Newsome Signs the "No Secret Police Act" (S.B. 627) into Law: Watch David E. Mastagni's Senate Public Safety Committee Testimony in Opposition

    On September 11, 2025, David E. Mastagni, a partner at Mastagni Holstedt and counsel for the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), testified before the California Senate Public Safety Committee in opposition to Senate Bill 627 along with Jonathan Feldman, lobbyist for the California Police Chiefs Association. Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed S.B. 627 into law on September 20, 2025. They explained how dangerous last minute amendments make the bill detrimental to public safety, by stripping important immunity protections for local officers who unintentionally violate the statute. Mastagni pointed out that because of the Supremacy Clause, this bill will not apply to federal officers, yet its severability clause means its restrictions and legal jeopardy will fall solely on California’s local peace officers, who don’t enforce federal immigration laws.

    Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed the "No Secret Police Act" into law on September 20, 2025. In his signing message, Newsom stated: "I am signing Senate Bill 627, which prohibits law enforcement officers, including federal immigration officers, from wearing masks or other face coverings that conceal their identity while performing their duties in public, with certain exceptions. This bill is an important step toward increasing transparency and accountability in law enforcement, particularly in light of reports of federal immigration officers concealing their identities during operations that have caused fear and mistrust in communities.

Scope and Purpose of S.B. 627

    S.B. 627, authored primarily by Senator Scott Wiener, prohibits local and federal law enforcement officers from concealing their faces with coverings during the performance of their duties. Senator Wiener described the bill as targeting secret police tactics, particularly by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. He argued that routine masking fosters mistrust, instills fear, and emboldens officers to violate civil rights with impunity.

    The bill defines prohibited facial coverings broadly to include any opaque mask, garment, helmet, headgear, or other item that obscures facial identity, such as balaclavas, tactical masks, or ski masks. The law includes narrow exceptions for certain safety equipment and circumstances, but they  are vague and open to conflicting interpretations. Violations constitute infractions or misdemeanors, with additional penalties including loss of immunities and statutory liability of $10,000.00 for tortious conduct committed while masked. Under the bill, enforcement agencies must develop policies to ensure officers adhere to these provisions by July 2026. 

Risks to Officer Safety and Operational Efficiency  

    In his testimony, Mastagni that facial coverings serve crucial safety functions for law enforcement officers and federal agents. Masks and helmets are often integral to protecting identities during sensitive, undercover, or tactical operations. Such protective gear shields officers and agents from retaliation, threats, or targeted harassment.

    He pointed out how the overly narrow and vague exceptions in the bill endanger officer safety and operational effectiveness. For example, the bill's prohibition on motor officers wearing helmets unless using a motorcycle contradicts standard training and roadside safety protocols. An officer could be exposed to fentanyl or other dangerous chemicals during a routine search of a car or home and need to cover their face with anything available in order to survive.  

    The bill also imposes burdens on local agencies by requiring them to develop compliant policies by July 2026. Law enforcement groups, such as PORAC and CPCA, fear that theses heightened safety risks and exposure to liability will exacerbate California's police staffing crisis. 

The Law Contradicts Established Federal and State Precedents: The Supremacy Clause

    Mastagni addressed the bills application to federal officers, citing Supreme Court precedent under the Supremacy Clause, including Cunningham v. Neagle (1890), which protects federal agents from state criminal prosecution when acting within their official duties. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court invalidated state laws intruding on federal immigration enforcement. The same applies here. States cannot second guess federal policies, such as ICE directives authorizing masks for officer protection. The bill creates conflict preemption, as officers cannot comply with both state and federal rules without compromising safety or mission effectiveness.

    Senator Wiener and supporters of S.B. 627 often refer to an op-ed by Erwin Chemerinsky, dean and professor of law at the UC Berkeley School of Law, to support the bill's constitutionality. This argument fails. Professor Chemerinsky contends that S.B. 627 can regulate federal agents' mask wearing because it is a law of general applicability that applies to all law enforcement officers rather than specifically targeting federal operations. Notably, he omits reference to the exclusion of California state peace officers. He compares the bill to federal agents' compliance with everyday state laws like traffic rules. 

Flawed Legal Justifications and Misinterpretations 

    Although written as a “general” law, it cannot be applied to federal officers if it interferes with federal operations. While appearing facially neutral, its practical effect substantially interferes with federal law enforcement operations in ways that traffic laws do not. Federal immigration enforcement involves unique considerations, including officer safety from targeted retaliation and protection of sensitive investigations that local law enforcement typically does not face. This creates an undue burden on federal operations that triggers intergovernmental immunity principles, protecting federal activities from state interference even when laws appear neutral on their face.

