KFBK Talk Radio Host John McGinness interviewed Mastagni Holstedt partner David E. Mastagni on August 30, 2018 about AB 931, the proposed state law that would have radically changed officer use of force standards. The bill stalled in the State Assembly yesterday when Speaker Toni Atkins shelved the bill for this legislative session.
McGinness introduced Mastagni as, "a well-known member
of a prominent law firm family," and explained he shared law enforcement concerns about the bill, saying, "We recognize the tremendous flawed changed of what had been proposed and celebrate the fact that at least for now it didn’t happen and I also understand that a significant amount of the work that was done on this is credited to you." David explained, "I wouldn’t take all
the credit on this; I worked with a great team.
From the President of PORAC and their lobbyist to the Cal Chiefs, a long
with a lot of other law enforcement stakeholders."
McGinness asked about the constitutional issues about AB 931. David explained, "We would have been headed to a massive constitutional challenge on this. The California Constitution, in article 1, section 1, expressly provides every citizen of California the right of self-defense and the defense of property. And what this bill would have done is it would have held officers to an impossible standard that was much higher than you and I and every other citizen of this state and treated them differently because of their status as a peace officer, which raises another serious constitutional question under the 14th amendment and that’s equal protection."
They also discussed the immediate impacts to officer and public safety. David explained, "I think [AB 931] would incentivize officers not to do anything and we’ve seen this happen back east. Baltimore is a great example."
"As a citizen and a father it is of great concern to me as well. What this kind of legislation really does is it creates a huge disincentive for officers to engage in proactive policing. Proactive policing and community policing over the last couple of decades is where we’ve seen the best results in reducing crime."
"And it’s going to incentive officers to wait for a call for service and respond only to that call because the feeling will be you can’t second guess me for going where you ordered me to go but if I engage in proactive policing and something happens that controversial I’m going to get second guessed; I’m going to get second guessed from this impossible standard that the Ninth Circuit has even said that would require super human judgement.”
You can listen the whole interview here.
Showing posts with label officer involved shootings. Show all posts
Showing posts with label officer involved shootings. Show all posts
Friday, August 31, 2018
Friday, August 17, 2018
Federal Court Confirms Officer’s Use of Deadly Force Justified in Order to Prevent Escape
A
recently published federal court case underlines that if officers have probable
cause to believe a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to
themselves or others, they are justified in using deadly force to prevent
escape. A warning is only required if feasible.
In Horton v. Pobjecky (2018), an unarmed off-duty police officer was waiting for food in a pizzeria. The officer—Frank Pobjecky, was sitting in the break area with the restaurant manager—Vincenzo Tarara. Suddenly, four young men entered the front door. One of the men held a revolver. Two of the men entered the break room while a third went around the counter toward the cash register. The fourth man, Michael Sago (“Sago”), acted as a lookout. Sago stood in the entrance holding the front door open.
One of the men pointed a gun at Tarara and demanded money. Tarara told him to get out of his restaurant. Tarra then slamed the man against a cooler and reached for the man’s gun. While Tarara and the man struggled for control of the gun, Pobjecky, who knew that Tarara carried a concealed handgun on his hip under his shirt, grabbed Tarara’s gun.
Sago approached the break area. As he approached, Pobjecky gained possession of Tarara’s gun. Simultaneously, Tarara won the struggle for the other gun. Pobjecky began shooting. He never identified himself as a police officer or gave any verbal warnings or commands.
With Tarara’s gun, Pobjecky engaged each suspect as they moved around the restaurant. Pobjecky shot and wounded all three men. Sago was shot three times from behind in the lower back as he crawled away toward the door. After Sago crawled out of the restaurant, Pobjecky locked the front door and called 911. Approximately 11 minutes later paramedics arrived. Sago died shortly thereafter.
James Horton, representing Sago’s estate, sued Pobjecky alleging that he used excessive force and failed to provide medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In dismissing Horton’s case, the Court noted that as long as the assailants were moving inside the pizzeria, they posed a threat. The Court ruled that given the circumstances no reasonable juror could conclude that he should have stopped to identify himself as a police officer or warn each assailants before defending himself.
