Friday, August 22, 2025

Ninth Circuit Holds Officer’s Use of Less-Lethal Force That Injured Bystander During Protest Not Excessive

In Cheairs v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that an officer’s deployment of a blast ball during a chaotic protest, which injured a nearby bystander, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscores the challenges officers face in managing volatile crowds and highlights key considerations for use-of-force policies in public safety operations.


Background

The case stems from protests in Seattle following George Floyd’s death in 2020. On June 7, demonstrators escalated actions by breaching police barricades, throwing projectiles, shining lasers at officers, and threatening to burn precincts. Seattle Police Department officers, equipped with less-lethal munitions like OC blast balls, issued multiple dispersal orders and warnings via public address.

Officer Carl Anderson, leading the chemical agent response team, threw several blast balls to protect officers and disperse the crowd. One device bounced off the pavement and struck Taylor Cheairs, a bystander filming from the sidewalk near the front of the protesters. Cheairs suffered serious injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and First Amendment retaliation.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Cheairs appealed.

Legal Ruling

The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Cheairs was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. Citing Torres v. Madrid, the court noted that force applied with intent to restrain can constitute a seizure. Here, a jury could find the blast ball’s use manifested such intent, given its design and deployment.

Turning to reasonableness, the court applied the Graham v. Connor factors: severity of the crime, immediate threat to safety, and resistance or evasion. The most critical factor—immediate threat—weighed heavily in favor of the officer. Video evidence showed protesters near Cheairs assaulting officers with rocks, bottles, fireworks, and lasers amid escalating violence. The crowd ignored dispersal orders, creating probable cause for arrests related to assault or failure to disperse.

The court balanced the intrusion (serious injury from a less-lethal device) against the government’s interest in protecting officers, citizens, and property. Officer Anderson followed department policy, throwing the device at the ground rather than at head height, reducing lethality risk. Under the totality of circumstances, viewed from the officer’s on-scene perspective, the force was deemed reasonable.

On the First Amendment claim, Cheairs failed to show retaliation for filming. No evidence indicated Officer Anderson knew Cheairs was recording or targeted him; the officer’s view was obstructed by the police line.

Implications for Public Safety Officers

This ruling offers valuable guidance for California peace officers and firefighters handling protests or crowd control. It affirms that less-lethal force can be justified when crowds pose objective threats, even if bystanders are inadvertently harmed. Agencies should review policies on munitions deployment, emphasizing ground-level throws to minimize injury risks, and officers should document threats via body cams and reports to support reasonableness claims.

If you have questions about this case or its application to your department, contact your representatives.   

Monday, August 11, 2025

Appellate Ruling Severely Limits Public Employees' Legal Recourse for Improperly Disclosed Personnel Records

    In the ever-evolving landscape of public safety labor law, protecting the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records remains a critical issue. A recent California Court of Appeal decision, Santa Ana Police Officers Association et al. v. City of Santa Ana (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 296, limits the remedies available to public employees when such records are improperly disclosed. This ruling exposes the rising tensions between CPRA transparency goals and the erosion of public employees' due process rights to protect their privacy. For public employee labor organizations, this ruling sets forth the procedural hurdles they face and the need for legislative reform to balance transparency interests with a meaningful process for employees to enforce their privacy rights.  

A CPRA Response Gone Wrong

    The case stems from a 2021 incident where the City of Santa Ana inadvertently disclosed confidential personnel records of over 100 police officers to the media outlet Voice of OC in response to a CPRA request. These records included sensitive information about prior complaints and disciplinary investigations that were not subject to disclosure under S.B. 1421 or 16. In fact, the materials were confidential under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (the "Pitchess" statutes).

    The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA), along with anonymous "Doe" officers, sued the City, alleging violations of these confidentiality laws, negligence per se, failure to investigate their subsequent complaint about the disclosure (under Penal Code section 832.5), and denial of a request for information relating to the disclosures in violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The plaintiffs sought relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and mandamus.

    The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, delivering a mixed bag of outcomes with significant labor implications.

