David P. Mastagni Interviewed on KFBK's Kitty O'Neal About AB 748

On October 1, 2018, KBFK broadcaster Kitty O'Neil interviewed David P. Mastagni about AB 748.  Governor Brown signed the bill, which requires public release of video and records relating to critical incident investigations. 

O'Neil asked Mastagni what his concerns were about the new law.  He explained, "My greater concern is that the release itself is going to interfere with every single solitary investigation.  It’s going to cause witnesses to go into hiding. It’s going to jeopardize the safety of witnesses.  Frankly, it’s going to jeopardize the safety of the officers. And it will definitely take a law enforcement function and make it a media ping pong game."

O'Neil continued asking what he thought was behind the creation of the bill.  He explained, "I’ve dealt with the Legislature long enough to know they go by poll barometers and the never do anything based on the philosophic or best interests of society or law enforcement.  It’s always on what their district is like.  I call it promoability.  That public service, Kitty, has just gone from where you had volunteer councilman and people serving out of civic duty and dedication to career advancement and therefore you take positions that will encourage your constituency in your local district then you take them that will encourage your nomination ability in bigger, more statewide elections and I think that it’s all a calculus.  I’m sorry to say I don’t believe that the question of transparency or police-community relations – I think it’s there – but its maybe fifth, sixth, tenth down the line from how will this effect my career."

Listen to the whole interview here.

KFBK Talk Radio Host John McGinness Interviews David E. Mastagni on AB 931

KFBK Talk Radio Host John McGinness interviewed Mastagni Holstedt partner David E. Mastagni on August 30, 2018 about AB 931, the proposed state law that would have radically changed officer use of force standards.  The bill stalled in the State Assembly yesterday when Speaker Toni Atkins shelved the bill for this legislative session. 

McGinness introduced Mastagni as, "a well-known member of a prominent law firm family," and explained he shared law enforcement concerns about the bill, saying, "We recognize the tremendous flawed changed of what had been proposed and celebrate the fact that at least for now it didn’t happen and I also understand that a significant amount of the work that was done on this is credited to you."  David explained, "I wouldn’t take all the credit on this; I worked with a great team.  From the President of PORAC and their lobbyist to the Cal Chiefs, a long with a lot of other law enforcement stakeholders."

McGinness asked about the constitutional issues about AB 931.  David explained, "We would have been headed to a massive constitutional challenge on this.  The California Constitution, in article 1, section 1, expressly provides every citizen of California the right of self-defense and the defense of property.  And what this bill would have done is it would have held officers to an impossible standard that was much higher than you and I and every other citizen of this state and treated them differently because of their status as a peace officer, which raises another serious constitutional question under the 14th amendment and that’s equal protection."

They also discussed the immediate impacts to officer and public safety.  David explained, "I think [AB 931] would incentivize officers not to do anything and we’ve seen this happen back east.  Baltimore is a great example."

"As a citizen and a father it is of great concern to me as well.  What this kind of legislation really does is it creates a huge disincentive for officers to engage in proactive policing.  Proactive policing and community policing over the last couple of decades is where we’ve seen the best results in reducing crime."

"And it’s going to incentive officers to wait for a call for service and respond only to that call because the feeling will be you can’t second guess me for going where you ordered me to go but if I engage in proactive policing and something happens that controversial I’m going to get second guessed; I’m going to get second guessed from this impossible standard that the Ninth Circuit has even said that would require super human judgement.”

You can listen the whole interview here.

Supreme Court Clarifies Qualified Immunity Applies to Use of Force When Protecting Third Parties

 On April 2, 2018, the United States Supreme Court clarified that peace officers are permitted to use deadly force in order to protect third parties.

In Kisela v. Hughes, three Tucson, Arizona police officers responded to reports of a woman hacking at a tree with a kitchen knife and acting erratically. Upon arriving on the scene, the officers spotted a woman, later identified as Sharon Chadwick, standing in the driveway of a nearby house. A chain-link fence separated Chadwick from the three officers.

Amy Hughes came out of that same house carrying a large knife at her side. She matched the description of the woman who had been seen hacking a tree. Hughes walked toward Chadwick. She stopped no more than six feet from her.

All three officers drew their guns. At least twice they told Hughes to drop the knife. Chadwick said “take it easy” to both Hughes and the three officers. Although Hughes appeared calm, she failed to acknowledge the officers’ presence or drop the knife.

