Ninth Circuit Vindicates Second Amendment Rights in Two Recent Rulings: Ammo Background Checks & One-Gun-A-Month Law

Ninth Circuit Upholds Ruling Against California's Ammo Background Check Law

In a closely watched decision today, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that California's ammunition background check requirements, enacted through voter-approved Proposition 63 in 2016, violate the Second Amendment. The case, Rhode v. Bonta, brought by Olympic gold medalist Kim Rhode and other firearm owners, underscores ongoing tensions between state gun regulations and constitutional protections

Court's Decision

The majority opinion, authored by Judge Sandra S. Ikuta and joined by Judge Bridget S. Bade, applied the Supreme Court's framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) to evaluate the law's constitutionality. California's system mandates face-to-face purchases through licensed vendors, with background checks required for every ammunition transaction. Options include a quick $1 standard check for those with existing firearm records, a $19 basic check for others, or annual certificate verifications processes that the court found impose unnecessary fees, potential delays, and geographic restrictions on law-abiding citizens.

The panel determined that the Second Amendment's plain text covers the right to "operable arms," which inherently includes ammunition. They argued that the regime "meaningfully constrains" this right by creating barriers not just for casual buyers but for anyone needing regular access, such as competitive shooters or off-duty officers maintaining proficiency. Critically, California failed to provide sufficient historical analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras (focusing on 1791 and 1868 eras) to justify the repeated checks. Analogues like loyalty oaths, concealed carry permits, surety laws, and vendor licensing were deemed not "relevantly similar" in "how" (burden imposed) and "why" (purpose, e.g., public safety vs. disloyalty). No historical precedent for repeated background checks on every ammo purchase.

This facial challenge succeeded, meaning the law was deemed invalid in all applications, leading the court to uphold a permanent injunction against enforcement. The decision did not address related claims under the dormant Commerce Clause or federal preemption, focusing squarely on Second Amendment grounds.

Judge Jay S. Bybee dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority overlooked Bruen's endorsement of "shall-issue" licensing regimes with modest fees and delays. He pointed out that most checks under California's system cost just $1 and process in under a minute, hardly a "meaningful constraint" on access. Bybee warned that the ruling could undermine practical regulations that help ensure ammunition doesn't fall into the wrong hands.

Governor Newsom's Response

Governor Gavin Newsom, a prominent figure in national gun control efforts, quickly issued a statement criticizing the ruling as a setback for public safety initiatives. He emphasized the voter-approved nature of the law, stating:

“Strong gun laws save lives – and today’s decision is a slap in the face to the progress California has made in recent years to keep its communities safer from gun violence. Californians voted to require background checks on ammunition and their voices should matter.”

Conclusion

Many first responders value streamlined access to ammunition for training, home defense, or off-duty carry, viewing excessive red tape as an added burden in an already demanding profession. While supporters of the law argue it enhances community safety, critics contend it disproportionately affects responsible owners without clear historical precedent.

This ruling could prompt California to seek en banc review or Supreme Court intervention, especially given the split panel and Bruen's evolving application. In the meantime, this ruling removes a layer of regulation that some see as overly restrictive.

Ninth Circuit Declares California's One-Gun-A-Month Law Unconstitutional: Implications for Peace Officers and Public Safety

In a significant victory for Second Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down California's longstanding one-gun-a-month purchase restriction, ruling it facially unconstitutional. The unanimous decision in Nguyen v. Bonta, handed down on June 20, 2025, rejects the state's attempt to limit firearm acquisitions without historical precedent, emphasizing the plural nature of the right to "keep and bear Arms." For California peace officers and public safety professionals, this ruling not only expands access to firearms but also underscores the evolving landscape of gun regulations post-Bruen, potentially affecting training, personal protection, and enforcement duties.

The case challenged California's 1999 law, which prohibited most residents from purchasing more than one handgun or semiautomatic centerfire rifle within any 30-day period. Plaintiffs, backed by groups like the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and California Rifle & Pistol Association (CRPA), argued it infringed on the Second Amendment's core protections. The Ninth Circuit panel—Judges Danielle J. Forrest (Trump appointee), John B. Owens (Obama appointee), and Bridget S. Bade (Trump appointee)—agreed, finding no basis in America's founding-era traditions for such metering of constitutional rights. 

Judge Forrest's opinion dismantled the state's defenses. California claimed the Second Amendment doesn't protect acquiring multiple firearms, as the law allowed initial purchases. The court rebuffed this: "The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to 'keep and bear Arms,' plural," Forrest wrote. "This 'guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons.' And not only is 'Arms' stated in the plural, but this term refers to more than just guns." She drew analogies to other rights: "We are not aware of any circumstance where government may temporarily meter the exercise of constitutional rights in this manner... [like] limit[ing] citizens’ free-speech right to one protest a month." 

The state invoked historical analogues, such as colonial-era laws on arms sales to Native Americans or intoxicated persons, but the panel found them inapplicable. "Many of California’s proposed historical analogues impose no burden on an individual’s ability to acquire, keep, or bear arms," Forrest noted. Distinguishing from a Fifth Circuit case upholding enhanced background checks for young adults, the court highlighted that delay here was the purpose, not a byproduct of valid scrutiny.

Judge Owens concurred, clarifying the ruling doesn't preclude other measures against bulk or straw purchases if historically supported. The decision halts enforcement in Ninth Circuit states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.

Many first responders are already exempt from the limit, but retired officers may benefit from easier access for personal defense or training. The court's reasoning follow post-Bruen trends scrutinizing restrictions, potentially easing burdens on law enforcement implementing such laws.  

Gun-rights advocates hailed the win. "We have a right to buy more than one gun at a time just as we have a right to buy more than one bible at a time," FPC President Brandon Combs said. SAF echoed: "This is a unanimous decision... in favor of SAF and its partners." 

Governor Newsom called the decision a "slap in the face," while Attorney General Bonta emphasized that the ruling undermines the state's efforts to reduce gun violence. Bonta's office hasn't commented on appeals, but en banc review is possible.

Navigating "Great Bodily Injury" Disclosures under PC 832.7: CA Supreme Court's Cabrera Decision Raises the Bar

In the evolving landscape of police transparency laws, California's peace officers are facing a critical debate over what constitutes "great bodily injury" (GBI) under Penal Code Section 832.7. This provision, amended by Senate Bill 1421 in 2018, mandates the disclosure of personnel records related to use-of-force incidents that result in death or GBI. Without a clear statutory definition, agencies and courts have been left to interpret GBI, leading to a divide between broad and narrow views. A recent California Supreme Court ruling in In re Cabrera (2023) offers crucial guidance, suggesting GBI sets a higher bar than "serious bodily injury" (SBI), which could limit unnecessary disclosures and protect officer confidentiality.

The problem stems from SB 1421's push for accountability. Before the bill, officer records were largely confidential under Section 832.7(a), accessible only through Pitchess motions. Now, agencies must release records on specific misconduct, including force causing GBI, firearm discharges, sexual assault, or dishonesty. The lack of a GBI definition has sparked confusion. Some courts and transparency advocates favor a broad interpretation based on Penal Code Section 12022.7(f), which calls GBI a "significant or substantial physical injury" greater than minor or moderate harm. This could include bruises, lacerations, or abrasions—common in routine arrests.

Imagine an officer involved in a standard takedown where a suspect sustains a bruise or minor cut. Under a broad view, that incident's records might be disclosed via a Public Records Act request, overwhelming agencies with CPRA disclosures and inviting litigation. We've seen this play out in cases like People v. Cross (2008), where the Supreme Court held that GBI doesn't require permanent damage but can cover physical pain or contusions. Appellate decisions have upheld GBI for injuries like swollen jaws, sore ribs, or multiple bruises, as in People v. Corona (1989) or People v. Jaramillo (1979). Groups like the First Amendment Coalition argue this broadens transparency, aligning with the California Constitution's mandate to favor disclosure.

But this expansive approach creates real burdens. Agencies could be flooded with requests for records on everyday encounters, straining resources for redaction and review. For peace officers, it means more exposure, potentially chilling their ability to perform duties without fear of constant second-guessing.