As to the failure to provide medical care, the Court ruled that it was “unreasonable to demand Pobjecky venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, braving the hazards [Sago] and the other assailants created, to administer treatment to [Sago]”
In Horton v. Pobjecky (2018), an unarmed off-duty police officer was waiting for food in a pizzeria. The officer—Frank Pobjecky, was sitting in the break area with the restaurant manager—Vincenzo Tarara. Suddenly, four young men entered the front door. One of the men held a revolver. Two of the men entered the break room while a third went around the counter toward the cash register. The fourth man, Michael Sago (“Sago”), acted as a lookout. Sago stood in the entrance holding the front door open.
One of the men pointed a gun at Tarara and demanded money. Tarara told him to get out of his restaurant. Tarra then slamed the man against a cooler and reached for the man’s gun. While Tarara and the man struggled for control of the gun, Pobjecky, who knew that Tarara carried a concealed handgun on his hip under his shirt, grabbed Tarara’s gun.
Sago approached the break area. As he approached, Pobjecky gained possession of Tarara’s gun. Simultaneously, Tarara won the struggle for the other gun. Pobjecky began shooting. He never identified himself as a police officer or gave any verbal warnings or commands.
With Tarara’s gun, Pobjecky engaged each suspect as they moved around the restaurant. Pobjecky shot and wounded all three men. Sago was shot three times from behind in the lower back as he crawled away toward the door. After Sago crawled out of the restaurant, Pobjecky locked the front door and called 911. Approximately 11 minutes later paramedics arrived. Sago died shortly thereafter.
James Horton, representing Sago’s estate, sued Pobjecky alleging that he used excessive force and failed to provide medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In dismissing Horton’s case, the Court noted that as long as the assailants were moving inside the pizzeria, they posed a threat. The Court ruled that given the circumstances no reasonable juror could conclude that he should have stopped to identify himself as a police officer or warn each assailants before defending himself.
As to the failure to provide medical care, the Court ruled that it was “unreasonable to demand Pobjecky venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, braving the hazards [Sago] and the other assailants created, to administer treatment to [Sago]”
Thursday, October 15, 2015
AG: CHP Can Disclose Brady List to Prosecutors
The California Highway Patrol and other law enforcement
agencies are allowed to disclose some Brady
information about their officers to prosecutors without a Pitchess motion.
On October 13th the Attorney General issued a legal opinion
about the steps prosecutors must take to get Brady material about peace officers. The Attorney General said CHP could give prosecutors a list of its officers
who have been found guilty of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or bias, without a Pitchess motion being filed without violating Pitchess statutes or the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of
Rights Act (POBRA).
Under the its proposed “External Brady Policy,” CHP would
create a list of its officers who have been found guilty of dishonesty, moral
turpitude, or bias within the last five years. This list would include the
names of officers and the earliest date of any misconduct. But it would not
describe the misconduct. Prosecutors could search this Brady list for CHP officers who might be called to testify as
witnesses in criminal trials. If a likely witness was on the list, a prosecutor
could then file a Pitchess motion to
view the officer’s personnel records. Also, an officer whose name was put on
the list would be notified and could file an administrative appeal challenging
their inclusion on the list.
The Attorney General noted that several police
departments have adopted similar Brady
policies and the Supreme Court approved one of these policies in Johnson. So CHP would not violate Pitchess statutes by creating and
sharing a Brady list. She also said CHP was part of the prosecution team for Brady purposes, and CHP was qualified to create a Brady list.
Although the Attorney General’s legal opinion is only
advisory and is not binding on local law enforcement agencies, it is has a lot of influence. Officer associations should be aware of their agency’s Brady policy and ensure that the
confidentiality of peace officer personnel records is protected. While Brady lists may be created and shared,
POBRA and Pitchess procedures must
still be followed.
