A Cautionary Tale: Refusal of Recommended Surgery Leads to Denial of Deputy's Disability Retirement

    In a significant decision for public safety employees seeking disability retirement benefits, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, has upheld the denial of a deputy sheriff's application for service-connected disability retirement. The ruling in Alberto Mendoza v. Board of Retirement of the Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association (2025) 94 Cal.App.5th 1234 emphasizes the critical importance of complying with recommended medical treatments, even when personal fears or anecdotal concerns lead to hesitation. This case serves as a cautionary reminder that an unreasonable refusal to undergo advised procedures can bar access to essential retirement protections under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL) and related doctrines.

    The Appellant, a Ventura County Deputy Sheriff assigned to the Todd Road Jail Facility, sustained two work-related back injuries. The first occurred on December 30, 2014, when he slipped on stairs, causing lower back discomfort. The second followed on May 27, 2015, during an altercation with an inmate who kicked him in the waist. Diagnostic imaging revealed degenerative disc disease at the L5-S1 level, along with a disc herniation and extrusion abutting the right S1 nerve root. Multiple physicians, including the Qualified Medical Evaluator Dr. Robert H. Fields and treating doctors Dr. Brian Grossman and Dr. Sam Bakshian, unanimously recommended surgical intervention, citing a high likelihood of successful outcomes—estimated at 90 percent for good to excellent results given the deputy's youth and overall health.

    Despite authorization from the County of Ventura and repeated urgings from his medical team, the deputy declined the procedures. His refusal stemmed from fears informed by colleagues' negative experiences with back surgery and online research, which Dr. Fields characterized as based on "bad information." Over time, his condition deteriorated, as evidenced by subsequent MRIs showing progression of the discopathy. By 2017, more extensive surgery, such as a spinal fusion, was deemed necessary, but even then, he wavered before ultimately deciding against it. In 2018, another evaluator noted improvement to the point where surgery was no longer indicated, but the deputy's ongoing disability persisted, attributed in part to his non-compliance with home exercises and other conservative measures.

    The deputy applied for service-connected disability retirement in May 2016, invoking Government Code sections 31720 et seq. The Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association Board denied the application following an administrative hearing, finding that his permanent incapacity resulted not from the industrial injuries themselves but from his unreasonable refusal to submit to recommended treatment. The trial court denied his petition for a writ of administrative mandate, and the appellate court affirmed, relying on the common law doctrine of avoidable consequences as articulated in Reynolds v. City of San Carlos (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 208 and Labor Code section 4056. The latter provides that no compensation is payable where disability is caused, continued, or aggravated by an unreasonable refusal to undergo medical or surgical treatment, provided the risk is inconsiderable relative to the injury's seriousness based on expert advice.

    The court rejected the deputy's argument that the doctrine should not apply because, unlike in Reynolds, the recommended surgeries would not have enabled his return to full duty as a deputy sheriff. Instead, it held that the principle extends to situations where timely treatment might have prevented the worsening of the condition, even if the window for effective intervention has closed due to delay. As the court explained, a retirement board may reasonably conclude that the employee's inability to work stems from their own choices rather than the work-related injury alone.

    For California public safety unions and their members, peace officers and firefighters alike, this ruling underscores both the protections and pitfalls inherent in the disability retirement system. On the beneficial side, it reinforces the expectation that employers and retirement boards must base denials on substantial evidence of unreasonableness, considering factors such as the treatment's success rate, risks, and the employee's informed decision-making process. Employees facing similar dilemmas can leverage this to advocate for comprehensive medical counseling and second opinions, potentially strengthening their claims if refusal is deemed reasonable under the circumstances.

    However, the risks are substantial. Refusing treatment perceived as low-risk and high-reward could forfeit not only retirement benefits but also compound physical suffering through condition progression. In high-stakes professions where injuries are commonplace, this decision incentivizes prompt compliance with medical recommendations to preserve eligibility for tax-advantaged disability pensions. It also highlights the interplay between workers' compensation and retirement systems, where delays in one arena can adversely affect the other.

