NLRB Issues New Standard For Duty Of Fair Representation Charge Defenses

On September 14, 2018 the National Labor Relations Board issued a memo addressing duty of fair representation charges against labor unions. The National Labor Relations Act makes it illegal for labor unions to restrain or coerce employees when they exercise their rights granted to them by the Act. The law states that a labor organization has a duty to fairly represent employees.

The NLRB believes that their past approach to duty of fair representation cases has created
confusion for employees in what duties are owed to them by union representatives. In response, the memo instructed regional directors that unions should be required to show they have procedures or systems in place to track grievances. It was also explained that a union which does not communicate or respond to a complaining member is negligent, and the negligence would be considered arbitrary and willful. The NLRB stated that it will not accept after-the-fact communication as a correction for negligence. 

The position taken by the NLRB is inconsistent with how they have interpreted duty of fair
representation law in the past. The change means that labor organizations can now be subject to charges based on careless or unprofessional actions that had previously been viewed as just plain error. To avoid a negligence charge, labor organizations should evaluate the procedures and case tracking systems they currently have to ensure their timeliness and thoroughness.

PERB Approves Demand for Fact Finding Over Gun Policy

In 2016, the Ventura County Professional Peace OfficersAssociation (“Association”) and the County of Ventura began negotiating a Firearm Manual. In January of 2017, an impasse was declared over negotiations regarding a specific chapter covering the conduct of armed probation officers.

In February of 2017, the Association filed a request for factfinding with the Public Employees Relations Board (“PERB”). The request was made pursuant to Section 3505.4 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”), as well as, PERB Regulation 32802.

Ventura County objected to the factfinding request. It argued that the policy at issue in the Firearm Manual addressed the use of force by sworn staff. According to the County, matters concerning use of force are not within the scope of representation and therefore not subject to factfinding under the MMBA.  The Association responded that because the Firearm Manual involves the use of deadly force standard applicable in the discharge of a firearm, it is a matter of employee safety and therefore within the scope of representation.

PERB’s Office of the General Counsel issued an administrative determination approving the Association’s request for factfinding. It held that it was not required to determine whether a matter is within the scope of representation before approving a factfinding request. Since the Office of the General Counsel’s role is limited to determining whether the conditions of MMBA section 3505.4 and PERB Regulation 32802 have been met, it was not empowered to determine whether the dispute or difference subject to factfinding is a matter within the scope of representation. As a result, it approved the Association’s request that the parties’ bargaining dispute be submitted to a factfinding panel.

The County appealed this administrative determination.  According to the County, the Office of the General Counsel should have first assessed whether the matter submitted to the factfinding was a matter within the scope of representation.

In ruling against the County, PERB noted that although factfinding is ultimately required only for disputes over matters within the scope of representation, the Office of General Counsel is not required in every case to make a definite determination to that effect before approving a factfinding request. Such a process is unwieldy and generally inconsistent with the time-sensitive nature of the factfinding process.

According to PERB, the principal purpose of factfinding is to assist the parties in reaching a voluntary and prompt resolution to their dispute through intervention of a neutral. To require a preliminary determination as to whether a matter is within the scope of representation before approving a factfinding request “would encourage both delay and gamesmanship, thus defeating the principal purpose of factfinding.”

Court of Appeal: No Requirement to Meet and Confer on Citizen Sponsored Initiatives

In City of San Diego v. PERB, an appellate court said a citizen sponsored initiative to end pensions for new government employees did not require the city of San Diego (City) to meet and confer with the unions whose members would be affected.  

In November of 2010 then Mayor of San Diego Jerry Sanders announced his plan to place a citizen sponsored initiative on the June 2012 ballot.  The initiative was called the Citizens Pension Reform Iniative (CPRI).  CPRI, if passed, would amend San Diego’s city charter.  The main effect of this amendment was eliminating the pension program for specified future employees, and replacing the program with a 401(k) plan.  

Mayor Sanders, along with many prominent city employees, spent significant time and used considerable resources to gain support for the initiative.  Eventually, enough signatures were collected to place the matter on the June 2012 ballot.  Several unions demanded to meet and confer with City Council before CPRI was placed on the ballot.  If CPRI passed Mayor Sanders would have effectively ended future pensions for city employees without any discussion with union representatives. 

City Council declined to meet with the union representatives, citing a law which requires a citizen sponsored initiative to be placed on the ballot if procedural requirements were met.  Here, the requirements were met, so CPRI was placed on the ballot and passed by the voters.

