A Cautionary Tale: Refusal of Recommended Surgery Leads to Denial of Deputy's Disability Retirement

    In a significant decision for public safety employees seeking disability retirement benefits, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, has upheld the denial of a deputy sheriff's application for service-connected disability retirement. The ruling in Alberto Mendoza v. Board of Retirement of the Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association (2025) 94 Cal.App.5th 1234 emphasizes the critical importance of complying with recommended medical treatments, even when personal fears or anecdotal concerns lead to hesitation. This case serves as a cautionary reminder that an unreasonable refusal to undergo advised procedures can bar access to essential retirement protections under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL) and related doctrines.

    The Appellant, a Ventura County Deputy Sheriff assigned to the Todd Road Jail Facility, sustained two work-related back injuries. The first occurred on December 30, 2014, when he slipped on stairs, causing lower back discomfort. The second followed on May 27, 2015, during an altercation with an inmate who kicked him in the waist. Diagnostic imaging revealed degenerative disc disease at the L5-S1 level, along with a disc herniation and extrusion abutting the right S1 nerve root. Multiple physicians, including the Qualified Medical Evaluator Dr. Robert H. Fields and treating doctors Dr. Brian Grossman and Dr. Sam Bakshian, unanimously recommended surgical intervention, citing a high likelihood of successful outcomes—estimated at 90 percent for good to excellent results given the deputy's youth and overall health.

    Despite authorization from the County of Ventura and repeated urgings from his medical team, the deputy declined the procedures. His refusal stemmed from fears informed by colleagues' negative experiences with back surgery and online research, which Dr. Fields characterized as based on "bad information." Over time, his condition deteriorated, as evidenced by subsequent MRIs showing progression of the discopathy. By 2017, more extensive surgery, such as a spinal fusion, was deemed necessary, but even then, he wavered before ultimately deciding against it. In 2018, another evaluator noted improvement to the point where surgery was no longer indicated, but the deputy's ongoing disability persisted, attributed in part to his non-compliance with home exercises and other conservative measures.

    The deputy applied for service-connected disability retirement in May 2016, invoking Government Code sections 31720 et seq. The Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association Board denied the application following an administrative hearing, finding that his permanent incapacity resulted not from the industrial injuries themselves but from his unreasonable refusal to submit to recommended treatment. The trial court denied his petition for a writ of administrative mandate, and the appellate court affirmed, relying on the common law doctrine of avoidable consequences as articulated in Reynolds v. City of San Carlos (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 208 and Labor Code section 4056. The latter provides that no compensation is payable where disability is caused, continued, or aggravated by an unreasonable refusal to undergo medical or surgical treatment, provided the risk is inconsiderable relative to the injury's seriousness based on expert advice.

    The court rejected the deputy's argument that the doctrine should not apply because, unlike in Reynolds, the recommended surgeries would not have enabled his return to full duty as a deputy sheriff. Instead, it held that the principle extends to situations where timely treatment might have prevented the worsening of the condition, even if the window for effective intervention has closed due to delay. As the court explained, a retirement board may reasonably conclude that the employee's inability to work stems from their own choices rather than the work-related injury alone.

    For California public safety unions and their members, peace officers and firefighters alike, this ruling underscores both the protections and pitfalls inherent in the disability retirement system. On the beneficial side, it reinforces the expectation that employers and retirement boards must base denials on substantial evidence of unreasonableness, considering factors such as the treatment's success rate, risks, and the employee's informed decision-making process. Employees facing similar dilemmas can leverage this to advocate for comprehensive medical counseling and second opinions, potentially strengthening their claims if refusal is deemed reasonable under the circumstances.

    However, the risks are substantial. Refusing treatment perceived as low-risk and high-reward could forfeit not only retirement benefits but also compound physical suffering through condition progression. In high-stakes professions where injuries are commonplace, this decision incentivizes prompt compliance with medical recommendations to preserve eligibility for tax-advantaged disability pensions. It also highlights the interplay between workers' compensation and retirement systems, where delays in one arena can adversely affect the other.

    Looking ahead, this ruling may influence future litigation by empowering retirement boards to more rigorously scrutinize applications involving treatment non-compliance. Public safety employees might see increased pressure from employers to pursue aggressive interventions, potentially leading to disputes over what constitutes "unreasonable" refusal—especially in cases involving psychological barriers like fear or cultural mistrust of surgery. Unions should consider negotiating enhanced support mechanisms, such as peer counseling or alternative treatment options, to mitigate these risks. Moreover, with the opinion now certified for publication, it establishes binding precedent statewide, likely prompting retirement associations in other counties to adopt similar stances.

    Public safety professionals dedicate their careers to protecting communities, often at great personal cost. Decisions like Mendoza remind us that safeguarding one's own health through informed, timely action is equally vital to securing the benefits earned through that service. For personalized guidance on disability retirement claims or related matters, members are encouraged to consult with experienced labor counsel.

Significant Expansions to Workers' Compensation Protections for California's Public Safety Employees Effective January 1, 2026

    As we approach 2026, California’s workers’ compensation system is set to undergo significant changes that will directly impact all workers, with particular emphasis on public safety employees. These legislative updates, effective January 1, 2026, aim to enhance protections and streamline processes for those who serve in high-risk environments. Key bills such as SB 20, SB 230, SB 447, and SB 487, along with AB 799, AB 1125, AB 1293, and AB 1398, introduce reforms that public safety workers should be aware of. These measures take effect January 1, 2026, and will influence how claims are alleged, defended, documented, and resolved.

    The Legislature has again focused on public safety workers, expanding presumptions and access to benefits consistent with occupational exposures and cumulative trauma realities. For injured workers, these reforms are likely to expand access to timely care, strengthen protections for public safety personnel, and reduce procedural obstacles that historically prolonged litigation. Families of injured or deceased workers may see improved clarity in death benefit procedures, potential adjustments in dependency standards, and better coordination between workers’ compensation benefits and collateral benefits.

    The reforms address conditions frequently encountered by firefighters, peace officers, and allied public safety personnel, potentially enlarging the list of presumptive injuries and extending statutory presumption periods. The legislation may adjust evidentiary burdens for rebutting presumptions, mandate employer notice regarding coverage and procedural rights, and refine the interplay between industrial causation, apportionment, and preexisting conditions. Public entities and their third-party administrators will likely have to reassess their protocols for investigation, panel selection, and early intervention in light of these changes.

    One of the most notable changes is SB 230, which expands presumptive coverage for firefighters. This bill extends protections for conditions like cancer and PTSD to those working at commercial airports, NASA installations, and U.S. Department of Defense facilities. This means that if you’re a firefighter in these environments, you’ll have broader coverage for injuries related to your work, making it easier to access the benefits you deserve.

    SB 447 is another critical piece of legislation, closing the gap between state and federal law by extending health benefits for minor dependents of public safety personnel who die in the line of duty. This change aligns with the Affordable Care Act, ensuring that your family is supported if the unthinkable happens.