Enter the narrower interpretation, which ties GBI to something at least as severe as SBI under Penal Code Section 243(f)(4). SBI includes loss of consciousness, concussions, bone fractures, wounds needing sutures, or serious disfigurement—harms that require medical intervention and pose substantial risks. Federal definitions in statutes like 18 U.S.C. Section 1365(h)(3) echo this, focusing on risks of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impaired function.

SB 1421's legislative history supports this view. Initially drafted with SBI, it switched to GBI to clarify a higher threshold, influenced by law enforcement groups. The ACLU even described the bill's intent as covering incidents where officers "seriously injure" the public. A broad GBI would undermine this by capturing relatively minor injuries and overwhelming departments with CPRA obligations.

The California Supreme Court's decision in Cabrera provides potentially game-changing relief. In that case, a defendant was convicted of battery with SBI (brief unconsciousness, a head laceration needing stitches, dizziness) but the jury deadlocked on GBI enhancements. The trial court imposed a GBI enhancement anyway, assuming SBI implied GBI. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that SBI and GBI are "essentially equivalent" but not interchangeable as a matter of law. Crucially, the Court noted that GBI requires a more demanding severity threshold. It cited examples like People v. Taylor (2004), where a bone fracture was SBI but not GBI because it was deemed moderate, and People v. Thomas (2019), involving a broken jaw with permanent damage—SBI yes, GBI no.

The Court emphasized that while overlaps exist, juries decide factually where injuries fall on a continuum. A hairline fracture might be SBI but not "significant or substantial" enough for GBI. This disapproved prior cases equating the two and essentially assumed that all GBI qualifies as SBI, but not vice versa. For Section 832.7, this means agencies may not have to disclose records unless injuries meet this elevated GBI standard, reducing the scope of mandatory releases.

The impacts for California law enforcement are profound. A narrower GBI interpretation eases administrative burdens, allowing agencies to focus on serious incidents rather than minor ones. It aligns disclosures with existing SBI reporting under Government Code Section 12525.2, promoting uniformity. For officers, it safeguards privacy in routine duties, preventing overbroad scrutiny that could deter necessary force. However, without appellate precedent directly on Section 832.7, superior courts have varied—some broadening GBI in non-binding rulings like Richmond Police Officers’ Association v. City of Richmond (2020).

Looking ahead, ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition's 2025 suit against San Diego over a beanbag and dog attack incident, will test Cabrera's application. Agencies currently apply varied standards for responding to GBI request. Peace officers and unions can now cite Cabrera to argue for narrower lens in court and push for legislative clarity, perhaps defining GBI akin to federal standards: substantial risk of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.

This debate highlights the tension in striking the proper balance between transparency and functionality. Mastagni Holstedt, APC has been at the forefront, representing PORAC in analyzing bills like SB 1421. For a deeper dive, look for David E. Mastagni's upcoming full-length article in the PORAC Law Enforcement News and Review, where he'll unpack court rulings, agency practices, and advocacy strategies in detail.

Watch David E. Mastagni Testifying for AB 340: PORAC Sponsored Legislation to Protect Confidential Union Communications

    On July 15, 2025, David E. Mastagni of Mastagni Holstedt, APC testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of AB 340 (Ahrens), a vital bill sponsored by PORAC that codifies existing PERB precedent to protect confidential communications between public employees and their union representatives. This legislation closes a statutory gap, ensuring workers—from teachers and firefighters to peace officers—can discuss grievances, safety concerns, or discipline without fear of employer intrusion. It's particularly important for public safety officers, who depend on candid union advice to navigate high-stakes investigations while fulfilling their duties.

    AB 340 prohibits public employers from questioning or compelling disclosure of these confidential representational communications, enforceable as an unfair labor practice through PERB. It exempts criminal investigations and aligns with the Peace Officers' Bill of Rights (Gov. Code § 3303), balancing accountability with representation rights. No evidentiary privilege is created—civil or criminal proceedings remain unaffected. This bill levels the playing field across PERB-jurisdictional employers, fostering trust and reducing litigation over coercive inquiries that chill protected activities.

    During the opening statement, Mastagni emphasized the bill's role in codifying PERB precedent and addressed opposition claims, explaining that AB 340 does not hinder investigations like those under AB 218 for childhood sexual assault. He noted that schools can question witnesses about firsthand knowledge, as the bill protects only representation-related communications lacking evidentiary value.

    In the Q&A session, committee members inquired about how employers would recognize confidential communications and the consequences of accidental intrusions. Mastagni explained that confidentiality is obvious in 99.9% of cases, such as when employers ask what a member told their representative during interview preparation. If an employer accidentally intrudes, the representative or member must object. PERB liability typically only arises if the employer compels disclosure after such an objection.

    The video of the hearing Q&A session is available here: Watch the Testimony.

    The bill passed the Judiciary Committee 10-2 and now heads to Appropriations, chaired by Senator Caballero, who voted yes in Judiciary. This momentum is reflective of the strong support from public employees and their unions for this bill.

    Thank you to the Judiciary Committee for advancing AB 340 and Assembly Member Patrick Ahrens for carrying this bill on behalf of PORAC. Mr. Mastagni is grateful for the opportunity to assist PORAC and work with their legislative advocate Randy Perry in drafting and advancing this bill. To drive final enactment, contact your legislators and Governor Newsome to urge their support—California's public employees deserve this safeguard.

    The video of the entire hearing is available here: Watch the Full Hearing.

Michigan Jury Acquits State Police Sergeant in Off-Duty Accidental Firearm Discharge Case

 In a notable victory for law enforcement, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer of reckless firearm use charges stemming from an accidental discharge while she shopped off-duty at a Costco. The case highlights the challenges of proving criminal negligence in firearm mishaps, especially when officers follow departmental policies on off-duty carry. While this occurred in Michigan, it offers valuable insights for California peace officers on liability risks, training, and the importance of robust departmental protocols to defend against similar allegations.

Facts

In February 2025, Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer was shopping off-duty at a Costco in Oshtemo Township, Kalamazoo County. As she checked out at the cash register, she placed her wallet back into her purse. At that moment, her department-issued Sig P365 firearm, which she carried in an Uncle Mike's foam holster inside the purse, discharged a round. The bullet passed through the holster, the purse, and the officer's hand. It then grazed another customer's ankle. Additionally, a third customer fainted due to distress from the loud noise and witnessing the injury.

Following an internal investigation and public outcry, the Kalamazoo County Prosecutor's Office charged Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer with Reckless Use of a Firearm Causing Injury, a misdemeanor under Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) 752.861.

In July 2025, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer. The jury concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding

The Constitution and relevant statutes require careful scrutiny in cases involving accidental firearm discharges by law enforcement officers. Michigan Compiled Laws 752.861 states: "Any person who, by carelessness, recklessness, or negligence, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause or allow any firearm under his immediate control to be discharged so as to injure or endanger any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

This statute criminalizes non-willful but negligent discharges that result in injury or endangerment. The key terms—carelessness, recklessness, or negligence—must be interpreted based on their ordinary meanings: carelessness as a lack of attention to safety, negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care, and recklessness as a conscious disregard of a known risk.

Michigan courts apply the plain meaning rule to statutory language. For conviction, the prosecution must show that the defendant's conduct deviated from what a reasonable person would do in handling a loaded firearm. The mens rea requires proof of fault beyond a mere accident, amounting to culpable negligence, as held in People v. Orr, 242 Mich. App. 694 (2000).

Law enforcement officers do not receive separate criminal immunity for off-duty carry in Michigan, but courts may consider professional training, expectations, and departmental policies in assessing reasonableness.

In this case, the prosecution argued that Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer was reckless because she entered a crowded store with a firearm lacking an external safety, carried a round in the chamber and a full magazine, and used a foam holster in her purse.

The defense countered that the Sig P365 and Uncle Mike's holster were department-issued. Michigan State Police require officers to carry firearms off-duty in approved holsters, loaded with a round chambered. The firearm features an internal safety preventing discharge without trigger pull. The defense portrayed the incident as a rare mechanical failure, not a foreseeable result of negligence.

