor Code provisions. (see, Stone v. Alameda Health System (2023).) However, the CRST decision indirectly benefits public employees by reinforcing labor law enforcement standards, which can influence public-sector policies on wages, overtime, and working conditions. PAGA decisions encourage public employers to conform with Labor Code standards to avoid grievances or alternative litigation under the FLSA or other laws. High-profile PAGA cases can raise awareness of workplace rights, empowering public safety unions to advocate for better protections.

PERB Issues Significant Ruling Protecting the Bargaining Process and the Right to Unionize

On February 21, 2024, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important decision in Teamsters Local 542 v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (PERB Decision No. 2890-M), finding that El Centro Regional Medical Center (ECRMC) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by unilaterally denying a 2021 merit salary increase to Laboratory Unit employees represented by Teamsters Local 542. This case underscores the importance of maintaining the status quo during collective bargaining and highlights protections against discriminatory practices targeting unionized employees. 

Since 2016, ECRMC had a consistent practice of granting annual merit salary increases, typically around 2%, to all employees. In September 2020, the Laboratory Unit employees at ECRMC chose Teamsters Local 542 as their exclusive bargaining representative, triggering negotiations for their first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While negotiations were ongoing in July 2021, ECRMC announced a 2% merit increase for unrepresented employees but explicitly excluded the Laboratory Unit. Despite Teamsters’ demands to extend the increase to the Laboratory Unit and negotiate the issue, ECRMC refused, resulting in no merit increase for these employees for the 2021-2022 fiscal year.

The core question before PERB was whether ECRMC violated the MMBA by unilaterally withholding the 2021 merit increase from the Laboratory Unit employees. Specifically, the union contended these actions: 1) Altered the established status quo without bargaining; 2) Discriminated against employees for choosing union representation, and 3) Interfered with protected union and employee rights. PERB ruled against ECRMC on all grounds.

Unilateral Change to the Status Quo

PERB determined that ECRMC’s practice of providing annual merit increases was an established part of the status quo. By excluding the Laboratory Unit from the 2021 increase without prior notice or bargaining, ECRMC violated its obligation to negotiate changes to wages, a mandatory subject of bargaining under the MMBA. Employers cannot unilaterally alter established practices, such as regular merit increases, during collective bargaining. Any changes to wages or working conditions must be negotiated with the union, particularly during initial MOU negotiations. 

Discrimination Based on Unionization

ECRMC admitted that the Laboratory Unit was excluded from the merit increase solely because Teamsters had become their exclusive representative. PERB found this reasoning to be facially discriminatory, as it penalized employees for exercising their right to unionize. PERB’s ruling reinforces that employers cannot penalize employees for choosing union representation. Actions that single out unionized employees for unfavorable treatment are likely to be deemed discriminatory and unlawful. 

Interference with Protected Rights

By withholding the merit increase due to the employees’ choice to unionize, ECRMC created an environment where employees might fear retaliation for engaging in union activities. This interference with protected rights further violated the MMBA. Employers must respect employees’ rights to engage in union activities without fear of retaliation. Actions that undermine union representation can lead to liability for interference with protected rights.

PERB rejected ECRMC’s defenses. The employer’s claim that it was preserving the status quo was deemed pretextual, as it failed to offer the increase during bargaining despite Teamsters’ demands. Additionally, ECRMC’s argument that subsequent salary increases offset the withheld 2021 increase was dismissed due to a lack of credible evidence.

Remedies Awarded

PERB ordered several remedies. ECRMC was directed to cease unilaterally changing wages, discriminating against Laboratory Unit employees for their unionization, and interfering with Teamsters’ and employees’ MMBA-protected rights. Affirmatively, ECRMC must compensate all current and former Laboratory Unit employees employed before January 1, 2021, with backpay equal to 2% of wages earned from July 4, 2021, to July 26, 2022, plus 7% annual interest compounded daily. Additionally, ECRMC is required to post a notice for 30 days at all relevant work locations, both physically and electronically, acknowledging the violations and affirming compliance. ECRMC must also report its compliance actions to PERB’s Office of the General Counsel.