    Peace officers and firefighters will also benefit from SB 487, which limits employer subrogation rights in third-party recovery actions. This bill guarantees that you receive a fair share of liability insurance proceeds, protecting your financial interests in the event of an injury.

    AB 799 introduces a dedicated death benefit for incarcerated firefighters participating in the California Conservation Camp program. This provision acknowledges the risks faced by these individuals and ensures their families receive support.

    Additionally, AB 1125 extends the heart injury presumption to peace officers employed by the State Department of State Hospitals. This change recognizes the unique risks faced by these officers and ensures they receive the same benefits as their counterparts at Atascadero State Hospital.

    For those involved in medical evaluations, AB 1293 aims to improve the consistency and quality of medical reporting by developing standardized templates for Qualified Medical Examiner reports. This will help ensure that your medical evaluations are clear and comprehensive.

    Finally, AB 1398 targets fraud and conflicts of interest, requiring transparency in service referrals. This measure protects workers from schemes that could undermine their claims.

    We anticipate revised definitions pertinent to compensable injuries, updated standards governing medical treatment utilization review and independent medical review, and adjustments to permanent disability rating inputs. The legislation is expected to refine claim processing timeframes, enhance disclosure and record completeness requirements in medical-legal evaluations, and clarify when penalties and attorney’s fees are available for unreasonable delay or denial.  

    Early case triage will become more important, particularly where presumptions are implicated and where medical-legal issues must be framed early to avoid downstream fights. Experienced counsel will likely be needed in order to ensure experts properly apply the revised standards and develop evidence in support of causation, apportionment, and disability assessments.

    These legislative changes reflect California’s commitment to supporting public safety employees by expanding benefits and improving the workers’ compensation system. As these laws take effect, it’s crucial for you to stay informed and understand how they impact your rights and benefits. By doing so, you can ensure that you and your family are protected as you continue to serve your community. 

    As the January 1, 2026 effective date approaches, unions should ensure their members are aware of updated reporting requirements and timelines. 

    Taken together, these enactments underscore California's commitment to bolstering the workers' compensation framework for public safety employees, closing benefit disparities, and refining system procedures. For peace officers, firefighters, and their unions, the 2026 landscape offers enhanced presumptions, family protections, and recovery priorities that better reflect the realities of the job. Practitioners and members alike should prepare to leverage these changes in upcoming claims. 

    As the January 1, 2026 effective date approaches, Mastagni Holstedt APC, remains dedicated to advocating for the full rights of California's workers and public safety professionals and stands ready to enforce these evolving protections.

Court of Appeal Clarifies Standby Pay Under PEPRA: Audio of David Mastagni's Oral Argument Now Available

    The audio from partner attorney David E. Mastagni’s oral argument is now available to listen—and it accompanies a major development for California’s public safety employees. In Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association, the Court of Appeal ruled the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA) does not impose a categorial ban on counting standby pay as pensionable compensation under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL).

    Although the court ultimately upheld Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association’s exclusion of standby pay in this particular case, the opinion delivers an important clarification: standby or on-call pay can be pensionable if it is part of an employee’s regular, non-discretionary schedule.

For a more detailed analysis of the case, please refer to our full blog post here.

You can listen to David’s argument here.

A Cautionary Tale From PERB: When AI Hallucinations Lead to Stricken Briefs and Lost Arguments

    In the fast-evolving world of public sector labor law, tools like generative AI promise efficiency and innovation. But as a recent decision from the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) reminds us, they can also spell disaster if not handled with the utmost care. In California State University Employees Union v. Trustees of the California State University (San Diego) (PERB Case No. LA-CE-1433-H), an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) took the extraordinary step of striking the employer’s pre-hearing brief from the record. The reason? Fabricated citations and quotations from a federal appellate decision that simply didn’t exist as presented—hallmarks of unchecked AI output.

    Let’s break this down step by step, because this isn’t just a procedural hiccup; it’s a wake-up call for unions, employers, and practitioners alike in California’s public safety sector.

The Case Background

    The underlying dispute centers on the employee status of residential assistants (“RAs”) under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (“HEERA”), specifically Government Code section 3562(e). The union argued that student RAs qualify as employees entitled to bargaining rights, while the Trustees of the California State University (“CSU”) contended otherwise. In preparation for a hearing, the ALJ directed both parties to submit pre-hearing briefs addressing the legal test for employee status and the relevance of federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) precedents.

    CSU filed its brief on November 3, 2025, relying heavily on Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp. (10th Cir. 1981) 666 F.2d 1324 (“Marshall”)—a real case, but one that CSU misrepresented through inaccurate page citations and invented quotations. For instance, the brief claimed the Tenth Circuit held that RAs’ duties were “primarily educational rather than economic in nature” and that they “receive the greater benefit from the program.” In reality, Marshall ends at page 1328 and contains none of these phrases or conclusions. The ALJ spotted the discrepancies, issued an Order to Show Cause, and ultimately struck the entire brief as a sanction after CSU’s response failed to adequately explain the errors.

    CSU admitted to “misnumbering of pages” and “erroneously included quotation marks around paraphrasing statements,” attributing it to a failure to double-check. But the ALJ wasn’t buying it, noting that the misrepresentations went beyond mere typos—they distorted the case’s holdings in a way that aligned suspiciously with CSU’s position. Drawing parallels to Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 336 Cal.Rptr.3d 897, where a California appellate court sanctioned counsel for AI-generated fabrications, the ALJ emphasized that such “hallucinations” undermine the integrity of legal proceedings.

Why This Matters for Public Safety Unions

    For unions representing California’s firefighters, police officers, corrections staff, and other public safety workers, this ruling underscores a critical lesson: diligence in legal advocacy isn’t optional. PERB proceedings, like those under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”) or the Dills Act, demand precision because the stakes—bargaining rights, working conditions, and member protections—are high. Imagine a grievance over shift differentials or safety equipment where a union’s brief gets tossed due to sloppy AI use. Not only does it weaken your position, but it could invite scrutiny or countersanctions that distract from the merits.

    More broadly, this decision signals PERB’s intolerance for shortcuts in an era where AI tools like ChatGPT are tempting for drafting research summaries or arguments. As the ALJ pointed out, citing CSU’s own AI guidelines, it’s the attorney’s responsibility to verify content. In public sector labor, where decisions often set precedents affecting thousands of members, relying on unvetted AI could erode trust with arbitrators, boards, or courts. We’ve seen similar pitfalls in federal cases, but this is one of the first in California’s public employment arena—and it happened to a major employer like CSU, which should know better.

    The potential ripple effects? Expect heightened scrutiny of briefs in PERB and related forums. Unions might see employers trying to exploit AI for aggressive positions, only to backfire as in this case. On the flip side, it empowers unions to challenge dubious citations, turning the tables in discovery or hearings. And for ongoing debates like student employee status—relevant if your union deals with campus safety personnel—this ruling keeps the focus on statutory language over manufactured precedents.