    Chemerinsky further asserts that requiring officers not to wear masks does not constitute a significant burden on federal activities and does not impede federal agents' performance of their duties. This overlooks the fundamental differences between local policing and federal immigration enforcement. Federal agents frequently operate in sensitive contexts where identity protection is critical for both officer safety and operational success. Even if only 10 percent of operations require face coverings, that represents thousands of high risk federal operations annually where agent safety would be compromised.

    Courts typically defer to federal determinations that prohibitions on face coverings create substantial burdens on operations by compromising officer safety, operational security, and effectiveness. The legislation seeks to second guess policy determinations that federal agents, particularly in immigration enforcement, face unique threats from targeted retaliation against them and their families through doxing and harassment. The inability to protect their identities would significantly impair their ability to conduct sensitive operations, gather intelligence, and work undercover. These burdens are concrete operational impediments that directly interfere with federal law enforcement functions.

    Chemerinsky cites Ninth Circuit precedent that states can prosecute federal agents criminally if their actions are objectively unreasonable, suggesting this provides a pathway for enforcement of S.B. 627 against non compliant federal officers. He primarily relies on the vacated Ninth Circuit decision in Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (Ninth Cir. 2001), vacated at 266 F.3d 979 (Ninth Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit's objectively unreasonable standard applies to federal agents who exceed their authority or violate constitutional rights, not to agents following lawful federal protocols. Wearing masks during legitimate operations is standard procedure for many federal agencies based on assessed security risks and operational needs. Criminalizing conduct that follows established federal guidelines would allow state law to dictate federal operational procedures, creating an impermissible state veto over federal law enforcement methods. This directly conflicts with Supremacy Clause principles that protect federal operations from state interference.

    When asked if Legislative Counsel had time to review S.B. 627 to determine if it would hold up in court, Senator Wiener dodged the question. U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the Central District of California stated that federal agents will not alter their practices, calling the law unconstitutional and preempted by federal authority. Local officers may face the impossible task of enforcing S.B. 627 against federal personnel, risking claims of obstruction or false arrest if courts invalidate the statute.

Threat to Immunities Local Officers Need to Perform Their Duties

   

    At the Public Safety Committee hearing, Senator Wiener and his supporters erroneously claimed that the bills' “knowing and willful” violation language shields officers who make good faith mistake regarding whether an exemption applies from the bill's criminal penalties, including loss of immunity. Mastagni pointed out that as drafted “knowing and willful” refer only to the intentional decision to cover an officer's face, not intentionally breaking the law. This general intent standard exposes officers to lawsuits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution with at least $10,000 damages, even with no actual harm. The bill’s “notwithstanding any other law” clause overrides basic protections for our officers like indemnification under Government Code 825. That exposes officers to personal liability for a good faith mistake about whether an exception applies.  Mistake of law, such as erroneously believing conduct fits a legal exemption, is generally not a defense, as it does not negate the intent to commit the underlying act. 

    SB 627 removes critical immunities that protect officers when making good faith arrests, relying on probable cause, or exercising lawful discretion. The importance of immunity protections cannot be overstated. The California Legislature has enacted numerous civil immunities and privileges, which courts have carefully interpreted and applied for decades. These protections apply only to officers acting in good faith and are forfeited if officers break the law. The Legislature has consistently refused to weaken these protections because they are essential to public safety and enable officers to make arrests, execute search warrants, exercise reasonable discretion, and participate in prosecutions without fear of retaliatory suits.  

    The late addition of language stripping local peace officers of immunity is the single most troubling aspect of S.B. 627. Officers operate under carefully balanced immunities, including Civil Code section 43.55, Penal Code sections 836 and 847, and Government Code section 821.6, which shield them from personal lawsuits when they act in good faith and within the scope of duty. S.B. 627 overrides those protections solely because a face covering is involved, regardless of intent.  

   The bill's exemptions are too narrow and vague to adequately protect local officers, who do not enforce immigration laws. State officers are exempt from the bill's provisions. The severability clause ensures that if the law cannot apply to federal officers, its restrictions will still bind local California law enforcement. This means the Trump administration will likely have an easy win in court, invalidating application of the law to federal officers through preemption challenges. The severability clause in the bill leaves local officers bearing the full brunt of the criminal penalties and loss of immunities.

