Showing posts with label District Attorneys. Show all posts
Showing posts with label District Attorneys. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 26, 2017

Santa Clara Correctional Officer Vindicated in Mistrial Over Use of Force

On Tuesday, July 25, Santa Clara County Correctional Officer Tim Tri was vindicated when a jury voted 11-1 to acquit him in a use of force case.

Because the jury deadlocked, the judge declared a mistrial.  Tri’s attorney, Erin Dervin from Mastagni Holstedt, told ABC7 that “the eleven jurors are very adamant with us that they saw the case for what it was, that truly Mr. Tri was doing his job, what he’s expected to do and saving his partner.”

Santa Clara Correctional Peace Officers’ Association President Amy Le said, “With this particular case, to me, it seems like a witch hunt.”  She noted Tri should never have been arrested and that Tri was charged three years after the incident, only after a high-profile inmate death.

Erin M. Dervin is an experienced criminal trial lawyer with over 15 years experience as a deputy district attorney where she handled litigation and trials including complex financial crimes, sexual assaults, narcotics, domestic violence and general felony practice and tried over 60 jury trials.  She is a Senior Associate at Mastagni Holstedt.

Thursday, October 15, 2015

AG: CHP Can Disclose Brady List to Prosecutors

The California Highway Patrol and other law enforcement agencies are allowed to disclose some Brady information about their officers to prosecutors without a Pitchess motion.


On October 13th the Attorney General issued a legal opinion about the steps prosecutors must take to get Brady material about peace officers.  The Attorney General said CHP could give prosecutors a list of its officers who have been found guilty of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or bias, without a Pitchess motion being filed without violating Pitchess statutes or the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA).


Under the its proposed “External Brady Policy,” CHP would create a list of its officers who have been found guilty of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or bias within the last five years. This list would include the names of officers and the earliest date of any misconduct. But it would not describe the misconduct. Prosecutors could search this Brady list for CHP officers who might be called to testify as witnesses in criminal trials. If a likely witness was on the list, a prosecutor could then file a Pitchess motion to view the officer’s personnel records. Also, an officer whose name was put on the list would be notified and could file an administrative appeal challenging their inclusion on the list. 


The Attorney General noted that several police departments have adopted similar Brady policies and the Supreme Court approved one of these policies in Johnson. So CHP would not violate Pitchess statutes by creating and sharing a Brady list. She also said CHP was part of the prosecution team for Brady purposes, and CHP was qualified to create a Brady list. 


Although the Attorney General’s legal opinion is only advisory and is not binding on local law enforcement agencies, it is has a lot of influence. Officer associations should be aware of their agency’s Brady policy and ensure that the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records is protected. While Brady lists may be created and shared, POBRA and Pitchess procedures must still be followed.

Monday, July 6, 2015

California Supreme Court Clarifies Pitchess Process Protects Officer Privacy

On July 6, 2015, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal to protect the confidentiality of peace officers' personnel files.  In People v. The Superior Court of San Francisco County, the Supreme Court held District Attorneys offices must file Pitchess motions to review personnel files, ending attempts by some DAs offices to have unfettered access to officers' private information.

Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045 regulate access to peace officers' personnel files in California. The sections make peace officers' personnel files preemptively confidential, but permit parties that have a reason to believe the personnel records contain information material to a case to file what's typically called a Pitchess motion, to gain access to relevant parts of a file.  If party makes a preliminary showing, a judge reviews potentially relevant portions of the file and decides if they are material to the case and must be turned over.

This process applies in criminal cases, but also civil and administrative cases.  In criminal cases, another feature of this process is a prosecutor's duties under Brady v. Maryland.  Under that case, a prosecutor must disclose information that may help a criminal defendant in court.

In San Francisco, the Police Department had a Brady policy that took into account officer privacy and prosecutors' Brady obligations.  Under the policy, the Department had a Brady committee consider potential Brady issues, permitted comment by the affected employee, and made a recommendation to Chief, who decided whether to inform the DA.  The DA then had to file a Pitchess motion to access relevant portions of the officer's file.

But recently, some DAs claimed their Brady duty is so broad that they are entitled to unfettered access to peace officers' personnel files so they can decide what to give criminal defendants.  In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed with this conclusion.

The Court of Appeal held prosecutors could access peace officer personnel records without filing a Pitchess motion for two reasons.  First, it concluded disclosing peace officers’ personnel records to the DA did not count as a “disclosure” within the meaning of the statute.  Second, the Court interpreted an exception to the Pitchess process about “investigations” to apply any time a criminal defendant filed a Pitchess motion.  The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning.

The Supreme Court noted the Pitchess process balances officers’ privacy with the needs of prosecutors to perform their duties under Brady.  It found the limited exception allowing direct access showed the Legislature did not intend DAs to have direct access under normal circumstances.  Second, Supreme Court disagreed the argument a Pitchess motion triggers a DA’s right to investigate an officer.  The Court defended peace officers noting, “A police officer does not become the target of an investigation merely by being a witness in a criminal case.”  The Supreme Court explained the exception applied, instead, to cases where the DA needs to do a criminal investigation of the officer’s own conduct.

Thus, the Supreme Court held, "the prosecution does not have unfettered access to confidential personnel records of police officers who are potential witnesses in criminal cases. Rather, it must follow the same procedures that apply to criminal defendants, i.e., make a Pitchess motion, in order to seek information in those records."