The jury found that the prosecution failed to prove negligence under the circumstances. It entered a not guilty verdict, emphasizing that mere accident or mechanical issues do not suffice for liability. Although not precedential, this case is a reminder that prosecutors must prove a clear deviation from reasonable care. Accidental discharges tied to policy compliant carry may not meet this threshold.

Ninth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity to CHP officer Who Mistook Stroke for DUI: Must Officers Now Play Doctor? Implications for Officers' Medical Response Duties

 In a significant ruling for California law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of qualified immunity to a CHP officer who delayed medical care for a motorist suffering a stroke, after mistaking symptoms for drug impairment. D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol underscores officers' obligations to provide prompt medical aid to detainees showing signs of distress, regardless of suspected causes. In light of this decision officers should consider how they assess and respond to medical needs in the field.

Facts

On June 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., CHP Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo responded to a single-vehicle crash on a freeway onramp in Orange County. The driver, 55-year-old Steven D’Braunstein, had totaled his car in a near head-on collision with a concrete wall. D’Braunstein told the officer he "didn’t know what happened" and that "the car did something." He exhibited signs of distress, such as dry mouth, slurred and slow speech, profuse sweating, confusion, poor balance, slow reaction time, and constricted pupils. He struggled to answer simple questions and interjected random comments during their conversation.

Suspecting impairment, Officer Durazo conducted field sobriety tests, which D’Braunstein failed due to his condition. His breathalyzer showed a BAC of 0.00, and Durazo noted he had a serious condition. However, she was not a drug recognition expert and did not call for one. Instead of summoning an ambulance, she arrested him for suspected DUI and transported him to jail about 45 minutes after arriving on scene—roughly an hour after the crash.

At the jail, a nurse refused to admit D’Braunstein after examination. After two hours there (about 3.5 hours post-crash), Durazo took him to a hospital, where doctors diagnosed a stroke. The delay allegedly prevented timely treatment that could have mitigated brain damage. D’Braunstein spent weeks in the hospital and now resides in a long-term care facility, unable to care for himself due to lasting injuries.

D’Braunstein’s son sued Officer Durazo and the CHP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for deprivation of medical care. The district court found a constitutional violation but granted summary judgment and qualified immunity, ruling the right was not "clearly established."

Holding

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard for post-arrest care, which requires officers to seek necessary medical attention for injured detainees by promptly summoning help or transporting them to a hospital. This duty stems from the Constitution's requirement that state actors provide adequate medical care when confining individuals, as established in cases like County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) and DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989). For pretrial detainees, it also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, but both use an objective reasonableness test.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find Durazo's actions objectively unreasonable. Despite the serious crash and D’Braunstein's symptoms (disorientation, profuse sweating, poor balance, and slurred speech), Durazo delayed care for hours. Her suspicion of drug use, unsupported by evidence, did not excuse the failure to act, as the crash and distress signals warranted emergency evaluation. The court emphasized, that the reason for the crash did not change the need for emergency medical evaluation.

On qualified immunity, the court rejected Durazo's argument that the duty applies only to injuries caused by officers. Existing precedent clearly establishes that officers must provide reasonable medical care for any serious medical need, regardless of cause. Citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) and others, the panel noted it doesn't require "unusual foresight" to recognize that a major accident victim showing distress needs prompt aid. Officers aren't expected to diagnose conditions but must assess if the situation calls for immediate help. The violation was clearly established, so qualified immunity was denied. The case was reversed and remanded.

Judge Lee partially dissented, arguing no clearly established law required distinguishing symptoms without obvious injury signs, but the majority held the duty was plain.

Takeaways for California Public Safety Employees

The Court found a broad duty to provide care. Officers must deliver objectively reasonable medical aid to detainees displaying need, irrespective of whether the issue stems from arrest, accident, or other causes. Mistaking medical emergencies for impairment won't shield from liability if signs of distress are ignored.

No diagnosis is required, but assessment is key. Officers don't need to pinpoint the ailment (e.g., stroke vs. drugs), but must evaluate if prompt medical attention is warranted based on observable facts like crash severity and symptoms.

This ruling may prompt agencies to enhance training on recognizing medical vs. impairment signs, encouraging earlier calls for paramedics or drug experts in ambiguous cases. The case highlights the risks in delaying care post-accident.

Expect more § 1983 claims challenging medical response delays. Document observations thoroughly and err toward summoning aid to demonstrate reasonableness.

This decision reinforces that protecting detainee well-being is paramount, even in high-pressure field scenarios.  

Major Victory for the Los Angeles City Attorneys Association: Court Upholds Right to Arbitrate

    On July 8, 2025, the Los Angeles City Attorneys Association (LACAA) achieved a significant legal triumph in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, in the case of Los Angeles City Attorneys Association, et al. vs. City of Los Angeles, et al. (Case No. 24STCP03479). The court granted LACAA’s petition to compel arbitration, affirming the right of our members to utilize the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to address workplace disputes, including allegations of discrimination. This ruling, obtained by Steven Welch of Mastagni Holstedt, APC, affirms LACAA’s commitment to protecting the rights of Deputy City Attorneys and ensuring fair treatment in the workplace.

The Case: Jacquelyn Lawson’s Grievance

    The case centered on LACAA member Jacquelyn Lawson, a Deputy City Attorney over 40 years old, who initiated a grievance under Article 21 of MOU #29, alleging age-based discrimination in violation of Article 3, the MOU’s non-discrimination provision. Lawson claimed that on April 30, 2024, her supervisor inquired about her retirement plans, a comment she viewed as part of a pattern of age bias that led to her being passed over for deserved promotions. When the grievance was not resolved through the initial steps of the MOU’s four-step process, LACAA and Lawson petitioned to compel binding arbitration, as provided for in Article 21. The City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office (collectively, “the City”) opposed the petition, seeking to severely limit the scope of grievances that LACAA members could pursue under MOU #29.

The City’s Opposition: A Threat to Grievance Rights

    The City’s opposition was a broad attempt to curtail the grievance and arbitration rights guaranteed to LACAA members. They argued that only a very limited set of issues, such as disputes over sick pay or holiday pay, are subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures under Article 21, asserting that Lawson’s discrimination-based grievance fell outside this scope. Additionally, the City contended that the grievance was both substantively and procedurally non-arbitrable, claiming that Article 3’s non-discrimination policy does not create an arbitrable right and that the grievance was untimely, particularly regarding incidents predating the MOU’s effective date of January 1, 2024. The City further argued that discrimination allegations should be handled through their “MyVoiceLA” procedure, not the MOU’s grievance process. They also claimed that arbitrating Lawson’s grievance would infringe on their discretionary authority to make workplace decisions, violating public policy and potentially leading to “absurd results” where any workplace comment could trigger arbitration. Finally, the City downplayed the April 30, 2024, incident, suggesting that a single remark about retirement could not justify an arbitrable grievance.

The Court’s Ruling: A Resounding Win for LACAA

    Presided over by Judge Michael Small, the Superior Court rejected the City’s arguments and granted LACAA’s petition. The court held that Article 3’s non-discrimination policies can form the basis of a grievance under Article 21, as the provision explicitly prohibits discrimination based on protected characteristics, including age. Lawson’s allegations of age bias clearly fall within this framework. The court rejected the City’s attempt to limit grievances to minor administrative issues. The court also found no basis in the MOU for the City’s claim that discrimination grievances must be channeled through MyVoiceLA, ensuring that LACAA members can pursue such claims through arbitration. Additionally, the court clarified that Lawson’s grievance concerns the broader implications of alleged age discrimination, not just a single remark, rebuffing the City’s attempt to trivialize the issue. The court dismissed the City’s public policy argument as overly broad, noting that it would effectively render all grievances non-arbitrable, and declined to address procedural objections about timeliness, leaving such disputes for arbitration. The case was stayed pending binding arbitration, with a status conference scheduled for July 9, 2026.