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

    CSU’s misstep highlights how overreliance on AI technology can backfire.  AI is a tool that must be used carefully. It’s a substitute for human research and must be verified. Always cross-check citations, quotes, and summaries against primary sources. Tools like Westlaw or Lexis are irreplaceable for this. Follow the State Bar’s guidance on AI, which stresses competence and candor. Don’t let “enhancements” from AI platforms slip through without review. Labor organizations, and lawyers alike, should establish protocols for AI use, including safeguards for confidential information and verification policies. If you spot hallucinations in an opponent’s filing, don’t hesitate to call it as doing so will strengthen your case.

SB 747: An Unwarranted Expansion of Liability Against California Peace Officers

Senator Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) announced Senate Bill (SB) 747, the deceptively named No Kings Act, to purportedly hold federal ICE officers accountable for violating people's Constitutional rights. Unfortunately, this legislation suffers the same fatal flaws as SB 627's restrictions on facial coverings in that the legislation will not be enforceable against federal officers but will significantly harm to our California peace officers. 

SB  747;s proposed amendment to the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (CA Civil Code § 52.1) will unleash a torrent of new civil liability on the shoulders of California's peace officers while stripping away critical safeguards like the specific intent requirement that has long distinguished the Bane Act from its federal counterpart in 42 U.S.C.  section 1983.  

SB 747 adds a new subdivision (d) to the Bane Act that mirrors federal section 1983, creating state-law liability for any person acting “under color” of law who deprives a person of their federal constitutional rights without the qualified immunity protections under Section 1983.  Although proponents characterize the measure as a modest codification of existing case law describing the Bane Act as the “state equivalent” of section 1983, the proposed language is neither redundant nor innocuous. It represents a deliberate and substantial enlargement of liability California officers will face. Without the Bane Act’s current requirements of threats, intimidation, or coercion and without any specific intent element, this bill creates a much easier pathway to sue peace officers in state court, and applies existing Bane Act venues, orders, and fee-shifting applied to these new claims.

Existing Law: The Bane Act’s Distinct and Narrower Scope

Under current law, a plaintiff seeking damages under Civil Code section 52.1 must prove that the defendant interfered, or attempted to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or California Constitution or laws. In the context of peace officer liability, California courts have consistently held that this statutory language imposes an additional element beyond a mere constitutional violation, i.e. the defendant must act with specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (or, in certain Fourth Amendment seizure cases, with reckless disregard for those rights). Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860 (2007). 

SN 747 represents a significant expansion in liability from the current framework where courts emphasize that the Bane Act was "intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights" requiring "deliberate or spiteful" conduct. Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (2012). Moreover, while qualified immunity is unavailable under the Bane Act for peace officers acting under color of state law, the heightened intent standard has served as a functional substitute, shielding officers from liability for good-faith errors in rapidly evolving situations.

SB 747’s Proposed Subdivision (d): A New and Broader Cause of Action

Senate Bill 747 would add the following language to Civil Code section 52.1:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the United States or of this state, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of this state or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

This text is lifted almost verbatim from 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The legislation contains none of the existing Bane Act’s limiting elements, such as the requirement of threats, intimidation, or coercion, nor the specific-intent requirement. The new subdivision would therefore create a parallel and independent cause of action within section 52.1 that plaintiffs could plead in the alternative, allowing them to bypass the safeguards that have defined Bane Act jurisprudence for decades.

Why This Matters to Public Safety Agencies and Officers 

The legislative digest confirms the intent: the bill “would also provide” a state-law remedy “similar” to section 1983 for deprivations of federal constitutional rights under color of law. The measure further extends to subdivision (d) claims the same expansive venue provisions, injunctive remedies, and one-way attorney-fee shifting that already apply to traditional Bane Act actions.

SB 747 would remove that hurdle for subdivision (d), replacing it with a lower threshold akin to section 1983’s objective reasonableness standard and doing so without any qualified immunity defense in state court. This dramatically raises litigation risk for line officers and agencies. Thus, SB 747 would transform the Bane Act from a statute aimed at coercive and intentional misconduct into nearly a strict-liability regime for any constitutional deprivation committed under color of law. 

Senate Bill 2 originally attempted to accomplish a similar result by eliminating the specific intent requirement. David E. Mastagni successfully testified against the elimination of the specific intent requirement in Senate Judiciary Committee. Chair Thomas Umberg and the Democratic party forced amendments to SB 2 that preserved the specific intent requirement, a compromise this bill seeks to reverse. 

Sovereign Immunity: The Bill’s Targeted Federal Officers Are Largely Immune

Proponents suggest that the amendment is necessary to hold federal immigration enforcement officers accountable in state court. That justification collapses under even cursory scrutiny. Federal officers acting within the scope of their official duties are protected by federal sovereign immunity from monetary claims brought under state civil rights statutes.

While ICE officers may also receive qualified immunity for immigration enforcement activities, the more fundamental barrier to lability is sovereign immunity. Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.Supp.2d 1177 (2009). Federal agencies and officers acting in official capacity cannot be sued under state civil rights statutes. State of Cal. v. U.S., 104 F.3d 1086 (1997) held that "California's claims against the United States premised on impact of federal immigration policy were barred by sovereign immunity to extent that monetary awards were sought." Because immigration enforcement remains a core federal function, sovereign immunity protects federal officers from state civil rights liability for conduct within their official duties. See also Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 401-402, (2012)(holding the United States has a “single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation's borders.”)

Thus, SB 747’s expansion is unlikely to affect ICE officers acting within the scope of federal immigration duties, meaning the bill’s practical impact will fall primarily on the state and local officers protecting our communities. As with the failed mask-mandate provisions of SB 627, SB 747 is a symbolic shot at federal ICE agents that will almost certainly only impact California’s state and local peace officers-making their jobs more difficult.  

Conclusion

California’s peace officers have repeatedly demonstrated that meaningful accountability and officer protection are not mutually exclusive. SB 747 abandons that balance. 

PORAC, CAHP & CPRC File Amicus Brief Urging US Supreme Court to Uphold Second Amendment Rights in Wolford v. Lopez

The Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPRC) have jointly filed an amicus brief asking the United States Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wolford v. Lopez, which upheld Hawaii’s consent “presumption-flip” law. The presumption-flip is also called the "Vampire Rule," reverses the default rule permitting concealed carry on on private property open to the public and requires CCW permit holders to first obtain the property owner's express consent.

Our brief urges the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision, arguing this rule is incompatible with the Court’s landmark decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, undermines the rights of thoroughly vetted permit holders, turns everyday commercial spaces into soft targets for criminals, and wastes scarce police resources that should be focused on violent crime. A reversal will restore the traditional presumption that licensed carry is allowed unless the owner affirmatively objects, and will strengthen lawful self-defense rights for both civilians and peace officers.

At stake in Wolford is the core right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home, a right the Supreme Court affirmed in Bruen just three years ago. Hawaii's laws, much like those in California and other restrictive states, effectively transform vast swaths of public life into "gun-free" zones. Petitioners Jason Wolford, Alison Wolford, Atom Kasprzycki, and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition argue that these restrictions violate the Second Amendment, as they lack historical analogues and burden the right to self-defense without justification.

