PORAC, CAHP & CPRC File Amicus Brief Urging US Supreme Court to Uphold Second Amendment Rights in Wolford v. Lopez

The Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPRC) have jointly filed an amicus brief asking the United States Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wolford v. Lopez, which upheld Hawaii’s consent “presumption-flip” law. The presumption-flip is also called the "Vampire Rule," reverses the default rule permitting concealed carry on on private property open to the public and requires CCW permit holders to first obtain the property owner's express consent.

Our brief urges the Supreme Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision, arguing this rule is incompatible with the Court’s landmark decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, undermines the rights of thoroughly vetted permit holders, turns everyday commercial spaces into soft targets for criminals, and wastes scarce police resources that should be focused on violent crime. A reversal will restore the traditional presumption that licensed carry is allowed unless the owner affirmatively objects, and will strengthen lawful self-defense rights for both civilians and peace officers.

At stake in Wolford is the core right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home, a right the Supreme Court affirmed in Bruen just three years ago. Hawaii's laws, much like those in California and other restrictive states, effectively transform vast swaths of public life into "gun-free" zones. Petitioners Jason Wolford, Alison Wolford, Atom Kasprzycki, and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition argue that these restrictions violate the Second Amendment, as they lack historical analogues and burden the right to self-defense without justification.

The core dispute in Wolford centers on the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the United States has a historical tradition of banning firearm carry on private property open to the public unless the owner consents. In effect, the court flipped the default rule for businesses, stores, restaurants, and other places the public is invited to enter. Petitioners and supporting amici argue that this interpretation badly misreads both history and Bruen’s requirement that modern regulations be evaluated by “how” and “why” analogous laws burdened the right in the past.

Even though the panel struck down California’s signage-only consent rule while upholding Hawaii’s more “flexible” version, the deeper constitutional problem is the presumption flip itself. By making consent the exception rather than the rule, the law creates nearly insurmountable barriers to the public carry that the Second Amendment protects. Other federal circuits have already rejected similar default bans on carry in places open to the public, creating a clear circuit split that only the Supreme Court can resolve.

Our amicus brief, authored by Mastagni Holstedt, APC attorneys David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey alongside colleagues Timothy Talbot and Michael Morguess, drives home several critical points. The brief deconstructs the Ninth Circuits faulty analogues, which fail the Court's "how and why" test, and lays out the empirical data demonstrating how such laws actually endanger the public.

First, Bruen demands that the government bear the burden of proving a modern regulation is consistent with historical tradition in both its burden and its justification. The Ninth Circuit relied on only two outlier laws, an anti-poaching statute and a racist Reconstruction-era Black Code, as purported "dead ringers" for the presumption flip. The anti-poaching statute fails the how test because the hunting lands were not open to the public. Both laws fail the why test. Hawaii's law was presumably intended to reduce gun violence, not invidiously discriminate based on race or prevent trespassing and poaching.

Second, flipping the default consent rule chills the exercise of a core constitutional right and effectively converts most private businesses into “sensitive places,” something Bruen explicitly warned against.

Drawing on CPRC's extensive research, we present evidence that right-to-carry laws do not increase violent crime. In fact, they deter it. Concealed-carry permit holders are among the most heavily vetted and law-abiding segments of the population, with revocation and criminal violation rates that are vanishingly small. In California alone, where permit holders must undergo rigorous background checks and training, these individuals commit crimes at rates exponentially lower than even peace officers. Restricting their ability to carry does nothing to enhance safety.

Modern empirical evidence, when analyzed by economists like John R. Lott, Jr. with rigorous methods that correct the flaws of earlier studies, shows that right-to-carry laws are associated with reductions in violent crime, especially murder and rape, and are not linked to increases in robbery or assault. Gun-free zones, by contrast, simply invite attack and create defenseless victims in the very places where police cannot always be present. Over 92% of attacks since 1950 have occurred in such areas, including the 2023 Atlanta hospital shooting, the Louisville bank attack, and the Texas mall incident. Mass shooters purposefully select areas where law-abiding CCW holders are disarmed, leaving victims vulnerable. Armed, law-abiding civilians deter criminals and can interrupt attacks in progress, making communities safer and, importantly, making the job of uniformed officers less dangerous.

