SB 747: An Unwarranted Expansion of Liability Against California Peace Officers

Senator Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) announced Senate Bill (SB) 747, the deceptively named No Kings Act, to purportedly hold federal ICE officers accountable for violating people's Constitutional rights. Unfortunately, this legislation suffers the same fatal flaws as SB 627's restrictions on facial coverings in that the legislation will not be enforceable against federal officers but will significantly harm to our California peace officers. 

SB  747;s proposed amendment to the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (CA Civil Code § 52.1) will unleash a torrent of new civil liability on the shoulders of California's peace officers while stripping away critical safeguards like the specific intent requirement that has long distinguished the Bane Act from its federal counterpart in 42 U.S.C.  section 1983.  

SB 747 adds a new subdivision (d) to the Bane Act that mirrors federal section 1983, creating state-law liability for any person acting “under color” of law who deprives a person of their federal constitutional rights without the qualified immunity protections under Section 1983.  Although proponents characterize the measure as a modest codification of existing case law describing the Bane Act as the “state equivalent” of section 1983, the proposed language is neither redundant nor innocuous. It represents a deliberate and substantial enlargement of liability California officers will face. Without the Bane Act’s current requirements of threats, intimidation, or coercion and without any specific intent element, this bill creates a much easier pathway to sue peace officers in state court, and applies existing Bane Act venues, orders, and fee-shifting applied to these new claims.

Existing Law: The Bane Act’s Distinct and Narrower Scope

Under current law, a plaintiff seeking damages under Civil Code section 52.1 must prove that the defendant interfered, or attempted to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or California Constitution or laws. In the context of peace officer liability, California courts have consistently held that this statutory language imposes an additional element beyond a mere constitutional violation, i.e. the defendant must act with specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (or, in certain Fourth Amendment seizure cases, with reckless disregard for those rights). Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860 (2007). 

SN 747 represents a significant expansion in liability from the current framework where courts emphasize that the Bane Act was "intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights" requiring "deliberate or spiteful" conduct. Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (2012). Moreover, while qualified immunity is unavailable under the Bane Act for peace officers acting under color of state law, the heightened intent standard has served as a functional substitute, shielding officers from liability for good-faith errors in rapidly evolving situations.

SB 747’s Proposed Subdivision (d): A New and Broader Cause of Action

Senate Bill 747 would add the following language to Civil Code section 52.1:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the United States or of this state, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of this state or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

This text is lifted almost verbatim from 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The legislation contains none of the existing Bane Act’s limiting elements, such as the requirement of threats, intimidation, or coercion, nor the specific-intent requirement. The new subdivision would therefore create a parallel and independent cause of action within section 52.1 that plaintiffs could plead in the alternative, allowing them to bypass the safeguards that have defined Bane Act jurisprudence for decades.

Why This Matters to Public Safety Agencies and Officers 

The legislative digest confirms the intent: the bill “would also provide” a state-law remedy “similar” to section 1983 for deprivations of federal constitutional rights under color of law. The measure further extends to subdivision (d) claims the same expansive venue provisions, injunctive remedies, and one-way attorney-fee shifting that already apply to traditional Bane Act actions.

SB 747 would remove that hurdle for subdivision (d), replacing it with a lower threshold akin to section 1983’s objective reasonableness standard and doing so without any qualified immunity defense in state court. This dramatically raises litigation risk for line officers and agencies. Thus, SB 747 would transform the Bane Act from a statute aimed at coercive and intentional misconduct into nearly a strict-liability regime for any constitutional deprivation committed under color of law. 

Senate Bill 2 originally attempted to accomplish a similar result by eliminating the specific intent requirement. David E. Mastagni successfully testified against the elimination of the specific intent requirement in Senate Judiciary Committee. Chair Thomas Umberg and the Democratic party forced amendments to SB 2 that preserved the specific intent requirement, a compromise this bill seeks to reverse. 

Sovereign Immunity: The Bill’s Targeted Federal Officers Are Largely Immune

Proponents suggest that the amendment is necessary to hold federal immigration enforcement officers accountable in state court. That justification collapses under even cursory scrutiny. Federal officers acting within the scope of their official duties are protected by federal sovereign immunity from monetary claims brought under state civil rights statutes.

While ICE officers may also receive qualified immunity for immigration enforcement activities, the more fundamental barrier to lability is sovereign immunity. Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.Supp.2d 1177 (2009). Federal agencies and officers acting in official capacity cannot be sued under state civil rights statutes. State of Cal. v. U.S., 104 F.3d 1086 (1997) held that "California's claims against the United States premised on impact of federal immigration policy were barred by sovereign immunity to extent that monetary awards were sought." Because immigration enforcement remains a core federal function, sovereign immunity protects federal officers from state civil rights liability for conduct within their official duties. See also Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 401-402, (2012)(holding the United States has a “single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation's borders.”)

Thus, SB 747’s expansion is unlikely to affect ICE officers acting within the scope of federal immigration duties, meaning the bill’s practical impact will fall primarily on the state and local officers protecting our communities. As with the failed mask-mandate provisions of SB 627, SB 747 is a symbolic shot at federal ICE agents that will almost certainly only impact California’s state and local peace officers-making their jobs more difficult.  

Conclusion

California’s peace officers have repeatedly demonstrated that meaningful accountability and officer protection are not mutually exclusive. SB 747 abandons that balance. 

PORAC, CAHP & CPRC File Amicus Brief Urging US Supreme Court to Uphold Second Amendment Rights in Wolford v. Lopez

The Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPRC) have jointly filed an amicus brief asking the United States Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wolford v. Lopez, which upheld Hawaii’s consent “presumption-flip” law. The presumption-flip is also called the "Vampire Rule," reverses the default rule permitting concealed carry on on private property open to the public and requires CCW permit holders to first obtain the property owner's express consent.

Our brief urges the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision, arguing this rule is incompatible with the Court’s landmark decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, undermines the rights of thoroughly vetted permit holders, turns everyday commercial spaces into soft targets for criminals, and wastes scarce police resources that should be focused on violent crime. A reversal will restore the traditional presumption that licensed carry is allowed unless the owner affirmatively objects, and will strengthen lawful self-defense rights for both civilians and peace officers.

At stake in Wolford is the core right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home, a right the Supreme Court affirmed in Bruen just three years ago. Hawaii's laws, much like those in California and other restrictive states, effectively transform vast swaths of public life into "gun-free" zones. Petitioners Jason Wolford, Alison Wolford, Atom Kasprzycki, and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition argue that these restrictions violate the Second Amendment, as they lack historical analogues and burden the right to self-defense without justification.

The core dispute in Wolford centers on the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the United States has a historical tradition of banning firearm carry on private property open to the public unless the owner consents. In effect, the court flipped the default rule for businesses, stores, restaurants, and other places the public is invited to enter. Petitioners and supporting amici argue that this interpretation badly misreads both history and Bruen’s requirement that modern regulations be evaluated by “how” and “why” analogous laws burdened the right in the past.

Even though the panel struck down California’s signage-only consent rule while upholding Hawaii’s more “flexible” version, the deeper constitutional problem is the presumption flip itself. By making consent the exception rather than the rule, the law creates nearly insurmountable barriers to the public carry that the Second Amendment protects. Other federal circuits have already rejected similar default bans on carry in places open to the public, creating a clear circuit split that only the Supreme Court can resolve.