The core dispute in Wolford centers on the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the United States has a historical tradition of banning firearm carry on private property open to the public unless the owner consents. In effect, the court flipped the default rule for businesses, stores, restaurants, and other places the public is invited to enter. Petitioners and supporting amici argue that this interpretation badly misreads both history and Bruen’s requirement that modern regulations be evaluated by “how” and “why” analogous laws burdened the right in the past.

Even though the panel struck down California’s signage-only consent rule while upholding Hawaii’s more “flexible” version, the deeper constitutional problem is the presumption flip itself. By making consent the exception rather than the rule, the law creates nearly insurmountable barriers to the public carry that the Second Amendment protects. Other federal circuits have already rejected similar default bans on carry in places open to the public, creating a clear circuit split that only the Supreme Court can resolve.

Our amicus brief, authored by Mastagni Holstedt, APC attorneys David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey alongside colleagues Timothy Talbot and Michael Morguess, drives home several critical points. The brief deconstructs the Ninth Circuits faulty analogues, which fail the Court's "how and why" test, and lays out the empirical data demonstrating how such laws actually endanger the public.

First, Bruen demands that the government bear the burden of proving a modern regulation is consistent with historical tradition in both its burden and its justification. The Ninth Circuit relied on only two outlier laws, an anti-poaching statute and a racist Reconstruction-era Black Code, as purported "dead ringers" for the presumption flip. The anti-poaching statute fails the how test because the hunting lands were not open to the public. Both laws fail the why test. Hawaii's law was presumably intended to reduce gun violence, not invidiously discriminate based on race or prevent trespassing and poaching.

Second, flipping the default consent rule chills the exercise of a core constitutional right and effectively converts most private businesses into “sensitive places,” something Bruen explicitly warned against.

Drawing on CPRC's extensive research, we present evidence that right-to-carry laws do not increase violent crime. In fact, they deter it. Concealed-carry permit holders are among the most heavily vetted and law-abiding segments of the population, with revocation and criminal violation rates that are vanishingly small. In California alone, where permit holders must undergo rigorous background checks and training, these individuals commit crimes at rates exponentially lower than even peace officers. Restricting their ability to carry does nothing to enhance safety.

Modern empirical evidence, when analyzed by economists like John R. Lott, Jr. with rigorous methods that correct the flaws of earlier studies, shows that right-to-carry laws are associated with reductions in violent crime, especially murder and rape, and are not linked to increases in robbery or assault. Gun-free zones, by contrast, simply invite attack and create defenseless victims in the very places where police cannot always be present. Over 92% of attacks since 1950 have occurred in such areas, including the 2023 Atlanta hospital shooting, the Louisville bank attack, and the Texas mall incident. Mass shooters purposefully select areas where law-abiding CCW holders are disarmed, leaving victims vulnerable. Armed, law-abiding civilians deter criminals and can interrupt attacks in progress, making communities safer and, importantly, making the job of uniformed officers less dangerous.

Compounding this risk, manifestos from several mass shooters reveal a calculated strategy to target gun-free zones where resistance is minimal. The 2022 Buffalo supermarket shooter explicitly noted in his writings that "areas where CCW are outlawed or prohibited may be good areas of attack" and that "areas with strict gun laws are also great places of attack," deliberately choosing a location in New York with virtually no concealed carry permits. Likewise, the 2023 Nashville Covenant School shooter planned assaults on multiple sites but selected the school after a "threat assessment" deemed another target to have "too much security," opting for the softer target. This pattern heightens dangers for law enforcement, as in these disarmed environments, uniformed police officers, i.e. the only armed presence, become the initial targets for elimination. FBI data indicates officers are shot in one out of every six active shooter events, often in lethal ambushes at the outset to neutralize any immediate response. A discreetly armed, law-abiding populace introduces uncertainty for criminals and spreads the risk, reducing the chance that officers will be singled out.

For California's peace officers, the stakes are especially high. A favorable ruling would vindicate inherent self-defense rights that officers rely upon to protect us and themselves. The Court can also end post-Bruen attempts to evade the Second Amendment through blanket presumptive bans and bring the Ninth Circuit into line with the rest of our country. Restoring the consent presumption would allow officers and civilians alike to carry for self-defense on private property without navigating a maze of prohibitions.

A Supreme Court decision restoring broader self-defense rights could have profound ripple effects. It might bolster officers' use-of-force defenses in court, emphasizing the objective reasonableness of the response to an immediate and lethal threat, while countering false narratives that equate armed self-defense with escalation or murder. Operationally, with staffing shortages plaguing departments statewide, law-abiding armed citizens serve as a critical force multiplier in the rare but catastrophic active-shooter or mass-attack events where an immediate officer response is impossible. Politically, reversing Wolford would push back against efforts to turn most commercial spaces into prohibited zones and would reinforce evidence-based policies that target prohibited possessors and enhance penalties for gun crime rather than disarming the law-abiding.

In short, our brief argues that the presumption-flip endorsed by the Ninth Circuit is constitutionally unsound and operationally counterproductive. It creates defenseless victims, wastes police resources, and places officers at greater risk. Vetted concealed-carry holders are demonstrably not the problem. The data show extraordinarily low CCW carrier violation rates and clear public-safety benefits from right-to-carry laws. A Supreme Court decision restoring the traditional consent presumption would return workable, constitutionally faithful rules to private property open to the public and make California’s streets safer for both communities and the officers who protect them.

We will continue to keep PORAC, CAHP, and our peace-officer clients updated as the Supreme Court considers Wolford v. Lopez. View the full brief here.

Court of Appeal Rules PEPRA Does Not Categorically Exclude Standby Pay from Pensionable Compensation

In a significant decision for California's public safety employees, the Court of Appeal in Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (November 13, 2025) clarified that the Public Employees' Pension Reform Act (PEPRA) does not impose a blanket exclusion on standby pay when calculating "compensation earnable" under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL). While the court ultimately upheld the exclusion of standby pay in this specific case based on the terms of the parties' Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the ruling opens the door for unions to negotiate or arbitrate standby pay as part of normal working hours—making it potentially pensionable.

David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey filed the appeal on behalf of the Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association (VCPFA) and several individual members against the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA). VCERA had excluded prescheduled standby pay from pension calculations, citing PEPRA's amendments to Government Code section 31461 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020). 

Under PEPRA, compensation earnable excludes "[p]ayments for additional services rendered outside of normal working hours" (§ 31461, subd. (b)(3)). VCPFA argued that prescheduled standby was assigned regularly as part of firefighters' duties, and therefore should count toward pensions because it formed part of their normal schedules.

The trial court sustained VCERA's demurrer without leave to amend, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that the MOA's language treated standby as discretionary and outside the base 40-hour workweek. Specifically, the MOA and a subsequent Side Letter described standby assignments as subject to the fire chief's discretion, not as fixed "normal working hours." As a result, the court concluded it fell under PEPRA's exclusion for services outside normal hours.

