In
Alailima-Millon v. Los Angeles County Superior Ct. No. B326373, 2024 WL
3271129 (Cal. Ct. App. July 2, 2024), a California Court of Appeal issued a
rare opinion reversing the penalty in a 1094.5 administrative writ of mandate
proceeding. The appellate decision is notable because penalty determinations
are reviewed for abuse of discretion, as opposed to the independent judgment typically
applied to factual findings and conclusions.
Based on differing standards of review, a court is much more
likely to reverse findings of misconduct culpability rather than a penalty. That
is because, once misconduct is affirmed, the burden to reverse the penalty is a
demanding one: “if reasonable minds can differ with regard to the propriety of
the disciplinary action” the court will find no abuse of discretion.[i] Therefore, an examination
of Alailima-Millon provides helpful insights and guidance for
challenging an excessive penalty.
Facts of the Case
Joy Alailima-Millon has been employed by the Los Angeles County
Superior Court (LASC) since 1990 and has been a Judicial Assistant since 2008.
She consistently received positive performance reviews but had incurred a
one-day disciplinary suspension in 2014 for failing to recall a bench warrant,
which led to an individual's erroneous arrest and detention for one day.
In 2017, Alailima-Millon received
a three-day unpaid suspension for preparing an incorrect commitment order that
resulted in a criminal defendant being over-detained for six days. The error
was due to an inaccurate comparison of pre-sentencing custody credits
(calculated in days) and the sentence (calculated in months). The judge, as
well as the defense and prosecution attorneys, also failed to realize the
defendant should be released and had actually agreed that the calculations were
correct. Nevertheless, it is a duty of the Judicial Assistant to determine
whether a release should be issued and confirm with the court. The Manual of
Procedure for Superior Court Clerks/Judicial Assistants specified, “Errors that deprive any person of liberty,
jeopardize public safety, or delay the criminal justice process will subject
the Judicial Assistant to disciplinary action.”
The mistake was eventually identified by defense counsel, who communicated
the issue to Alailima-Millon. She immediately notified the judge, processed a
release order for the defendant, and self-reported the situation to the court
operations manager. She met with LASC performance investigators and provided a
statement about the incident. She was served with a notice of proposed
discipline, participated in a Skelly hearing, and was issued a final
order of discipline with the three-day suspension. Alailima-Millon appealed to advisory
arbitration.
Advisory Arbitration
Recommends Suspension
At arbitration, LASC witnesses testified regarding the training
and duties of judicial assistants, focusing on the responsibility to calculate custody
credits and issue correct paperwork. They highlighted that over-detention is a
significant error because it deprives a person of their freedom and impacts
public trust. Additionally, based on Alailima-Millon’s prior one-day
suspension, the three-day suspension was considered “progressive discipline for
custody paperwork errors.”
By contrast, Judge Victor Wright came to Alailima-Millon’s
defense. He testified that, in his courtroom, judicial assistants only prepare
release orders when expressly instructed to do so. The judge also verified that
both the prosecution and defense attorneys approved the incorrect calculations.
In previous written communications to the court operations manager, Judge
Wright explained Alailima-Millon “took the blame, somewhat unfairly,” and that
she “handled the entire matter with grace and aplomb, and did not point the
finger at anyone else, though she had every right to do so.” At arbitration,
another judicial officer provided corroborating testimony that she had not
calculated sentence credits as one of her job duties.
The arbitration hearing officer concluded the discipline and
penalty were warranted because Alailima-Millon did not seek clarification from
the court regarding the custody status. The hearing officer cited a failure to take
responsibility for the error, the severity of the offense resulting in
deprivation of liberty, the procedure manual's description of responsibilities
and notice of discipline, and LASC’s use of progressive discipline. LASC
adopted the hearing officer's decision. Alailima-Millon filed a petition for
writ of mandate.
Superior Court Denies
Petition for Writ of Mandate
The superior court denied the petition, finding there were no
facts in dispute and that Alailima-Millon's undisputed conduct provided cause
for discipline. Further, the superior court determined the three-day suspension
was not an abuse of discretion given the seriousness of the error. Alailima-Millon
appealed the superior court's denial of her petition for writ of mandate.
Court of Appeal Reverses
Penalty
The Court of Appeal ruled the record contained substantial
evidence to support the superior court's conclusion that the weight of the
evidence supported the hearing officer's finding that LASC had cause to
discipline Alailima-Millon. Accordingly, the court affirmed those findings.[ii]
However, its review of the penalty came
to a different conclusion. A Court of Appeal independently reviews the agency's
determination of penalty, without deference to the superior court's ruling, and
decides whether the agency abused its discretion, i.e., whether the penalty is
“arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive.”[iii] The court recognized
that its “authority to review LASC's penalty for Alailima-Millon's misconduct
is ‘quite limited’ and ‘exercised ... with great deference to the
administrative agency's findings.’” In public employee discipline, “the
overriding consideration . . . is the extent to which the employee's conduct
resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[h]arm to the public
service.’ [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances
surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.”[iv]
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the
seriousness of the error that resulted in the deprivation of an individual’s
freedom and its impact on public trust. However, even applying the highly deferential
review standard, the appellate court held the three-day suspension was an abuse
of discretion. The court found that the arbitrator conflated Alailima-Millon's
exercise of her right to challenge the discipline and penalty through the
grievance, arbitration, and litigation process with denial of responsibility.
The evidence showed that when she was notified of the error, she immediately
notified the judge and self-reported to LASC management. The appellate court
found her description of the circumstances to be reasonable explanations for
her actions rather than an attempt to shift blame.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found there was no substantial
evidence supporting progressive discipline or suggesting a likelihood of
recurrence. Although the two relevant disciplinary actions were based on serious
events affecting an individual's liberty, the court distinguished the level of culpability.
The previous conduct of failing to follow a clear instruction to recall a bench
warrant is “fundamentally different” than the “ambiguous circumstances” here.
The appellate court recognized a reviewing court cannot interfere with
a penalty imposed by an administrative agency “because in the court's own
evaluation of the circumstances the penalty appears to be too harsh.”[v] However, the court stated,
“that does not mean the three-day suspension penalty imposed on Alailima-Millon
was justified by the evidence before the arbitrator.” In sum, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the determination that LASC had cause to discipline Alailima-Millon.
However, it reversed the three-day suspension penalty and directed the superior
court to remand to LASC to reconsider what penalty, if any, is justified under
the circumstances.
Takeaways
Based on the infrequency of administrative penalty
reversals, Alailima-Millon should be analyzed closely. The court’s
dismantling of the penalty justifications related to blame-shifting and
progressive discipline can likely be applied in many disciplinary proceedings. Although
unpublished, the Opinion offers an understanding of the considerations and reasoning
of courts in reviewing penalty determinations.
The unanimous reversal also provides hope that despite the high legal
burden, penalty determinations can be successfully challenged under the right
factual circumstances.
[i] Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 37, 46.
[ii] Fukuda v. City
of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 810-811; Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(c).
[iii] Griego v. City of Barstow (2023)
87 Cal. App. 5th 133, 139.
[iv] Skelly v. State Pers. Bd.
(1975) 15 Cal. 3d 194, 218.
[v] Yazdi v. Dental Bd. of California (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 25, 46.