    Looking ahead, this ruling may influence future litigation by empowering retirement boards to more rigorously scrutinize applications involving treatment non-compliance. Public safety employees might see increased pressure from employers to pursue aggressive interventions, potentially leading to disputes over what constitutes "unreasonable" refusal—especially in cases involving psychological barriers like fear or cultural mistrust of surgery. Unions should consider negotiating enhanced support mechanisms, such as peer counseling or alternative treatment options, to mitigate these risks. Moreover, with the opinion now certified for publication, it establishes binding precedent statewide, likely prompting retirement associations in other counties to adopt similar stances.

    Public safety professionals dedicate their careers to protecting communities, often at great personal cost. Decisions like Mendoza remind us that safeguarding one's own health through informed, timely action is equally vital to securing the benefits earned through that service. For personalized guidance on disability retirement claims or related matters, members are encouraged to consult with experienced labor counsel.

Significant Expansions to Workers' Compensation Protections for California's Public Safety Employees Effective January 1, 2026

    As we approach 2026, California’s workers’ compensation system is set to undergo significant changes that will directly impact all workers, with particular emphasis on public safety employees. These legislative updates, effective January 1, 2026, aim to enhance protections and streamline processes for those who serve in high-risk environments. Key bills such as SB 20, SB 230, SB 447, and SB 487, along with AB 799, AB 1125, AB 1293, and AB 1398, introduce reforms that public safety workers should be aware of. These measures take effect January 1, 2026, and will influence how claims are alleged, defended, documented, and resolved.

    The Legislature has again focused on public safety workers, expanding presumptions and access to benefits consistent with occupational exposures and cumulative trauma realities. For injured workers, these reforms are likely to expand access to timely care, strengthen protections for public safety personnel, and reduce procedural obstacles that historically prolonged litigation. Families of injured or deceased workers may see improved clarity in death benefit procedures, potential adjustments in dependency standards, and better coordination between workers’ compensation benefits and collateral benefits.

    The reforms address conditions frequently encountered by firefighters, peace officers, and allied public safety personnel, potentially enlarging the list of presumptive injuries and extending statutory presumption periods. The legislation may adjust evidentiary burdens for rebutting presumptions, mandate employer notice regarding coverage and procedural rights, and refine the interplay between industrial causation, apportionment, and preexisting conditions. Public entities and their third-party administrators will likely have to reassess their protocols for investigation, panel selection, and early intervention in light of these changes.

    One of the most notable changes is SB 230, which expands presumptive coverage for firefighters. This bill extends protections for conditions like cancer and PTSD to those working at commercial airports, NASA installations, and U.S. Department of Defense facilities. This means that if you’re a firefighter in these environments, you’ll have broader coverage for injuries related to your work, making it easier to access the benefits you deserve.

    SB 447 is another critical piece of legislation, closing the gap between state and federal law by extending health benefits for minor dependents of public safety personnel who die in the line of duty. This change aligns with the Affordable Care Act, ensuring that your family is supported if the unthinkable happens.

    Peace officers and firefighters will also benefit from SB 487, which limits employer subrogation rights in third-party recovery actions. This bill guarantees that you receive a fair share of liability insurance proceeds, protecting your financial interests in the event of an injury.

    AB 799 introduces a dedicated death benefit for incarcerated firefighters participating in the California Conservation Camp program. This provision acknowledges the risks faced by these individuals and ensures their families receive support.

    Additionally, AB 1125 extends the heart injury presumption to peace officers employed by the State Department of State Hospitals. This change recognizes the unique risks faced by these officers and ensures they receive the same benefits as their counterparts at Atascadero State Hospital.

    For those involved in medical evaluations, AB 1293 aims to improve the consistency and quality of medical reporting by developing standardized templates for Qualified Medical Examiner reports. This will help ensure that your medical evaluations are clear and comprehensive.

    Finally, AB 1398 targets fraud and conflicts of interest, requiring transparency in service referrals. This measure protects workers from schemes that could undermine their claims.