However, the real victory for public safety employees lies in the court's explicit rejection of the categorical ban asserted by VCERA's counsel. The opinion states: "We do not, as respondents urge, interpret section 31461 or Alameda as categorically prohibiting CERL pension programs from including standby or on-call pay when calculating compensation earnable. The 'underlying concept of compensation earnable' is 'to reflect pay for work ordinarily performed during the course of a year . . . .'" This means that if a labor agreement clearly defines standby as part of an employee's regular, non-discretionary schedule, it could qualify as pensionable.

GOP Labor Bills Could Crush Union Organizing: What This Means for California Workers

In a move that could significantly alter the landscape of labor relations, Senate Republicans, led by Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, have introduced a package of seven bills targeting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). While framed as reforms to empower workers and streamline processes, these proposals raise serious concerns about their potential to hinder union formation and organizing efforts—particularly in states like California, where strong labor protections have long supported both private and public sector employees. California labor organizations should closely monitoring these developments. 

The bills, introduced on November 10, 2025, cover a range of changes to how unions interact with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and employers. Key provisions include requiring a two-thirds majority of eligible voters to participate in union representation elections for the results to count, banning voluntary union recognition (often called "card check"), and imposing fines on workers or unions for filing what the NLRB deems "frivolous" unfair labor practice (ULP) charges. Other measures would make it an unfair labor practice to hire undocumented immigrants, prohibit unions from using member dues for political advocacy without explicit consent, and lower barriers for employers to discipline workers engaging in picket line activities.

For private sector unions in California, these changes would strike at the heart of organizing campaigns. Under current NLRA rules, unions can secure recognition through majority support via signed authorization cards or secret-ballot elections overseen by the NLRB. The proposed ban on voluntary recognition would force all organizing into potentially contentious elections, where employer influence often sways outcomes. Coupled with the two-thirds participation threshold, this could make it exceedingly difficult for unions to win representation, especially in larger workplaces where voter turnout challenges are common. As former NLRB Chair Lauren McFerran noted in her critique, these reforms might render other pro-worker gestures in the package, like expedited first-contract negotiations, largely meaningless, as they erect formidable barriers to forming a union in the first place.

The proposed fines for "frivolous" ULP charges would deter enforcement of our nations labor laws. The NLRA has never imposed penalties on workers for filing charges, even if they're later dismissed. This novel approach could chill legitimate complaints, as employees might fear financial repercussions for challenging unfair practices. McFerran aptly described it as "intimidating for workers," pointing out that the NLRB already filters meritless claims without pursuing them. In California's dynamic private sector economy, such provisions would embolden employers to push boundaries, knowing that workers could hesitate to seek NLRB intervention.

The proposed "Protection on the Picket Line Act" would make it easier for employers to impose discipline for alleged misconduct on the picket line. Currently, under the NLRA, picketing is a protected concerted activity, allowing workers to protest peacefully outside their workplace to highlight labor disputes. While misconduct like harassment or slurs can currently lead to discipline, NLRB precedents afford some leeway for heated language in the heat of a dispute. This legislation would narrow the scope of protected activity, potentially exposing picketers to quicker repercussions and discouraging robust protest tactics that have been key to union successes.

While California's public safety employees fall under state jurisdiction through the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) rather than the NLRB, federal labor trends often ripple into state policies. If enacted, some of these federal changes could inspire similar restrictions in California, potentially limiting unions' ability to advocate for safer working conditions, better staffing, or legislative reforms that protect first responders. In California, where public employees enjoy robust protections under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Dills Act, any erosion of federal standards might encourage anti-union forces to challenge state laws.  

Pro-business groups like the National Right to Work Committee and the Competitive Enterprise Institute have lauded the package for promoting "worker choice" and secret-ballot elections. Yet, as union advocates argue, these measures often tip the scales toward employers, masking restrictions on collective action under the guise of fairness. The requirement for two-thirds voter turnout, for example, ignores the realities of workplace intimidation and low participation due to fear of retaliation.  

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the package's prospects remain uncertain in a divided Congress while the filibuster remains intact, but its introduction signals a renewed push to overhaul labor law. These bills, if passed, would complicate organizing while setting precedents that could influence California labor law.

Union members should engage with their leadership to advocacy for counter-legislation like the bipartisan Faster Labor Contracts Act. The Faster Labor Contracts Act (FLCA) is bipartisan legislation, supported by the Teamsters, designed to expedite the process of negotiating a union's first contract by setting strict deadlines for talks (start within 10 days, mediation at 90 days, then binding arbitration if talks fail) to prevent employers from stalling and denying workers fair terms. Teamsters President Sean O'Brien champions it as crucial for labor, forcing good-faith bargaining, while business groups like the U.S. Chamber and NFIB oppose it as government overreach. 

CA Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Protecting Officers From False Misconduct Claims

     In a 6-1 decision issued on November 10, 2025, the California Supreme Court invalidated Penal Code section 148.6, overturning its own prior ruling in People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497. The case, Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles  2025 WL 3136580 (Cal., 2025), centered on the statute's requirement that complainants sign an advisory warning them that filing a knowingly false allegation of police misconduct is a crime. Justice Joshua Groban, writing for the majority, held that this provision violates the First Amendment by creating an undue chill on protected speech, i.e. complaints against peace officers.

    As counsel to numerous public safety unions and their members across California, we know our clients have been closely tracking this litigation. Unfortunately, it removes a critical safeguard against baseless accusations that can stunt officers' careers. 

Background and the Court's Reasoning

    Penal Code section 148.6, enacted in 1995, made it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false misconduct complaint against a peace officer (§ 148.6(a)(1)). More controversially, it mandated that agencies require complainants to read and sign an advisory before accepting a complaint, explicitly warning of potential criminal liability (§ 148.6(a)(2)). This was designed to deter frivolous or malicious filings while ensuring agencies investigated all public complaints under Penal Code section 832.5.

    The LAPPL sued the City of Los Angeles in 2017 after the City stopped enforcing the advisory requirement, citing federal rulings that deemed it unconstitutional. Lower courts, bound by Stanistreet, sided with the LAPPL and ordered compliance. On review, however, the Supreme Court reversed course, holding that section 148.6 discriminates based on content within the proscribable category of "knowingly false statements of fact," triggering heightened scrutiny.

    The Court explained that the law criminalizes false complaints against officers but leaves unregulated false statements in support of officers during investigations. This imbalance, the Court argued, risks distorting the "marketplace of ideas" by deterring one side of the debate. Requiring a signed warning before filing could intimidate even truthful complainants, who might fear prosecution if their accounts are later disbelieved. The Court emphasized that prohibitions on falsehoods must not unduly burden legitimate expression. 

    While acknowledging the state's interest in protecting officers from abusive claims, the majority held the statute wasn't sufficiently tailored. It noted ill-defined triggers for liability, no materiality or harm requirement, and the unusual admonition process, which together create "a potent disincentive" for good-faith reporting.

    Former UC Berkeley Law School Professor Justice Goodwin Liu dissented, arguing the ruling was "speculative" and that section 148.6 is no different from other anti-falsehood laws like perjury statutes. He stressed the real-world burdens on officers: "Our men and women in uniform have a hard enough job without having to deal with knowingly false allegations of misconduct."

