KFBK Talk Radio Host John McGinness interviewed Mastagni Holstedt partner David E. Mastagni on August 30, 2018 about AB 931, the proposed state law that would have radically changed officer use of force standards. The bill stalled in the State Assembly yesterday when Speaker Toni Atkins shelved the bill for this legislative session.
McGinness introduced Mastagni as, "a well-known member
of a prominent law firm family," and explained he shared law enforcement concerns about the bill, saying, "We recognize the tremendous flawed changed of what had been proposed and celebrate the fact that at least for now it didn’t happen and I also understand that a significant amount of the work that was done on this is credited to you." David explained, "I wouldn’t take all
the credit on this; I worked with a great team.
From the President of PORAC and their lobbyist to the Cal Chiefs, a long
with a lot of other law enforcement stakeholders."
McGinness asked about the constitutional issues about AB 931. David explained, "We would have been headed to a massive constitutional challenge on this. The California Constitution, in article 1, section 1, expressly provides every citizen of California the right of self-defense and the defense of property. And what this bill would have done is it would have held officers to an impossible standard that was much higher than you and I and every other citizen of this state and treated them differently because of their status as a peace officer, which raises another serious constitutional question under the 14th amendment and that’s equal protection."
They also discussed the immediate impacts to officer and public safety. David explained, "I think [AB 931] would incentivize officers not to do anything and we’ve seen this happen back east. Baltimore is a great example."
"As a citizen and a father it is of great concern to me as well. What this kind of legislation really does is it creates a huge disincentive for officers to engage in proactive policing. Proactive policing and community policing over the last couple of decades is where we’ve seen the best results in reducing crime."
"And it’s going to incentive officers to wait for a call for service and respond only to that call because the feeling will be you can’t second guess me for going where you ordered me to go but if I engage in proactive policing and something happens that controversial I’m going to get second guessed; I’m going to get second guessed from this impossible standard that the Ninth Circuit has even said that would require super human judgement.”
You can listen the whole interview here.
Showing posts with label peace officers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peace officers. Show all posts
Friday, August 31, 2018
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
Governor Brown Vetoes PORAC Endorsed Bill Allowing Peace Officers to File Unfair Practices with PERB
On October 14, 2017, the Governor vetoed A.B. 530, a Bill introduced by Jim Cooper to provide Penal Code 830.1 peace officers access to PERB. Mastagni Holstedt assisted in the drafting of this PORAC supported this Bill and both David E. Mastagni and Kathleen Storm testified in favor of the Bill extending PERB's jurisdiction to all peace officers while preserving their ability to seek injunctive relief in court.
PERB possesses expertise in enforcing the MMBA and affords other local public employees access to a cost-effective administrative process to enforce their bargaining and representational rights. In light of the prohibition against peace officers engaging in certain job actions in response to unfair practices, A.B. 530 also authorized all peace officers to "seek injunctive relief or a writ of mandamus to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable harm pending a final determination by the board on any issue upon which a court has not made a ruling." Currently, non-830.1 peace officer unions may obtain similar injunctive relief, but only if PERB agrees to bring such an action.
Unfortunately, the Governor denied 830.1 peace officers access to PERB by vetoing the Bill. He explained his veto as follows: "I am returning Assembly Bill 530 without my signature. This bill authorizes peace officers to bring unfair practice charges to the Public Employment Relations Board while preserving their existing right to directly petition a superior court for injunctive relief. No other group has both of these rights and I’m unconvinced that providing such a unique procedure is warranted."
PERB possesses expertise in enforcing the MMBA and affords other local public employees access to a cost-effective administrative process to enforce their bargaining and representational rights. In light of the prohibition against peace officers engaging in certain job actions in response to unfair practices, A.B. 530 also authorized all peace officers to "seek injunctive relief or a writ of mandamus to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable harm pending a final determination by the board on any issue upon which a court has not made a ruling." Currently, non-830.1 peace officer unions may obtain similar injunctive relief, but only if PERB agrees to bring such an action.
