The Stockton Record reported Thursday that the "police union appears to have prevailed in the first round today of its ongoing courtroom battle with Stockton in a dispute over the city’s right to break its contract with the police union during its financial crisis." In that case, the Court found in favor of the Stockton POA on a key issue. Mastagni Law attorneys David E. Mastagni, William M. Briggs, Isaac S. Stevens and B.J. Pierce represent the Stockton Police Officers' Association in the matter. Read the entire article here.
Thursday, January 5, 2012
Court Rejects "Fiscal Emergency" Reopener, Upholds Stockton POA's Right to Enforce Contract
In a closely-watched case with national implications, the San Joaquin Superior Court dismissed the City of Stockton's claim it could unilaterally reopen a closed contract. In Stockton Police Officers' Association et al. v. City of Stockton et al., the City claimed it could force the Stockton Police Officers' Association to reopen a closed contract and renegotiate because the City declared so-called "fiscal emergency."
The Court rejected the City's claims, finding the union "was not required to accept the City's invitation to discuss or renegotiate the terms of a closed contract, notwithstanding the City's declaration of fiscal emergency" and "was within its right to refuse" to reopen its contract, dismissing the City's claim.
The City of Stockton's claims are part of an emerging trend by some public sector management firms to try to expand the definition of "emergency" and create a new tool for public agencies seeking to get out of contractual obligations. Tellingly, however, the Court noted the City "has not identified any contractual or statutory basis for its claim that SPOA must meet and confer, bargain, or renegotiate a closed labor agreement."
Mastagni Law attorneys David E. Mastagni, William M. Briggs, Isaac S. Stevens and B.J. Pierce represent the Stockton Police Officers' Association in the matter. The case was previously profiled by Fox News commentator Tom Sullivan.
The Court rejected the City's claims, finding the union "was not required to accept the City's invitation to discuss or renegotiate the terms of a closed contract, notwithstanding the City's declaration of fiscal emergency" and "was within its right to refuse" to reopen its contract, dismissing the City's claim.
The City of Stockton's claims are part of an emerging trend by some public sector management firms to try to expand the definition of "emergency" and create a new tool for public agencies seeking to get out of contractual obligations. Tellingly, however, the Court noted the City "has not identified any contractual or statutory basis for its claim that SPOA must meet and confer, bargain, or renegotiate a closed labor agreement."
Mastagni Law attorneys David E. Mastagni, William M. Briggs, Isaac S. Stevens and B.J. Pierce represent the Stockton Police Officers' Association in the matter. The case was previously profiled by Fox News commentator Tom Sullivan.
Court of Appeal: Retirement Does Not Void Right to Arbitration
In Service Employees Intern. Union, Local 1021 v. San Joaquin County (3rd DCA, C066861) December 28, 2011, 2011 WL 6812543, the Court of Appeal found an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU.
The case arose after an employee was terminated from his job as a craft worker for allegedly stealing recyclable material. He then invoked a provision of the MOU and requested arbitration of the decision to terminate him. The employee also filed for retirement benefits. The County denied the employee’s request for arbitration, and the trial court found for the County by denying the union’s petition to compel arbitration.
On appeal, the County argued once the employee had retired from his job, he was no longer “an employee” under the MOU and had forfeited any rights to arbitration under the MOU. The Court disagreed, holding an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU. The Court found the employee appropriately invoked his right to arbitration and accordingly reversed the lower court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration.
The case arose after an employee was terminated from his job as a craft worker for allegedly stealing recyclable material. He then invoked a provision of the MOU and requested arbitration of the decision to terminate him. The employee also filed for retirement benefits. The County denied the employee’s request for arbitration, and the trial court found for the County by denying the union’s petition to compel arbitration.
On appeal, the County argued once the employee had retired from his job, he was no longer “an employee” under the MOU and had forfeited any rights to arbitration under the MOU. The Court disagreed, holding an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU. The Court found the employee appropriately invoked his right to arbitration and accordingly reversed the lower court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration.