Thursday, May 28, 2015
Proposal to Subject Officers in Critical Incidents to Special Prosecutor Fails in the Assembly
AB 86 was 86'd in the Assembly today. Under the proposed bill, every officer-involved shooting would have to be reviewed by a special prosecutor appointed by the Attorney General. This review would have been in addition to department and district attorney reviews. The bill was among several bills that failed to advance through the Assembly Appropriations Committee earlier today.
Friday, May 8, 2015
California Senate Bans Grand Jury Investigations of Officer Involved Critical Incidents
On May 7, 2015, the California Senate voted to ban the use of grand juries to investigate officer involved critical incidents. Specifically, Senate Bill 227 prohibits a grand jury from inquiring into an offense or misconduct that involves a shooting or the use of excessive force by a peace officer that lead to the death of a person being detained or arrested by the peace officer.
Under current law there are two tracks a district attorney can take to file a case. Under one track, the district attorney can file a complaint in criminal court and schedule a preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing the district attorney and the defense attorney present witnesses and evidence subject to cross-examination in open court. The judge then makes a determination of probable cause based on the evidence. If there is probable cause, the judge issues an information which lays the foundation for the criminal case.
The district attorney can also send the case to a grand jury. The grand jury then hears evidence presented in secret. The district attorney is allowed to present evidence favorable to his or her case without calling all relevant witnesses and without cross-examination. The grand jury decides if there is probable cause. If the grand jury dismisses the indictment, then the proceedings remain secret.
Senator Holly Mitchell, D-Los Angeles, argued the lack of transparency in the grand jury process and in grand jury deliberations has fostered an atmosphere of suspicion regarding the justice system and officer involved critical incidents. According to Senator Mitchell, requiring a district attorney to bring the case through a complaint allows the public to view the proceedings. If the public does not agree with the district attorney the public can then remove the district attorney at the next election.
The bill passed the senate on May 7 by a vote of 23-12. All of the "yes" votes came from Senate Democrats. The bill now moves to the Assembly for further review.
Monday, November 24, 2014
Ninth Circuit's Opinion Granting Distress Damages in Officer-Involved Shootings Stands
On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review of the City's appeal of Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles. This upholds the Ninth Circuit's ruling allowing pre-death pain and suffering damages in section 1983 claims when the death was caused by a violation of federal law.
In Chaudhry, a jury found a police officer's shooting was unjustified despite the officer testifying the suspect lunged at him with a knife. The jury awarded $700,000 to the suspect's family for wrongful death and $1 million to the suspect's estate for pain and suffering based on an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. California law prevents a decedent's estate from recovering damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Federal law is silent on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit found California's limitation on damages conflicted with section 1983's goals of compensation and deterrence. The Ninth Circuit ruled preventing pre-death pain and suffering damages to a decedent's estate makes it more economically advantageous for the defendant to kill rather than injure. The court held the state-law limitation on damages does not apply in section 1983 claims if the death was caused by a violation of federal law. This ruling greatly increases potential liability for section 1983 defendants.
In Chaudhry, a jury found a police officer's shooting was unjustified despite the officer testifying the suspect lunged at him with a knife. The jury awarded $700,000 to the suspect's family for wrongful death and $1 million to the suspect's estate for pain and suffering based on an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. California law prevents a decedent's estate from recovering damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Federal law is silent on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit found California's limitation on damages conflicted with section 1983's goals of compensation and deterrence. The Ninth Circuit ruled preventing pre-death pain and suffering damages to a decedent's estate makes it more economically advantageous for the defendant to kill rather than injure. The court held the state-law limitation on damages does not apply in section 1983 claims if the death was caused by a violation of federal law. This ruling greatly increases potential liability for section 1983 defendants.