Enforcement Concerns

   California Senate Bill 627 introduces significant legal challenges for law enforcement officers, particularly concerning potential obstruction violations. The bill's provisions aim to enhance accountability by stripping qualified immunity and good faith defenses if officers are found to have acted with masked intentions. This legislative change underscores the delicate balance officers must maintain between executing their enforcement duties and adhering to the stringent requirements set forth by SB 627.

Federal law provides comprehensive protection for Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents through multiple statutory frameworks. Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, it is a federal crime to forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating penalties: simple obstruction carries up to one year imprisonment, while obstruction involving physical contact or intent to commit another felony increases the maximum penalty to eight years. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating imprisonment penalties.

Ironically, federal qualified immunity doctrine would likely protect local officers from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting masked ICE agents, even if the arrest later proves unlawful. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity protects government officials unless the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. No clearly established federal law prohibits state officers from enforcing state identification requirements against individuals who refuse to identify themselves, even if those individuals are federal agents. 

California immunity statutes would likely provide additional protection. California officers acting under state authority would have reasonable grounds to believe their actions were justified under California Penal Code Section 847(b)(1). The good faith immunity, which protects officers who act with a reasonable belief that their conduct is lawful, also faces limitations under the new bill. The removal of this defense in cases of masked actions places officers in a precarious position, requiring them to exercise heightened diligence and judgment in their interactions with the public.

Conclusion

The legal complexities introduced by SB 627 necessitate a thorough understanding of the bill's provisions and the potential defenses available. Officers must navigate these challenges while ensuring compliance with the law, a task that demands both legal acumen and practical wisdom. As the legal landscape evolves, the ability to effectively balance enforcement responsibilities with the mandates of SB 627 will be crucial for law enforcement professionals in California.

Watch the full Senate Public Safety Committee hearing on SB 627 below.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Firearm Possession by Unlawful Drug Users, Leaving Uncertainty for California Peace Officers Using Cannabis Off-Duty

On September 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment against Jaren Michael Stennerson, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of methamphetamine and under § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. United States v. Stennerson, 2025 WL 2600006 (C.A.9 (Mont.), 2025).  Stennerson argued both statutes violate the Second Amendment on their face and that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Forrest, rejected these claims, finding the statutes consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation under the framework set by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). 

The court held that § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of or addicts to controlled substances from possessing firearms, survives facial challenge because it can be constitutionally applied in circumstances analogous to founding-era laws restricting arms from intoxicated individuals. Citing examples like Virginia's 1655 ban on shooting guns while drinking and post-founding statutes in states such as Kansas and Missouri barring carry while intoxicated, the panel reasoned these traditions support disarming those impaired in judgment, such as active drug users. The court noted alignment with decisions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits upholding the statute's facial validity, though it left open the possibility of successful as-applied challenges where the restriction exceeds historical analogues. On vagueness, the panel found Stennerson had clear notice, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use contemporaneous with possession, consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363 (1977), and United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (2001).

While the case involved methamphetamine, its reasoning extends to other controlled substances, including marijuana, which remains a Schedule I drug under federal law. This raises unresolved questions regarding the ongoing conflict between state protections for off-duty cannabis use and federal firearm restrictions. California's Assembly Bill 2188, effective January 1, 2024, amended the Fair Employment and Housing Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on off-duty cannabis use or non-psychoactive metabolites in drug tests. Though untested by the courts, this law may apply to public safety personnel, including peace officers. Senate Bill 700 further reinforces these protections by barring inquiries into prior cannabis use during hiring.

These state laws offer job security for marijuana users, but federal law conflicts. Section 922(g)(3) categorically bars firearm possession by unlawful drug users, and marijuana's federal status makes even occasional users "unlawful" regardless of state legalization. Before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (2011), upheld this ban for drug users, including marijuana users.  

The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed recreational marijuana under Bruen standards. Peace officers must often possess firearms off-duty. Yet using cannabis off-duty, even sporadically, could trigger federal prosecution under § 922(g)(3), as courts interpret "unlawful user" to include regular or prolonged use close in time to possession. Recent challenges in other circuits, like the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (2024), suggest as-applied relief might be available for non-intoxicated marijuana users, but no such ruling has emerged in the Ninth Circuit yet.  

Officers considering off-duty cannabis use should consult legal counsel to weigh risks, including department policies and federal gun charges. This ruling underscores the need for caution when state law conflicts with federal prohibitions.  The law surrounding these issues will likely evolve as further as-applied challenges are litigated within the Ninth Circuit. 