Conclusion

The Teamsters decision is a significant victory for public sector unions and employees, reinforcing the protections afforded by the MMBA. By holding ECRMC accountable for its unilateral and discriminatory actions, PERB has set a clear precedent that employers must respect the bargaining process and employees’ rights to unionize. This case serves as a powerful reminder that maintaining the status quo and avoiding discrimination are not just legal obligations but essential components of fair labor relations. Unions can confidently demand that longstanding practices continue during bargaining and seek remedies for violations that undermine employee rights.

 

PERB Upholds the Bargaining Rights Over Telework & Return to Office Policies

On May 8, 2025, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important and timely decision in Professional Engineers in California Government v. State of California (Department of Transportation) (Case No. LA-CE-771-S), affirming that public sector employers must meet and confer in good faith over changes to telework policies. The ruling held that the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act by unilaterally altering telework arrangements, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters, and eliminating travel reimbursements without negotiating with the Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG). This decision is a critical safeguard for workers’ rights amid California’s push to reduce telework, ensuring that such policy shifts are subject to collective bargaining.

 In a significant win for public employees, PECG successfully challenged Caltrans in this PERB case, exposing violations through unilateral policy changes, refusal to provide critical information, and bad-faith bargaining, underscoring the importance of protecting collective bargaining rights. In April 2024, Governor Gavin Newsom directed state agencies to transition from full telework, adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, to hybrid programs requiring at least two in-person workdays per week, with provisions for exceptions. Caltrans, however, exceeded this directive, imposing severe changes that harmed PECG-represented engineers in Bargaining Unit 9. By reassigning employees living over 50 miles from Sacramento to headquarters, eliminating travel reimbursements, and ignoring prior remote work practices, Caltrans disrupted engineers’ lives, who had relied on job postings designating district offices as their work locations. PEGG filed an unfair practice charge to defend its members’ rights.

The PERB Administrative Law Judge found Caltrans committed multiple unfair labor practices, reflecting a deliberate disregard for its bargaining obligations. Caltrans unilaterally halted travel reimbursements, a long-standing practice confirmed by 83 approved Travel Expense Claims for at least 16 Unit 9 members between 2022 and June 2024, altering wages without notifying or negotiating with PECG, violating Dills Act Section 3519(c). Additionally, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters forced them to bear significant commuting costs or relocate, nullifying job postings designating district offices as headquarters and breaching the duty to bargain over telework policies. PECG’s request for TEC records to substantiate past practices was met with a four-month delay, with Caltrans offering misleading excuses about technical limitations despite possessing internal lists that could have expedited the process, hindering PECG’s representational role. Caltrans’ overall conduct, marked by false statements, unilateral actions, and rejection of PECG’s reasonable proposals, such as maintaining reimbursements or allowing local office reporting, amounted to surface bargaining, frustrating negotiations and undermining PECG’s authority. Each violation also interfered with employees’ protected rights and PECG’s representational duties, contravening Dills Act Sections 3519(a) and (b).

The human toll of Caltrans’ actions was profound, as evidenced by affected engineers’ testimonies. two members retired early, losing income and retirement benefits, while another incurred significant expenses after surrendering his San Diego apartment. One member struggled to balance work with an adoption process requiring Fresno residency. These hardships underscored PECG’s commitment to its members. From May 2024, PECG advocated tirelessly, requesting to meet and confer, proposing practical solutions, and filing the unfair practice charge in September, culminating in a robust PERB ruling validating its efforts.  The ALJ ordered Caltrans to cease unilateral changes, rescind reassignments, restore district office headquarters, resume TEC processing with 7% interest compensation, fulfill information requests, negotiate in good faith, and notify Unit 9 employees, including those who left since April 2024. Although PECG’s request for attorney’s fees was denied, the ruling sends a clear message: employers cannot evade bargaining duties without consequences.

This ruling is significant given California’s recent push to reduce or eliminate telework in the public sector. It reaffirms that employers must meet and confer in good faith over telework policies, particularly when reversing emergency measures like those adopted during the pandemic. As state agencies increasingly mandate in-person work, the decision clarifies that unilateral changes to telework arrangements, which affect wages, hours, and working conditions, require notice and negotiation. By upholding the duty to bargain, the ruling protects public sector workers from arbitrary policy shifts, ensuring their rights are respected in an evolving workplace landscape.