Unfortunately, the Governor denied 830.1 peace officers access to PERB by vetoing the Bill. He explained his veto as follows: "I am returning Assembly Bill 530 without my signature. This bill authorizes peace officers to bring unfair practice charges to the Public Employment Relations Board while preserving their existing right to directly petition a superior court for injunctive relief. No other group has both of these rights and I’m unconvinced that providing such a unique procedure is warranted."
Tuesday, September 5, 2017
PERB Again Upholds Its Jurisdiction to Hear Unfair Labor Practices Charges Brought by 830.1 Peace Officers Unions
In Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange (July 19, 2017) PERB Case No. LA-CE-1101-M, PERB's Chief ALJ Shawn P. Cloughesy confirmed that police officer and deputy sheriff associations representing members who are Penal Code Section 830.1 peace officers have jurisdiction before PERB. Orange County argued that PERB lacks jurisdiction over AOCDS because the bargaining units represented by the Association includes Deputy Sheriff I and II, Investigator, Investigator I, Sergeant, District Attorney Investigator, Investigator-Polygraph Operator, and Supervising Attorney's Investigator and Sergeant, who are classified as peace officers under Penal Code section 830.1. MMBA section 3511 excludes “persons who are peace officers” from PERB's jurisdiction.
Relying on a case won by Mastagni Holstedt, County of Santa Clara (2015) PERB Decision No. 2431-M, PERB upheld its authority to hear charges “that are brought by employee organizations, including employee organizations representing or seeking to represent units including persons who are peace officers.” PERB specified that its authority applies to both adjudicating and remedying unfair practices in those cases. PERB exercised jurisdiction over two AOCDS units, one comprised exclusively of peace officers, the other containing both peace officer and non-peace officer positions. Thus, the exemption under Section 3511 only excludes from PERB individual MMBA actions brought by persons who are 830.1 peace officers. As a result, an unlawful interference or retaliation against an officer of a peace officer union could result in duplicative litigation with the individual officers' action being brought before superior court and the union's action being adjudicated by PERB. Pending legislation in A.B. 530 would bring all unfair practices involving 830.1 peace officers and their unions before PERB while preserving the ability to seek injunction relief.
Relying on a case won by Mastagni Holstedt, County of Santa Clara (2015) PERB Decision No. 2431-M, PERB upheld its authority to hear charges “that are brought by employee organizations, including employee organizations representing or seeking to represent units including persons who are peace officers.” PERB specified that its authority applies to both adjudicating and remedying unfair practices in those cases. PERB exercised jurisdiction over two AOCDS units, one comprised exclusively of peace officers, the other containing both peace officer and non-peace officer positions. Thus, the exemption under Section 3511 only excludes from PERB individual MMBA actions brought by persons who are 830.1 peace officers. As a result, an unlawful interference or retaliation against an officer of a peace officer union could result in duplicative litigation with the individual officers' action being brought before superior court and the union's action being adjudicated by PERB. Pending legislation in A.B. 530 would bring all unfair practices involving 830.1 peace officers and their unions before PERB while preserving the ability to seek injunction relief.
Wednesday, July 12, 2017
Court Upholds Officer's Right to Administrative Appeal of Termination
In 2008, a citizen filed a complaint against San Francisco police officer Morgado. The office of citizen complaints investigated and recommended the Chief impose discipline. The Chief agreed and submitted a complaint against the officer to the City’s police commission. After a full evidentiary hearing which the officer participated in, the Commission decided to impose termination. The officer sued the City in Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco alleging that the City violated the Public Safety Officers’ Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBR”) by failing to give him an administrative appeal of the final termination. The trial court agreed with the officer and issued an injunction vacating the termination until he had been provided the opportunity for an administrative appeal of the termination decision. The City appealed.
On appeal, the City argued that the evidentiary hearing at the Commission level effectively served as an administrative appeal of the Chief’s decision to discipline. By providing this evidentiary hearing, the City argued it fulfilled the purposes of the administrative appeal provision of POBR. The Court found a distinction between the Chief’s decision to recommend discipline and the termination actually imposed by the commission. The Court found that while there may be a right for an administrative appeal of an interim-step towards discipline, such as the Chief’s recommendation, ultimately this was not the relevant issue in this case.