Long-term Implication of this Victory

    This ruling is a landmark win for LACAA and its members, preserving a critical mechanism for Deputy City Attorneys to address workplace injustices, including discrimination. Over the last several years, the City had engaged in a pattern of contesting the arbitrability or various grievances involving a variety of issues, including appeals of discipline. The City’s attempt to confine arbitrable grievances to narrow issues like pay or benefits was a direct threat to the protections LACAA has fought to secure. Had the City prevailed, it would have undermined the MOU’s grievance process, leaving members with limited recourse for serious workplace issues.

    Through the dedicated efforts of LACAA and Mastagni Holstedt, APC, this ruling prevents the City of Los Angels from unilaterally limiting the scope of LACAA’s collective bargaining agreement. It affirms that Article 3’s non-discrimination protections are enforceable rights, not mere platitudes, and that allegations of discrimination will be addressed through the fair, impartial process outlined in the MOU.

Los AngelesCity Attorneys Association

Understanding the No Tax on Tips and Overtime Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) 

On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) into law, introducing significant tax relief for workers, including public safety labor union members like firefighters, police officers, and paramedics. Among its key provisions are deductions for qualified tips and overtime pay, designed to increase the take-home pay for those who rely on these income sources. This blog post explains how these deductions work, how they enhance the value of overtime (OT), and what they mean for joint filers earning over $300,000, including details on the phase-out and expiration date.

No Tax on Tips: What It Means for Union Members 

The OBBB allows workers in tipped occupations to deduct up to $25,000 of qualified tip income from their federal taxable income for tax years 2025 through 2028. Here’s how it works:

• Eligibility: The deduction applies to tips received in industries where tipping is customary, such as food service or hospitality. The IRS will provide further guidance on qualifying occupations.

• Deduction Amount: Up to $25,000 per year can be deducted, regardless of whether you itemize or take the standard deduction.

• Reporting: Tips must be reported on Form W-2 or Form 1099, and employers must separately report the total amount of cash tips.

• Payroll Taxes: The deduction applies only to federal income taxes, not Social Security or Medicare taxes.

For tipped employees, this deduction could save up to $3,000–$6,000 annually, depending on their tax bracket. For example, an employee earning $15,000 in tips from a part-time restaurant job could deduct that entire amount, reducing their taxable income and potentially saving $1,800–$3,300 in federal income taxes (assuming a 12%–22% tax bracket).

No Tax on Overtime: Boosting the Value of OT for Public Safety Employees

The OBBB’s “No Tax on Overtime” provision is particularly relevant for peace officers and firefighter, who often rely on overtime to meet staffing demands. This provision allows workers to deduct up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of qualified overtime compensation from their federal taxable income for tax years 2025 through 2028. Here’s a breakdown:

• Eligibility: The deduction applies to overtime pay required under Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandates time-and-a-half pay for hours worked over 40 per week for non-exempt employees. Most public safety workers, such as firefighters and police officers, qualify as non-exempt under FLSA.

• Deduction Amount: Single filers can deduct up to $12,500, while joint filers can deduct up to $25,000 of qualified overtime pay. Only the overtime premium (the amount exceeding the regular rate) qualifies. For example, if you earn $30/hour and work 10 overtime hours at $45/hour, only the $15/hour premium ($150 total) counts toward the deduction, not the full $450.

• Reporting: Employers must report qualified overtime separately on Form W-2, and the deduction is only available for reported amounts.

• Payroll Taxes: Like the tip deduction, this applies only to federal income taxes, not Social Security or Medicare taxes.

How It Increases the Value of Overtime

For public safety employees, overtime is a critical income source, often comprising 20–30% of annual earnings. By exempting up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of overtime pay from federal income taxes, the OBBB effectively increases the after-tax value of OT. For example:

• Scenario: A police officer earns $150,000 in regular wages and $30,000 in overtime premium pay. Without the deduction, the $30,000 is taxed at their marginal rate (e.g., 24%, or $7,200 in taxes). With the OBBB deduction, $12,500 of the $30,000 is tax-free for federal income tax purposes for single filers (or $25,000 for joint filers), saving $3,000 (single, 24% bracket) or $6,000 (joint, 24% bracket).

• Impact: This tax savings increases the officer’s take-home pay, making overtime shifts more financially rewarding. The White House estimates average savings of up to $2,000 annually for qualifying workers, though the Tax Policy Center estimates average savings of $1,800.

For union members, this provision incentivizes taking on overtime shifts, especially in high-demand public safety roles, while boosting financial security.

Joint Filers Earning Over $300,000: Phase-Out Calculation

For joint filers with modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) exceeding $300,000, both the tip and overtime deductions phase out. MAGI is calculated as adjusted gross income (AGI) plus certain exclusions (e.g., foreign income under Code sections 911, 931, or 933). Here’s how the phase-out works:

• Phase-Out Mechanism: The deduction is reduced by $100 for every $1,000 of MAGI above $300,000 for joint filers.

• Calculation Example:

  • A firefighter and their spouse file jointly with a MAGI of $350,000, including $20,000 in qualified overtime pay.

  • Excess MAGI: $350,000 – $300,000 = $50,000.

  • Reduction: ($50,000 ÷ $1,000) × $100 = $5,000.

  • Deduction: $25,000 (max for joint filers) – $5,000 = $20,000.

  • Result: They can deduct $20,000 of the $20,000 overtime pay, fully eliminating federal income tax on it.

• Complete Phase-Out: The deduction is fully phased out when MAGI reaches $550,000 ($300,000 + $250,000, as $25,000 ÷ $100 × 1,000 = $250,000). At this point, no deduction is available.

For high-earning joint filers, the phase-out limits the benefit, but partial deductions can still provide significant savings. For example, a couple with $400,000 MAGI could deduct $15,000 of overtime pay, saving $3,300–$5,550 in taxes (assuming a 22%–37% tax bracket).

Expiration Date

Both the tip and overtime deductions are temporary, effective for tax years 2025 through 2028. They expire on December 31, 2028, unless Congress extends them. This means the last tax returns to claim these deductions will be filed in early 2029. Union members should plan accordingly, as the tax benefits may not persist beyond 2028.

Practical Implications for Public Safety Union Members

1. Increased Take-Home Pay: The overtime deduction directly boosts the value of OT shifts, making them more lucrative. This is especially beneficial for public safety employees facing mandatory overtime due to staffing shortages.

2. Reporting Requirements: Ensure your employer correctly reports overtime pay on Form W-2. Check pay stubs and W-2s for separate reporting of qualified overtime to maximize your deduction.

3. Tax Planning: Consult a tax professional to understand how these deductions interact with your overall tax situation, especially if you’re a joint filer nearing or exceeding $300,000 MAGI.

4. Side Gigs: If you work a tipped side job, such as ridesharing, track your tips meticulously to claim the full $25,000 deduction.

Caveats and Considerations

• Limited Benefit for Low-Income Workers: Workers with incomes below the standard deduction ($15,750 for single filers, $31,500 for joint filers in 2025) may see little benefit, as their federal tax liability is already low.

• Payroll Tax Burden: Social Security and Medicare taxes still apply, reducing the net benefit. For example, $10,000 in overtime incurs $765 in payroll taxes (7.65%).

• Potential Labor Market Effects: Some analysts warn that the overtime deduction could encourage employers to rely more on OT rather than hiring additional staff, potentially increasing workload pressures.

Conclusion

The OBBB’s no tax on tips and overtime provisions offer meaningful tax relief for public safety labor union members, particularly those earning significant overtime. By deducting up to $12,500 ($25,000 for joint filers) of overtime pay, workers can save up to $2,000–$5,550 annually, depending on their tax bracket and income. For joint filers earning over $300,000, the phase-out reduces the deduction, but partial benefits remain until MAGI reaches $550,000. These deductions, effective through 2028, enhance the financial value of overtime, providing financial support to the hardworking men and women who keep our communities safe.

For personalized advice, consult a tax professional to maximize these benefits.  