Mastagni Holstedt Attorneys Recognized in 2026 Best Lawyers in America

We are pleased to announce that David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey have been selected for inclusion in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. This recognition highlights their work in Litigation - Labor and Employment, Labor Law - Union, and Employment Law - Individuals.

The Best Lawyers in America represents the top 5% of practicing attorneys in the United States, based on a rigorous peer-review process. Nominations come from leading lawyers outside the nominee's firm, followed by confidential evaluations from peers in the same practice areas and geographic regions. Only attorneys in good standing with their local bar associations are considered. For over 40 years, this process has identified lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill and integrity. As the announcement notes, "the best lawyers know who the best lawyers are." No fees or payments are involved in the selection, ensuring its credibility. More details on the 2026 awards can be found here.

This honor not only affirms our attorneys' expertise but also reinforces the value our firm delivers to clients. For unions facing employment challenges, such recognition signals reliable counsel grounded in proven success. If you have questions about labor or employment issues, contact our firm for a consultation.

David E. Mastagni's attorney profile is available here. 

Taylor Davies-Mahaffey's attorney profile is available here. 

Ninth Circuit Holds Officer’s Use of Less-Lethal Force That Injured Bystander During Protest Not Excessive

In Cheairs v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that an officer’s deployment of a blast ball during a chaotic protest, which injured a nearby bystander, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscores the challenges officers face in managing volatile crowds and highlights key considerations for use-of-force policies in public safety operations.

Background

The case stems from protests in Seattle following George Floyd’s death in 2020. On June 7, demonstrators escalated actions by breaching police barricades, throwing projectiles, shining lasers at officers, and threatening to burn precincts. Seattle Police Department officers, equipped with less-lethal munitions like OC blast balls, issued multiple dispersal orders and warnings via public address.

Officer Carl Anderson, leading the chemical agent response team, threw several blast balls to protect officers and disperse the crowd. One device bounced off the pavement and struck Taylor Cheairs, a bystander filming from the sidewalk near the front of the protesters. Cheairs suffered serious injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and First Amendment retaliation.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Cheairs appealed.

Legal Ruling

The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Cheairs was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. Citing Torres v. Madrid, the court noted that force applied with intent to restrain can constitute a seizure. Here, a jury could find the blast ball’s use manifested such intent, given its design and deployment.

Turning to reasonableness, the court applied the Graham v. Connor factors: severity of the crime, immediate threat to safety, and resistance or evasion. The most critical factor—immediate threat—weighed heavily in favor of the officer. Video evidence showed protesters near Cheairs assaulting officers with rocks, bottles, fireworks, and lasers amid escalating violence. The crowd ignored dispersal orders, creating probable cause for arrests related to assault or failure to disperse.

The court balanced the intrusion (serious injury from a less-lethal device) against the government’s interest in protecting officers, citizens, and property. Officer Anderson followed department policy, throwing the device at the ground rather than at head height, reducing lethality risk. Under the totality of circumstances, viewed from the officer’s on-scene perspective, the force was deemed reasonable.

On the First Amendment claim, Cheairs failed to show retaliation for filming. No evidence indicated Officer Anderson knew Cheairs was recording or targeted him; the officer’s view was obstructed by the police line.

Implications for Public Safety Officers

This ruling offers valuable guidance for California peace officers and firefighters handling protests or crowd control. It affirms that less-lethal force can be justified when crowds pose objective threats, even if bystanders are inadvertently harmed. Agencies should review policies on munitions deployment, emphasizing ground-level throws to minimize injury risks, and officers should document threats via body cams and reports to support reasonableness claims.

If you have questions about this case or its application to your department, contact your representatives.   

Appellate Ruling Severely Limits Public Employees' Legal Recourse for Improperly Disclosed Personnel Records

    In the ever-evolving landscape of public safety labor law, protecting the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records remains a critical issue. A recent California Court of Appeal decision, Santa Ana Police Officers Association et al. v. City of Santa Ana (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 296, limits the remedies available to public employees when such records are improperly disclosed. This ruling exposes the rising tensions between CPRA transparency goals and the erosion of public employees' due process rights to protect their privacy. For public employee labor organizations, this ruling sets forth the procedural hurdles they face and the need for legislative reform to balance transparency interests with a meaningful process for employees to enforce their privacy rights.  