Court Holdings:

    The appellate court's decision, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Sanchez, addressed several core issues relevant to public safety unions and officers:

No Private Right of Action for Improper Disclosure

    The court held that Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not create a private cause of action for officers or unions seeking damages or other relief for the unauthorized release of confidential records. Rather, these statutes primarily establish procedures for protecting against improper disclosures but don't authorize lawsuits against public entities who violate the statutes and improperly disclose confidential material. 

    Related negligence claims were also dismissed, as they relied on the same statutes for a "duty of care." This ruling effectively strips public employees of any meaningful remedy for violation of these statutes or the disclosure of sensitive materials that violate their right to privacy. The court recognized the violation of mandated confidentiality laws but limited the employees' remedies to administrative or mandamus relief rather than civil damages. 

    These remedies are woefully inadequate because at most they seek to prevent future violations. The CPRA does not contain any mechanism for retraction of improperly disclosed materials and once disclosed and publicized, and injection against further disclosures by the employer provides little comfort. Moreover, public employees often discovery improper disclosures once they are publicized, because public agencies often disclose the records without notifying employees or providing them an opportunity to object. 

    Even if afforded notice, filing an action to prevent the disclosure is costly and risky. If the court rules against the employee, the requester, typically a media entity, is often awarded attorneys' fees and cost. If successful, the employee still suffers litigation costs with no hopes of monetary damages. This system urgently needs rebalancing. 

Anonymity in Litigation: A High Bar

    Officers suing anonymously (as "Does") must obtain court approval after a hearing balancing their privacy interests against the public's First Amendment right to access court proceedings. Here, the Doe officers failed to seek such authorization, leading to dismissal of their claims. Officers dealing with sensitive personnel matters can't assume anonymity will be granted. They must proactively justify it, or risk procedural dismissal.

Mootness of Injunctive and Mandamus Relief for Past Disclosures

    Claims for injunctive relief to prevent disclosure or mandamus to compel non-disclosure were deemed moot, as the records had already been released years earlier in response to the CPRA request. The court noted that once disclosure occurs, a public entity lacks the ability to "undo" it, rendering such remedies ineffective.

Mandamus Available for Failure to Investigate Complaints

    In a win for the union, the court reversed on the cause of action for failure to investigate its complaints. Penal Code section 832.5 requires agencies to investigate citizen complaints against personnel, including staff involved in disclosures, and notify complainants of the disposition within 30 days. The SAPOA adequately alleged the City never investigated or reported on their complaint about the disclosure, creating a ministerial duty enforceable via mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. This "win" still cannot undo the violation of the employees' privacy rights.

Exhaustion Required for MMBA Claims

    The cause of action alleging the City violated the MMBA by denying the union's information requests  was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court confirmed the SAPOA's associational standing to represent its members but dismissed the claims. While individual peace officers are exempt from PERB jurisdiction, unions like the SAPOA are not.

Conclusion

    This decision has many negative effects for public employee labor organizations.  Unions must focus on prevention. With limited remedies post-disclosure, unions should bargain for protections against agency negligence to avoid accidental releases of exempt records. Procedures that require agencies to notify the recognized labor representative and employee before any personnel record is released would at least provide an opportunity to object or even commence a reverse CPRA action to prevent disclosure.

    Legislation is also need to balance public employee due process rights. The state could mandate these pre-disclosure notification and process for the employee to object. The one-sided attorneys' fees structure in favor of requestors needs rebalancing so public employees can seek judicial relief without the fear of being subject to excessive attorneys' fees being awarded to deep pocketed media organizations.   

    Overall, Santa Ana narrows direct paths to compensation for privacy breaches. While the SAPOA scored a partial victory on the investigation front, the case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the limited protections of confidentiality statutes.  

Friday, August 8, 2025

Sacramento Police Officers Association Wins Interest Arbitration Award: 5% Retroactive Raise, Enhanced Longevity, and 14 Month Term

The Sacramento Police Officers Association (SPOA) obtained an Interest Arbitration Award from Arbitrator John LaRocco effective August 8, 2025, adopting SPOA's last best offer on a 5% salary adjustment for all members retroactive to January 25, 2025. The Award runs through April 17, 2026, and also provides all unit members additional longevity at 10 years and 17 years of service, and well as an additional 4% increase for Dispatcher IIIs. 