Our amicus brief, authored by Mastagni Holstedt, APC attorneys David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey alongside colleagues Timothy Talbot and Michael Morguess, drives home several critical points. The brief deconstructs the Ninth Circuits faulty analogues, which fail the Court's "how and why" test, and lays out the empirical data demonstrating how such laws actually endanger the public.

First, Bruen demands that the government bear the burden of proving a modern regulation is consistent with historical tradition in both its burden and its justification. The Ninth Circuit relied on only two outlier laws, an anti-poaching statute and a racist Reconstruction-era Black Code, as purported "dead ringers" for the presumption flip. The anti-poaching statute fails the how test because the hunting lands were not open to the public. Both laws fail the why test. Hawaii's law was presumably intended to reduce gun violence, not invidiously discriminate based on race or prevent trespassing and poaching.

Second, flipping the default consent rule chills the exercise of a core constitutional right and effectively converts most private businesses into “sensitive places,” something Bruen explicitly warned against.

Drawing on CPRC's extensive research, we present evidence that right-to-carry laws do not increase violent crime. In fact, they deter it. Concealed-carry permit holders are among the most heavily vetted and law-abiding segments of the population, with revocation and criminal violation rates that are vanishingly small. In California alone, where permit holders must undergo rigorous background checks and training, these individuals commit crimes at rates exponentially lower than even peace officers. Restricting their ability to carry does nothing to enhance safety.

Modern empirical evidence, when analyzed by economists like John R. Lott, Jr. with rigorous methods that correct the flaws of earlier studies, shows that right-to-carry laws are associated with reductions in violent crime, especially murder and rape, and are not linked to increases in robbery or assault. Gun-free zones, by contrast, simply invite attack and create defenseless victims in the very places where police cannot always be present. Over 92% of attacks since 1950 have occurred in such areas, including the 2023 Atlanta hospital shooting, the Louisville bank attack, and the Texas mall incident. Mass shooters purposefully select areas where law-abiding CCW holders are disarmed, leaving victims vulnerable. Armed, law-abiding civilians deter criminals and can interrupt attacks in progress, making communities safer and, importantly, making the job of uniformed officers less dangerous.

Compounding this risk, manifestos from several mass shooters reveal a calculated strategy to target gun-free zones where resistance is minimal. The 2022 Buffalo supermarket shooter explicitly noted in his writings that "areas where CCW are outlawed or prohibited may be good areas of attack" and that "areas with strict gun laws are also great places of attack," deliberately choosing a location in New York with virtually no concealed carry permits. Likewise, the 2023 Nashville Covenant School shooter planned assaults on multiple sites but selected the school after a "threat assessment" deemed another target to have "too much security," opting for the softer target. This pattern heightens dangers for law enforcement, as in these disarmed environments, uniformed police officers, i.e. the only armed presence, become the initial targets for elimination. FBI data indicates officers are shot in one out of every six active shooter events, often in lethal ambushes at the outset to neutralize any immediate response. A discreetly armed, law-abiding populace introduces uncertainty for criminals and spreads the risk, reducing the chance that officers will be singled out.

For California's peace officers, the stakes are especially high. A favorable ruling would vindicate inherent self-defense rights that officers rely upon to protect us and themselves. The Court can also end post-Bruen attempts to evade the Second Amendment through blanket presumptive bans and bring the Ninth Circuit into line with the rest of our country. Restoring the consent presumption would allow officers and civilians alike to carry for self-defense on private property without navigating a maze of prohibitions.

A Supreme Court decision restoring broader self-defense rights could have profound ripple effects. It might bolster officers' use-of-force defenses in court, emphasizing the objective reasonableness of the response to an immediate and lethal threat, while countering false narratives that equate armed self-defense with escalation or murder. Operationally, with staffing shortages plaguing departments statewide, law-abiding armed citizens serve as a critical force multiplier in the rare but catastrophic active-shooter or mass-attack events where an immediate officer response is impossible. Politically, reversing Wolford would push back against efforts to turn most commercial spaces into prohibited zones and would reinforce evidence-based policies that target prohibited possessors and enhance penalties for gun crime rather than disarming the law-abiding.

In short, our brief argues that the presumption-flip endorsed by the Ninth Circuit is constitutionally unsound and operationally counterproductive. It creates defenseless victims, wastes police resources, and places officers at greater risk. Vetted concealed-carry holders are demonstrably not the problem. The data show extraordinarily low CCW carrier violation rates and clear public-safety benefits from right-to-carry laws. A Supreme Court decision restoring the traditional consent presumption would return workable, constitutionally faithful rules to private property open to the public and make California’s streets safer for both communities and the officers who protect them.

We will continue to keep PORAC, CAHP, and our peace-officer clients updated as the Supreme Court considers Wolford v. Lopez. View the full brief here.

Court of Appeal Rules PEPRA Does Not Categorically Exclude Standby Pay from Pensionable Compensation

In a significant decision for California's public safety employees, the Court of Appeal in Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (November 13, 2025) clarified that the Public Employees' Pension Reform Act (PEPRA) does not impose a blanket exclusion on standby pay when calculating "compensation earnable" under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL). While the court ultimately upheld the exclusion of standby pay in this specific case based on the terms of the parties' Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the ruling opens the door for unions to negotiate or arbitrate standby pay as part of normal working hours—making it potentially pensionable.

David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey filed the appeal on behalf of the Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association (VCPFA) and several individual members against the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA). VCERA had excluded prescheduled standby pay from pension calculations, citing PEPRA's amendments to Government Code section 31461 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020). 

Under PEPRA, compensation earnable excludes "[p]ayments for additional services rendered outside of normal working hours" (§ 31461, subd. (b)(3)). VCPFA argued that prescheduled standby was assigned regularly as part of firefighters' duties, and therefore should count toward pensions because it formed part of their normal schedules.

The trial court sustained VCERA's demurrer without leave to amend, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that the MOA's language treated standby as discretionary and outside the base 40-hour workweek. Specifically, the MOA and a subsequent Side Letter described standby assignments as subject to the fire chief's discretion, not as fixed "normal working hours." As a result, the court concluded it fell under PEPRA's exclusion for services outside normal hours.

However, the real victory for public safety employees lies in the court's explicit rejection of the categorical ban asserted by VCERA's counsel. The opinion states: "We do not, as respondents urge, interpret section 31461 or Alameda as categorically prohibiting CERL pension programs from including standby or on-call pay when calculating compensation earnable. The 'underlying concept of compensation earnable' is 'to reflect pay for work ordinarily performed during the course of a year . . . .'" This means that if a labor agreement clearly defines standby as part of an employee's regular, non-discretionary schedule, it could qualify as pensionable.

GOP Labor Bills Could Crush Union Organizing: What This Means for California Workers

In a move that could significantly alter the landscape of labor relations, Senate Republicans, led by Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, have introduced a package of seven bills targeting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). While framed as reforms to empower workers and streamline processes, these proposals raise serious concerns about their potential to hinder union formation and organizing efforts—particularly in states like California, where strong labor protections have long supported both private and public sector employees. California labor organizations should closely monitoring these developments. 