Several affected unions filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERB.  The City claimed it had no discretion to keep CPRI off the ballot.  According to the City, Mayor Sanders was acting in his capacity as a private citizen.  Since this was was not a government action, they argued, there was no requirement to meet and confer.

PERB found Mayor Sanders was acting as an agent of the City.  Essentially, the City used one of its stronger political figures to create, support, and pass a citizen sponsored initiative.  By doing so the City bypassed the MMBA’s requirement to meet and confer, and ended the pension program for most of the City's future employees.  PERB found this to be a violation of the MMBA, and ordered the City to repay employees for lost compensation, including pension benefits.  The City appealed.

On appeal one of the main argument was over a 1984 case commonly referred to as Seal Beach.  Seal Beach declared, before a governing body can place a charter amendment on the ballot it must satisfy the meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA.  The unions argued Seal Beach was applicable in the present case.  In other words, 33 years of precedent said governing bodies cannot bypass unions by placing charter amendments on the ballot which will impact the terms and conditions of employment.  The Appellate Court disagreed.

First, the decision dismissed any argument that mayor Sanders was acting as an agent of the City. Concluding CPRI was neither ratified by the City, nor an action of its agent, the court next addressed whether Seal Beach applied.  

The decision said, what took place in San Diego was different from Seal Beach.  CPRI was a citizen sponsored initiative.  In Seal Beach, the city council was using its own authority to place matters on the ballot without an initiative.  Thus, CPRI was not a proposal by a governing body.  Accordingly, there was no obligation to meet and confer.

PERB's decisions are given significant deference on appeal.  Their factual findings are considered final if there is any substantial evidence to support them.  Despite this strong presumption, the court overturned PERB's decision.

Stay tuned as the unions are likely to seek review in the Supreme Court of California.

Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm Testifies at Capitol on Peace Officer PERB Jurisdiction

On April 19, 2017, Mastagni Holstedt partner Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm testified before the Assembly Committee on Public Employees, Retirement, and Social Security on AB 530, a proposal to allow peace officers to file unfair practice charges at PERB.  The bill is sponsored by Jim Cooper (D-Elk Grove), a retired sheriff's captain.

In her remarks, Storm explained, "AB 530 is important because it affects my clients' ability to enforce their collective bargaining rights and resolves serious uncertainty about the law."  She said, "superior court is too costly and results in justice being denied because unions can't afford to sue [but] there is a high rate of resolution [at PERB] because the agency is adept at analyzing labor disputes."

She also addressed "the uncertainty in section 3511 [of the MMBA]."  She explained the law is vague because it exempts from PERB's jurisdiction "persons who are peace officers" but does not define that term.  "As things stand now, if a peace officer labor leader experiences retaliation, there would be parts of the case that the union has to bring at PERB and other parts the labor leader would have to bring separately in superior court.  This legislation solves these problems."

Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm manages the Labor Department at Mastagni Holstedt, APC.  Her practice focuses on unfair practice litigation, officer-involved shootings, and trial litigation in state and federal courts.

California Supreme Court Grants Review of CAL FIRE Airtime Credit Case

On April 12, 2017, the California Supreme Court granted CAL FIRE Local 2881's petition for review of the First District Court of Appeal's decision on December 20, 2016 to uphold the elimination of the “airtime credit” benefit in the Public Employment Retirement Systems (“PERS”).

The most significant part of the previous decision by the  Court of Appeal for the First District was the court's decision to adopt the ruling in Marin Association of Public Employees v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Association (MAPE) regarding the authority of the Legislature to reduce retirement benefits if they do not destroy the pension. The MAPE ruling broke with a half century of precedent holding that any modification of a pension resulting in a detriment must include an offsetting advantage.

The California Supreme Court has now granted review of both the MAPE and Cal Fire rulings. This is a significant opportunity to right the ship and overturn the damage these decisions did to the California vested rights doctrine.

Our office is currently representing two law enforcement associations in separate pension-related appeals in the First Appellate District, including the Alameda Deputy Sheriff's Association. 2017 continues to be an important year for determination of pension rights.