Binding under the Sacramento City Charter, this Award provides SPOA members substantial and immediate increases, while also allowing the parties to promptly return to negations to bargain over a long-term agreement. The City had initially refused to bargain, forcing the SPOA to file an unfair labor practice in December of 2024 and ultimately resulting in members working for over six (6) months without a contract. Unable to reach a long-term agreement, the SPOA and the City agreed to an expedited arbitration process of over a limited number of proposals. The issuance of this Award and its immediate financial relief illustrates the value of interest arbitration in resolving difficult negotiations.

The Interest Arbitration Process: Binding Impasse Resolution Under the City Charter

The Sacramento City Charter, Article XVIII, Section 503, mandates interest arbitration to break deadlocks in negotiations over wages, hours, benefits, and terms of employment. Unlike the advisory fact-finding under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which often leaves disputes unresolved due to its advisory nature, impasse arbitration provides for a neutral arbitrator to select from the last best offer of each party that best matches traditional factors: consumer price changes, comparable compensation in similar classifications (based on the local market and similarly sized cities throughout the state), the City's financial condition and ability to pay, staffing/recruitment/retention data, and other relevant information.

Here, the parties stipulated to an expedited mediation-arbitration (med-arb) process before a single arbitrator, limiting the issues to salary, pay differentials for Dispatcher III, longevity pay, and term. This strategic move narrowed the scope of proposals and relaxed the arbitration procedures to allow for a swift award while preserving the ability to quickly return to formal negotiations to address additional proposals and seek a longer-term contract.

 The Award

Arbitrator LaRocco selected a blend of proposals, favoring SPOA on core economic issues:

Salary Adjustments: Adopted SPOA's proposal for a 5% increase across all classifications, effective retroactively to January 25, 2025 (the expiration of the prior contract). The Award rejected the City's 2.5% offer without retroactivity, based on the parties' history of retroactive increases and SPOA's evidence showing City police salaries lagging below market comparators. Even the City's compensation survey (which used a controversial ERI cost-of-living adjustment for comparator cities) showed officers fell below market means and medians, as well as below Sacramento County deputies for the first time.

Dispatcher III Differential: Adopted SPOA's proposal to raise the salary benchmark from 17% to 21% above Dispatcher II top step, effective upon Award implementation. This proposal brings Dispatcher IIIs up to the sergeant-officer differentials and addresses chronic staffing problems within the dispatcher classifications. 

Longevity Pay: Established new 1.5% incentive at 10 years of service and increasing the existing 3% at 17 years to 4.5%, effective July 1, 2025. Although the Award selected the City's Longevity proposal due primarily to the overall cost of the increases provided by the Award over a short amount of time, the arbitrator noted importance of increasing retention incentives for mid-career officers. The arbitrator suggested that future contracts should both increase longevity pays and provide them sooner. 

Demonstrating the importance of interest arbitration, the City's submitted its first formal proposal to increase longevity in arbitration when faced with the prospect of the arbitrator adopting the SPOA proposal for a 3% increase at 10 and 17 years of service. Because the arbitrator selects the most reasonable offer, the City had to increase its proposals or risk losing on this issue.  

Contract Term: The arbitrator selected the City's proposed term from January 25, 2025, to April 17, 2026, over the SPOA proposed term to January 24, 2026. The arbitrator reasoned that the City's proposal provided more breathing room for comprehensive negotiations on unresolved issues. 

The award also incorporates four tentative agreements reached pre-arbitration and retains jurisdiction for implementation disputes.

City's Budget Deficit Claims

The City argued inability to pay, citing a structural deficit projected at $50 million for FY 2025-2026, escalating to $130 million by FY 2028-2029, driven by past policy decisions like expanded services funded by temporary revenues. The arbitrator acknowledged the deficit's ongoing nature but distinguished it from external shocks like recessions. The City admitted that its revenues were growing at a healthy rate, but argued that spending priorities were outpacing the revenue growth. 