The bills, introduced on November 10, 2025, cover a range of changes to how unions interact with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and employers. Key provisions include requiring a two-thirds majority of eligible voters to participate in union representation elections for the results to count, banning voluntary union recognition (often called "card check"), and imposing fines on workers or unions for filing what the NLRB deems "frivolous" unfair labor practice (ULP) charges. Other measures would make it an unfair labor practice to hire undocumented immigrants, prohibit unions from using member dues for political advocacy without explicit consent, and lower barriers for employers to discipline workers engaging in picket line activities.

For private sector unions in California, these changes would strike at the heart of organizing campaigns. Under current NLRA rules, unions can secure recognition through majority support via signed authorization cards or secret-ballot elections overseen by the NLRB. The proposed ban on voluntary recognition would force all organizing into potentially contentious elections, where employer influence often sways outcomes. Coupled with the two-thirds participation threshold, this could make it exceedingly difficult for unions to win representation, especially in larger workplaces where voter turnout challenges are common. As former NLRB Chair Lauren McFerran noted in her critique, these reforms might render other pro-worker gestures in the package, like expedited first-contract negotiations, largely meaningless, as they erect formidable barriers to forming a union in the first place.

The proposed fines for "frivolous" ULP charges would deter enforcement of our nations labor laws. The NLRA has never imposed penalties on workers for filing charges, even if they're later dismissed. This novel approach could chill legitimate complaints, as employees might fear financial repercussions for challenging unfair practices. McFerran aptly described it as "intimidating for workers," pointing out that the NLRB already filters meritless claims without pursuing them. In California's dynamic private sector economy, such provisions would embolden employers to push boundaries, knowing that workers could hesitate to seek NLRB intervention.

The proposed "Protection on the Picket Line Act" would make it easier for employers to impose discipline for alleged misconduct on the picket line. Currently, under the NLRA, picketing is a protected concerted activity, allowing workers to protest peacefully outside their workplace to highlight labor disputes. While misconduct like harassment or slurs can currently lead to discipline, NLRB precedents afford some leeway for heated language in the heat of a dispute. This legislation would narrow the scope of protected activity, potentially exposing picketers to quicker repercussions and discouraging robust protest tactics that have been key to union successes.

While California's public safety employees fall under state jurisdiction through the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) rather than the NLRB, federal labor trends often ripple into state policies. If enacted, some of these federal changes could inspire similar restrictions in California, potentially limiting unions' ability to advocate for safer working conditions, better staffing, or legislative reforms that protect first responders. In California, where public employees enjoy robust protections under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Dills Act, any erosion of federal standards might encourage anti-union forces to challenge state laws.  

Pro-business groups like the National Right to Work Committee and the Competitive Enterprise Institute have lauded the package for promoting "worker choice" and secret-ballot elections. Yet, as union advocates argue, these measures often tip the scales toward employers, masking restrictions on collective action under the guise of fairness. The requirement for two-thirds voter turnout, for example, ignores the realities of workplace intimidation and low participation due to fear of retaliation.  

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the package's prospects remain uncertain in a divided Congress while the filibuster remains intact, but its introduction signals a renewed push to overhaul labor law. These bills, if passed, would complicate organizing while setting precedents that could influence California labor law.

Union members should engage with their leadership to advocacy for counter-legislation like the bipartisan Faster Labor Contracts Act. The Faster Labor Contracts Act (FLCA) is bipartisan legislation, supported by the Teamsters, designed to expedite the process of negotiating a union's first contract by setting strict deadlines for talks (start within 10 days, mediation at 90 days, then binding arbitration if talks fail) to prevent employers from stalling and denying workers fair terms. Teamsters President Sean O'Brien champions it as crucial for labor, forcing good-faith bargaining, while business groups like the U.S. Chamber and NFIB oppose it as government overreach. 

CA Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Protecting Officers From False Misconduct Claims

     In a 6-1 decision issued on November 10, 2025, the California Supreme Court invalidated Penal Code section 148.6, overturning its own prior ruling in People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497. The case, Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles  2025 WL 3136580 (Cal., 2025), centered on the statute's requirement that complainants sign an advisory warning them that filing a knowingly false allegation of police misconduct is a crime. Justice Joshua Groban, writing for the majority, held that this provision violates the First Amendment by creating an undue chill on protected speech, i.e. complaints against peace officers.

    As counsel to numerous public safety unions and their members across California, we know our clients have been closely tracking this litigation. Unfortunately, it removes a critical safeguard against baseless accusations that can stunt officers' careers. 

Background and the Court's Reasoning

    Penal Code section 148.6, enacted in 1995, made it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false misconduct complaint against a peace officer (§ 148.6(a)(1)). More controversially, it mandated that agencies require complainants to read and sign an advisory before accepting a complaint, explicitly warning of potential criminal liability (§ 148.6(a)(2)). This was designed to deter frivolous or malicious filings while ensuring agencies investigated all public complaints under Penal Code section 832.5.

    The LAPPL sued the City of Los Angeles in 2017 after the City stopped enforcing the advisory requirement, citing federal rulings that deemed it unconstitutional. Lower courts, bound by Stanistreet, sided with the LAPPL and ordered compliance. On review, however, the Supreme Court reversed course, holding that section 148.6 discriminates based on content within the proscribable category of "knowingly false statements of fact," triggering heightened scrutiny.

    The Court explained that the law criminalizes false complaints against officers but leaves unregulated false statements in support of officers during investigations. This imbalance, the Court argued, risks distorting the "marketplace of ideas" by deterring one side of the debate. Requiring a signed warning before filing could intimidate even truthful complainants, who might fear prosecution if their accounts are later disbelieved. The Court emphasized that prohibitions on falsehoods must not unduly burden legitimate expression. 

    While acknowledging the state's interest in protecting officers from abusive claims, the majority held the statute wasn't sufficiently tailored. It noted ill-defined triggers for liability, no materiality or harm requirement, and the unusual admonition process, which together create "a potent disincentive" for good-faith reporting.

    Former UC Berkeley Law School Professor Justice Goodwin Liu dissented, arguing the ruling was "speculative" and that section 148.6 is no different from other anti-falsehood laws like perjury statutes. He stressed the real-world burdens on officers: "Our men and women in uniform have a hard enough job without having to deal with knowingly false allegations of misconduct."

The Benefits of the Invalidated Law: A Shield Against Career-Derailing Complaints

    For three decades, section 148.6 served as a vital tool in maintaining the integrity of misconduct investigations. False complaints aren't just nuisances; they can trigger lengthy probes under Penal Code section 832.5, during which officers may face administrative leave, reassignment, an inability to promote, or reputational harm. Even if ultimately exonerated, the process can stall career advancement, erode public trust, and lead to psychological stress.  

    The advisory requirement was particularly effective in discouraging malicious filings without blocking legitimate ones. It put complainants on notice and promoted some level of accountability in a system where officers are held to high standards but often lack reciprocal protections. By invalidating this law, the Court has removed a deterrent that helped filter out vendetta-driven or unfounded claims, potentially increasing the volume of investigations agencies must handle.

Potential Future Impacts on Peace Officers

    This ruling could have ripple effects for California's public safety professionals. Without this backstop, malicious complaints will feel emboldened to file complaints knowing there's little downside. This asymmetry leaves officers exposed, as false statements defending them remain unregulated. Agencies will see more false complaints and officers will face avoidable jeopardy. This could exacerbate burnout, recruitment problems and foster hesitation in high-stakes encounters.