First Appellate District Challenges Vested Rights Doctrine in Upholding Elimination of Airtime Credit

In Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the Division Three of the First District Court of Appeal upheld the elimination of the “airtime credit” benefit in Public Employment Retirement Systems (“PERS”). Airtime credit was a benefit available to CalPERS and some other PERS programs that allowed members who had already earned five years of service credit, to purchase another five years of “nonqualified retirement service credit.” The record reflected that PERS had been under charging for the benefit.  In 2013, the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (“PEPRA”) was passed in what was billed as an effort to reign in unfunded pension liabilities. One of the provisions of PEPRA eliminated the ability to purchase airtime credit.

The court considered whether the ability to purchase airtime credit was a “vested benefit.” The court started its analysis with a general presumption against the granting of a vested benefit, unless its text or legislative history evidence an intent to be bound. Applying the reasoning in Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, the court held “there is nothing in either the text of the statute, or its legislative history, that unambiguously states an intent by the Legislature to create a vested pension benefit. This demonstration of intent, as we explained above, is required by California law.” The court found no such intent with respect to airtime.

Further, the court held no right was destroyed, noting PEPRA provided members with a seven month window to purchase the service credit, and that such applications would be honored if they were submitted prior to December 31, 2012. "Thus, nothing in the revised statutory scheme immediately destroyed plaintiffs’ right to purchase the airtime service credit ... To the extent plaintiffs lost out on the opportunity to purchase the airtime service credit, such loss was, accordingly, a product of their own doing."

The court also held that the elimination of airtime did not destroy any benefit because the cost of airtime was always intended to be borne entirely by the employee.  Because the benefit was established as cost neutral to the employer, "the employees, not the state, paid for this benefit" and therefore the court held "this simply is not a case where the state provided a retirement benefit to its employees in exchange for their work performance, and then took the benefit away."

Most significantly, the court endorsed Division Two of the First District's holdings in Marin Association of Public Employees v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Association (MAPE) regarding the authority of the Legislature to reduce retirement benefits s long as they do not destroy the pension.  This superfluous basis for upholding the elimination of airtime is striking given that the Supreme Court had granted Review of MAPE.

MAPE broke with a half century of precedent holding that any modification of a pension resulting in a detriment must include an offsetting advantage.  On November 22, 2016, the California Supreme Court issued an order granting review of MAPE, holding, "The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending the decision of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff's Association et al. v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association et al., A141913
 
Although the elimination of airtime is not particularly significant, the court's unnecessary adoption of the MAPE reasoning in the face of Supreme Court review could affect broader legal principles involving the California vested rights doctrine.  Our office currently is representing two law enforcement associations in two separate pension related appeals in the First Appellate District, including the Alameda Deputy Sheriff's Association.  2017 is shaping up to be an important year for determination pension rights.

Chicago Can't Impair Public Employee Pensions

On March 24, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court declared Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s pension reductions unconstitutional under state law. (Jonesv. Municipal Employees' Annuity and Ben. Fund of Chicago 2016 IL 119618.)

The sole question before the court was whether a pension reform act violated the pension protection clause of the Illinois state Constitution. Similar to the U.S. Contracts Clause, the Illinois’ Pension Protection Clause prohibits the State or local governments from diminishing or impairing pension benefits.  

The Act reduced the value of annual annuity increases, eliminated them entirely for certain years, postponed the time at which they began, and completely eliminated the compounding component. The Act applied regardless of whether the employee was in active service on or after the effective date of the Act. The court found the modifications “unquestionably” diminished the value of the retirement annuities promised to the employees when they joined the pension system.

Chicago's political leaders, like many throughout the country, responded to the great recession and accompanying revenue reductions by under-funding the pension system.  City leaders then sought to reduce their funding obligations by reducing promised pensions. The City argued the pension cuts were necessary to avoid bankruptcy within 15 years, and therefore did not violate the Illinois Constitution.

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating that it “would lead to an unjust result” because employees have a “legally enforceable right to receive the benefits they have been promised” – not merely the remaining funding after politicians satisfied their more glamorous spending priorities.  

Further, under pension law any detriment to pensioners must be accompanied by an offsetting advantage. The court rejected the City's argument that "by offering a purported 'offsetting benefit' of ... sound funding and solvency in the funds, the legislation merely offers participants in those funds what already is guaranteed to them — payment of the pension benefits in place when they joined the fund." This justification for impairment of contract is frequently raised. The court flatly rejected the argument, stating "thus, the 'guaranty' that the benefits due will be paid is merely an offer to do something already constitutionally mandated by the pension protection clause." 

