PERB Issues Significant Ruling Protecting the Bargaining Process and the Right to Unionize

On February 21, 2024, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important decision in Teamsters Local 542 v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (PERB Decision No. 2890-M), finding that El Centro Regional Medical Center (ECRMC) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by unilaterally denying a 2021 merit salary increase to Laboratory Unit employees represented by Teamsters Local 542. This case underscores the importance of maintaining the status quo during collective bargaining and highlights protections against discriminatory practices targeting unionized employees. 

Since 2016, ECRMC had a consistent practice of granting annual merit salary increases, typically around 2%, to all employees. In September 2020, the Laboratory Unit employees at ECRMC chose Teamsters Local 542 as their exclusive bargaining representative, triggering negotiations for their first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While negotiations were ongoing in July 2021, ECRMC announced a 2% merit increase for unrepresented employees but explicitly excluded the Laboratory Unit. Despite Teamsters’ demands to extend the increase to the Laboratory Unit and negotiate the issue, ECRMC refused, resulting in no merit increase for these employees for the 2021-2022 fiscal year.

The core question before PERB was whether ECRMC violated the MMBA by unilaterally withholding the 2021 merit increase from the Laboratory Unit employees. Specifically, the union contended these actions: 1) Altered the established status quo without bargaining; 2) Discriminated against employees for choosing union representation, and 3) Interfered with protected union and employee rights. PERB ruled against ECRMC on all grounds.

Unilateral Change to the Status Quo

PERB determined that ECRMC’s practice of providing annual merit increases was an established part of the status quo. By excluding the Laboratory Unit from the 2021 increase without prior notice or bargaining, ECRMC violated its obligation to negotiate changes to wages, a mandatory subject of bargaining under the MMBA. Employers cannot unilaterally alter established practices, such as regular merit increases, during collective bargaining. Any changes to wages or working conditions must be negotiated with the union, particularly during initial MOU negotiations. 

Discrimination Based on Unionization

ECRMC admitted that the Laboratory Unit was excluded from the merit increase solely because Teamsters had become their exclusive representative. PERB found this reasoning to be facially discriminatory, as it penalized employees for exercising their right to unionize. PERB’s ruling reinforces that employers cannot penalize employees for choosing union representation. Actions that single out unionized employees for unfavorable treatment are likely to be deemed discriminatory and unlawful. 

Interference with Protected Rights

By withholding the merit increase due to the employees’ choice to unionize, ECRMC created an environment where employees might fear retaliation for engaging in union activities. This interference with protected rights further violated the MMBA. Employers must respect employees’ rights to engage in union activities without fear of retaliation. Actions that undermine union representation can lead to liability for interference with protected rights.

PERB rejected ECRMC’s defenses. The employer’s claim that it was preserving the status quo was deemed pretextual, as it failed to offer the increase during bargaining despite Teamsters’ demands. Additionally, ECRMC’s argument that subsequent salary increases offset the withheld 2021 increase was dismissed due to a lack of credible evidence.

Remedies Awarded

PERB ordered several remedies. ECRMC was directed to cease unilaterally changing wages, discriminating against Laboratory Unit employees for their unionization, and interfering with Teamsters’ and employees’ MMBA-protected rights. Affirmatively, ECRMC must compensate all current and former Laboratory Unit employees employed before January 1, 2021, with backpay equal to 2% of wages earned from July 4, 2021, to July 26, 2022, plus 7% annual interest compounded daily. Additionally, ECRMC is required to post a notice for 30 days at all relevant work locations, both physically and electronically, acknowledging the violations and affirming compliance. ECRMC must also report its compliance actions to PERB’s Office of the General Counsel.

Conclusion

The Teamsters decision is a significant victory for public sector unions and employees, reinforcing the protections afforded by the MMBA. By holding ECRMC accountable for its unilateral and discriminatory actions, PERB has set a clear precedent that employers must respect the bargaining process and employees’ rights to unionize. This case serves as a powerful reminder that maintaining the status quo and avoiding discrimination are not just legal obligations but essential components of fair labor relations. Unions can confidently demand that longstanding practices continue during bargaining and seek remedies for violations that undermine employee rights.

 

PERB Upholds the Bargaining Rights Over Telework & Return to Office Policies

On May 8, 2025, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) issued an important and timely decision in Professional Engineers in California Government v. State of California (Department of Transportation) (Case No. LA-CE-771-S), affirming that public sector employers must meet and confer in good faith over changes to telework policies. The ruling held that the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act by unilaterally altering telework arrangements, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters, and eliminating travel reimbursements without negotiating with the Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG). This decision is a critical safeguard for workers’ rights amid California’s push to reduce telework, ensuring that such policy shifts are subject to collective bargaining.