The Benefits of the Invalidated Law: A Shield Against Career-Derailing Complaints

    For three decades, section 148.6 served as a vital tool in maintaining the integrity of misconduct investigations. False complaints aren't just nuisances; they can trigger lengthy probes under Penal Code section 832.5, during which officers may face administrative leave, reassignment, an inability to promote, or reputational harm. Even if ultimately exonerated, the process can stall career advancement, erode public trust, and lead to psychological stress.  

    The advisory requirement was particularly effective in discouraging malicious filings without blocking legitimate ones. It put complainants on notice and promoted some level of accountability in a system where officers are held to high standards but often lack reciprocal protections. By invalidating this law, the Court has removed a deterrent that helped filter out vendetta-driven or unfounded claims, potentially increasing the volume of investigations agencies must handle.

Potential Future Impacts on Peace Officers

    This ruling could have ripple effects for California's public safety professionals. Without this backstop, malicious complaints will feel emboldened to file complaints knowing there's little downside. This asymmetry leaves officers exposed, as false statements defending them remain unregulated. Agencies will see more false complaints and officers will face avoidable jeopardy. This could exacerbate burnout, recruitment problems and foster hesitation in high-stakes encounters.

    The California Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis focused on Penal Code section 148.6(a)’s asymmetrical criminalization of knowingly false complaints against officers while leaving false statements made by officers or witnesses in support of officers unregulated within the citizen complaint process. However, the Court did not consider the existing penalties for officers' false statements under Penal Code sections 832.7(c) and 13510.8(b)(1), which address officer dishonesty relating to the investigation of misconduct.  

Penal Code section 13510.8 defines "serious misconduct" to include "dishonesty relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, a peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, false statements, intentionally filing false reports, tampering with, falsifying, destroying, or concealing evidence, perjury." Officers found to have made false statements in an investigation face potential suspension or revocation of their peace officer certification, which effectively ends their law enforcement career.  

    The Opinion does provides a roadmap for the Legislature to craft narrower protections against frivolous complaints and false statements. The Court strongly suggested that a statute imposing symmetrical, material-harm-based liability for false statements by both complainants and officers, such as the disciplinary and decertification processes for officer dishonesty, would stand a much greater chance of passing constitutional muster. Such an amendment could also focus on any materially false statements intended to mislead or deceive and relevant to the determination of whether misconduct occurred. 

AB 692 and Its Impact on Police Training Repayment Agreements

    In recent years, the practice of requiring police officers to sign repayment agreements for academy and field training officer (FTO) training has become increasingly common among public entities. This trend has sparked significant legal debate, particularly in light of cases such as City of Oakland v. Hassey and Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles. However, the introduction of Assembly Bill 692 (AB 692) could potentially reshape the legal landscape surrounding these agreements.

Understanding AB 692

    AB 692 aims to address the fairness and legality of repayment agreements imposed on police officers for training costs. The bill seeks to ensure that such agreements do not violate labor laws or unfairly burden officers who choose to leave their positions before a specified period. The bill's provisions are designed to protect officers from being coerced into agreements that may not align with their best interests or the public policy of promoting fair labor practices.

Applicability to Public Entities

    One of the critical questions surrounding AB 692 is whether it will apply to public entities. Historically, public entities have enjoyed certain immunities and exceptions under labor laws, as seen in the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles case, where the court held that certain labor code provisions did not apply to the county. However, AB 692 explicitly targets the practices of public entities, suggesting that it intends to close these loopholes and ensure that all employers, including public entities, adhere to fair labor standards.

Potential Impact on Key Cases

City of Oakland v. Hassey

    In City of Oakland v. Hassey, the court upheld the city's right to require repayment of training costs, provided it did not violate minimum wage laws. The court found that the repayment agreement did not constitute an illegal covenant not to compete or violate wage laws, as long as the deductions did not reduce wages below the minimum wage. AB 692 could challenge this precedent by imposing stricter regulations on repayment agreements, potentially rendering such agreements unenforceable if they are deemed to coerce officers into staying or if they violate new statutory protections.

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles

    In this case, the court ruled that the labor code provision prohibiting employers from collecting wages already paid did not apply to the county, allowing it to recoup overpayments. AB 692 could overturn this decision by explicitly extending labor code protections to public entities, thereby prohibiting the recoupment of wages in a manner that violates the new standards set by the bill.

Conclusion

    AB 692 represents a significant shift in the legal framework governing police training repayment agreements. By potentially applying to public entities and challenging existing legal precedents, the bill could provide greater protections for police officers and ensure that repayment agreements are fair and equitable. Public safety unions and their members should closely monitor the progress of AB 692, as its enactment could have profound implications for labor practices within law enforcement agencies across California.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Wage Cases Despite Limited Success

In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit in Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. vacated a district court's award of $312,429 in attorneys' fees and costs but affirmed that plaintiffs can recover fees for work on related class and PAGA claims under a section 998 settlement agreement. Given the remedial nature of wage and hour laws, the decision ensures aggrieved workers can receive representation, even if class certification fails.

Claudia Alvarado sued Walmart for Labor Code violations, including denied meal breaks, unpaid overtime, and unreimbursed business expenses. She brought individual claims, a putative class action, and PAGA claims. After the district court denied class certification, Alvarado settled her individual claims for $22,000 under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and dismissed her PAGA claims without prejudice.

The settlement allowed Alvarado to seek "reasonable fees and costs actually incurred... in pursuit of [her] individual claims... and recoverable by law." She moved for $591,044 in fees and $44,879 in costs, arguing under Hensley v. Eckerhart that her class and PAGA work was intertwined with her successful individual claims, making apportionment unnecessary. Walmart opposed, but the district court awarded $297,799 in fees (after Alvarado's voluntary reduction) and $14,630 in costs.

On appeal, Walmart argued the agreement barred fees for anything beyond strictly individual work. The Ninth Circuit rejected this, holding that section 998 agreements do not limit fees recoverable under California law unless expressly stated. Since the agreement referenced fees "recoverable by law," it permitted Hensley recovery for intertwined claims. The court vacated the award only because the district court failed to provide a clear explanation, remanding for reconsideration.

This decision benefits California workers and unions in several ways. First, it clarifies that settling individual claims under section 998 does not forfeit fees for related class or PAGA efforts. Plaintiffs' lawyers can pursue broad litigation without fear that a partial settlement will wipe out compensation for overlapping work. Second, it upholds Hensley's flexible approach, allowing fees where claims share common facts or theories, which is common in wage cases involving systemic violations. Finally, by requiring only a "concise but clear" explanation on remand, the ruling keeps the door open for substantial fee awards proportional to the litigation's scope, even with limited monetary recovery. For unions, this means stronger leverage in negotiations and contract enforcement.