    We anticipate revised definitions pertinent to compensable injuries, updated standards governing medical treatment utilization review and independent medical review, and adjustments to permanent disability rating inputs. The legislation is expected to refine claim processing timeframes, enhance disclosure and record completeness requirements in medical-legal evaluations, and clarify when penalties and attorney’s fees are available for unreasonable delay or denial.  

    Early case triage will become more important, particularly where presumptions are implicated and where medical-legal issues must be framed early to avoid downstream fights. Experienced counsel will likely be needed in order to ensure experts properly apply the revised standards and develop evidence in support of causation, apportionment, and disability assessments.

    These legislative changes reflect California’s commitment to supporting public safety employees by expanding benefits and improving the workers’ compensation system. As these laws take effect, it’s crucial for you to stay informed and understand how they impact your rights and benefits. By doing so, you can ensure that you and your family are protected as you continue to serve your community. 

    As the January 1, 2026 effective date approaches, unions should ensure their members are aware of updated reporting requirements and timelines. 

    Taken together, these enactments underscore California's commitment to bolstering the workers' compensation framework for public safety employees, closing benefit disparities, and refining system procedures. For peace officers, firefighters, and their unions, the 2026 landscape offers enhanced presumptions, family protections, and recovery priorities that better reflect the realities of the job. Practitioners and members alike should prepare to leverage these changes in upcoming claims. 

    As the January 1, 2026 effective date approaches, Mastagni Holstedt APC, remains dedicated to advocating for the full rights of California's workers and public safety professionals and stands ready to enforce these evolving protections.

Court of Appeal Clarifies Standby Pay Under PEPRA: Audio of David Mastagni's Oral Argument Now Available

    The audio from partner attorney David E. Mastagni’s oral argument is now available to listen—and it accompanies a major development for California’s public safety employees. In Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association, the Court of Appeal ruled the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA) does not impose a categorial ban on counting standby pay as pensionable compensation under the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL).

    Although the court ultimately upheld Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association’s exclusion of standby pay in this particular case, the opinion delivers an important clarification: standby or on-call pay can be pensionable if it is part of an employee’s regular, non-discretionary schedule.

For a more detailed analysis of the case, please refer to our full blog post here.

You can listen to David’s argument here.

A Cautionary Tale From PERB: When AI Hallucinations Lead to Stricken Briefs and Lost Arguments

    In the fast-evolving world of public sector labor law, tools like generative AI promise efficiency and innovation. But as a recent decision from the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) reminds us, they can also spell disaster if not handled with the utmost care. In California State University Employees Union v. Trustees of the California State University (San Diego) (PERB Case No. LA-CE-1433-H), an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) took the extraordinary step of striking the employer’s pre-hearing brief from the record. The reason? Fabricated citations and quotations from a federal appellate decision that simply didn’t exist as presented—hallmarks of unchecked AI output.

    Let’s break this down step by step, because this isn’t just a procedural hiccup; it’s a wake-up call for unions, employers, and practitioners alike in California’s public safety sector.

The Case Background

    The underlying dispute centers on the employee status of residential assistants (“RAs”) under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (“HEERA”), specifically Government Code section 3562(e). The union argued that student RAs qualify as employees entitled to bargaining rights, while the Trustees of the California State University (“CSU”) contended otherwise. In preparation for a hearing, the ALJ directed both parties to submit pre-hearing briefs addressing the legal test for employee status and the relevance of federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) precedents.

    CSU filed its brief on November 3, 2025, relying heavily on Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp. (10th Cir. 1981) 666 F.2d 1324 (“Marshall”)—a real case, but one that CSU misrepresented through inaccurate page citations and invented quotations. For instance, the brief claimed the Tenth Circuit held that RAs’ duties were “primarily educational rather than economic in nature” and that they “receive the greater benefit from the program.” In reality, Marshall ends at page 1328 and contains none of these phrases or conclusions. The ALJ spotted the discrepancies, issued an Order to Show Cause, and ultimately struck the entire brief as a sanction after CSU’s response failed to adequately explain the errors.