The issue here was the ability to appeal the “final” imposition of discipline by the Commission. While the Commission’s evidentiary hearing fulfilled most of the purposes of an administrative appeal, the Commission’s processes ended when it made the final determination to impose discipline. The Court ruled the City should have provided an additional opportunity for independent re-examination of the imposition of termination. The Court stated that such an administrative appeal does not require the same full-scale evidentiary hearing, but merely the re-examination by someone not involved in the initial determination who will make written factual findings.
The City argued alternatively that the administrative appeal provision of POBR was unconstitutional because it restricted the constitutionally granted “plenary authority” of the City over the removal of its officers. The Court found no constitutional conflict, noting POBR constituted only a slight impingement. POBR did not proscribe reasons an officer could be terminated, rather it sets forth minimal procedural rights. The court upheld the Constitutionality of POBR finding it was narrowly tailored to the purpose of promoting labor relations and created no substantive restrictions on the City’s ability to terminate employees. The Court of Appeal upheld the injunction and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
On appeal, the City argued that the evidentiary hearing at the Commission level effectively served as an administrative appeal of the Chief’s decision to discipline. By providing this evidentiary hearing, the City argued it fulfilled the purposes of the administrative appeal provision of POBR. The Court found a distinction between the Chief’s decision to recommend discipline and the termination actually imposed by the commission. The Court found that while there may be a right for an administrative appeal of an interim-step towards discipline, such as the Chief’s recommendation, ultimately this was not the relevant issue in this case.
The issue here was the ability to appeal the “final” imposition of discipline by the Commission. While the Commission’s evidentiary hearing fulfilled most of the purposes of an administrative appeal, the Commission’s processes ended when it made the final determination to impose discipline. The Court ruled the City should have provided an additional opportunity for independent re-examination of the imposition of termination. The Court stated that such an administrative appeal does not require the same full-scale evidentiary hearing, but merely the re-examination by someone not involved in the initial determination who will make written factual findings.
The City argued alternatively that the administrative appeal provision of POBR was unconstitutional because it restricted the constitutionally granted “plenary authority” of the City over the removal of its officers. The Court found no constitutional conflict, noting POBR constituted only a slight impingement. POBR did not proscribe reasons an officer could be terminated, rather it sets forth minimal procedural rights. The court upheld the Constitutionality of POBR finding it was narrowly tailored to the purpose of promoting labor relations and created no substantive restrictions on the City’s ability to terminate employees. The Court of Appeal upheld the injunction and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Tuesday, June 27, 2017
CalPERS Changes Eligibility Rules for Industrial Disability Retirement
The
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) posted Circular
Letter 200-018-17 on March 30, 2017. Among
other things, this Letter addresses changes to the eligibility determinations
for certain local safety members applying for industrial disability retirement.
In the past, CalPERS relied on the employer’s recommendation to verify eligibility of any member for industrial disability retirement. However, CalPERS will now independently evaluate whether certain members are eligible. The employer must obtain CalPERS’ determination of a member’s eligibility to apply for disability retirement before the employer starts the process of a disability determination for any of the following circumstances:
In the past, CalPERS relied on the employer’s recommendation to verify eligibility of any member for industrial disability retirement. However, CalPERS will now independently evaluate whether certain members are eligible. The employer must obtain CalPERS’ determination of a member’s eligibility to apply for disability retirement before the employer starts the process of a disability determination for any of the following circumstances:
- Disciplinary process underway prior to the member’s separation from employment.
- The member was terminated for cause.
- The member resigned in lieu of termination.
- The member signed an agreement to waive his or her reinstatement right as part of a legal settlement (i.e., Employment Reinstatement Waiver).
- The member has been convicted of or is being investigated for a work-related felony.
The Letter requires employers to provide all relevant personnel documents and
medical records to CalPERS. This information will be used to conduct the second
evaluation of a member’s medical incapacity and employment status. However, providing such information
to CalPERS creates a conflict for safety employers. For example, Penal Code section 832.7 prohibits employers from disclosing peace officer personnel
records without the peace officer’s written consent or a Pitchess motion. Employers are also
prohibited from disclosing medical information without written authorization
from the employee.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)