California courts have also held public employment gives rise to certain vested rights, including pension and retiree medical benefits, under both the United States and California Constitutions.  Our office has successfully vindicated the vested pension and retiree medical rights of public employees in cities as small as Pacific Grove and large as Los Angeles.  Nationally, this ruling sends an important message to public entities that they cannot resolve their budgetary woes on the backs of their employees by breaking promises.

Public Employee's Personal Grievance Not Protected by the First Amendment

Pete Turner was hired as a "temporary exempt employee" for the Department of Public Works (DPW) in the City and County of San Francisco. Turner complained about his temporary job status, claiming the City and his Manager Bruce Storrs were violating the City Charter. The Charter only allows hiring temporary employees for certain special projects. According to Turner, the City and Storrs planned to underbid survey work for City and County agencies to "corner the market." They would then be able to make up the money on these low bids by overcharging the public and underpaying the staff. Turner claimed he spoke out against this practice at union meetings, staff meetings, and in face-to-face meetings with Storrs. Turner claimed he was being underpaid and assigned work on matters outside of his job description. Shortly after filing a complaint with HR, Turner was fired.

When he was unable to secure a job as a permanent DPW employee, Turner filed a complaint against the City in state court. The district court dismissed his complaint, finding Turner did not state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. To state a claim, the employee must show his speech was protected.

In Turner v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit held the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint. The Court clarified that an employee's speech is protected when he speaks out "as a citizen on matters of public concern," but not when he merely airs a personal grievance. The Court distinguished Turner's case from others where the public employee's speech was protected. Unlike those cases, Turner did not raise his complaint in a public forum, like the Civil Service Commission or Board of Supervisors. Because Turner did not seek relief on behalf of other temporary employees, the Court found Turner was motivated by his own dissatisfaction with his job status. The Court noted Turner's allegation that the City and Storr were violating the Charter could touch on a matter of public interest. However, this was not enough for the Court to find Turner's speech was protected under the First Amendment.

This case illustrates that a personal complaint voiced in a private forum will likely not be protected under the First Amendment even if it touches on matters of public interest.

Fair Pay Act Heads to Governor for Signature

On August 31, 2015, the California Senate unanimously passed SB 358. Titled the "Fair Pay Act," this bill amends California Labor Code section 1197.5 which prohibits wage disparities based on gender. SB 358 strengthens the procedures and protections for employees who report a violation of section 1197.5. Importantly, section 1197.5 applies to public employers. With these new protections, public employees may use section 1197.5 more efficiently to challenge discrepancies in wages between genders within classifications.

The Fair Pay Act requires an employer justify a disparity in wages between men and women who perform the same job. A wage differential is appropriate when the employer reasonably applies one of the following factors: 1) a merit system; 2) a seniority system; 3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or production; or 4) a bona fide factor other than sex such as education, training, or experience. For the last element, the employer must demonstrate the factor is not based on or derived form a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect to the questioned position, and is consistent with a business necessity. If the employee demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential, then the employer may not use this factor as a defense.

The Fair Pay Act also adds additional protections for employees who complain about wage disparities. Employers may not fire, discriminate, or retaliate against an employee who invokes the Fair Pay Act's provisions. Employees may disclose their own wages, discuss the wages of others, and inquire about another employee's wages without fear of reprisal.

To enforce the Fair Pay Act, an employee can either file a confidential complaint with the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement or bring a civil action. Any civil action must be commenced within one year of the alleged violation.

This bill is one of the most aggressive attempts in the country to remedy the wage disparity between genders. According to the Los Angeles Times, women in California on average make 84 cents to every dollar earned by a man. Nationally, the average is 74 cents. Women of color are even more disadvantaged with Latinas making only 44 cents to every dollar earned by a man.

California Attorney General Releases Title and Summary for Pension Busting Initiative

On August 11, 2015, the Office of the Attorney General released its title and summary for former San Jose Mayor Chuck Reed's pension busting initiative. The highly divisive initiative would strip pensions from public employees and allow voters to modify compensation packages at will. Fortunately, the Office of the Attorney General's title and summary highlight the problems with this initiative.

 

All ballot initiatives must be submitted to the Office of the Attorney General prior to being placed on the ballot. The Office of the Attorney General creates a title and summary of the initiative to appear on the actual ballot. 