    The California Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis focused on Penal Code section 148.6(a)’s asymmetrical criminalization of knowingly false complaints against officers while leaving false statements made by officers or witnesses in support of officers unregulated within the citizen complaint process. However, the Court did not consider the existing penalties for officers' false statements under Penal Code sections 832.7(c) and 13510.8(b)(1), which address officer dishonesty relating to the investigation of misconduct.  

Penal Code section 13510.8 defines "serious misconduct" to include "dishonesty relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, a peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, false statements, intentionally filing false reports, tampering with, falsifying, destroying, or concealing evidence, perjury." Officers found to have made false statements in an investigation face potential suspension or revocation of their peace officer certification, which effectively ends their law enforcement career.  

    The Opinion does provides a roadmap for the Legislature to craft narrower protections against frivolous complaints and false statements. The Court strongly suggested that a statute imposing symmetrical, material-harm-based liability for false statements by both complainants and officers, such as the disciplinary and decertification processes for officer dishonesty, would stand a much greater chance of passing constitutional muster. Such an amendment could also focus on any materially false statements intended to mislead or deceive and relevant to the determination of whether misconduct occurred. 

AB 692 and Its Impact on Police Training Repayment Agreements

    In recent years, the practice of requiring police officers to sign repayment agreements for academy and field training officer (FTO) training has become increasingly common among public entities. This trend has sparked significant legal debate, particularly in light of cases such as City of Oakland v. Hassey and Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles. However, the introduction of Assembly Bill 692 (AB 692) could potentially reshape the legal landscape surrounding these agreements.

Understanding AB 692

    AB 692 aims to address the fairness and legality of repayment agreements imposed on police officers for training costs. The bill seeks to ensure that such agreements do not violate labor laws or unfairly burden officers who choose to leave their positions before a specified period. The bill's provisions are designed to protect officers from being coerced into agreements that may not align with their best interests or the public policy of promoting fair labor practices.

Applicability to Public Entities

    One of the critical questions surrounding AB 692 is whether it will apply to public entities. Historically, public entities have enjoyed certain immunities and exceptions under labor laws, as seen in the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles case, where the court held that certain labor code provisions did not apply to the county. However, AB 692 explicitly targets the practices of public entities, suggesting that it intends to close these loopholes and ensure that all employers, including public entities, adhere to fair labor standards.

Potential Impact on Key Cases

City of Oakland v. Hassey

    In City of Oakland v. Hassey, the court upheld the city's right to require repayment of training costs, provided it did not violate minimum wage laws. The court found that the repayment agreement did not constitute an illegal covenant not to compete or violate wage laws, as long as the deductions did not reduce wages below the minimum wage. AB 692 could challenge this precedent by imposing stricter regulations on repayment agreements, potentially rendering such agreements unenforceable if they are deemed to coerce officers into staying or if they violate new statutory protections.

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles

    In this case, the court ruled that the labor code provision prohibiting employers from collecting wages already paid did not apply to the county, allowing it to recoup overpayments. AB 692 could overturn this decision by explicitly extending labor code protections to public entities, thereby prohibiting the recoupment of wages in a manner that violates the new standards set by the bill.

Conclusion

    AB 692 represents a significant shift in the legal framework governing police training repayment agreements. By potentially applying to public entities and challenging existing legal precedents, the bill could provide greater protections for police officers and ensure that repayment agreements are fair and equitable. Public safety unions and their members should closely monitor the progress of AB 692, as its enactment could have profound implications for labor practices within law enforcement agencies across California.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Wage Cases Despite Limited Success

In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit in Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. vacated a district court's award of $312,429 in attorneys' fees and costs but affirmed that plaintiffs can recover fees for work on related class and PAGA claims under a section 998 settlement agreement. Given the remedial nature of wage and hour laws, the decision ensures aggrieved workers can receive representation, even if class certification fails.

Claudia Alvarado sued Walmart for Labor Code violations, including denied meal breaks, unpaid overtime, and unreimbursed business expenses. She brought individual claims, a putative class action, and PAGA claims. After the district court denied class certification, Alvarado settled her individual claims for $22,000 under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and dismissed her PAGA claims without prejudice.

The settlement allowed Alvarado to seek "reasonable fees and costs actually incurred... in pursuit of [her] individual claims... and recoverable by law." She moved for $591,044 in fees and $44,879 in costs, arguing under Hensley v. Eckerhart that her class and PAGA work was intertwined with her successful individual claims, making apportionment unnecessary. Walmart opposed, but the district court awarded $297,799 in fees (after Alvarado's voluntary reduction) and $14,630 in costs.

On appeal, Walmart argued the agreement barred fees for anything beyond strictly individual work. The Ninth Circuit rejected this, holding that section 998 agreements do not limit fees recoverable under California law unless expressly stated. Since the agreement referenced fees "recoverable by law," it permitted Hensley recovery for intertwined claims. The court vacated the award only because the district court failed to provide a clear explanation, remanding for reconsideration.

This decision benefits California workers and unions in several ways. First, it clarifies that settling individual claims under section 998 does not forfeit fees for related class or PAGA efforts. Plaintiffs' lawyers can pursue broad litigation without fear that a partial settlement will wipe out compensation for overlapping work. Second, it upholds Hensley's flexible approach, allowing fees where claims share common facts or theories, which is common in wage cases involving systemic violations. Finally, by requiring only a "concise but clear" explanation on remand, the ruling keeps the door open for substantial fee awards proportional to the litigation's scope, even with limited monetary recovery. For unions, this means stronger leverage in negotiations and contract enforcement.

Newsom Signs the "No Secret Police Act" (S.B. 627) into Law: Watch David E. Mastagni's Senate Public Safety Committee Testimony in Opposition

    On September 11, 2025, David E. Mastagni, a partner at Mastagni Holstedt and counsel for the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), testified before the California Senate Public Safety Committee in opposition to Senate Bill 627 along with Jonathan Feldman, lobbyist for the California Police Chiefs Association. Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed S.B. 627 into law on September 20, 2025. They explained how dangerous last minute amendments make the bill detrimental to public safety, by stripping important immunity protections for local officers who unintentionally violate the statute. Mastagni pointed out that because of the Supremacy Clause, this bill will not apply to federal officers, yet its severability clause means its restrictions and legal jeopardy will fall solely on California’s local peace officers, who don’t enforce federal immigration laws.

    Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed the "No Secret Police Act" into law on September 20, 2025. In his signing message, Newsom stated: "I am signing Senate Bill 627, which prohibits law enforcement officers, including federal immigration officers, from wearing masks or other face coverings that conceal their identity while performing their duties in public, with certain exceptions. This bill is an important step toward increasing transparency and accountability in law enforcement, particularly in light of reports of federal immigration officers concealing their identities during operations that have caused fear and mistrust in communities.

Scope and Purpose of S.B. 627

    S.B. 627, authored primarily by Senator Scott Wiener, prohibits local and federal law enforcement officers from concealing their faces with coverings during the performance of their duties. Senator Wiener described the bill as targeting secret police tactics, particularly by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. He argued that routine masking fosters mistrust, instills fear, and emboldens officers to violate civil rights with impunity.

    The bill defines prohibited facial coverings broadly to include any opaque mask, garment, helmet, headgear, or other item that obscures facial identity, such as balaclavas, tactical masks, or ski masks. The law includes narrow exceptions for certain safety equipment and circumstances, but they  are vague and open to conflicting interpretations. Violations constitute infractions or misdemeanors, with additional penalties including loss of immunities and statutory liability of $10,000.00 for tortious conduct committed while masked. Under the bill, enforcement agencies must develop policies to ensure officers adhere to these provisions by July 2026. 