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
CDCR Failed to Provide Reasonable Accommodations
In Cohen v. CDCR (2nd DCA, B226762) December 22, 2011, 2011 WL 6739621, the Court of Appeal found CDCR failed to provide reasonable disability accommodations to a correctional employee. The employee sufferred an injury which limited her ability to carry heavy items and requested accommodations. Her doctor determined she could perform the essential job functions and suggested a reasonable accommodation of a cart to assist her in moving about the large facility.
However, CDCR ultimately moved her office to an area of the prison approximately one mile away from where she treated her patients which made it difficult for her to complete work in her office. She also had to find a bench or a vacant room to complete her work resulting in her having to transport all of her files as she moved about the facility. During this time, she missed several days of work and ended up taking 392 more hours of leave than she was allowed.
The Court found that if CDCR had reasonably accommodated the employee's limitations, her attendance would have been sufficient. The Court further found the employer had not offered a reasonable accommodation, noting all other employees had an office space in an appropriate place to meet with patients.
However, CDCR ultimately moved her office to an area of the prison approximately one mile away from where she treated her patients which made it difficult for her to complete work in her office. She also had to find a bench or a vacant room to complete her work resulting in her having to transport all of her files as she moved about the facility. During this time, she missed several days of work and ended up taking 392 more hours of leave than she was allowed.
The Court found that if CDCR had reasonably accommodated the employee's limitations, her attendance would have been sufficient. The Court further found the employer had not offered a reasonable accommodation, noting all other employees had an office space in an appropriate place to meet with patients.
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Court of Appeal Finds Police Chief's Termination Violated POBR
In Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (5th DCA F059608) December 23, 2011, 2011 WL 6450602, the Court of Appeal held the city violated POBR when it terminated Robinson, the city's police chief, without the requisite notice, statement of reasons, and opportunity for an administrative appeal. Following termination Robinson filed a petition for a writ of mandate claiming violations of POBR. POBR has special provisions for chiefs of police. Specifically, Government Code section 3304(c) provides:
“No chief of police may be removed by a public agency, or appointing authority, without providing the chief of police with written notice and the reason or reasons therefor and an opportunity for administrative appeal. For purposes of this subdivision, the removal of a chief of police by a public agency or appointing authority, for the purpose of implementing the goals or policies, or both, of the public agency or appointing authority, for reasons including, but not limited to, incompatibility of management styles or as a result of a change in administration, shall be sufficient to constitute ‘reason or reasons. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to create a property interest, where one does not exist by rule or law, in the job of Chief of Police.”
The City claimed the notice and appeal provisions apply only if a police chief has a protected property or liberty interest. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this argument, finding the last sentence of the subsection merely clarified that no new property interest was being created, but has no effect on procedural protections set forth elsewhere in the subdivision.
The Court also held the City removed Robinson from office, thereby violating POBR, when it forced Robinson to leave his physical office, took the authority of police chief away from him, and gave both the physical office and the authority of police chief to someone else, irrespective of when it stopped paying him.
“No chief of police may be removed by a public agency, or appointing authority, without providing the chief of police with written notice and the reason or reasons therefor and an opportunity for administrative appeal. For purposes of this subdivision, the removal of a chief of police by a public agency or appointing authority, for the purpose of implementing the goals or policies, or both, of the public agency or appointing authority, for reasons including, but not limited to, incompatibility of management styles or as a result of a change in administration, shall be sufficient to constitute ‘reason or reasons. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to create a property interest, where one does not exist by rule or law, in the job of Chief of Police.”
The City claimed the notice and appeal provisions apply only if a police chief has a protected property or liberty interest. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this argument, finding the last sentence of the subsection merely clarified that no new property interest was being created, but has no effect on procedural protections set forth elsewhere in the subdivision.
The Court also held the City removed Robinson from office, thereby violating POBR, when it forced Robinson to leave his physical office, took the authority of police chief away from him, and gave both the physical office and the authority of police chief to someone else, irrespective of when it stopped paying him.
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