Newsom Signs the "No Secret Police Act" (S.B. 627) into Law: Watch David E. Mastagni's Senate Public Safety Committee Testimony in Opposition

    On September 11, 2025, David E. Mastagni, a partner at Mastagni Holstedt and counsel for the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), testified before the California Senate Public Safety Committee in opposition to Senate Bill 627 along with Jonathan Feldman, lobbyist for the California Police Chiefs Association. Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed S.B. 627 into law on September 20, 2025. They explained how dangerous last minute amendments make the bill detrimental to public safety, by stripping important immunity protections for local officers who unintentionally violate the statute. Mastagni pointed out that because of the Supremacy Clause, this bill will not apply to federal officers, yet its severability clause means its restrictions and legal jeopardy will fall solely on California’s local peace officers, who don’t enforce federal immigration laws.

    Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed the "No Secret Police Act" into law on September 20, 2025. In his signing message, Newsom stated: "I am signing Senate Bill 627, which prohibits law enforcement officers, including federal immigration officers, from wearing masks or other face coverings that conceal their identity while performing their duties in public, with certain exceptions. This bill is an important step toward increasing transparency and accountability in law enforcement, particularly in light of reports of federal immigration officers concealing their identities during operations that have caused fear and mistrust in communities.

Scope and Purpose of S.B. 627

    S.B. 627, authored primarily by Senator Scott Wiener, prohibits local and federal law enforcement officers from concealing their faces with coverings during the performance of their duties. Senator Wiener described the bill as targeting secret police tactics, particularly by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. He argued that routine masking fosters mistrust, instills fear, and emboldens officers to violate civil rights with impunity.

    The bill defines prohibited facial coverings broadly to include any opaque mask, garment, helmet, headgear, or other item that obscures facial identity, such as balaclavas, tactical masks, or ski masks. The law includes narrow exceptions for certain safety equipment and circumstances, but they  are vague and open to conflicting interpretations. Violations constitute infractions or misdemeanors, with additional penalties including loss of immunities and statutory liability of $10,000.00 for tortious conduct committed while masked. Under the bill, enforcement agencies must develop policies to ensure officers adhere to these provisions by July 2026. 

Risks to Officer Safety and Operational Efficiency  

    In his testimony, Mastagni that facial coverings serve crucial safety functions for law enforcement officers and federal agents. Masks and helmets are often integral to protecting identities during sensitive, undercover, or tactical operations. Such protective gear shields officers and agents from retaliation, threats, or targeted harassment.

    He pointed out how the overly narrow and vague exceptions in the bill endanger officer safety and operational effectiveness. For example, the bill's prohibition on motor officers wearing helmets unless using a motorcycle contradicts standard training and roadside safety protocols. An officer could be exposed to fentanyl or other dangerous chemicals during a routine search of a car or home and need to cover their face with anything available in order to survive.  

    The bill also imposes burdens on local agencies by requiring them to develop compliant policies by July 2026. Law enforcement groups, such as PORAC and CPCA, fear that theses heightened safety risks and exposure to liability will exacerbate California's police staffing crisis. 

The Law Contradicts Established Federal and State Precedents: The Supremacy Clause

    Mastagni addressed the bills application to federal officers, citing Supreme Court precedent under the Supremacy Clause, including Cunningham v. Neagle (1890), which protects federal agents from state criminal prosecution when acting within their official duties. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court invalidated state laws intruding on federal immigration enforcement. The same applies here. States cannot second guess federal policies, such as ICE directives authorizing masks for officer protection. The bill creates conflict preemption, as officers cannot comply with both state and federal rules without compromising safety or mission effectiveness.

    Senator Wiener and supporters of S.B. 627 often refer to an op-ed by Erwin Chemerinsky, dean and professor of law at the UC Berkeley School of Law, to support the bill's constitutionality. This argument fails. Professor Chemerinsky contends that S.B. 627 can regulate federal agents' mask wearing because it is a law of general applicability that applies to all law enforcement officers rather than specifically targeting federal operations. Notably, he omits reference to the exclusion of California state peace officers. He compares the bill to federal agents' compliance with everyday state laws like traffic rules. 

Flawed Legal Justifications and Misinterpretations 

    Although written as a “general” law, it cannot be applied to federal officers if it interferes with federal operations. While appearing facially neutral, its practical effect substantially interferes with federal law enforcement operations in ways that traffic laws do not. Federal immigration enforcement involves unique considerations, including officer safety from targeted retaliation and protection of sensitive investigations that local law enforcement typically does not face. This creates an undue burden on federal operations that triggers intergovernmental immunity principles, protecting federal activities from state interference even when laws appear neutral on their face.

    Chemerinsky further asserts that requiring officers not to wear masks does not constitute a significant burden on federal activities and does not impede federal agents' performance of their duties. This overlooks the fundamental differences between local policing and federal immigration enforcement. Federal agents frequently operate in sensitive contexts where identity protection is critical for both officer safety and operational success. Even if only 10 percent of operations require face coverings, that represents thousands of high risk federal operations annually where agent safety would be compromised.

    Courts typically defer to federal determinations that prohibitions on face coverings create substantial burdens on operations by compromising officer safety, operational security, and effectiveness. The legislation seeks to second guess policy determinations that federal agents, particularly in immigration enforcement, face unique threats from targeted retaliation against them and their families through doxing and harassment. The inability to protect their identities would significantly impair their ability to conduct sensitive operations, gather intelligence, and work undercover. These burdens are concrete operational impediments that directly interfere with federal law enforcement functions.

    Chemerinsky cites Ninth Circuit precedent that states can prosecute federal agents criminally if their actions are objectively unreasonable, suggesting this provides a pathway for enforcement of S.B. 627 against non compliant federal officers. He primarily relies on the vacated Ninth Circuit decision in Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (Ninth Cir. 2001), vacated at 266 F.3d 979 (Ninth Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit's objectively unreasonable standard applies to federal agents who exceed their authority or violate constitutional rights, not to agents following lawful federal protocols. Wearing masks during legitimate operations is standard procedure for many federal agencies based on assessed security risks and operational needs. Criminalizing conduct that follows established federal guidelines would allow state law to dictate federal operational procedures, creating an impermissible state veto over federal law enforcement methods. This directly conflicts with Supremacy Clause principles that protect federal operations from state interference.

    When asked if Legislative Counsel had time to review S.B. 627 to determine if it would hold up in court, Senator Wiener dodged the question. U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the Central District of California stated that federal agents will not alter their practices, calling the law unconstitutional and preempted by federal authority. Local officers may face the impossible task of enforcing S.B. 627 against federal personnel, risking claims of obstruction or false arrest if courts invalidate the statute.

Threat to Immunities Local Officers Need to Perform Their Duties

   

    At the Public Safety Committee hearing, Senator Wiener and his supporters erroneously claimed that the bills' “knowing and willful” violation language shields officers who make good faith mistake regarding whether an exemption applies from the bill's criminal penalties, including loss of immunity. Mastagni pointed out that as drafted “knowing and willful” refer only to the intentional decision to cover an officer's face, not intentionally breaking the law. This general intent standard exposes officers to lawsuits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution with at least $10,000 damages, even with no actual harm. The bill’s “notwithstanding any other law” clause overrides basic protections for our officers like indemnification under Government Code 825. That exposes officers to personal liability for a good faith mistake about whether an exception applies.  Mistake of law, such as erroneously believing conduct fits a legal exemption, is generally not a defense, as it does not negate the intent to commit the underlying act. 