    CSU admitted to “misnumbering of pages” and “erroneously included quotation marks around paraphrasing statements,” attributing it to a failure to double-check. But the ALJ wasn’t buying it, noting that the misrepresentations went beyond mere typos—they distorted the case’s holdings in a way that aligned suspiciously with CSU’s position. Drawing parallels to Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 336 Cal.Rptr.3d 897, where a California appellate court sanctioned counsel for AI-generated fabrications, the ALJ emphasized that such “hallucinations” undermine the integrity of legal proceedings.

Why This Matters for Public Safety Unions

    For unions representing California’s firefighters, police officers, corrections staff, and other public safety workers, this ruling underscores a critical lesson: diligence in legal advocacy isn’t optional. PERB proceedings, like those under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”) or the Dills Act, demand precision because the stakes—bargaining rights, working conditions, and member protections—are high. Imagine a grievance over shift differentials or safety equipment where a union’s brief gets tossed due to sloppy AI use. Not only does it weaken your position, but it could invite scrutiny or countersanctions that distract from the merits.

    More broadly, this decision signals PERB’s intolerance for shortcuts in an era where AI tools like ChatGPT are tempting for drafting research summaries or arguments. As the ALJ pointed out, citing CSU’s own AI guidelines, it’s the attorney’s responsibility to verify content. In public sector labor, where decisions often set precedents affecting thousands of members, relying on unvetted AI could erode trust with arbitrators, boards, or courts. We’ve seen similar pitfalls in federal cases, but this is one of the first in California’s public employment arena—and it happened to a major employer like CSU, which should know better.

    The potential ripple effects? Expect heightened scrutiny of briefs in PERB and related forums. Unions might see employers trying to exploit AI for aggressive positions, only to backfire as in this case. On the flip side, it empowers unions to challenge dubious citations, turning the tables in discovery or hearings. And for ongoing debates like student employee status—relevant if your union deals with campus safety personnel—this ruling keeps the focus on statutory language over manufactured precedents.

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

    CSU’s misstep highlights how overreliance on AI technology can backfire.  AI is a tool that must be used carefully. It’s a substitute for human research and must be verified. Always cross-check citations, quotes, and summaries against primary sources. Tools like Westlaw or Lexis are irreplaceable for this. Follow the State Bar’s guidance on AI, which stresses competence and candor. Don’t let “enhancements” from AI platforms slip through without review. Labor organizations, and lawyers alike, should establish protocols for AI use, including safeguards for confidential information and verification policies. If you spot hallucinations in an opponent’s filing, don’t hesitate to call it as doing so will strengthen your case.

SB 747: An Unwarranted Expansion of Liability Against California Peace Officers

Senator Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) announced Senate Bill (SB) 747, the deceptively named No Kings Act, to purportedly hold federal ICE officers accountable for violating people's Constitutional rights. Unfortunately, this legislation suffers the same fatal flaws as SB 627's restrictions on facial coverings in that the legislation will not be enforceable against federal officers but will significantly harm to our California peace officers. 

SB  747;s proposed amendment to the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (CA Civil Code § 52.1) will unleash a torrent of new civil liability on the shoulders of California's peace officers while stripping away critical safeguards like the specific intent requirement that has long distinguished the Bane Act from its federal counterpart in 42 U.S.C.  section 1983.  

SB 747 adds a new subdivision (d) to the Bane Act that mirrors federal section 1983, creating state-law liability for any person acting “under color” of law who deprives a person of their federal constitutional rights without the qualified immunity protections under Section 1983.  Although proponents characterize the measure as a modest codification of existing case law describing the Bane Act as the “state equivalent” of section 1983, the proposed language is neither redundant nor innocuous. It represents a deliberate and substantial enlargement of liability California officers will face. Without the Bane Act’s current requirements of threats, intimidation, or coercion and without any specific intent element, this bill creates a much easier pathway to sue peace officers in state court, and applies existing Bane Act venues, orders, and fee-shifting applied to these new claims.