The top bar of the chain-link fence blocked Officer Kisela’s line of fire. He dropped to the ground and shot Hughes four times through the fence. Less than a minute transpired from the moment the officers saw Chadwick to the moment Kisela fired shots.

All three officers jumped the fence, handcuffed Hughes, and called paramedics—who transported her to a hospital. At the hospital, she was treated for non-life-threatening injuries.  Afterwards, Hughes sued Officer Kisela under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of her constitutional rights.

While underscoring the need for officers to make spit-second decisions, the Court declined to engage in the second-guessing of officers on the scene. The Court specifically noted that although the officers themselves were in no apparent danger, all three of the officers said at the time of the shooting they subjectively believed Hughes to be a threat to Chadwick. To that end, Officer Kisela was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity

This is an important case for California peace officers. It underscores that officers are entitled to qualified immunity when utilizing deadly force in order to protect third-parties.  

Supreme Court Overturns 9th Circuit Anti-Officer Use of Force Rule

In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez et al., the United States Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit to put an end to a rule that let people bring lawsuits against officers even when the officers' use of force was reasonable.  Under the so-called "Provocation Rule," officers whose use of force is deemed reasonable, could still be held liable if they did something else, in violation of the 4th Amendment, to make the suspect respond in a way that required force.  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this theory.

In the Mendez case, two deputies were looking for a wanted parolee when they entered a shack in the backyard of a home without knocking or announcing.  They did not have a warrant to enter the shack. It turned out Mendez lived in the shack.  Mendez got up with a gun in his hand when the officers entered and the officers reasonably believed their lives were in danger and fired in self-defense.  Mendez, who survived, sued, arguing that even if it was reasonable for the officers to shoot him, they should still be liable since they did not have a warrant to search his shack.  The Ninth Circuit agreed, applying its "Provocation Rule."

The Supreme Court, however, held, "The rule’s fundamental flaw is that it uses another constitutional violation to manufacture an excessive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.”  The Court explained "the provocation rule... instructs courts to look back in time to see if a different Fourth Amendment violation was somehow tied to the eventual use of force, an approach that mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth Amendment claims." As a result, the Court concluded, "the provocation rule is incompatible with this Court's excessive force jurisprudence."

California Senate Bans Grand Jury Investigations of Officer Involved Critical Incidents

On May 7, 2015, the California Senate voted to ban the use of grand juries to investigate officer involved critical incidents. Specifically, Senate Bill 227 prohibits a grand jury from inquiring into an offense or misconduct that involves a shooting or the use of excessive force by a peace officer that lead to the death of a person being detained or arrested by the peace officer.

Under current law there are two tracks a district attorney can take to file a case. Under one track, the district attorney can file a complaint in criminal court and schedule a preliminary hearing.  At the preliminary hearing the district attorney and the defense attorney present witnesses and evidence subject to cross-examination in open court. The judge then makes a determination of probable cause based on the evidence. If there is probable cause, the judge issues an information which lays the foundation for the criminal case.

The district attorney can also send the case to a grand jury. The grand jury then hears evidence presented in secret. The district attorney is allowed to present evidence favorable to his or her case without calling all relevant witnesses and without cross-examination. The grand jury decides if there is probable cause. If the grand jury dismisses the indictment, then the proceedings remain secret.

Senator Holly Mitchell, D-Los Angeles, argued the lack of transparency in the grand jury process and in grand jury deliberations has fostered an atmosphere of suspicion regarding the justice system and officer involved critical incidents. According to Senator Mitchell, requiring a district attorney to bring the case through a complaint allows the public to view the proceedings. If the public does not agree with the district attorney the public can then remove the district attorney at the next election.

The bill passed the senate on May 7 by a vote of 23-12. All of the "yes" votes came from Senate Democrats. The bill now moves to the Assembly for further review.

Assemblymember Jim Cooper Stands Up For Law Enforcement

California Assemblymember Jim Cooper is standing up for law enforcement statewide.  Cooper, a retired Sacramento Sheriff's Department Captain, has taken the lead educating his colleagues in the Legislature about officer-involved shootings, how law enforcement departments respond to and investigate critical incidents, limits of body cameras, how much training is already required of law enforcement, and the role of socio-economic issues law enforcement did not create and cannot solve alone.  Cooper's stand comes as another assemblymember has introduced a bill requiring the Department of Justice to review every officer-involved shooting in California.