Compounding this risk, manifestos from several mass shooters reveal a calculated strategy to target gun-free zones where resistance is minimal. The 2022 Buffalo supermarket shooter explicitly noted in his writings that "areas where CCW are outlawed or prohibited may be good areas of attack" and that "areas with strict gun laws are also great places of attack," deliberately choosing a location in New York with virtually no concealed carry permits. Likewise, the 2023 Nashville Covenant School shooter planned assaults on multiple sites but selected the school after a "threat assessment" deemed another target to have "too much security," opting for the softer target. This pattern heightens dangers for law enforcement, as in these disarmed environments, uniformed police officers, i.e. the only armed presence, become the initial targets for elimination. FBI data indicates officers are shot in one out of every six active shooter events, often in lethal ambushes at the outset to neutralize any immediate response. A discreetly armed, law-abiding populace introduces uncertainty for criminals and spreads the risk, reducing the chance that officers will be singled out.

For California's peace officers, the stakes are especially high. A favorable ruling would vindicate inherent self-defense rights that officers rely upon to protect us and themselves. The Court can also end post-Bruen attempts to evade the Second Amendment through blanket presumptive bans and bring the Ninth Circuit into line with the rest of our country. Restoring the consent presumption would allow officers and civilians alike to carry for self-defense on private property without navigating a maze of prohibitions.

A Supreme Court decision restoring broader self-defense rights could have profound ripple effects. It might bolster officers' use-of-force defenses in court, emphasizing the objective reasonableness of the response to an immediate and lethal threat, while countering false narratives that equate armed self-defense with escalation or murder. Operationally, with staffing shortages plaguing departments statewide, law-abiding armed citizens serve as a critical force multiplier in the rare but catastrophic active-shooter or mass-attack events where an immediate officer response is impossible. Politically, reversing Wolford would push back against efforts to turn most commercial spaces into prohibited zones and would reinforce evidence-based policies that target prohibited possessors and enhance penalties for gun crime rather than disarming the law-abiding.

In short, our brief argues that the presumption-flip endorsed by the Ninth Circuit is constitutionally unsound and operationally counterproductive. It creates defenseless victims, wastes police resources, and places officers at greater risk. Vetted concealed-carry holders are demonstrably not the problem. The data show extraordinarily low CCW carrier violation rates and clear public-safety benefits from right-to-carry laws. A Supreme Court decision restoring the traditional consent presumption would return workable, constitutionally faithful rules to private property open to the public and make California’s streets safer for both communities and the officers who protect them.

We will continue to keep PORAC, CAHP, and our peace-officer clients updated as the Supreme Court considers Wolford v. Lopez. View the full brief here.

Court of Appeal Rules PEPRA Does Not Categorically Exclude Standby Pay from Pensionable Compensation

In a significant decision for California's public safety employees, the Court of Appeal in Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (November 13, 2025) clarified that the Public Employees' Pension Reform Act (PEPRA) does not impose a blanket exclusion on standby pay when calculating "compensation earnable" under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL). While the court ultimately upheld the exclusion of standby pay in this specific case based on the terms of the parties' Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the ruling opens the door for unions to negotiate or arbitrate standby pay as part of normal working hours—making it potentially pensionable.

David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey filed the appeal on behalf of the Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association (VCPFA) and several individual members against the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA). VCERA had excluded prescheduled standby pay from pension calculations, citing PEPRA's amendments to Government Code section 31461 and the California Supreme Court's decision in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020). 

Under PEPRA, compensation earnable excludes "[p]ayments for additional services rendered outside of normal working hours" (§ 31461, subd. (b)(3)). VCPFA argued that prescheduled standby was assigned regularly as part of firefighters' duties, and therefore should count toward pensions because it formed part of their normal schedules.

The trial court sustained VCERA's demurrer without leave to amend, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that the MOA's language treated standby as discretionary and outside the base 40-hour workweek. Specifically, the MOA and a subsequent Side Letter described standby assignments as subject to the fire chief's discretion, not as fixed "normal working hours." As a result, the court concluded it fell under PEPRA's exclusion for services outside normal hours.

However, the real victory for public safety employees lies in the court's explicit rejection of the categorical ban asserted by VCERA's counsel. The opinion states: "We do not, as respondents urge, interpret section 31461 or Alameda as categorically prohibiting CERL pension programs from including standby or on-call pay when calculating compensation earnable. The 'underlying concept of compensation earnable' is 'to reflect pay for work ordinarily performed during the course of a year . . . .'" This means that if a labor agreement clearly defines standby as part of an employee's regular, non-discretionary schedule, it could qualify as pensionable.

