Court of Appeal: Retirement Does Not Void Right to Arbitration

In Service Employees Intern. Union, Local 1021 v. San Joaquin County (3rd DCA, C066861) December 28, 2011, 2011 WL 6812543, the Court of Appeal found an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU.

The case arose after an employee was terminated from his job as a craft worker for allegedly stealing recyclable material. He then invoked a provision of the MOU and requested arbitration of the decision to terminate him. The employee also filed for retirement benefits. The County denied the employee’s request for arbitration, and the trial court found for the County by denying the union’s petition to compel arbitration.

On appeal, the County argued once the employee had retired from his job, he was no longer “an employee” under the MOU and had forfeited any rights to arbitration under the MOU. The Court disagreed, holding an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU. The Court found the employee appropriately invoked his right to arbitration and accordingly reversed the lower court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

CDCR Failed to Provide Reasonable Accommodations

In Cohen v. CDCR (2nd DCA, B226762) December 22, 2011, 2011 WL 6739621, the Court of Appeal found CDCR failed to provide reasonable disability accommodations to a correctional employee. The employee sufferred an injury which limited her ability to carry heavy items and requested accommodations. Her doctor determined she could perform the essential job functions and suggested a reasonable accommodation of a cart to assist her in moving about the large facility.

However, CDCR ultimately moved her office to an area of the prison approximately one mile away from where she treated her patients which made it difficult for her to complete work in her office. She also had to find a bench or a vacant room to complete her work resulting in her having to transport all of her files as she moved about the facility. During this time, she missed several days of work and ended up taking 392 more hours of leave than she was allowed.

The Court found that if CDCR had reasonably accommodated the employee's limitations, her attendance would have been sufficient. The Court further found the employer had not offered a reasonable accommodation, noting all other employees had an office space in an appropriate place to meet with patients.

Court of Appeal Finds Police Chief's Termination Violated POBR

In Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, (5th DCA F059608) December 23, 2011, 2011 WL 6450602, the Court of Appeal held the city violated POBR when it terminated Robinson, the city's police chief, without the requisite notice, statement of reasons, and opportunity for an administrative appeal. Following termination Robinson filed a petition for a writ of mandate claiming violations of POBR. POBR has special provisions for chiefs of police. Specifically, Government Code section 3304(c) provides:

“No chief of police may be removed by a public agency, or appointing authority, without providing the chief of police with written notice and the reason or reasons therefor and an opportunity for administrative appeal. For purposes of this subdivision, the removal of a chief of police by a public agency or appointing authority, for the purpose of implementing the goals or policies, or both, of the public agency or appointing authority, for reasons including, but not limited to, incompatibility of management styles or as a result of a change in administration, shall be sufficient to constitute ‘reason or reasons. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to create a property interest, where one does not exist by rule or law, in the job of Chief of Police.”

The City claimed the notice and appeal provisions apply only if a police chief has a protected property or liberty interest. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this argument, finding the last sentence of the subsection merely clarified that no new property interest was being created, but has no effect on procedural protections set forth elsewhere in the subdivision.

The Court also held the City removed Robinson from office, thereby violating POBR, when it forced Robinson to leave his physical office, took the authority of police chief away from him, and gave both the physical office and the authority of police chief to someone else, irrespective of when it stopped paying him.

California Supreme Court Upholds Abolition of Redevelopment Agencies

In an opinion sure to have state-wide impact on the nearly 400 existing redevelopment agencies, the California Supreme Court held, “Redevelopment agencies ... do not have protected right to exist that immunizes them from statutory dissolution by the legislature.”  The ruling in California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (Cal., Dec. 29, 2011, S194861) 2011 WL 6822391, has broad implications for for public safety services.  Redevelopment agencies had been used to siphon local revenue away from core services, such as law enforcement and fire protection, but Thursday’s ruling makes it much more difficult for cities and counties to continue the practice.

The Court ruled on two state laws addressing so-called “Redevelopment Agencies.”  The Court held, “Assembly Bill 1X26, the Dissolution Measure, is a proper exercise of the legislative power vested in the legislature by the State Constitution.”  The Court explained that the power to create entities such as redevelopment agencies carried with it the corollary power to dissolve those entities.  However, the Court invalidated the measure’ companion bill, A.B. 1X27, which conditioned further redevelopment agency operations on additional payments by the agencies’ community sponsors to state funds benefitting schools and special districts.  The Court found this mandate violated Proposition 22, which amended the Constitution to prevent the state from redirecting redevelopment funds.

The opinion also chronicles how community redevelopment agencies, formed to combat urban decay, developed into the principal instrument of economic development for most cities.  These agencies principally acquire and transfer property on favorable terms for residential or commercial development.  Unable to levy taxes, the agencies rely on tax increment financing, whereby the property tax revenues for government entities other than the redevelopment agency are frozen, while revenues from any increase in values are awarded to the redevelopment agency on the theory that the increase is the result of redevelopment. The tax increment financing has, “sometimes been misused to subsidize the city’s economic development through the diversion of property tax revenue for other tax entities.”  The agencies are used to shield property tax revenue from other governmental agencies and create a shell game amongst local governments with respect to property tax funds.

The tax increment financing is a hot political issue because of the arguable unfair advantage it provides cities over school districts and local taxing agencies, and the loss of revenue to the state’s general fund.  While Governor Brown considered eliminating redevelopment agencies altogether as a partial mean of closing the state’s projected budget deficit, the legislation enacted “freezes” conditions by placing restrictions on modification of existing plans and barring creation of new agencies.  The legislation was intended to preserve redevelopment assets and revenues to fund core local services, i.e. public safety and education.  The dissolution component transfers control of redevelopment agency assets to the local public entity that created the agency and requires performance of existing obligations.  The Court invalidated the provision that created an exemption for agencies that agreed to make specified payments to other governmental funds.

Paper: Police vs. Stockton, Round 1

The Stockton POA was in court Friday trying to block the city's attempt to impair their MOU based on a purported fiscal emergency.  The city claims it can impair existing labor contracts because the city council passed a resolution declaring a fiscal emergency.  Mastagni Law attorneys David P. Mastagni, David E. Mastagni, William M. Briggs, Isaac S. Stevens and B.J. Pierce represent Stockton POA in the action.  A ruling is expected before the end of the year.  Read more about the case in the Stockton Record's article Police vs. Stockton, Round 1.