As detailed in the award, the City's Finance Director testified that "the City is experiencing a severe structural budget deficit of an ongoing nature" originating several years ago, with an initial February 2025 projection of "$62 million for fiscal year 2025-2026" updated to "$50 million" by July. The director acknowledged that "the structural budget deficit was caused by past City and voter decisions," including "long-run expenditure commitments based on one-time or two-time funding," resulting in a "continuing imbalance between revenues and expenditures." While "economic externalities, like inflation, contributed to the deficit," they "did not play a major role in causing the severe structural deficit."

Future projections included "$93.6 million for fiscal year 2026-2027; $110.1 million for fiscal year 2027-2028; and, $130.3 million for fiscal year 2028-2029." The City noted that "about 50% of City expenditures go toward employee salaries" and "every 1% salary increase for City employees costs $4.8 million," alongside unfunded liabilities like PERS contribution increases.

SPOA countered with expert analyses challenging these claims. Beacon Economics forecasted higher tax revenues, concluding "the City remains fiscally healthy because City employment, real estate transactions and business activities continue to thrive," with "property taxes will rise 4% to 8% over the next three fiscal years." Harvey M. Rose Associates reviewed historical data, finding that "for the past four fiscal years, the City projected General Fund deficits of $78.8 million to $160.5 million while the actual deficits were $5.6 million to $21.4 million." Applying this pattern, Rose estimated the FY 2025-2026 deficit at "approximately $34 million" and noted "the City has sufficient reserves to absorb the shortfall." Rose further observed that "the City's General Fund balance rose from $225.4 million to $326.4 million between fiscal year 2019-2020 and fiscal year 2023-2024," concluding "the General Fund is relatively healthy" and criticizing the City's "history of grossly overstating expected budget deficits."

The arbitrator acknowledged the deficits but found they did not preclude funding reasonable increases given the City's healthy reserves and the need for public safety. The arbitrator stated, "the City is experiencing a structural budget deficit and unfortunately, the evidence does not disclose how long the deficit might endure. It cannot be indefinite." However, he found the City's projections "exaggerated" even if SPOA's predictions were "overly optimistic," emphasizing that "if the City's projections are accurate, City inaction could prolong the deficit, which would precipitate fiscal chaos." Critically, he distinguished policy-driven shortfalls from external factors, holding that "a 5% wage increase cannot be nullified by diverse and contradictory evidence concerning the City's ability to pay." Employees "were not responsible for causing the deficit," and public safety "should be a top priority." With tax revenues expected to rise, the City "has the ability to fund a 5% salary increase."

Vacancies and Retention Challenges

The arbitrator noted the significance of the City's police officer vacancies, which were directly relevant to the parties proposals. The arbitrator noted, "the evidence reveals that the City's Police Department is confronted with a retention problem." The data presented revealed stark declines. "In June, 2025, there were 619 budgeted police officer positions, but only 470.5 were filled and only 373 were working. The number of working officers was just 60% of the budget positions." For context, "as of January, 2021, 94% (533.5) of the 569 budget positions were filled and 84% (479) of the positions were working." The arbitrator observed that "the percent of officers working as compared to budget positions had not been at or below 60% since 2015-2017" and that "except for a short upward bump in early 2022, the percentage of budgeted positions filled and working has steadily declined since 2021 indicating that police officer retention is a problem which must be addressed albeit, it cannot be cured in this agreement." 

The arbitrator emphasized the importance of early longevity steps and competitive salaries. "Commencing longevity pay at 10 years will begin to alleviate the problem" by establishing "a foundation for possible greater longevity pay in future contracts, especially if the parties collect more data about the reasons for the retention problem and where the departing officers are landing." He suggested flexibility for future adjustments, noting "during their upcoming negotiations, the parties may find that it might be more beneficial to start longevity pay before 10 years of service as opposed to raising longevity pay at 17 years of service."