GOP Labor Bills Could Crush Union Organizing: What This Means for California Workers

In a move that could significantly alter the landscape of labor relations, Senate Republicans, led by Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, have introduced a package of seven bills targeting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). While framed as reforms to empower workers and streamline processes, these proposals raise serious concerns about their potential to hinder union formation and organizing efforts—particularly in states like California, where strong labor protections have long supported both private and public sector employees. California labor organizations should closely monitoring these developments. 

The bills, introduced on November 10, 2025, cover a range of changes to how unions interact with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and employers. Key provisions include requiring a two-thirds majority of eligible voters to participate in union representation elections for the results to count, banning voluntary union recognition (often called "card check"), and imposing fines on workers or unions for filing what the NLRB deems "frivolous" unfair labor practice (ULP) charges. Other measures would make it an unfair labor practice to hire undocumented immigrants, prohibit unions from using member dues for political advocacy without explicit consent, and lower barriers for employers to discipline workers engaging in picket line activities.

For private sector unions in California, these changes would strike at the heart of organizing campaigns. Under current NLRA rules, unions can secure recognition through majority support via signed authorization cards or secret-ballot elections overseen by the NLRB. The proposed ban on voluntary recognition would force all organizing into potentially contentious elections, where employer influence often sways outcomes. Coupled with the two-thirds participation threshold, this could make it exceedingly difficult for unions to win representation, especially in larger workplaces where voter turnout challenges are common. As former NLRB Chair Lauren McFerran noted in her critique, these reforms might render other pro-worker gestures in the package, like expedited first-contract negotiations, largely meaningless, as they erect formidable barriers to forming a union in the first place.

The proposed fines for "frivolous" ULP charges would deter enforcement of our nations labor laws. The NLRA has never imposed penalties on workers for filing charges, even if they're later dismissed. This novel approach could chill legitimate complaints, as employees might fear financial repercussions for challenging unfair practices. McFerran aptly described it as "intimidating for workers," pointing out that the NLRB already filters meritless claims without pursuing them. In California's dynamic private sector economy, such provisions would embolden employers to push boundaries, knowing that workers could hesitate to seek NLRB intervention.

The proposed "Protection on the Picket Line Act" would make it easier for employers to impose discipline for alleged misconduct on the picket line. Currently, under the NLRA, picketing is a protected concerted activity, allowing workers to protest peacefully outside their workplace to highlight labor disputes. While misconduct like harassment or slurs can currently lead to discipline, NLRB precedents afford some leeway for heated language in the heat of a dispute. This legislation would narrow the scope of protected activity, potentially exposing picketers to quicker repercussions and discouraging robust protest tactics that have been key to union successes.

While California's public safety employees fall under state jurisdiction through the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) rather than the NLRB, federal labor trends often ripple into state policies. If enacted, some of these federal changes could inspire similar restrictions in California, potentially limiting unions' ability to advocate for safer working conditions, better staffing, or legislative reforms that protect first responders. In California, where public employees enjoy robust protections under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Dills Act, any erosion of federal standards might encourage anti-union forces to challenge state laws.  

Pro-business groups like the National Right to Work Committee and the Competitive Enterprise Institute have lauded the package for promoting "worker choice" and secret-ballot elections. Yet, as union advocates argue, these measures often tip the scales toward employers, masking restrictions on collective action under the guise of fairness. The requirement for two-thirds voter turnout, for example, ignores the realities of workplace intimidation and low participation due to fear of retaliation.  

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the package's prospects remain uncertain in a divided Congress while the filibuster remains intact, but its introduction signals a renewed push to overhaul labor law. These bills, if passed, would complicate organizing while setting precedents that could influence California labor law.

Union members should engage with their leadership to advocacy for counter-legislation like the bipartisan Faster Labor Contracts Act. The Faster Labor Contracts Act (FLCA) is bipartisan legislation, supported by the Teamsters, designed to expedite the process of negotiating a union's first contract by setting strict deadlines for talks (start within 10 days, mediation at 90 days, then binding arbitration if talks fail) to prevent employers from stalling and denying workers fair terms. Teamsters President Sean O'Brien champions it as crucial for labor, forcing good-faith bargaining, while business groups like the U.S. Chamber and NFIB oppose it as government overreach. 

CA Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Protecting Officers From False Misconduct Claims

     In a 6-1 decision issued on November 10, 2025, the California Supreme Court invalidated Penal Code section 148.6, overturning its own prior ruling in People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497. The case, Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles  2025 WL 3136580 (Cal., 2025), centered on the statute's requirement that complainants sign an advisory warning them that filing a knowingly false allegation of police misconduct is a crime. Justice Joshua Groban, writing for the majority, held that this provision violates the First Amendment by creating an undue chill on protected speech, i.e. complaints against peace officers.