Risks to Officer Safety and Operational Efficiency  

    In his testimony, Mastagni that facial coverings serve crucial safety functions for law enforcement officers and federal agents. Masks and helmets are often integral to protecting identities during sensitive, undercover, or tactical operations. Such protective gear shields officers and agents from retaliation, threats, or targeted harassment.

    He pointed out how the overly narrow and vague exceptions in the bill endanger officer safety and operational effectiveness. For example, the bill's prohibition on motor officers wearing helmets unless using a motorcycle contradicts standard training and roadside safety protocols. An officer could be exposed to fentanyl or other dangerous chemicals during a routine search of a car or home and need to cover their face with anything available in order to survive.  

    The bill also imposes burdens on local agencies by requiring them to develop compliant policies by July 2026. Law enforcement groups, such as PORAC and CPCA, fear that theses heightened safety risks and exposure to liability will exacerbate California's police staffing crisis. 

The Law Contradicts Established Federal and State Precedents: The Supremacy Clause

    Mastagni addressed the bills application to federal officers, citing Supreme Court precedent under the Supremacy Clause, including Cunningham v. Neagle (1890), which protects federal agents from state criminal prosecution when acting within their official duties. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court invalidated state laws intruding on federal immigration enforcement. The same applies here. States cannot second guess federal policies, such as ICE directives authorizing masks for officer protection. The bill creates conflict preemption, as officers cannot comply with both state and federal rules without compromising safety or mission effectiveness.

    Senator Wiener and supporters of S.B. 627 often refer to an op-ed by Erwin Chemerinsky, dean and professor of law at the UC Berkeley School of Law, to support the bill's constitutionality. This argument fails. Professor Chemerinsky contends that S.B. 627 can regulate federal agents' mask wearing because it is a law of general applicability that applies to all law enforcement officers rather than specifically targeting federal operations. Notably, he omits reference to the exclusion of California state peace officers. He compares the bill to federal agents' compliance with everyday state laws like traffic rules. 

Flawed Legal Justifications and Misinterpretations 

    Although written as a “general” law, it cannot be applied to federal officers if it interferes with federal operations. While appearing facially neutral, its practical effect substantially interferes with federal law enforcement operations in ways that traffic laws do not. Federal immigration enforcement involves unique considerations, including officer safety from targeted retaliation and protection of sensitive investigations that local law enforcement typically does not face. This creates an undue burden on federal operations that triggers intergovernmental immunity principles, protecting federal activities from state interference even when laws appear neutral on their face.

    Chemerinsky further asserts that requiring officers not to wear masks does not constitute a significant burden on federal activities and does not impede federal agents' performance of their duties. This overlooks the fundamental differences between local policing and federal immigration enforcement. Federal agents frequently operate in sensitive contexts where identity protection is critical for both officer safety and operational success. Even if only 10 percent of operations require face coverings, that represents thousands of high risk federal operations annually where agent safety would be compromised.

    Courts typically defer to federal determinations that prohibitions on face coverings create substantial burdens on operations by compromising officer safety, operational security, and effectiveness. The legislation seeks to second guess policy determinations that federal agents, particularly in immigration enforcement, face unique threats from targeted retaliation against them and their families through doxing and harassment. The inability to protect their identities would significantly impair their ability to conduct sensitive operations, gather intelligence, and work undercover. These burdens are concrete operational impediments that directly interfere with federal law enforcement functions.

    Chemerinsky cites Ninth Circuit precedent that states can prosecute federal agents criminally if their actions are objectively unreasonable, suggesting this provides a pathway for enforcement of S.B. 627 against non compliant federal officers. He primarily relies on the vacated Ninth Circuit decision in Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (Ninth Cir. 2001), vacated at 266 F.3d 979 (Ninth Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit's objectively unreasonable standard applies to federal agents who exceed their authority or violate constitutional rights, not to agents following lawful federal protocols. Wearing masks during legitimate operations is standard procedure for many federal agencies based on assessed security risks and operational needs. Criminalizing conduct that follows established federal guidelines would allow state law to dictate federal operational procedures, creating an impermissible state veto over federal law enforcement methods. This directly conflicts with Supremacy Clause principles that protect federal operations from state interference.

    When asked if Legislative Counsel had time to review S.B. 627 to determine if it would hold up in court, Senator Wiener dodged the question. U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the Central District of California stated that federal agents will not alter their practices, calling the law unconstitutional and preempted by federal authority. Local officers may face the impossible task of enforcing S.B. 627 against federal personnel, risking claims of obstruction or false arrest if courts invalidate the statute.

Threat to Immunities Local Officers Need to Perform Their Duties

   

    At the Public Safety Committee hearing, Senator Wiener and his supporters erroneously claimed that the bills' “knowing and willful” violation language shields officers who make good faith mistake regarding whether an exemption applies from the bill's criminal penalties, including loss of immunity. Mastagni pointed out that as drafted “knowing and willful” refer only to the intentional decision to cover an officer's face, not intentionally breaking the law. This general intent standard exposes officers to lawsuits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution with at least $10,000 damages, even with no actual harm. The bill’s “notwithstanding any other law” clause overrides basic protections for our officers like indemnification under Government Code 825. That exposes officers to personal liability for a good faith mistake about whether an exception applies.  Mistake of law, such as erroneously believing conduct fits a legal exemption, is generally not a defense, as it does not negate the intent to commit the underlying act. 

    SB 627 removes critical immunities that protect officers when making good faith arrests, relying on probable cause, or exercising lawful discretion. The importance of immunity protections cannot be overstated. The California Legislature has enacted numerous civil immunities and privileges, which courts have carefully interpreted and applied for decades. These protections apply only to officers acting in good faith and are forfeited if officers break the law. The Legislature has consistently refused to weaken these protections because they are essential to public safety and enable officers to make arrests, execute search warrants, exercise reasonable discretion, and participate in prosecutions without fear of retaliatory suits.  

    The late addition of language stripping local peace officers of immunity is the single most troubling aspect of S.B. 627. Officers operate under carefully balanced immunities, including Civil Code section 43.55, Penal Code sections 836 and 847, and Government Code section 821.6, which shield them from personal lawsuits when they act in good faith and within the scope of duty. S.B. 627 overrides those protections solely because a face covering is involved, regardless of intent.  

   The bill's exemptions are too narrow and vague to adequately protect local officers, who do not enforce immigration laws. State officers are exempt from the bill's provisions. The severability clause ensures that if the law cannot apply to federal officers, its restrictions will still bind local California law enforcement. This means the Trump administration will likely have an easy win in court, invalidating application of the law to federal officers through preemption challenges. The severability clause in the bill leaves local officers bearing the full brunt of the criminal penalties and loss of immunities.

Enforcement Concerns

   California Senate Bill 627 introduces significant legal challenges for law enforcement officers, particularly concerning potential obstruction violations. The bill's provisions aim to enhance accountability by stripping qualified immunity and good faith defenses if officers are found to have acted with masked intentions. This legislative change underscores the delicate balance officers must maintain between executing their enforcement duties and adhering to the stringent requirements set forth by SB 627.