Existing Law: The Bane Act’s Distinct and Narrower Scope

Under current law, a plaintiff seeking damages under Civil Code section 52.1 must prove that the defendant interfered, or attempted to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or California Constitution or laws. In the context of peace officer liability, California courts have consistently held that this statutory language imposes an additional element beyond a mere constitutional violation, i.e. the defendant must act with specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (or, in certain Fourth Amendment seizure cases, with reckless disregard for those rights). Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860 (2007). 

SN 747 represents a significant expansion in liability from the current framework where courts emphasize that the Bane Act was "intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights" requiring "deliberate or spiteful" conduct. Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (2012). Moreover, while qualified immunity is unavailable under the Bane Act for peace officers acting under color of state law, the heightened intent standard has served as a functional substitute, shielding officers from liability for good-faith errors in rapidly evolving situations.

SB 747’s Proposed Subdivision (d): A New and Broader Cause of Action

Senate Bill 747 would add the following language to Civil Code section 52.1:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the United States or of this state, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of this state or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

This text is lifted almost verbatim from 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The legislation contains none of the existing Bane Act’s limiting elements, such as the requirement of threats, intimidation, or coercion, nor the specific-intent requirement. The new subdivision would therefore create a parallel and independent cause of action within section 52.1 that plaintiffs could plead in the alternative, allowing them to bypass the safeguards that have defined Bane Act jurisprudence for decades.

Why This Matters to Public Safety Agencies and Officers 

The legislative digest confirms the intent: the bill “would also provide” a state-law remedy “similar” to section 1983 for deprivations of federal constitutional rights under color of law. The measure further extends to subdivision (d) claims the same expansive venue provisions, injunctive remedies, and one-way attorney-fee shifting that already apply to traditional Bane Act actions.

SB 747 would remove that hurdle for subdivision (d), replacing it with a lower threshold akin to section 1983’s objective reasonableness standard and doing so without any qualified immunity defense in state court. This dramatically raises litigation risk for line officers and agencies. Thus, SB 747 would transform the Bane Act from a statute aimed at coercive and intentional misconduct into nearly a strict-liability regime for any constitutional deprivation committed under color of law. 

Senate Bill 2 originally attempted to accomplish a similar result by eliminating the specific intent requirement. David E. Mastagni successfully testified against the elimination of the specific intent requirement in Senate Judiciary Committee. Chair Thomas Umberg and the Democratic party forced amendments to SB 2 that preserved the specific intent requirement, a compromise this bill seeks to reverse. 

Sovereign Immunity: The Bill’s Targeted Federal Officers Are Largely Immune

Proponents suggest that the amendment is necessary to hold federal immigration enforcement officers accountable in state court. That justification collapses under even cursory scrutiny. Federal officers acting within the scope of their official duties are protected by federal sovereign immunity from monetary claims brought under state civil rights statutes.

While ICE officers may also receive qualified immunity for immigration enforcement activities, the more fundamental barrier to lability is sovereign immunity. Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.Supp.2d 1177 (2009). Federal agencies and officers acting in official capacity cannot be sued under state civil rights statutes. State of Cal. v. U.S., 104 F.3d 1086 (1997) held that "California's claims against the United States premised on impact of federal immigration policy were barred by sovereign immunity to extent that monetary awards were sought." Because immigration enforcement remains a core federal function, sovereign immunity protects federal officers from state civil rights liability for conduct within their official duties. See also Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 401-402, (2012)(holding the United States has a “single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation's borders.”)

Thus, SB 747’s expansion is unlikely to affect ICE officers acting within the scope of federal immigration duties, meaning the bill’s practical impact will fall primarily on the state and local officers protecting our communities. As with the failed mask-mandate provisions of SB 627, SB 747 is a symbolic shot at federal ICE agents that will almost certainly only impact California’s state and local peace officers-making their jobs more difficult.  

Conclusion

California’s peace officers have repeatedly demonstrated that meaningful accountability and officer protection are not mutually exclusive. SB 747 abandons that balance.