Headless PAGA Actions Upheld in California Appeals Court Ruling

In a significant decision for California labor law, the Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal has ruled that workers can pursue "headless" claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) solely on behalf of other aggrieved employees, even after dismissing their individual claims. The case, CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2025), clarifies the scope of PAGA and reinforces its role as a unique enforcement mechanism for labor code violations.

Background

Espiridon Sanchez, a former tire maintenance technician, filed a lawsuit in September 2019 against CRST Expedited, Inc., doing business as Transportation Solution Inc., and its predecessor, Gardner Trucking Inc. Sanchez alleged multiple labor code violations, including failure to provide meal and rest breaks, unpaid overtime wages, unreimbursed business expenses, and untimely payment of wages upon termination. The lawsuit was brought under PAGA, which allows aggrieved employees to act as representatives of the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) to recover civil penalties for labor code violations.

In March 2019, Sanchez’s attorney sent a notice to the LWDA, as required by PAGA, outlining nine types of labor code violations experienced by nonexempt employees. After the LWDA did not respond within the 65-day statutory period, Sanchez was authorized to pursue a civil action as the state’s representative. In May 2023, the trial court granted CRST’s motion to compel arbitration of Sanchez’s individual PAGA claims but initially dismissed his nonindividual claims. However, following the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023), the trial court reinstated the nonindividual claims. CRST then moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Sanchez lacked standing to pursue nonindividual claims after dismissing his individual claims. The trial court denied this motion, prompting CRST’s petition for a writ of mandate.

Appellate Court’s Ruling

In a unanimous 51-page opinion written by Justice Donald R. Franson Jr., the Fifth Appellate District rejected CRST’s petition, affirming that PAGA allows "headless" actions—claims brought solely on behalf of other employees without pursuing individual claims. The court’s analysis hinged on the interpretation of Section 2699 of the Labor Code, particularly the phrase allowing an aggrieved employee to bring a civil action “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.”

Key Points of the Ruling

Ambiguity in Statutory Language 

The court found the word “and” in Section 2699 to be ambiguous. While CRST argued that “and” conjunctively requires an employee to pursue both individual and nonindividual claims together, Sanchez contended that the permissive nature of “may” in the statute allows flexibility. The court agreed with Sanchez, citing historical precedent that “and” can sometimes be read disjunctively as “or” to align with legislative intent (People v. Pool, 1865).

Legislative Intent and PAGA’s Purpose

PAGA was enacted in 2003 to address inadequate enforcement of labor code provisions due to limited government resources. The court emphasized that PAGA empowers employees to act as proxies for the state, recovering civil penalties (75% to the LWDA, 25% to aggrieved employees) to deter violations. Allowing headless PAGA actions aligns with this purpose by ensuring robust enforcement without requiring individual claims to be litigated first.

Impact of Viking River and Adolph

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana held that individual PAGA claims are arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but nonindividual claims may remain in court. The California Supreme Court’s Adolph decision clarified that an employee retains standing to pursue nonindividual claims in court even after individual claims are sent to arbitration. The CRST court built on Adolph, rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s suggestion in Viking River that nonindividual claims should be dismissed, and affirming that headless actions are permissible.

Practical Implications

The court noted that bifurcating PAGA claims (individual claims to arbitration, nonindividual to court) creates delays and procedural hurdles that undermine PAGA’s enforcement goals. Headless actions avoid these delays, allowing faster prosecution of claims affecting larger groups of employees. The court dismissed CRST’s argument that headless actions enable “gamesmanship” by plaintiffs’ attorneys, emphasizing that such actions still serve the public interest by enforcing labor laws.

Broader Implications

The CRST decision strengthens employees’ ability to enforce California’s labor laws through PAGA, particularly in cases where arbitration agreements might otherwise limit their claims. By allowing headless actions, the court ensures that employees can act as effective representatives of the state without being forced to pursue individual claims that may be subject to arbitration. This ruling also highlights the tension between federal arbitration policies and California’s labor enforcement framework, a conflict that continues to evolve post-Viking River.

The decision aligns with other California appellate rulings, such as Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) and Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (2023), which similarly upheld standing for nonindividual PAGA claims. However, the issue remains unsettled, as the California Supreme Court is set to address the same question in Leeper v. Shipt Inc. (2025). The outcome of Leeper could provide further clarity on headless PAGA actions.

Conclusion

The CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court of Fresno County ruling is a victory for workers seeking to enforce labor code violations on behalf of others. By interpreting PAGA’s language flexibly and prioritizing its enforcement objectives, the Fifth Appellate District has reinforced the statute’s role as a powerful tool for addressing workplace violations. As the legal landscape continues to evolve, this decision underscores the importance of balancing arbitration agreements with the public policy goals of labor law enforcement.

PAGA does not typically cover public employees due to exemptions for public entities under most Labor Code provisions. (see, Stone v. Alameda Health System (2023).) However, the CRST decision indirectly benefits public employees by reinforcing labor law enforcement standards, which can influence public-sector policies on wages, overtime, and working conditions. PAGA decisions encourage public employers to conform with Labor Code standards to avoid grievances or alternative litigation under the FLSA or other laws. High-profile PAGA cases can raise awareness of workplace rights, empowering public safety unions to advocate for better protections.

PERB Issues Significant Ruling Protecting the Bargaining Process and the Right to Unionize

On February 21, 2024, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important decision in Teamsters Local 542 v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (PERB Decision No. 2890-M), finding that El Centro Regional Medical Center (ECRMC) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by unilaterally denying a 2021 merit salary increase to Laboratory Unit employees represented by Teamsters Local 542. This case underscores the importance of maintaining the status quo during collective bargaining and highlights protections against discriminatory practices targeting unionized employees. 

Since 2016, ECRMC had a consistent practice of granting annual merit salary increases, typically around 2%, to all employees. In September 2020, the Laboratory Unit employees at ECRMC chose Teamsters Local 542 as their exclusive bargaining representative, triggering negotiations for their first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While negotiations were ongoing in July 2021, ECRMC announced a 2% merit increase for unrepresented employees but explicitly excluded the Laboratory Unit. Despite Teamsters’ demands to extend the increase to the Laboratory Unit and negotiate the issue, ECRMC refused, resulting in no merit increase for these employees for the 2021-2022 fiscal year.

The core question before PERB was whether ECRMC violated the MMBA by unilaterally withholding the 2021 merit increase from the Laboratory Unit employees. Specifically, the union contended these actions: 1) Altered the established status quo without bargaining; 2) Discriminated against employees for choosing union representation, and 3) Interfered with protected union and employee rights. PERB ruled against ECRMC on all grounds.

Unilateral Change to the Status Quo

PERB determined that ECRMC’s practice of providing annual merit increases was an established part of the status quo. By excluding the Laboratory Unit from the 2021 increase without prior notice or bargaining, ECRMC violated its obligation to negotiate changes to wages, a mandatory subject of bargaining under the MMBA. Employers cannot unilaterally alter established practices, such as regular merit increases, during collective bargaining. Any changes to wages or working conditions must be negotiated with the union, particularly during initial MOU negotiations. 

Discrimination Based on Unionization

ECRMC admitted that the Laboratory Unit was excluded from the merit increase solely because Teamsters had become their exclusive representative. PERB found this reasoning to be facially discriminatory, as it penalized employees for exercising their right to unionize. PERB’s ruling reinforces that employers cannot penalize employees for choosing union representation. Actions that single out unionized employees for unfavorable treatment are likely to be deemed discriminatory and unlawful. 

Interference with Protected Rights

By withholding the merit increase due to the employees’ choice to unionize, ECRMC created an environment where employees might fear retaliation for engaging in union activities. This interference with protected rights further violated the MMBA. Employers must respect employees’ rights to engage in union activities without fear of retaliation. Actions that undermine union representation can lead to liability for interference with protected rights.

PERB rejected ECRMC’s defenses. The employer’s claim that it was preserving the status quo was deemed pretextual, as it failed to offer the increase during bargaining despite Teamsters’ demands. Additionally, ECRMC’s argument that subsequent salary increases offset the withheld 2021 increase was dismissed due to a lack of credible evidence.