 

The title the Office of the Attorney General gave Reed's initiative is "Public Employees. Pension and Retiree Healthcare Benefits. Initiative and Constitutional Amendment." The summary aptly states the initiative, "[e]liminates constitutional protections for vested pension and retiree healthcare benefits for current public employees." This language demonstrates how drastic this reform is and how it will prejudice California's public employees. The summary also notes the long term effects of the initiative are unknown and "depend heavily on future decisions made by voters, governmental employers, and the courts."

 

Mastagni Holstedt, APC has used the Contracts Clause in California’s Constitution to protect vested employee benefits in several high profile court battles: Stockton (fiscal emergency declaration does not authorize City to renegotiate a closed labor contract), Los Angeles (fiscal emergency declaration does not permit freezing retiree medical benefits or imposing furloughs), Pacific Grove (Ballot measure capping PERS pension contributions unconstitutional).  Similar rulings were obtained by the police and fire unions in San Jose invalidating in substantial measure Reed’s San Jose pension impairments.

 

This pension "reform" effort is led by Democrat Chuck Reed and his lawyers. As we blogged previously, the initiative amends the California Constitution to allow voters to impair employment contracts. While Reed claims his measure will not impair current employees' pensions, even Daniel Borenstein of the Contra Costa Times has acknowledged "the initiative would amend the state Constitution to give voters the right through an initiative or referendum to reduce the future pension accrual rate for current employees…Reed and DeMaio should be honest about it, or abandon the measure."

 

Additionally, the Constitutional amendment would abolish pensions for employees hired after January 1, 2019 and replace them with a "defined-contribution" system unless changes to benefits are approved in an election.  In a defined-contribution system, employees have to pay in a fixed amount with no guarantee of what their retirement income would be.  As a result, this approach shifts the risk and could prevent thousands of public employees from retiring.

 

The proposal is not limited to retirement benefits.  It provides, "Voters have the right to use the power of initiative or referendum... to determine the amount of and manner in which compensation and retirement benefits are provided to employees of a government employer."  As a result, the Constitutional Amendment would likely be used to pursue local voter initiatives to bypass collective bargaining to reduce public safety compensation or due process rights.

 

The proposal also seriously jeopardizes death and disability benefits for public safety employees. The new proposal states it shall not be “interpreted to modify or limit any disability benefits provided for government employees or death benefits for families.” But death and disability benefits are often an integral part of a pension plan. As noted by the Legislative Analyst's Office, death and disability benefits are usually prefunded through a pension plan's normal cost. If voters can modify, or even eliminate, pensions for public employees, this necessarily means the funding for death and disability benefits will be cut.  The measure does not provide any means of securing those benefits.

 

The proposal also seeks to insulate future measures from legal challenge by eliminating the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board to hear unfair practice charges regarding future measures which impair vested rights or collective bargaining agreements. 

 

Now that the initiative has a summary, the proponents must furnish the required number of signatures in order to make the November 2016 ballot. You can help stop this initiative by educating your family, friends, and community members about the drastic and detrimental effects of this initiative and encourage them not to sign any petition supporting the initiative. You can help stop future attempts to impair retirement benefits by opposing all candidates who endorse this imitative.

PERB Clarifies Jurisdiction Over "Mixed Unit" Associations with Peace Officer and Non-Peace Officer Members

In County of Santa Clara (2015) PERB Decision 2431-M, the Public Employment Relations Board  found PERB has jurisdiction over charges brought by labor associations representing mixed units.

This case involved the Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers Association, which represents one bargaining unit, the Correctional Employees Unit.  That unit is composed of peace officers under Penal Code section 830.1(c) and non-peace officer correctional officers.  This type of unit is sometimes called a "mixed unit."

There has been a dispute about whether PERB has jurisdiction over charges brought by or against labor associations representing peace officers, but also other employee classifications. The reason there is a dispute is that Government Code section 3511, part of the MMBA, exempts "persons who are peace officers" from the 2001 changes to the MMBA that gave PERB jurisdiction over the Act. Some parties claimed this meant PERB does not have jurisdiction over claims brought by labor associations representing mixed units, since those units contain peace officers.  The Board heard oral argument on this issue two years ago, but that case settled before the Board issued a decision.

Since this case also involved a mixed unit, the Board clarified its jurisdiction over these units.  The Board wrote "we make explicit PERB's authority to hear charges, such as the present one, that are brought by employee organizations, including employee organizations representing or seeking to represent units including persons who are peace officers."