Friday, May 30, 2014
California Supreme Court Rules CPRA Requires "Particularized Showing" to Prevent Disclosure of Officers' Names After Shooting
On May 29, 2014 in Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach, the California Supreme Court held the California Public Records Act ("CPRA") requires a "particularized showing" of officer safety concerns to prevent disclosure of an officer's name after a shooting. In this case, the Court found "vaguely worded declarations" and "general assertions" about officer safety risks was not enough to prevent disclosure.
On December 12, 2010, officers responded to a call about an intoxicated man brandishing a "six-shooter." When officers arrived, the man pointed an object at them resembling a gun. The officers opened fire and the man died. It turned out the object he pointed at officers was a garden hose spray nozzle with a pistol grip. A few days later, a reporter from the L.A. Times submitted a CPRA request for the names of the officers involved in the shooting, and the names of all officers involved in shootings from January 1, 2005 to December 11, 2010.
CPRA section 6254 subsection (c) exempts from disclosure personnel or similar files if disclosure "would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The Court refused to apply a blanket rule preventing disclosure of officers' names after a shooting in every circumstance. Instead, the Court emphasized the public's interest in the conduct of its peace officers. To overcome the public's interest and prevent disclosure, the City of Long Beach ("City") and the Long Beach Police Officers' Association ("Association") had to show disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of the officers' personal privacy.
A particularized risk or threat to the officers' safety or their family's safety exempts officers' names from disclosure under the CPRA. The Court stated "Of course, if it is essential to protect an officer's anonymity for safety reasons or for reasons peculiar to the officer's duties - as, for example, in the case of an undercover officer - then the public interest in disclosure of the officer's name may need to give way." While the Association and the City submitted declarations describing the possibility of gang retaliation against officers involved in shootings with gang members, in the Court's opinion, the concerns were "general in nature." The Court was quick to point out "We do not hold that the names of officers involved in shootings have to be disclosed in every case, regardless of the circumstances. We merely conclude...that the particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure was not made here..."
Justice Ming W. Chin disagreed with the majority's ruling and wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion. In his view, the Association and the City presented ample evidence of the safety threat faced by police officers after a shooting. He argued the City and the Association established officers' names should be exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. He concluded by stating courts should allow law enforcement agencies to protect their officers, because "They deserve at least that much for their brave service."
On December 12, 2010, officers responded to a call about an intoxicated man brandishing a "six-shooter." When officers arrived, the man pointed an object at them resembling a gun. The officers opened fire and the man died. It turned out the object he pointed at officers was a garden hose spray nozzle with a pistol grip. A few days later, a reporter from the L.A. Times submitted a CPRA request for the names of the officers involved in the shooting, and the names of all officers involved in shootings from January 1, 2005 to December 11, 2010.
CPRA section 6254 subsection (c) exempts from disclosure personnel or similar files if disclosure "would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The Court refused to apply a blanket rule preventing disclosure of officers' names after a shooting in every circumstance. Instead, the Court emphasized the public's interest in the conduct of its peace officers. To overcome the public's interest and prevent disclosure, the City of Long Beach ("City") and the Long Beach Police Officers' Association ("Association") had to show disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of the officers' personal privacy.
A particularized risk or threat to the officers' safety or their family's safety exempts officers' names from disclosure under the CPRA. The Court stated "Of course, if it is essential to protect an officer's anonymity for safety reasons or for reasons peculiar to the officer's duties - as, for example, in the case of an undercover officer - then the public interest in disclosure of the officer's name may need to give way." While the Association and the City submitted declarations describing the possibility of gang retaliation against officers involved in shootings with gang members, in the Court's opinion, the concerns were "general in nature." The Court was quick to point out "We do not hold that the names of officers involved in shootings have to be disclosed in every case, regardless of the circumstances. We merely conclude...that the particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure was not made here..."
Justice Ming W. Chin disagreed with the majority's ruling and wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion. In his view, the Association and the City presented ample evidence of the safety threat faced by police officers after a shooting. He argued the City and the Association established officers' names should be exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. He concluded by stating courts should allow law enforcement agencies to protect their officers, because "They deserve at least that much for their brave service."
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