    As counsel to numerous public safety unions and their members across California, we know our clients have been closely tracking this litigation. Unfortunately, it removes a critical safeguard against baseless accusations that can stunt officers' careers. 

Background and the Court's Reasoning

    Penal Code section 148.6, enacted in 1995, made it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false misconduct complaint against a peace officer (§ 148.6(a)(1)). More controversially, it mandated that agencies require complainants to read and sign an advisory before accepting a complaint, explicitly warning of potential criminal liability (§ 148.6(a)(2)). This was designed to deter frivolous or malicious filings while ensuring agencies investigated all public complaints under Penal Code section 832.5.

    The LAPPL sued the City of Los Angeles in 2017 after the City stopped enforcing the advisory requirement, citing federal rulings that deemed it unconstitutional. Lower courts, bound by Stanistreet, sided with the LAPPL and ordered compliance. On review, however, the Supreme Court reversed course, holding that section 148.6 discriminates based on content within the proscribable category of "knowingly false statements of fact," triggering heightened scrutiny.

    The Court explained that the law criminalizes false complaints against officers but leaves unregulated false statements in support of officers during investigations. This imbalance, the Court argued, risks distorting the "marketplace of ideas" by deterring one side of the debate. Requiring a signed warning before filing could intimidate even truthful complainants, who might fear prosecution if their accounts are later disbelieved. The Court emphasized that prohibitions on falsehoods must not unduly burden legitimate expression. 

    While acknowledging the state's interest in protecting officers from abusive claims, the majority held the statute wasn't sufficiently tailored. It noted ill-defined triggers for liability, no materiality or harm requirement, and the unusual admonition process, which together create "a potent disincentive" for good-faith reporting.

    Former UC Berkeley Law School Professor Justice Goodwin Liu dissented, arguing the ruling was "speculative" and that section 148.6 is no different from other anti-falsehood laws like perjury statutes. He stressed the real-world burdens on officers: "Our men and women in uniform have a hard enough job without having to deal with knowingly false allegations of misconduct."

The Benefits of the Invalidated Law: A Shield Against Career-Derailing Complaints

    For three decades, section 148.6 served as a vital tool in maintaining the integrity of misconduct investigations. False complaints aren't just nuisances; they can trigger lengthy probes under Penal Code section 832.5, during which officers may face administrative leave, reassignment, an inability to promote, or reputational harm. Even if ultimately exonerated, the process can stall career advancement, erode public trust, and lead to psychological stress.  

    The advisory requirement was particularly effective in discouraging malicious filings without blocking legitimate ones. It put complainants on notice and promoted some level of accountability in a system where officers are held to high standards but often lack reciprocal protections. By invalidating this law, the Court has removed a deterrent that helped filter out vendetta-driven or unfounded claims, potentially increasing the volume of investigations agencies must handle.

Potential Future Impacts on Peace Officers

    This ruling could have ripple effects for California's public safety professionals. Without this backstop, malicious complaints will feel emboldened to file complaints knowing there's little downside. This asymmetry leaves officers exposed, as false statements defending them remain unregulated. Agencies will see more false complaints and officers will face avoidable jeopardy. This could exacerbate burnout, recruitment problems and foster hesitation in high-stakes encounters.

    The California Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis focused on Penal Code section 148.6(a)’s asymmetrical criminalization of knowingly false complaints against officers while leaving false statements made by officers or witnesses in support of officers unregulated within the citizen complaint process. However, the Court did not consider the existing penalties for officers' false statements under Penal Code sections 832.7(c) and 13510.8(b)(1), which address officer dishonesty relating to the investigation of misconduct.  

Penal Code section 13510.8 defines "serious misconduct" to include "dishonesty relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, a peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, false statements, intentionally filing false reports, tampering with, falsifying, destroying, or concealing evidence, perjury." Officers found to have made false statements in an investigation face potential suspension or revocation of their peace officer certification, which effectively ends their law enforcement career.  

    The Opinion does provides a roadmap for the Legislature to craft narrower protections against frivolous complaints and false statements. The Court strongly suggested that a statute imposing symmetrical, material-harm-based liability for false statements by both complainants and officers, such as the disciplinary and decertification processes for officer dishonesty, would stand a much greater chance of passing constitutional muster. Such an amendment could also focus on any materially false statements intended to mislead or deceive and relevant to the determination of whether misconduct occurred.