 In a significant win for public employees, PECG successfully challenged Caltrans in this PERB case, exposing violations through unilateral policy changes, refusal to provide critical information, and bad-faith bargaining, underscoring the importance of protecting collective bargaining rights. In April 2024, Governor Gavin Newsom directed state agencies to transition from full telework, adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, to hybrid programs requiring at least two in-person workdays per week, with provisions for exceptions. Caltrans, however, exceeded this directive, imposing severe changes that harmed PECG-represented engineers in Bargaining Unit 9. By reassigning employees living over 50 miles from Sacramento to headquarters, eliminating travel reimbursements, and ignoring prior remote work practices, Caltrans disrupted engineers’ lives, who had relied on job postings designating district offices as their work locations. PEGG filed an unfair practice charge to defend its members’ rights.

The PERB Administrative Law Judge found Caltrans committed multiple unfair labor practices, reflecting a deliberate disregard for its bargaining obligations. Caltrans unilaterally halted travel reimbursements, a long-standing practice confirmed by 83 approved Travel Expense Claims for at least 16 Unit 9 members between 2022 and June 2024, altering wages without notifying or negotiating with PECG, violating Dills Act Section 3519(c). Additionally, reassigning employees to Sacramento headquarters forced them to bear significant commuting costs or relocate, nullifying job postings designating district offices as headquarters and breaching the duty to bargain over telework policies. PECG’s request for TEC records to substantiate past practices was met with a four-month delay, with Caltrans offering misleading excuses about technical limitations despite possessing internal lists that could have expedited the process, hindering PECG’s representational role. Caltrans’ overall conduct, marked by false statements, unilateral actions, and rejection of PECG’s reasonable proposals, such as maintaining reimbursements or allowing local office reporting, amounted to surface bargaining, frustrating negotiations and undermining PECG’s authority. Each violation also interfered with employees’ protected rights and PECG’s representational duties, contravening Dills Act Sections 3519(a) and (b).

The human toll of Caltrans’ actions was profound, as evidenced by affected engineers’ testimonies. two members retired early, losing income and retirement benefits, while another incurred significant expenses after surrendering his San Diego apartment. One member struggled to balance work with an adoption process requiring Fresno residency. These hardships underscored PECG’s commitment to its members. From May 2024, PECG advocated tirelessly, requesting to meet and confer, proposing practical solutions, and filing the unfair practice charge in September, culminating in a robust PERB ruling validating its efforts.  The ALJ ordered Caltrans to cease unilateral changes, rescind reassignments, restore district office headquarters, resume TEC processing with 7% interest compensation, fulfill information requests, negotiate in good faith, and notify Unit 9 employees, including those who left since April 2024. Although PECG’s request for attorney’s fees was denied, the ruling sends a clear message: employers cannot evade bargaining duties without consequences.

This ruling is significant given California’s recent push to reduce or eliminate telework in the public sector. It reaffirms that employers must meet and confer in good faith over telework policies, particularly when reversing emergency measures like those adopted during the pandemic. As state agencies increasingly mandate in-person work, the decision clarifies that unilateral changes to telework arrangements, which affect wages, hours, and working conditions, require notice and negotiation. By upholding the duty to bargain, the ruling protects public sector workers from arbitrary policy shifts, ensuring their rights are respected in an evolving workplace landscape.

PERB Strengthens Employee Discovery Rights in Disciplinary Appeals

To successfully appeal a disciplinary action, access to all relevant or exculpatory information is often critical. Skelly materials are often inadequate, as the disclosures pertain to the employer's investigation and materials the employer relied upon to sustain the charges, not exculpatory or exonerating materials. While firefighters and peace officers have a statutory right to discovery under their respective bills of rights, the labor relations statutes also provide an underutilized right to obtain disciplinary discovery.   A recent ruling from the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in Automotive Machinists Union Local 1414 v. City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency) (49 PERC ¶ 181, 2025) provides a powerful precedent to ensure employers supply essential documents for your appeals.

The Automotive Machinists Union Local 1414 filed an unfair practice charge against the City and County of San Francisco for failing to fully respond to a request for information (RFI) related to a bargaining unit member’s discipline. The union requested notes from investigatory interviews and other documents tied to an investigation. The employer provided some notes but omitted key documents and failed to explain their absence, violating the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). PERB’s Administrative Law Judge ruled that this failure breached the duty to bargain in good faith and interfered with employees’ rights to union representation. The remedies included a cease-and-desist order, a directive to diligently seek and provide missing notes if requested, and a requirement to post a notice of compliance.