Federal law provides comprehensive protection for Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents through multiple statutory frameworks. Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, it is a federal crime to forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating penalties: simple obstruction carries up to one year imprisonment, while obstruction involving physical contact or intent to commit another felony increases the maximum penalty to eight years. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating imprisonment penalties.

Ironically, federal qualified immunity doctrine would likely protect local officers from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting masked ICE agents, even if the arrest later proves unlawful. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity protects government officials unless the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. No clearly established federal law prohibits state officers from enforcing state identification requirements against individuals who refuse to identify themselves, even if those individuals are federal agents. 

California immunity statutes would likely provide additional protection. California officers acting under state authority would have reasonable grounds to believe their actions were justified under California Penal Code Section 847(b)(1). The good faith immunity, which protects officers who act with a reasonable belief that their conduct is lawful, also faces limitations under the new bill. The removal of this defense in cases of masked actions places officers in a precarious position, requiring them to exercise heightened diligence and judgment in their interactions with the public.

Conclusion

The legal complexities introduced by SB 627 necessitate a thorough understanding of the bill's provisions and the potential defenses available. Officers must navigate these challenges while ensuring compliance with the law, a task that demands both legal acumen and practical wisdom. As the legal landscape evolves, the ability to effectively balance enforcement responsibilities with the mandates of SB 627 will be crucial for law enforcement professionals in California.

Watch the full Senate Public Safety Committee hearing on SB 627 below.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Firearm Possession by Unlawful Drug Users, Leaving Uncertainty for California Peace Officers Using Cannabis Off-Duty

On September 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment against Jaren Michael Stennerson, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of methamphetamine and under § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. United States v. Stennerson, 2025 WL 2600006 (C.A.9 (Mont.), 2025).  Stennerson argued both statutes violate the Second Amendment on their face and that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Forrest, rejected these claims, finding the statutes consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation under the framework set by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). 

The court held that § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of or addicts to controlled substances from possessing firearms, survives facial challenge because it can be constitutionally applied in circumstances analogous to founding-era laws restricting arms from intoxicated individuals. Citing examples like Virginia's 1655 ban on shooting guns while drinking and post-founding statutes in states such as Kansas and Missouri barring carry while intoxicated, the panel reasoned these traditions support disarming those impaired in judgment, such as active drug users. The court noted alignment with decisions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits upholding the statute's facial validity, though it left open the possibility of successful as-applied challenges where the restriction exceeds historical analogues. On vagueness, the panel found Stennerson had clear notice, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use contemporaneous with possession, consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363 (1977), and United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (2001).

While the case involved methamphetamine, its reasoning extends to other controlled substances, including marijuana, which remains a Schedule I drug under federal law. This raises unresolved questions regarding the ongoing conflict between state protections for off-duty cannabis use and federal firearm restrictions. California's Assembly Bill 2188, effective January 1, 2024, amended the Fair Employment and Housing Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on off-duty cannabis use or non-psychoactive metabolites in drug tests. Though untested by the courts, this law may apply to public safety personnel, including peace officers. Senate Bill 700 further reinforces these protections by barring inquiries into prior cannabis use during hiring.

These state laws offer job security for marijuana users, but federal law conflicts. Section 922(g)(3) categorically bars firearm possession by unlawful drug users, and marijuana's federal status makes even occasional users "unlawful" regardless of state legalization. Before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (2011), upheld this ban for drug users, including marijuana users.  

The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed recreational marijuana under Bruen standards. Peace officers must often possess firearms off-duty. Yet using cannabis off-duty, even sporadically, could trigger federal prosecution under § 922(g)(3), as courts interpret "unlawful user" to include regular or prolonged use close in time to possession. Recent challenges in other circuits, like the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (2024), suggest as-applied relief might be available for non-intoxicated marijuana users, but no such ruling has emerged in the Ninth Circuit yet.  

Officers considering off-duty cannabis use should consult legal counsel to weigh risks, including department policies and federal gun charges. This ruling underscores the need for caution when state law conflicts with federal prohibitions.  The law surrounding these issues will likely evolve as further as-applied challenges are litigated within the Ninth Circuit. 

Mastagni Holstedt Attorneys Recognized in 2026 Best Lawyers in America

We are pleased to announce that David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey have been selected for inclusion in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. This recognition highlights their work in Litigation - Labor and Employment, Labor Law - Union, and Employment Law - Individuals.

The Best Lawyers in America represents the top 5% of practicing attorneys in the United States, based on a rigorous peer-review process. Nominations come from leading lawyers outside the nominee's firm, followed by confidential evaluations from peers in the same practice areas and geographic regions. Only attorneys in good standing with their local bar associations are considered. For over 40 years, this process has identified lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill and integrity. As the announcement notes, "the best lawyers know who the best lawyers are." No fees or payments are involved in the selection, ensuring its credibility. More details on the 2026 awards can be found here.

This honor not only affirms our attorneys' expertise but also reinforces the value our firm delivers to clients. For unions facing employment challenges, such recognition signals reliable counsel grounded in proven success. If you have questions about labor or employment issues, contact our firm for a consultation.

David E. Mastagni's attorney profile is available here. 

Taylor Davies-Mahaffey's attorney profile is available here. 

Ninth Circuit Holds Officer’s Use of Less-Lethal Force That Injured Bystander During Protest Not Excessive

In Cheairs v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that an officer’s deployment of a blast ball during a chaotic protest, which injured a nearby bystander, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscores the challenges officers face in managing volatile crowds and highlights key considerations for use-of-force policies in public safety operations.

Background

The case stems from protests in Seattle following George Floyd’s death in 2020. On June 7, demonstrators escalated actions by breaching police barricades, throwing projectiles, shining lasers at officers, and threatening to burn precincts. Seattle Police Department officers, equipped with less-lethal munitions like OC blast balls, issued multiple dispersal orders and warnings via public address.

Officer Carl Anderson, leading the chemical agent response team, threw several blast balls to protect officers and disperse the crowd. One device bounced off the pavement and struck Taylor Cheairs, a bystander filming from the sidewalk near the front of the protesters. Cheairs suffered serious injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and First Amendment retaliation.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Cheairs appealed.

Legal Ruling

The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Cheairs was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. Citing Torres v. Madrid, the court noted that force applied with intent to restrain can constitute a seizure. Here, a jury could find the blast ball’s use manifested such intent, given its design and deployment.

Turning to reasonableness, the court applied the Graham v. Connor factors: severity of the crime, immediate threat to safety, and resistance or evasion. The most critical factor—immediate threat—weighed heavily in favor of the officer. Video evidence showed protesters near Cheairs assaulting officers with rocks, bottles, fireworks, and lasers amid escalating violence. The crowd ignored dispersal orders, creating probable cause for arrests related to assault or failure to disperse.

The court balanced the intrusion (serious injury from a less-lethal device) against the government’s interest in protecting officers, citizens, and property. Officer Anderson followed department policy, throwing the device at the ground rather than at head height, reducing lethality risk. Under the totality of circumstances, viewed from the officer’s on-scene perspective, the force was deemed reasonable.

On the First Amendment claim, Cheairs failed to show retaliation for filming. No evidence indicated Officer Anderson knew Cheairs was recording or targeted him; the officer’s view was obstructed by the police line.