The Board explained, "MMBA section 3511 precludes jurisdiction only with respect to charges brought by peace officers, not employee organizations."  The Board found support for this distinction in the MMBA's own definition of person which refers to a natural person, distinguishing it from an entity, such as a labor association.  Likewise, the Board noted the Legislature gave it jurisdiction over factfinding requests without a restriction on mixed units.

Mastagni Holstedt senior associate Jeffrey R. A. Edwards represented the Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers Association in the matter.

PERB Vindicates Right of Public Safety Professionals to Wear Union Insignia on Duty

In a decisive win for labor, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) overturned an administrative law judge and held firefighters at Sacramento’s airports have the right to wear Sacramento Area Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 522 union logos on duty.

The case has statewide importance for two reasons. First, the ruling means public safety professionals, such as firefighters and peace officers who were a uniform, still have the right to wear union insignia on duty. Second, firmly established that the right to wear union insignia cannot be limited to pins, but includes other apparel such as T-shirts, caps, and clothing.

In County of Sacramento (2014) PERB Decision No. 2393-M, firefighters wanted to wear union logos on the Class B uniform t-shirts, caps, and sweatshirts. Local 522 provides the apparel at cost to firefighters it represents throughout the Sacramento area. The Local 522 apparel conforms to uniform specifications and includes the union logo.

For a time, firefighters were allowed to wear the union logo apparel occasionally. In October, firefighters wore pink versions of their union logo apparel to support breast cancer awareness. There were no operational problems or complaints. Then, the County ordered the firefighters not to wear “hats, T-shirts and sweatshirts with the union logo” and announced it would discipline any firefighter who wore the union logo.

Local 522 filed an unfair practice charge with PERB, alleging the prohibition against wearing the Local 522 logo interfered with their rights under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, one of California’s public sector collective bargaining statutes. Local 522 members expressed their strong desire to support and show solidarity with their union which they had worked hard to join by wearing union apparel on duty.

The County claimed the firefighters did not have the right to wear union insignia on their Class B uniform. It claimed that since the firefighters wore public safety uniforms, the County had the right to ban union insignia since they were not part of the uniform. The County also claimed union members only have a right to wear small union pins, not other kinds of union apparel.

PERB rejected the County’s arguments and upheld the right of Local 522 members to wear the union logo. PERB held the “fundamental right to wear union insignia at work” applies equally to employees who wear public safety uniforms. PERB rejected the notion that a union member’s right to wear union insignia is limited to wearing pins, noting, “The County offers no logical argument why a protected right to wear union insignia transforms into an unprotected right because the insignia appears on clothing rather than an object that is attached to clothing.”

Thus, PERB held the County had to demonstrate there was a special circumstance justifying the restriction on wearing the union logo. The County provided no evidence of a special circumstance and the evidence showed several other agencies permit firefighters to wear union insignia at work without incident. Thus, PERB decided the County violated Local 522 members’ rights and ordered it to cease and desist and post notice of its violation of state law.

Local 522 was represented in the matter by Jeffrey R. A. Edwards, a senior associate at Mastagni Holstedt, APC.

US Supreme Court: Public Employee Testimony Protected By First Amendment

On June 19, 2014, in Lane v. Franks, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled an employee’s testimony was protected by the First Amendment because it was a citizen’s speech on a matter of public concern.

Edward Lane directed a program for underprivileged youth at Central Alabama Community College. Lane audited the program’s expenses and found an employee, Suzanne Schmitz, had not been reporting for work. Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment and testified against her in federal court. Schmitz was sentenced to 30 months on charges of mail fraud and theft.

After the trial, the college’s president, Franks, fired 29 employees, including Lane. Franks claimed the action was an attempt to fix the college’s budget. He then rehired all but two of the employees. Franks did not rehire Lane.

In response, Lane filed a civil rights lawsuit. Lane claimed Franks violated the First Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz. If a public employee speaks in the course of their ordinary duties, the employee is not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. But in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled Lane’s sworn testimony was outside the scope of his normal duties and entitled to First Amendment protection.

The Court also ruled the testimony was on a matter of public concern.  If a public employee speaks on a matter of public concern, the government must have adequate justification for treating the employee differently. Whether speech is a matter of public concern turns on the content, form, and context of the speech.

Here, the Court held corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds are matters of significant public concern. Speech by public employees related to their employment holds special value because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment.

Because the Court ruled the testimony was a public concern, it then decided if the college lacked adequate justification for firing Lane. The college did not assert or demonstrate any government interest for their treatment of Lane. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.