Remedies Awarded

PERB ordered several remedies. ECRMC was directed to cease unilaterally changing wages, discriminating against Laboratory Unit employees for their unionization, and interfering with Teamsters’ and employees’ MMBA-protected rights. Affirmatively, ECRMC must compensate all current and former Laboratory Unit employees employed before January 1, 2021, with backpay equal to 2% of wages earned from July 4, 2021, to July 26, 2022, plus 7% annual interest compounded daily. Additionally, ECRMC is required to post a notice for 30 days at all relevant work locations, both physically and electronically, acknowledging the violations and affirming compliance. ECRMC must also report its compliance actions to PERB’s Office of the General Counsel.

Conclusion

The Teamsters decision is a significant victory for public sector unions and employees, reinforcing the protections afforded by the MMBA. By holding ECRMC accountable for its unilateral and discriminatory actions, PERB has set a clear precedent that employers must respect the bargaining process and employees’ rights to unionize. This case serves as a powerful reminder that maintaining the status quo and avoiding discrimination are not just legal obligations but essential components of fair labor relations. Unions can confidently demand that longstanding practices continue during bargaining and seek remedies for violations that undermine employee rights.

 

PERB Upholds the Bargaining Rights Over Telework & Return to Office Policies

On May 8, 2025, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important and timely decision in Professional Engineers in California Government v. State of California (Department of Transportation) (Case No. LA-CE-771-S), affirming that public sector employers must meet and confer in good faith over changes to telework policies. The ruling held that the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act by unilaterally altering telework arrangements, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters, and eliminating travel reimbursements without negotiating with the Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG). This decision is a critical safeguard for workers’ rights amid California’s push to reduce telework, ensuring that such policy shifts are subject to collective bargaining.

 In a significant win for public employees, PECG successfully challenged Caltrans in this PERB case, exposing violations through unilateral policy changes, refusal to provide critical information, and bad-faith bargaining, underscoring the importance of protecting collective bargaining rights. In April 2024, Governor Gavin Newsom directed state agencies to transition from full telework, adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, to hybrid programs requiring at least two in-person workdays per week, with provisions for exceptions. Caltrans, however, exceeded this directive, imposing severe changes that harmed PECG-represented engineers in Bargaining Unit 9. By reassigning employees living over 50 miles from Sacramento to headquarters, eliminating travel reimbursements, and ignoring prior remote work practices, Caltrans disrupted engineers’ lives, who had relied on job postings designating district offices as their work locations. PEGG filed an unfair practice charge to defend its members’ rights.

The PERB Administrative Law Judge found Caltrans committed multiple unfair labor practices, reflecting a deliberate disregard for its bargaining obligations. Caltrans unilaterally halted travel reimbursements, a long-standing practice confirmed by 83 approved Travel Expense Claims for at least 16 Unit 9 members between 2022 and June 2024, altering wages without notifying or negotiating with PECG, violating Dills Act Section 3519(c). Additionally, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters forced them to bear significant commuting costs or relocate, nullifying job postings designating district offices as headquarters and breaching the duty to bargain over telework policies. PECG’s request for TEC records to substantiate past practices was met with a four-month delay, with Caltrans offering misleading excuses about technical limitations despite possessing internal lists that could have expedited the process, hindering PECG’s representational role. Caltrans’ overall conduct, marked by false statements, unilateral actions, and rejection of PECG’s reasonable proposals, such as maintaining reimbursements or allowing local office reporting, amounted to surface bargaining, frustrating negotiations and undermining PECG’s authority. Each violation also interfered with employees’ protected rights and PECG’s representational duties, contravening Dills Act Sections 3519(a) and (b).

The human toll of Caltrans’ actions was profound, as evidenced by affected engineers’ testimonies. two members retired early, losing income and retirement benefits, while another incurred significant expenses after surrendering his San Diego apartment. One member struggled to balance work with an adoption process requiring Fresno residency. These hardships underscored PECG’s commitment to its members. From May 2024, PECG advocated tirelessly, requesting to meet and confer, proposing practical solutions, and filing the unfair practice charge in September, culminating in a robust PERB ruling validating its efforts.  The ALJ ordered Caltrans to cease unilateral changes, rescind reassignments, restore district office headquarters, resume TEC processing with 7% interest compensation, fulfill information requests, negotiate in good faith, and notify Unit 9 employees, including those who left since April 2024. Although PECG’s request for attorney’s fees was denied, the ruling sends a clear message: employers cannot evade bargaining duties without consequences.

This ruling is significant given California’s recent push to reduce or eliminate telework in the public sector. It reaffirms that employers must meet and confer in good faith over telework policies, particularly when reversing emergency measures like those adopted during the pandemic. As state agencies increasingly mandate in-person work, the decision clarifies that unilateral changes to telework arrangements, which affect wages, hours, and working conditions, require notice and negotiation. By upholding the duty to bargain, the ruling protects public sector workers from arbitrary policy shifts, ensuring their rights are respected in an evolving workplace landscape.

PERB Strengthens Employee Discovery Rights in Disciplinary Appeals

To successfully appeal a disciplinary action, access to all relevant or exculpatory information is often critical. Skelly materials are often inadequate, as the disclosures pertain to the employer's investigation and materials the employer relied upon to sustain the charges, not exculpatory or exonerating materials. While firefighters and peace officers have a statutory right to discovery under their respective bills of rights, the labor relations statutes also provide an underutilized right to obtain disciplinary discovery.   A recent ruling from the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in Automotive Machinists Union Local 1414 v. City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency) (49 PERC ¶ 181, 2025) provides a powerful precedent to ensure employers supply essential documents for your appeals.

The Automotive Machinists Union Local 1414 filed an unfair practice charge against the City and County of San Francisco for failing to fully respond to a request for information (RFI) related to a bargaining unit member’s discipline. The union requested notes from investigatory interviews and other documents tied to an investigation. The employer provided some notes but omitted key documents and failed to explain their absence, violating the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). PERB’s Administrative Law Judge ruled that this failure breached the duty to bargain in good faith and interfered with employees’ rights to union representation. The remedies included a cease-and-desist order, a directive to diligently seek and provide missing notes if requested, and a requirement to post a notice of compliance.

This ruling is a significant win for public employees, as it reinforces their right to obtain all necessary and relevant information for disciplinary appeals. It establishes that employers must promptly provide documents like investigatory notes, witness statements, or pre-written interview questions—or clearly explain why they cannot—to support your union’s representational duties. If an employer provides incomplete information without justification, the employees and their unions can bring an unfair labor practice charge before PERB arguing the agency violated MMBA Sections 3505 and 3506.5. These rights ensure assess to the full scope of evidence needed to build a strong appeal and better chances of success.

Murphy v. City of Petaluma: No Duty to Assess When Medical Aid is Refused

    On November 24, 2024, the court in Murphy v. City of Petaluma addressed a medical negligence claim against the City of Petaluma and its fire department paramedics. Following a head-on car collision, plaintiff Murphy sued, alleging that paramedics’ failure to assess her condition led to a stroke hours later, resulting in permanent brain damage, speech and language impairment, and paralysis. Despite her repeated refusals of treatment or transport, Murphy argued that the paramedics assumed a duty of care by interacting with her at the scene. The court disagreed, holding that merely offering medical care does not impose a duty to perform a comprehensive medical assessment. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. The Court discussed exceptions to this general rule that emergency personnel, such as paramedics, do not have a duty to perform a full medical assessment or provide medical care when an individual refuses treatment. This rule is grounded in the absence of a voluntary assumption of duty, lack of reliance by the individual, and no increase in the risk of harm caused by the responders' actions. These exceptions highlight that a duty is not automatic but depends on specific actions or reliance.   