This ruling is a significant win for public employees, as it reinforces their right to obtain all necessary and relevant information for disciplinary appeals. It establishes that employers must promptly provide documents like investigatory notes, witness statements, or pre-written interview questions—or clearly explain why they cannot—to support your union’s representational duties. If an employer provides incomplete information without justification, the employees and their unions can bring an unfair labor practice charge before PERB arguing the agency violated MMBA Sections 3505 and 3506.5. These rights ensure assess to the full scope of evidence needed to build a strong appeal and better chances of success.

Murphy v. City of Petaluma: No Duty to Assess When Medical Aid is Refused

    On November 24, 2024, the court in Murphy v. City of Petaluma addressed a medical negligence claim against the City of Petaluma and its fire department paramedics. Following a head-on car collision, plaintiff Murphy sued, alleging that paramedics’ failure to assess her condition led to a stroke hours later, resulting in permanent brain damage, speech and language impairment, and paralysis. Despite her repeated refusals of treatment or transport, Murphy argued that the paramedics assumed a duty of care by interacting with her at the scene. The court disagreed, holding that merely offering medical care does not impose a duty to perform a comprehensive medical assessment. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. The Court discussed exceptions to this general rule that emergency personnel, such as paramedics, do not have a duty to perform a full medical assessment or provide medical care when an individual refuses treatment. This rule is grounded in the absence of a voluntary assumption of duty, lack of reliance by the individual, and no increase in the risk of harm caused by the responders' actions. These exceptions highlight that a duty is not automatic but depends on specific actions or reliance.   

    Murphy cited several cases to argue that the paramedics “triggered a duty of care to render medical assistance.” The court analyzed and distinguished each: In Wright v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 318, a paramedic conducted a cursory “60-second examination” on a fight victim, checking only for life-threatening injuries. The paramedic neither assessed the decedent’s mental capacity nor recommended hospital transport, advising only that the decedent “probably should see a doctor” before leaving. The decedent soon died from sickle cell anemia complications. Expert testimony indicated that checking pulse or blood pressure could have revealed shock, potentially averting the crisis. Unlike Murphy, the Wright paramedic’s inadequate assessment fell below the standard of care, but the court noted that the duty of care was presumed, not litigated, in Wright.

    In Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 232, paramedics delayed aid to a gunshot victim until police arrived, resulting in the victim’s death. The trial court found no duty to provide immediate care or even inquire about the victim’s status. The paramedics did not create the peril, assume a special duty, induce reliance, or increase the risk of harm. Thus, emergency personnel are not obligated to assist “whenever and wherever summoned,” reinforcing the absence of a general duty.

    In Camp v. State of California (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 967, highway patrol officers, including a certified Emergency Medical Responder, responded to an accident. They found Camp lying near a car and asked if she was injured or needed an ambulance. Camp declined both. A friend later carried her to a car, and within hours, she was hospitalized with severe spinal cord injuries. The Court of Appeal held that the officer owed no duty, as no voluntary assumption of care occurred, and the officer’s actions did not increase the risk of harm. Liability requires either a voluntary duty or increased risk, neither of which applied.

Conclusion:

    The Murphy ruling clarifies that paramedics do not assume a duty to examine a patient who repeatedly refuses medical aid. The paramedics made no promises, ignored no requests, and left Murphy in the same position as before their arrival. However, this case underscores the importance of assessing and documenting a person’s cognitive capacity to refuse treatment. Had Murphy’s refusals been deemed uninformed or impaired, the outcome might have differed. Emergency responders should prioritize clear documentation to protect against liability while respecting patient autonomy.

Supreme Court Holds Officer’s Pre-Shooting Conduct Relevant but Not Determinative in Use-of-Force Cases, Consistent with California’s Totality Framework

    In a unanimous ruling on May 15, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court revived a civil rights lawsuit against Houston-area traffic officer Roberto Felix Jr., who fatally shot 24-year-old Ashtian Barnes during a 2016 traffic stop. The Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the case, which had relied on a narrow “moment-of-threat” doctrine, limiting review to the seconds before the shooting. Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires courts to consider the “totality of circumstances,” including an officer’s actions leading up to the use of force, as established in the 1989 Graham v. Connor precedent. This ruling strengthens protections for evaluating California peace officers by establishing an analytical framework that balances the officer’s tactical decisions against the suspect’s threat, while affirming that a genuine and immediate threat can justify deadly force, even if the officer made errors in judgment.