Future Impacts 

This Award strengthens SPOA's position and provides the parties guidance to address the growing problem of officer vacancies by enhancing mid-term longevity as a retention tool. The arbitrator noted  growing vacancies of 20% of authorized positions and declining fill rates of working officers from 84% in 2021 to 60% by June of 2025. He noted that starting longevity at 10 years lays the groundwork for expansions, potentially before 10 years if data shows earlier incentives curb attrition more effectively. 

This Award also demonstrates the power of interest arbitration to provide binding decisions based on data-driven evidence and prevents endless stalemates. The analysis highlights the importance of comparable data, recruitment and retention data, and ability to pay evidence in any negotiations or impasse proceedings. Further, it provides insights regarding differences in how arbitrators view budget deficits cited as a basis to deny raises depending upon whether the deficit is policy driven , e.g. other spending priorities, or caused by external factors, e.g. recessions.

Mastagni Labor Representative Jose Cuervo was SPOA's lead negotiator during these negotiations and David E. Mastagni represented the SPOA during the Interest Arbitration.  

CLICK HERE TO READ THE INTEREST ARBITRATION AWARD.

Monday, August 4, 2025

Recent Appellate Decisions Erode Pitchess Protections for California Peace Officers

Two new Court of Appeal decisions are chipping away at the confidentiality safeguards for peace officers' personnel files under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. These rulings expand disclosure requirements and limit protective orders, potentially exposing officers to broader scrutiny and misuse of sensitive information. For public safety unions and officers, this signals a shifting landscape where traditional protections are giving way to demands for transparency. Below, we break down the cases and their combined implications.

Schneider v. Superior Court (2025): Full Disclosure of IA Investigation if  Brady Material, Not Just Witness Info

In Schneider v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 613, the Second District Court of Appeal addressed a murder defendant's motion for discovery of Brady material in the personnel files of six LASD deputies involved in the investigation. The trial court found Brady material in four files but limited disclosure to names, addresses, and phone numbers of complainants and witnesses—standard under classic Pitchess practice.

The appellate court reversed, holding that when material qualifies as Brady (favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment), the prosecution must disclose the full records, including documents, reports, and audio-visual evidence. This bypasses the usual Pitchess limitation, as Brady's constitutional mandate trumps officers' privacy interests in such cases.

The court reasoned that Brady materiality is higher than Pitchess relevance, so once identified, full access is essential for the defense to build a case. Protective measures like sealing transcripts still apply, but the ruling opens the door to verbatim records rather than summaries.

For officers, this means personnel files (e.g. IA investigations and disciplinary actions) containing impeachment evidence (e.g., dishonesty or excessive force) could be handed over wholesale in criminal cases where deputies are witnesses. What started as a targeted Pitchess motion now risks broader exposure, especially since most motions seek Brady-type material.

Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024): No Protective Order for Pitchess Disclosures of  Serious Misconduct Records Deemed  Public Records Under Penal Code § 832.7

The Second District's decision in Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 542 further weakens Pitchess by eliminating protective orders for records made public under Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(C), which mandates disclosure of sustained findings of dishonesty.

Here, a murder defendant sought records of an Azusa PD officer's dishonesty finding via a CPRA request and a parallel Pitchess motion. The trial court ordered disclosure after an in-camera review but imposed a protective order under Evidence Code § 1045(e), restricting use to the criminal proceeding.

The appellate court vacated the order, ruling that since § 832.7 deems these records nonconfidential and subject to public inspection, no protective order applies, even if obtained through Pitchess. This builds on ALADS v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, which separated Pitchess from CPRA but didn't address overlapping disclosures.

The impacts are significant. Officers' records of sustained serious misconduct, such as dishonesty, can now be freely shared beyond the courtroom, blurring the lines between Pitchess disclosures and public record requests. Defense teams can now disseminate this subset of Pitchess materials widely, increasing risks of reputational harm.

Combined Impact: A Weakening of Privacy Rights for Peace Officers

Together, Schneider and Banuelos accelerate the erosion of Pitchess protections. By expanding Brady to require full documents and stripping protective orders for § 832.7 records, these rulings prioritize defendants' rights and police transparency over officers' privacy. These rulings will lead to much more invasive criminal discovery and the more wide spread use of those materials beyond the specific criminal case.