    Murphy cited several cases to argue that the paramedics “triggered a duty of care to render medical assistance.” The court analyzed and distinguished each: In Wright v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 318, a paramedic conducted a cursory “60-second examination” on a fight victim, checking only for life-threatening injuries. The paramedic neither assessed the decedent’s mental capacity nor recommended hospital transport, advising only that the decedent “probably should see a doctor” before leaving. The decedent soon died from sickle cell anemia complications. Expert testimony indicated that checking pulse or blood pressure could have revealed shock, potentially averting the crisis. Unlike Murphy, the Wright paramedic’s inadequate assessment fell below the standard of care, but the court noted that the duty of care was presumed, not litigated, in Wright.

    In Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 232, paramedics delayed aid to a gunshot victim until police arrived, resulting in the victim’s death. The trial court found no duty to provide immediate care or even inquire about the victim’s status. The paramedics did not create the peril, assume a special duty, induce reliance, or increase the risk of harm. Thus, emergency personnel are not obligated to assist “whenever and wherever summoned,” reinforcing the absence of a general duty.

    In Camp v. State of California (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 967, highway patrol officers, including a certified Emergency Medical Responder, responded to an accident. They found Camp lying near a car and asked if she was injured or needed an ambulance. Camp declined both. A friend later carried her to a car, and within hours, she was hospitalized with severe spinal cord injuries. The Court of Appeal held that the officer owed no duty, as no voluntary assumption of care occurred, and the officer’s actions did not increase the risk of harm. Liability requires either a voluntary duty or increased risk, neither of which applied.

Conclusion:

    The Murphy ruling clarifies that paramedics do not assume a duty to examine a patient who repeatedly refuses medical aid. The paramedics made no promises, ignored no requests, and left Murphy in the same position as before their arrival. However, this case underscores the importance of assessing and documenting a person’s cognitive capacity to refuse treatment. Had Murphy’s refusals been deemed uninformed or impaired, the outcome might have differed. Emergency responders should prioritize clear documentation to protect against liability while respecting patient autonomy.

Supreme Court Holds Officer’s Pre-Shooting Conduct Relevant but Not Determinative in Use-of-Force Cases, Consistent with California’s Totality Framework

    In a unanimous ruling on May 15, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court revived a civil rights lawsuit against Houston-area traffic officer Roberto Felix Jr., who fatally shot 24-year-old Ashtian Barnes during a 2016 traffic stop. The Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the case, which had relied on a narrow “moment-of-threat” doctrine, limiting review to the seconds before the shooting. Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires courts to consider the “totality of circumstances,” including an officer’s actions leading up to the use of force, as established in the 1989 Graham v. Connor precedent. This ruling strengthens protections for evaluating California peace officers by establishing an analytical framework that balances the officer’s tactical decisions against the suspect’s threat, while affirming that a genuine and immediate threat can justify deadly force, even if the officer made errors in judgment.

    The Court’s opinion mirrors Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)’s requirement to include "the conduct of the peace officer and the subject leading up to the use of force." Both frameworks reject a narrow focus on the instant of force deployment and mandate a broader contextual analysis. Peace Officers Research Association of California (“PORAC”) and the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (“CAHP”) filed an amicus curiae brief arguing against adopting a rigid “provocation rule” that would automatically negate an officer’s self-defense rights based solely on their prior actions. The Court held that reckless or unreasonable actions (e.g., escalating a minor stop into a deadly encounter) could weigh against the reasonableness of force but do not automatically negate a justification defense. Courts must also consider the suspect’s actions, and the immediacy of the suspect’s threat is often the "most important and fact-intensive" factor.

    The case arose when Felix pulled Barnes over for unpaid tolls, and Barnes drove away. Standing on the doorsill of the vehicle as Barnes sped away, Felix shot him in self-defense. Barnes’ mother, Janice Barnes, sued under Section 1983, alleging excessive force. Lower courts dismissed the suit, citing the Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat analysis.

    The Supreme Court rejected this approach, finding it improperly narrowed Fourth Amendment protections. The ruling requires consideration of pre-shooting conduct of both the officer and the suspect in weighing the totality of the circumstances and sent the case back to the lower court for reconsideration. While the decision affirms the definition of totality of the circumstances set forth in AB 392 (Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)), the Court did not determine whether Felix’s alleged escalation of the danger negated the reasonableness of his use of deadly force in response to the threat posed by Barnes’s actions. Instead, it left this question for lower courts to address under the broader totality framework.

    While the decision arguably opens new avenues for police liability, consideration of whether an officer's actions prior to a shooting helped create the danger they later claim justified deadly force was held to be one of many reasonableness factors. Ultimately, the Court issued a narrow ruling about the “timing” of the totality of the circumstances and expressly declined to address the appropriateness of the “Provocation Rule” theory, which had been previously rejected in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez and which the California Legislature had also rejected in amending AB 392. The majority explained:

We do not address here the different question Felix raises about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer's own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted the issue, precisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the danger necessitating deadly force. So, to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of Barnes's car. And because they never considered that issue, it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The question presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to look only at the encounter's final two seconds, or also to consider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context. (Citations omitted.)

    Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett, provided important guidance for assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in response to a fleeing vehicle. His concurrence elaborates on the inherent dangers of traffic stops for police officers, particularly when a driver flees, and emphasizes the need for courts to consider these risks when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Highlighting that traffic stops are “fraught with danger” for officers, he cited historical examples of officers killed or assaulted during such encounters, even for minor violations. He noted that drivers who flee, such as Barnes, amplify these risks by potentially endangering the officer, bystanders, and other drivers. Fleeing in the face of a minor violation may also indicate more serious criminal activity, such as possession of illegal drugs, weapons, or involvement in violent crimes, as illustrated by cases like Timothy McVeigh and Ted Bundy, who were apprehended after traffic stops.

    The concurrence outlines the limited and risky options available to an officer when a driver flees: (1) letting the driver go, which may embolden dangerous behavior and pose public safety risks; (2) pursuing the driver, which can lead to hazardous high-speed chases; (3) shooting at the vehicle’s tires, which is often ineffective and dangerous; or (4) physically intervening, as Felix did by jumping onto the vehicle. Kavanaugh stresses that none of these options are safe, requiring officers to make split-second decisions in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances. His concurrence underscores the need for judicial sensitivity to the real-world risks officers face, ensuring that the reasonableness analysis reflects the high-stakes nature of such encounters.

    Echoing PORAC and CAHP’s arguments, he urges courts to recognize the extraordinary dangers of traffic stops, especially when drivers flee, and to account for the suspect’s flight as a key factor in the “totality of the circumstances.” “The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffic violation ‘presents risks to public safety’—it is also ‘whether flight,’ and what that flight might indicate or enable, ‘does so.’” In other words, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry includes not only the “severity of the crime” that prompted the stop but also takes into account the suspect's attempt “to evade” the officer “by flight.”

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnes v. Felix largely conforms with the arguments raised in PORAC and CAHP’s amicus brief rejecting a rigid provocation rule and that holding the pre-shooting conduct of the officer is merely one factor in the calculus of reasonableness. By avoiding clear guidance on the weight such conduct should be afforded, the Opinion does open the door for continued scrutiny of tactical decisions. However, the concurrence strongly suggests that Felix’s tactics may have been within the range of reasonableness and cautions lower courts against both hindsight analysis and failing to apportion significant weight to the risk posed by a suspect fleeing in a vehicle. In sum, the Court confirmed that for a justification defense to be nullified, the officer’s conduct would need to be so egregious that it outweighs the immediacy of the suspect’s threat in the reasonableness calculus, aligning closely with California’s framework under Penal Code § 835a.

    David E. Mastagni was privileged to file the amicus curiae brief on behalf of PORAC and CAHP.   

AB 2561: New Amendments to the MMBA Bring Transparency to the Public Sector Vacancy Crisis

    AB 2561, signed into law in September 2024, amends the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) to address the persistent public sector vacancy crisis in California while significantly enhancing the role of public sector unions in collective bargaining. Staffing vacancies in local governments continue to be a problem plaguing public service and affecting a wide range of occupations, including critical services like public safety. These vacancies tend to negatively impact both the public service employees that pick up the extra work and the Californians who rely on these public service deliverables.