Ninth Circuit: Officers' Use of Taser 22 Times Was Justified, Despite Death of Suspect

In Marquez v. City of Phoenix (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1167, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that officers’ repeated and prolonged use of a taser against the suspect, both in “probe mode” and in “drive-stun mode,” which resulted in the suspect’s death, did not amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The case started when two Phoenix, Arizona, police officers arrived at a suspect's family home. They learned that the male suspect was attempting to perform an exorcism on his three-year old granddaughter. Upon entering the bedroom, which had been barricaded, the officers found chaos. The walls and furniture were smeared with blood, the suspect was reclining on the bed with a silent and motionless victim in a choke-hold, and the suspect’s adult daughter was naked in the corner screaming with evidence on her face of a recent beating. One officer ordered the suspect to let the child go or he was going to be tased. The suspect did not comply and, the officer deployed his TASER X26 ECD in “probe mode.” The taser was ineffective and the suspect continued to actively resist arrest, even kicking one officer in the groin.

After the victim was removed, the suspect continued to resist. Officers were eventually able to wrestle Ronald into submission after using the taser multiple times. At that point, the officers found that he had a weak pulse. Despite resuscitation efforts, the suspect went into cardiac arrest and died. The cause of death was listed as “excited delirium” and records found that the suspect received nine five-second cycles from the X26; two while it was ineffectively deployed in “probe mode” and seven when it was deployed in “drive-stun mode.” In all, the officers pulled the X26's trigger a combined 22 times.

While the Court found that considerable force was used, the force was not excessive. Interestingly, the Court was “not convinced that the use of an X26 involves deadly force” but even if it did, under the totality of the circumstances, the force was reasonable. The Court highlighted the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving. In this situation, officers were responding to a domestic violence call in which the suspect would not release his granddaughter from a choke-hold and then struggled viciously in close quarters against the officers attempting to restrain him while his daughter, who had also been the victim of his attacks, remained in the room throughout.

New York Court Finds Post-Critical Incident Breathalyzer Legal Under Some Circumstances

In Palladino v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2012, 07 CV 9246 GBD) 2012 WL 2497272, a federal court in New York decided NYPD’s policy of requiring a breathalyzer for officer who discharged firearms in critical incidents was constitutional under some circumstances. The case started after NYPD required all uniformed members involved in firearms discharges resulting in injury to or death of a person be subjected to Department administered alcohol testing. The stated purpose of the policy was to ensure the highest levels of integrity at the scene of officer involved shootings.

Law enforcement unions sued, arguing the policy was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court decided the primary purpose of the policy was to deter police officers from becoming intoxicated and discharging their weapon, which qualified as a “special need”. The Court decided NYPD officers carrying and discharging firearms had diminished expectations of privacy, the breathalyzer test was not an overly intrusive search, the policy was applied uniformly, and the policy was narrowly tailored to accomplish NYPD's goals of ensuring compliance with its policies regarding personnel management.  The ruling only addresses the constitutionality of the policy and not whether it would violate California state laws such as POBR.

Court of Appeal: Names of Police Officers Involved in Critical Incidents Not Always Confidential

In Long Beach Police Officers' Association v. City of Long Beach, (February 7, 2012) the Second District Court of Appeal ruled the city must release the names of police officers involved in officer-involved shootings.  In reaching its decision, the Court disagreed with the arguments of the POA and the city against disclosure, but declined to issue a blanket rule, noting public agencies have to consider disclosure on a case-by-case basis.

The case arose after the Los Angeles Times sent a public records request to the city requesting the names of all police officers involved in officer-involved shootings for a five-year time period.  After the city initially agreed to comply, the POA sued the city and the city backed down.  Then the LA times sued the city.  After initially blocking the release, the superior court ordered the city to release the names and the city and POA appealed.

The Court held the names of officers were not confidential personnel records protected from disclosure by the Penal Code.  The Court also decided not to apply the so-called "catch-all" exception to the public records act.  The catch-all exception applies whenever "the public interest served by withholding the records clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure."  The POA argued the exception applied because of threats to officer safety.  The Court, however, held "generalized safety concerns" are not enough to trigger the exception, but noted  "in certain circumstances protecting the anonymity of a peace officer may outweigh the public interest in disclosure."