    SB 627 removes critical immunities that protect officers when making good faith arrests, relying on probable cause, or exercising lawful discretion. The importance of immunity protections cannot be overstated. The California Legislature has enacted numerous civil immunities and privileges, which courts have carefully interpreted and applied for decades. These protections apply only to officers acting in good faith and are forfeited if officers break the law. The Legislature has consistently refused to weaken these protections because they are essential to public safety and enable officers to make arrests, execute search warrants, exercise reasonable discretion, and participate in prosecutions without fear of retaliatory suits.  

    The late addition of language stripping local peace officers of immunity is the single most troubling aspect of S.B. 627. Officers operate under carefully balanced immunities, including Civil Code section 43.55, Penal Code sections 836 and 847, and Government Code section 821.6, which shield them from personal lawsuits when they act in good faith and within the scope of duty. S.B. 627 overrides those protections solely because a face covering is involved, regardless of intent.  

   The bill's exemptions are too narrow and vague to adequately protect local officers, who do not enforce immigration laws. State officers are exempt from the bill's provisions. The severability clause ensures that if the law cannot apply to federal officers, its restrictions will still bind local California law enforcement. This means the Trump administration will likely have an easy win in court, invalidating application of the law to federal officers through preemption challenges. The severability clause in the bill leaves local officers bearing the full brunt of the criminal penalties and loss of immunities.

Enforcement Concerns

   California Senate Bill 627 introduces significant legal challenges for law enforcement officers, particularly concerning potential obstruction violations. The bill's provisions aim to enhance accountability by stripping qualified immunity and good faith defenses if officers are found to have acted with masked intentions. This legislative change underscores the delicate balance officers must maintain between executing their enforcement duties and adhering to the stringent requirements set forth by SB 627.

Federal law provides comprehensive protection for Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents through multiple statutory frameworks. Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, it is a federal crime to forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating penalties: simple obstruction carries up to one year imprisonment, while obstruction involving physical contact or intent to commit another felony increases the maximum penalty to eight years. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating imprisonment penalties.

Ironically, federal qualified immunity doctrine would likely protect local officers from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting masked ICE agents, even if the arrest later proves unlawful. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity protects government officials unless the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. No clearly established federal law prohibits state officers from enforcing state identification requirements against individuals who refuse to identify themselves, even if those individuals are federal agents. 

California immunity statutes would likely provide additional protection. California officers acting under state authority would have reasonable grounds to believe their actions were justified under California Penal Code Section 847(b)(1). The good faith immunity, which protects officers who act with a reasonable belief that their conduct is lawful, also faces limitations under the new bill. The removal of this defense in cases of masked actions places officers in a precarious position, requiring them to exercise heightened diligence and judgment in their interactions with the public.

Conclusion

The legal complexities introduced by SB 627 necessitate a thorough understanding of the bill's provisions and the potential defenses available. Officers must navigate these challenges while ensuring compliance with the law, a task that demands both legal acumen and practical wisdom. As the legal landscape evolves, the ability to effectively balance enforcement responsibilities with the mandates of SB 627 will be crucial for law enforcement professionals in California.

Watch the full Senate Public Safety Committee hearing on SB 627 below.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Firearm Possession by Unlawful Drug Users, Leaving Uncertainty for California Peace Officers Using Cannabis Off-Duty

On September 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment against Jaren Michael Stennerson, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of methamphetamine and under § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. United States v. Stennerson, 2025 WL 2600006 (C.A.9 (Mont.), 2025).  Stennerson argued both statutes violate the Second Amendment on their face and that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Forrest, rejected these claims, finding the statutes consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation under the framework set by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). 

The court held that § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of or addicts to controlled substances from possessing firearms, survives facial challenge because it can be constitutionally applied in circumstances analogous to founding-era laws restricting arms from intoxicated individuals. Citing examples like Virginia's 1655 ban on shooting guns while drinking and post-founding statutes in states such as Kansas and Missouri barring carry while intoxicated, the panel reasoned these traditions support disarming those impaired in judgment, such as active drug users. The court noted alignment with decisions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits upholding the statute's facial validity, though it left open the possibility of successful as-applied challenges where the restriction exceeds historical analogues. On vagueness, the panel found Stennerson had clear notice, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use contemporaneous with possession, consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363 (1977), and United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (2001).

While the case involved methamphetamine, its reasoning extends to other controlled substances, including marijuana, which remains a Schedule I drug under federal law. This raises unresolved questions regarding the ongoing conflict between state protections for off-duty cannabis use and federal firearm restrictions. California's Assembly Bill 2188, effective January 1, 2024, amended the Fair Employment and Housing Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on off-duty cannabis use or non-psychoactive metabolites in drug tests. Though untested by the courts, this law may apply to public safety personnel, including peace officers. Senate Bill 700 further reinforces these protections by barring inquiries into prior cannabis use during hiring.

These state laws offer job security for marijuana users, but federal law conflicts. Section 922(g)(3) categorically bars firearm possession by unlawful drug users, and marijuana's federal status makes even occasional users "unlawful" regardless of state legalization. Before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (2011), upheld this ban for drug users, including marijuana users.  

The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed recreational marijuana under Bruen standards. Peace officers must often possess firearms off-duty. Yet using cannabis off-duty, even sporadically, could trigger federal prosecution under § 922(g)(3), as courts interpret "unlawful user" to include regular or prolonged use close in time to possession. Recent challenges in other circuits, like the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (2024), suggest as-applied relief might be available for non-intoxicated marijuana users, but no such ruling has emerged in the Ninth Circuit yet.  

Officers considering off-duty cannabis use should consult legal counsel to weigh risks, including department policies and federal gun charges. This ruling underscores the need for caution when state law conflicts with federal prohibitions.  The law surrounding these issues will likely evolve as further as-applied challenges are litigated within the Ninth Circuit. 

Mastagni Holstedt Attorneys Recognized in 2026 Best Lawyers in America

We are pleased to announce that David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey have been selected for inclusion in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. This recognition highlights their work in Litigation - Labor and Employment, Labor Law - Union, and Employment Law - Individuals.

The Best Lawyers in America represents the top 5% of practicing attorneys in the United States, based on a rigorous peer-review process. Nominations come from leading lawyers outside the nominee's firm, followed by confidential evaluations from peers in the same practice areas and geographic regions. Only attorneys in good standing with their local bar associations are considered. For over 40 years, this process has identified lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill and integrity. As the announcement notes, "the best lawyers know who the best lawyers are." No fees or payments are involved in the selection, ensuring its credibility. More details on the 2026 awards can be found here.

This honor not only affirms our attorneys' expertise but also reinforces the value our firm delivers to clients. For unions facing employment challenges, such recognition signals reliable counsel grounded in proven success. If you have questions about labor or employment issues, contact our firm for a consultation.

David E. Mastagni's attorney profile is available here. 

Taylor Davies-Mahaffey's attorney profile is available here.