    AB 2561 seeks to address this growing vacancy crisis and gives unions an additional avenue to address vacancy concerns outside of the regular contract negotiations cycles. It requires agencies to essentially provide yearly presentations focused on vacancy issues and solutions, along with providing unions: (1) an opportunity to present at such hearings, (2) an ability to put pressure on governing bodies to fix vacancy rates, and (3) an ability to gain easy access to data useful for other collective bargaining purposes. By mandating transparency in staffing data and providing unions with structured opportunities to influence agency policies, the bill equips unions with powerful tools to advocate for better wages, working conditions, and staffing levels.

    The Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC) and the California Professional Firefighters (CPF) are two of the many labor organizations that supported AB 2561.  

How Did We Get Here & Legislative Intent:

    The Legislature’s adoption of the bill followed a series a legislative findings in which the Legislature noted that “[j]ob vacancies in local government are a widespread and significant problem for the public sector affecting occupations across wage levels and educational requirements.” High vacancies put pressure on current employees who are forced to handle heavier workloads, and understaffing leads to burnout and increased turnover, which further exacerbates staffing challenges. The problem compounds as public service workers increasingly move into the private sector as they seek other jobs with more predictable hours, manageable workloads, and competitive pay.

    High vacancy rates in local government agencies have strained public service delivery and employee morale. The Legislature, citing a University of California at Berkeley Labor Center report, noted that vacancies across various occupations increase workloads for existing staff, leading to burnout, turnover, and a growing reliance on temporary or contracted workers. An example of this alarming trend can be found in a recent report by the California State Auditor. For example, a California State Auditor report highlighted a backlog of 47,000 wage theft claims at the Labor Commissioner’s Office, with resolution times exceeding 854 days due to understaffing. These challenges drive public sector workers to the private sector for better pay and manageable workloads, further exacerbating the crisis.

What AB 2561 Does:

    AB 2561 amends section 3502.3 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) to require public agencies to present detailed vacancy and recruitment data at an annual public hearing before their governing board. It requires a public agency to present the status of vacancies and recruitment and retention efforts during a public hearing before its governing board at least once per fiscal year.

    AB 2561 also imposes additional requirements on the agency if the number of job vacancies within a single bargaining unit meets or exceeds 20% of the total number of full-time positions. In such cases, the public agency (upon the union’s request) must include the following information in its presentation:

1.      The total number of job vacancies within the bargaining unit

2.      The total number of applicants for vacant positions within the unit

3.      The average number of days to complete the hiring process

4.      Opportunities to improve compensation and other working conditions

    This transparency statute is intended to disclose obstacles to recruitment and retention by requiring that the agency’s presentation must identify any necessary changes to policies, procedures, and recruitment activities that may lead to obstacles in the hiring process.

    The bill grants unions the right to present at the annual public hearing, with no time limit on their presentation. This provision allows unions to directly address governing bodies, such as city councils, and highlight the impact of vacancies on employees and public services. The bill encourages collaboration between agencies and unions to develop vacancy reduction plans. This collaborative framework also fosters stronger employer-employee relations, which can lead to more productive negotiations. By presenting in a public forum, unions can advocate for public agencies to prioritize recruitment and retention strategies, including budget allocations for higher wages or additional positions.

    This public platform amplifies the workers’ voices, enabling them to influence budgetary policies outside of traditional bargaining sessions. AB 2561 mandates that the agency’s vacancy presentation occur before the adoption of the final budget. This timing enables unions to influence budgetary decisions related to staffing and compensation.            

Conclusion:

    AB 2561 has the potential to not only mitigate the public sector vacancy crisis but also reshape the landscape of public sector labor negotiations, fostering greater accountability and collaboration between agencies and their employees. The disclosure mandates provide unions with critical evidence of recruitment and retention challenges without the need for time-consuming Public Records Act (PRA) or MMBA requests. Unions can use this data to challenge agency costing models during contract negotiations, demonstrating the need for increased staffing, higher wages, or improved benefits. For instance, data showing prolonged hiring times or low applicant numbers can bolster union arguments for competitive compensation packages to attract and retain workers.

When Agency Heads Must Speak Up: PERB’s New Video Notice Remedy

 

If you’re a public safety employee in California, you know your job comes with high stakes and unique workplace challenges. You also have rights under state labor laws, enforced by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). In two recent cases involving school districts, PERB ordered an unusual remedy: the districts’ top officials must read a notice out loud, record it on video, and share it with employees. While these cases involve schools, they set a precedent that also applies under the MMBA, Dills Act, etc. This post explains why PERB ordered this extraordinary remedy, and what it means for your workplace rights.

Background

In these cases, PERB found that two school districts violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), a law that protects public employees’ rights to organize and speak out.

• Clovis Unified School District (PERB Decision No. 2904, October 2024): Clovis Unified illegally propped up an employee group called the Clovis Unified Faculty Senate, giving it money, special access, and preferential treatment over a competing union, the Association of Clovis Educators (ACE). This created a “company union” that wasn’t truly independent, undermining employees’ freedom to choose their representation.
• Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (PERB Decision No. 2930, November 2024): The district retaliated against Margarita Caldera, a union leader who spoke out about workplace safety and contract issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. They investigated her, accused her of breaking their “civility policy,” and ordered her to stay quiet, scaring her so much she stepped down as union president.

These violations aren’t unique to schools. Peace officers, firefighters, and public attorneys often face similar issues: management favoring one union, punishing union leaders for speaking out, or interfering with your right to organize. PERB’s new remedy of a spoken notice read aloud and recorded sends a strong message to management.

What’s a Spoken Notice, and Why Video?

Normally, PERB orders employers to post a written notice, like on a break room bulletin board, promising to follow labor laws. But in these cases, PERB upped the ante:

• Clovis Unified: The superintendent must read PERB’s notice aloud on video, and the video must be shown at staff meetings across all 50+ schools during the school year, ensuring everyone hears it.
• Hacienda La Puente: The superintendent must read the notice aloud at meetings with employees in Caldera’s bargaining unit, designed to reach as many workers as possible. A union representative can attend to ensure it’s done properly. While not explicitly requiring a video, the formal reading is meant to maximize impact.

Why did PERB order the top boss to read it aloud and record it? A written notice can be ignored in a busy workplace like a police station, firehouse, or the courthouse. Hearing your agency’s leader admit they broke the law, in their own voice, is harder to miss. This remedy:

• Shows Accountability: When the head of your agency reads the notice, it proves they’re taking the violation seriously and committing to change.
• Reaches Everyone: Your work is often spread across precincts, stations, or offices. Videos or live readings ensure the message gets to you, whether you’re on shift or in a meeting.
• Restores Confidence: If you’ve felt pressured to avoid a union or silenced for raising concerns, this public act reassures you that your rights are protected.

Why These Cases Matter to You

The violations in these cases hit close to home for public safety employees. In Clovis, the district controlled the Faculty Senate with money and influence, making it hard for employees to pick a union that truly represented them. Imagine your agency retaliating against your representatives for demanding better safety gear, less mandatory overtime, or fair disciplinary investigations. In Hacienda La Puente, Caldera was punished for raising safety issues, which scared others from speaking up. If you’re calling out unsafe equipment, unfair promotions, or contract violations, your agency can’t retaliate to silence you.

PERB ordered spoken notices because these violations were serious and widespread. Clovis Unified has a history of favoring one group, going back to 1984. Hacienda La Puente’s actions chilled free speech across the workplace. This remedy signals that PERB won’t let agencies undermine your rights to engage in concerted action, whether it’s understaffing, excessive overtime, or budget cuts.

What’s Next?

In Clovis, the district must record the superintendent reading the notice within 60 days of the decision being final (no more appeals) and show the video at staff meetings. In Hacienda La Puente, the superintendent must read the notice at employee meetings within 60 days or at the semester’s start, if the union prefers. Both districts also have to post written notices and take other steps, like stopping illegal actions and clearing Caldera’s disciplinary records.

These spoken notices are a wake-up call and a reminder that PERB has your back. When labor organization file unfair practice charges, they should consider requesting recorded readings of the notice. PERB can’t award remedies that the union does not request.