Implications for Public Safety Officers

This ruling offers valuable guidance for California peace officers and firefighters handling protests or crowd control. It affirms that less-lethal force can be justified when crowds pose objective threats, even if bystanders are inadvertently harmed. Agencies should review policies on munitions deployment, emphasizing ground-level throws to minimize injury risks, and officers should document threats via body cams and reports to support reasonableness claims.

If you have questions about this case or its application to your department, contact your representatives.   

Appellate Ruling Severely Limits Public Employees' Legal Recourse for Improperly Disclosed Personnel Records

    In the ever-evolving landscape of public safety labor law, protecting the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records remains a critical issue. A recent California Court of Appeal decision, Santa Ana Police Officers Association et al. v. City of Santa Ana (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 296, limits the remedies available to public employees when such records are improperly disclosed. This ruling exposes the rising tensions between CPRA transparency goals and the erosion of public employees' due process rights to protect their privacy. For public employee labor organizations, this ruling sets forth the procedural hurdles they face and the need for legislative reform to balance transparency interests with a meaningful process for employees to enforce their privacy rights.  

A CPRA Response Gone Wrong

    The case stems from a 2021 incident where the City of Santa Ana inadvertently disclosed confidential personnel records of over 100 police officers to the media outlet Voice of OC in response to a CPRA request. These records included sensitive information about prior complaints and disciplinary investigations that were not subject to disclosure under S.B. 1421 or 16. In fact, the materials were confidential under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (the "Pitchess" statutes).

    The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA), along with anonymous "Doe" officers, sued the City, alleging violations of these confidentiality laws, negligence per se, failure to investigate their subsequent complaint about the disclosure (under Penal Code section 832.5), and denial of a request for information relating to the disclosures in violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The plaintiffs sought relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and mandamus.

    The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, delivering a mixed bag of outcomes with significant labor implications.

Court Holdings:

    The appellate court's decision, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Sanchez, addressed several core issues relevant to public safety unions and officers:

No Private Right of Action for Improper Disclosure

    The court held that Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not create a private cause of action for officers or unions seeking damages or other relief for the unauthorized release of confidential records. Rather, these statutes primarily establish procedures for protecting against improper disclosures but don't authorize lawsuits against public entities who violate the statutes and improperly disclose confidential material. 

    Related negligence claims were also dismissed, as they relied on the same statutes for a "duty of care." This ruling effectively strips public employees of any meaningful remedy for violation of these statutes or the disclosure of sensitive materials that violate their right to privacy. The court recognized the violation of mandated confidentiality laws but limited the employees' remedies to administrative or mandamus relief rather than civil damages. 

    These remedies are woefully inadequate because at most they seek to prevent future violations. The CPRA does not contain any mechanism for retraction of improperly disclosed materials and once disclosed and publicized, and injection against further disclosures by the employer provides little comfort. Moreover, public employees often discovery improper disclosures once they are publicized, because public agencies often disclose the records without notifying employees or providing them an opportunity to object. 

    Even if afforded notice, filing an action to prevent the disclosure is costly and risky. If the court rules against the employee, the requester, typically a media entity, is often awarded attorneys' fees and cost. If successful, the employee still suffers litigation costs with no hopes of monetary damages. This system urgently needs rebalancing. 

Anonymity in Litigation: A High Bar

    Officers suing anonymously (as "Does") must obtain court approval after a hearing balancing their privacy interests against the public's First Amendment right to access court proceedings. Here, the Doe officers failed to seek such authorization, leading to dismissal of their claims. Officers dealing with sensitive personnel matters can't assume anonymity will be granted. They must proactively justify it, or risk procedural dismissal.

Mootness of Injunctive and Mandamus Relief for Past Disclosures

    Claims for injunctive relief to prevent disclosure or mandamus to compel non-disclosure were deemed moot, as the records had already been released years earlier in response to the CPRA request. The court noted that once disclosure occurs, a public entity lacks the ability to "undo" it, rendering such remedies ineffective.

Mandamus Available for Failure to Investigate Complaints

    In a win for the union, the court reversed on the cause of action for failure to investigate its complaints. Penal Code section 832.5 requires agencies to investigate citizen complaints against personnel, including staff involved in disclosures, and notify complainants of the disposition within 30 days. The SAPOA adequately alleged the City never investigated or reported on their complaint about the disclosure, creating a ministerial duty enforceable via mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. This "win" still cannot undo the violation of the employees' privacy rights.

Exhaustion Required for MMBA Claims

    The cause of action alleging the City violated the MMBA by denying the union's information requests  was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court confirmed the SAPOA's associational standing to represent its members but dismissed the claims. While individual peace officers are exempt from PERB jurisdiction, unions like the SAPOA are not.

Conclusion

    This decision has many negative effects for public employee labor organizations.  Unions must focus on prevention. With limited remedies post-disclosure, unions should bargain for protections against agency negligence to avoid accidental releases of exempt records. Procedures that require agencies to notify the recognized labor representative and employee before any personnel record is released would at least provide an opportunity to object or even commence a reverse CPRA action to prevent disclosure.

    Legislation is also need to balance public employee due process rights. The state could mandate these pre-disclosure notification and process for the employee to object. The one-sided attorneys' fees structure in favor of requestors needs rebalancing so public employees can seek judicial relief without the fear of being subject to excessive attorneys' fees being awarded to deep pocketed media organizations.   

    Overall, Santa Ana narrows direct paths to compensation for privacy breaches. While the SAPOA scored a partial victory on the investigation front, the case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the limited protections of confidentiality statutes.  

Sacramento Police Officers Association Wins Interest Arbitration Award: 5% Retroactive Raise, Enhanced Longevity, and 14 Month Term

The Sacramento Police Officers Association (SPOA) obtained an Interest Arbitration Award from Arbitrator John LaRocco effective August 8, 2025, adopting SPOA's last best offer on a 5% salary adjustment for all members retroactive to January 25, 2025. The Award runs through April 17, 2026, and also provides all unit members additional longevity at 10 years and 17 years of service, and well as an additional 4% increase for Dispatcher IIIs. 

Binding under the Sacramento City Charter, this Award provides SPOA members substantial and immediate increases, while also allowing the parties to promptly return to negations to bargain over a long-term agreement. The City had initially refused to bargain, forcing the SPOA to file an unfair labor practice in December of 2024 and ultimately resulting in members working for over six (6) months without a contract. Unable to reach a long-term agreement, the SPOA and the City agreed to an expedited arbitration process of over a limited number of proposals. The issuance of this Award and its immediate financial relief illustrates the value of interest arbitration in resolving difficult negotiations.

The Interest Arbitration Process: Binding Impasse Resolution Under the City Charter

The Sacramento City Charter, Article XVIII, Section 503, mandates interest arbitration to break deadlocks in negotiations over wages, hours, benefits, and terms of employment. Unlike the advisory fact-finding under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which often leaves disputes unresolved due to its advisory nature, impasse arbitration provides for a neutral arbitrator to select from the last best offer of each party that best matches traditional factors: consumer price changes, comparable compensation in similar classifications (based on the local market and similarly sized cities throughout the state), the City's financial condition and ability to pay, staffing/recruitment/retention data, and other relevant information.

Here, the parties stipulated to an expedited mediation-arbitration (med-arb) process before a single arbitrator, limiting the issues to salary, pay differentials for Dispatcher III, longevity pay, and term. This strategic move narrowed the scope of proposals and relaxed the arbitration procedures to allow for a swift award while preserving the ability to quickly return to formal negotiations to address additional proposals and seek a longer-term contract.