A CPRA Response Gone Wrong

    The case stems from a 2021 incident where the City of Santa Ana inadvertently disclosed confidential personnel records of over 100 police officers to the media outlet Voice of OC in response to a CPRA request. These records included sensitive information about prior complaints and disciplinary investigations that were not subject to disclosure under S.B. 1421 or 16. In fact, the materials were confidential under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (the "Pitchess" statutes).

    The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA), along with anonymous "Doe" officers, sued the City, alleging violations of these confidentiality laws, negligence per se, failure to investigate their subsequent complaint about the disclosure (under Penal Code section 832.5), and denial of a request for information relating to the disclosures in violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The plaintiffs sought relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and mandamus.

    The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, delivering a mixed bag of outcomes with significant labor implications.

Court Holdings:

    The appellate court's decision, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Sanchez, addressed several core issues relevant to public safety unions and officers:

No Private Right of Action for Improper Disclosure

    The court held that Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not create a private cause of action for officers or unions seeking damages or other relief for the unauthorized release of confidential records. Rather, these statutes primarily establish procedures for protecting against improper disclosures but don't authorize lawsuits against public entities who violate the statutes and improperly disclose confidential material. 

    Related negligence claims were also dismissed, as they relied on the same statutes for a "duty of care." This ruling effectively strips public employees of any meaningful remedy for violation of these statutes or the disclosure of sensitive materials that violate their right to privacy. The court recognized the violation of mandated confidentiality laws but limited the employees' remedies to administrative or mandamus relief rather than civil damages. 

    These remedies are woefully inadequate because at most they seek to prevent future violations. The CPRA does not contain any mechanism for retraction of improperly disclosed materials and once disclosed and publicized, and injection against further disclosures by the employer provides little comfort. Moreover, public employees often discovery improper disclosures once they are publicized, because public agencies often disclose the records without notifying employees or providing them an opportunity to object. 

    Even if afforded notice, filing an action to prevent the disclosure is costly and risky. If the court rules against the employee, the requester, typically a media entity, is often awarded attorneys' fees and cost. If successful, the employee still suffers litigation costs with no hopes of monetary damages. This system urgently needs rebalancing. 

Anonymity in Litigation: A High Bar

    Officers suing anonymously (as "Does") must obtain court approval after a hearing balancing their privacy interests against the public's First Amendment right to access court proceedings. Here, the Doe officers failed to seek such authorization, leading to dismissal of their claims. Officers dealing with sensitive personnel matters can't assume anonymity will be granted. They must proactively justify it, or risk procedural dismissal.

Mootness of Injunctive and Mandamus Relief for Past Disclosures

    Claims for injunctive relief to prevent disclosure or mandamus to compel non-disclosure were deemed moot, as the records had already been released years earlier in response to the CPRA request. The court noted that once disclosure occurs, a public entity lacks the ability to "undo" it, rendering such remedies ineffective.

Mandamus Available for Failure to Investigate Complaints

    In a win for the union, the court reversed on the cause of action for failure to investigate its complaints. Penal Code section 832.5 requires agencies to investigate citizen complaints against personnel, including staff involved in disclosures, and notify complainants of the disposition within 30 days. The SAPOA adequately alleged the City never investigated or reported on their complaint about the disclosure, creating a ministerial duty enforceable via mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. This "win" still cannot undo the violation of the employees' privacy rights.

Exhaustion Required for MMBA Claims

    The cause of action alleging the City violated the MMBA by denying the union's information requests  was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court confirmed the SAPOA's associational standing to represent its members but dismissed the claims. While individual peace officers are exempt from PERB jurisdiction, unions like the SAPOA are not.

Conclusion

    This decision has many negative effects for public employee labor organizations.  Unions must focus on prevention. With limited remedies post-disclosure, unions should bargain for protections against agency negligence to avoid accidental releases of exempt records. Procedures that require agencies to notify the recognized labor representative and employee before any personnel record is released would at least provide an opportunity to object or even commence a reverse CPRA action to prevent disclosure.

    Legislation is also need to balance public employee due process rights. The state could mandate these pre-disclosure notification and process for the employee to object. The one-sided attorneys' fees structure in favor of requestors needs rebalancing so public employees can seek judicial relief without the fear of being subject to excessive attorneys' fees being awarded to deep pocketed media organizations.   

    Overall, Santa Ana narrows direct paths to compensation for privacy breaches. While the SAPOA scored a partial victory on the investigation front, the case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the limited protections of confidentiality statutes.