    The Court’s opinion mirrors Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)’s requirement to include "the conduct of the peace officer and the subject leading up to the use of force." Both frameworks reject a narrow focus on the instant of force deployment and mandate a broader contextual analysis. Peace Officers Research Association of California (“PORAC”) and the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (“CAHP”) filed an amicus curiae brief arguing against adopting a rigid “provocation rule” that would automatically negate an officer’s self-defense rights based solely on their prior actions. The Court held that reckless or unreasonable actions (e.g., escalating a minor stop into a deadly encounter) could weigh against the reasonableness of force but do not automatically negate a justification defense. Courts must also consider the suspect’s actions, and the immediacy of the suspect’s threat is often the "most important and fact-intensive" factor.

    The case arose when Felix pulled Barnes over for unpaid tolls, and Barnes drove away. Standing on the doorsill of the vehicle as Barnes sped away, Felix shot him in self-defense. Barnes’ mother, Janice Barnes, sued under Section 1983, alleging excessive force. Lower courts dismissed the suit, citing the Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat analysis.

    The Supreme Court rejected this approach, finding it improperly narrowed Fourth Amendment protections. The ruling requires consideration of pre-shooting conduct of both the officer and the suspect in weighing the totality of the circumstances and sent the case back to the lower court for reconsideration. While the decision affirms the definition of totality of the circumstances set forth in AB 392 (Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)), the Court did not determine whether Felix’s alleged escalation of the danger negated the reasonableness of his use of deadly force in response to the threat posed by Barnes’s actions. Instead, it left this question for lower courts to address under the broader totality framework.

    While the decision arguably opens new avenues for police liability, consideration of whether an officer's actions prior to a shooting helped create the danger they later claim justified deadly force was held to be one of many reasonableness factors. Ultimately, the Court issued a narrow ruling about the “timing” of the totality of the circumstances and expressly declined to address the appropriateness of the “Provocation Rule” theory, which had been previously rejected in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez and which the California Legislature had also rejected in amending AB 392. The majority explained:

We do not address here the different question Felix raises about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer's own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted the issue, precisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the danger necessitating deadly force. So, to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of Barnes's car. And because they never considered that issue, it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The question presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to look only at the encounter's final two seconds, or also to consider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context. (Citations omitted.)

    Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett, provided important guidance for assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in response to a fleeing vehicle. His concurrence elaborates on the inherent dangers of traffic stops for police officers, particularly when a driver flees, and emphasizes the need for courts to consider these risks when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Highlighting that traffic stops are “fraught with danger” for officers, he cited historical examples of officers killed or assaulted during such encounters, even for minor violations. He noted that drivers who flee, such as Barnes, amplify these risks by potentially endangering the officer, bystanders, and other drivers. Fleeing in the face of a minor violation may also indicate more serious criminal activity, such as possession of illegal drugs, weapons, or involvement in violent crimes, as illustrated by cases like Timothy McVeigh and Ted Bundy, who were apprehended after traffic stops.

    The concurrence outlines the limited and risky options available to an officer when a driver flees: (1) letting the driver go, which may embolden dangerous behavior and pose public safety risks; (2) pursuing the driver, which can lead to hazardous high-speed chases; (3) shooting at the vehicle’s tires, which is often ineffective and dangerous; or (4) physically intervening, as Felix did by jumping onto the vehicle. Kavanaugh stresses that none of these options are safe, requiring officers to make split-second decisions in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances. His concurrence underscores the need for judicial sensitivity to the real-world risks officers face, ensuring that the reasonableness analysis reflects the high-stakes nature of such encounters.

    Echoing PORAC and CAHP’s arguments, he urges courts to recognize the extraordinary dangers of traffic stops, especially when drivers flee, and to account for the suspect’s flight as a key factor in the “totality of the circumstances.” “The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffic violation ‘presents risks to public safety’—it is also ‘whether flight,’ and what that flight might indicate or enable, ‘does so.’” In other words, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry includes not only the “severity of the crime” that prompted the stop but also takes into account the suspect's attempt “to evade” the officer “by flight.”

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnes v. Felix largely conforms with the arguments raised in PORAC and CAHP’s amicus brief rejecting a rigid provocation rule and that holding the pre-shooting conduct of the officer is merely one factor in the calculus of reasonableness. By avoiding clear guidance on the weight such conduct should be afforded, the Opinion does open the door for continued scrutiny of tactical decisions. However, the concurrence strongly suggests that Felix’s tactics may have been within the range of reasonableness and cautions lower courts against both hindsight analysis and failing to apportion significant weight to the risk posed by a suspect fleeing in a vehicle. In sum, the Court confirmed that for a justification defense to be nullified, the officer’s conduct would need to be so egregious that it outweighs the immediacy of the suspect’s threat in the reasonableness calculus, aligning closely with California’s framework under Penal Code § 835a.

    David E. Mastagni was privileged to file the amicus curiae brief on behalf of PORAC and CAHP.