 The Award

Arbitrator LaRocco selected a blend of proposals, favoring SPOA on core economic issues:

Salary Adjustments: Adopted SPOA's proposal for a 5% increase across all classifications, effective retroactively to January 25, 2025 (the expiration of the prior contract). The Award rejected the City's 2.5% offer without retroactivity, based on the parties' history of retroactive increases and SPOA's evidence showing City police salaries lagging below market comparators. Even the City's compensation survey (which used a controversial ERI cost-of-living adjustment for comparator cities) showed officers fell below market means and medians, as well as below Sacramento County deputies for the first time.

Dispatcher III Differential: Adopted SPOA's proposal to raise the salary benchmark from 17% to 21% above Dispatcher II top step, effective upon Award implementation. This proposal brings Dispatcher IIIs up to the sergeant-officer differentials and addresses chronic staffing problems within the dispatcher classifications. 

Longevity Pay: Established new 1.5% incentive at 10 years of service and increasing the existing 3% at 17 years to 4.5%, effective July 1, 2025. Although the Award selected the City's Longevity proposal due primarily to the overall cost of the increases provided by the Award over a short amount of time, the arbitrator noted importance of increasing retention incentives for mid-career officers. The arbitrator suggested that future contracts should both increase longevity pays and provide them sooner. 

Demonstrating the importance of interest arbitration, the City's submitted its first formal proposal to increase longevity in arbitration when faced with the prospect of the arbitrator adopting the SPOA proposal for a 3% increase at 10 and 17 years of service. Because the arbitrator selects the most reasonable offer, the City had to increase its proposals or risk losing on this issue.  

Contract Term: The arbitrator selected the City's proposed term from January 25, 2025, to April 17, 2026, over the SPOA proposed term to January 24, 2026. The arbitrator reasoned that the City's proposal provided more breathing room for comprehensive negotiations on unresolved issues. 

The award also incorporates four tentative agreements reached pre-arbitration and retains jurisdiction for implementation disputes.

City's Budget Deficit Claims

The City argued inability to pay, citing a structural deficit projected at $50 million for FY 2025-2026, escalating to $130 million by FY 2028-2029, driven by past policy decisions like expanded services funded by temporary revenues. The arbitrator acknowledged the deficit's ongoing nature but distinguished it from external shocks like recessions. The City admitted that its revenues were growing at a healthy rate, but argued that spending priorities were outpacing the revenue growth. 

As detailed in the award, the City's Finance Director testified that "the City is experiencing a severe structural budget deficit of an ongoing nature" originating several years ago, with an initial February 2025 projection of "$62 million for fiscal year 2025-2026" updated to "$50 million" by July. The director acknowledged that "the structural budget deficit was caused by past City and voter decisions," including "long-run expenditure commitments based on one-time or two-time funding," resulting in a "continuing imbalance between revenues and expenditures." While "economic externalities, like inflation, contributed to the deficit," they "did not play a major role in causing the severe structural deficit."

Future projections included "$93.6 million for fiscal year 2026-2027; $110.1 million for fiscal year 2027-2028; and, $130.3 million for fiscal year 2028-2029." The City noted that "about 50% of City expenditures go toward employee salaries" and "every 1% salary increase for City employees costs $4.8 million," alongside unfunded liabilities like PERS contribution increases.

SPOA countered with expert analyses challenging these claims. Beacon Economics forecasted higher tax revenues, concluding "the City remains fiscally healthy because City employment, real estate transactions and business activities continue to thrive," with "property taxes will rise 4% to 8% over the next three fiscal years." Harvey M. Rose Associates reviewed historical data, finding that "for the past four fiscal years, the City projected General Fund deficits of $78.8 million to $160.5 million while the actual deficits were $5.6 million to $21.4 million." Applying this pattern, Rose estimated the FY 2025-2026 deficit at "approximately $34 million" and noted "the City has sufficient reserves to absorb the shortfall." Rose further observed that "the City's General Fund balance rose from $225.4 million to $326.4 million between fiscal year 2019-2020 and fiscal year 2023-2024," concluding "the General Fund is relatively healthy" and criticizing the City's "history of grossly overstating expected budget deficits."

The arbitrator acknowledged the deficits but found they did not preclude funding reasonable increases given the City's healthy reserves and the need for public safety. The arbitrator stated, "the City is experiencing a structural budget deficit and unfortunately, the evidence does not disclose how long the deficit might endure. It cannot be indefinite." However, he found the City's projections "exaggerated" even if SPOA's predictions were "overly optimistic," emphasizing that "if the City's projections are accurate, City inaction could prolong the deficit, which would precipitate fiscal chaos." Critically, he distinguished policy-driven shortfalls from external factors, holding that "a 5% wage increase cannot be nullified by diverse and contradictory evidence concerning the City's ability to pay." Employees "were not responsible for causing the deficit," and public safety "should be a top priority." With tax revenues expected to rise, the City "has the ability to fund a 5% salary increase."

Vacancies and Retention Challenges

The arbitrator noted the significance of the City's police officer vacancies, which were directly relevant to the parties proposals. The arbitrator noted, "the evidence reveals that the City's Police Department is confronted with a retention problem." The data presented revealed stark declines. "In June, 2025, there were 619 budgeted police officer positions, but only 470.5 were filled and only 373 were working. The number of working officers was just 60% of the budget positions." For context, "as of January, 2021, 94% (533.5) of the 569 budget positions were filled and 84% (479) of the positions were working." The arbitrator observed that "the percent of officers working as compared to budget positions had not been at or below 60% since 2015-2017" and that "except for a short upward bump in early 2022, the percentage of budgeted positions filled and working has steadily declined since 2021 indicating that police officer retention is a problem which must be addressed albeit, it cannot be cured in this agreement." 

The arbitrator emphasized the importance of early longevity steps and competitive salaries. "Commencing longevity pay at 10 years will begin to alleviate the problem" by establishing "a foundation for possible greater longevity pay in future contracts, especially if the parties collect more data about the reasons for the retention problem and where the departing officers are landing." He suggested flexibility for future adjustments, noting "during their upcoming negotiations, the parties may find that it might be more beneficial to start longevity pay before 10 years of service as opposed to raising longevity pay at 17 years of service."

Future Impacts 

This Award strengthens SPOA's position and provides the parties guidance to address the growing problem of officer vacancies by enhancing mid-term longevity as a retention tool. The arbitrator noted  growing vacancies of 20% of authorized positions and declining fill rates of working officers from 84% in 2021 to 60% by June of 2025. He noted that starting longevity at 10 years lays the groundwork for expansions, potentially before 10 years if data shows earlier incentives curb attrition more effectively. 

This Award also demonstrates the power of interest arbitration to provide binding decisions based on data-driven evidence and prevents endless stalemates. The analysis highlights the importance of comparable data, recruitment and retention data, and ability to pay evidence in any negotiations or impasse proceedings. Further, it provides insights regarding differences in how arbitrators view budget deficits cited as a basis to deny raises depending upon whether the deficit is policy driven , e.g. other spending priorities, or caused by external factors, e.g. recessions.

Mastagni Labor Representative Jose Cuervo was SPOA's lead negotiator during these negotiations and David E. Mastagni represented the SPOA during the Interest Arbitration.  

CLICK HERE TO READ THE INTEREST ARBITRATION AWARD.