tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-86103397449201402002024-03-18T16:40:22.559-07:00California Public Safety Labor BlogMastagni.com Law Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10701897977733296649noreply@blogger.comBlogger604125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-63759432125308880282024-03-18T16:36:00.000-07:002024-03-18T16:39:48.967-07:00Watch Kathleen Mastagni Storm’s Oral Argument in the Sixth District Court of Appeals on Behalf of the Palo Alto Professional Firefighters, IAFF Local 1319<p>Watch the oral argument below:</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="291" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/C2iG9Q98uz8" width="485" youtube-src-id="C2iG9Q98uz8"></iframe></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>On March 14, 2024, partner, Kathleen
Mastagni Storm, presented oral argument in the Sixth District Court of Appeals over
the City of Palo Alto’s illegal repeal of binding interest arbitration for Fire
and Police Department employee disputes. The legal battle started in 2011, when
the City of Palo Alto unilaterally placed Measure D on the ballot repealing
binding interest arbitration from the City’s Charter. Prior to the change, the
Charter required disputes involving wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment be submitted to binding arbitration. Palo Alto voters
passed Measure D in November 2011.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>In 2020, Local 1319, on behalf of
the State of California, filed a Writ in Quo Warranto in superior court to
invalidate Measure D and restore the Charter’s binding interest arbitration
procedures. The superior court found in Local 1319’s favor, but declined to
rescind the unlawful charter amendment. Therefore, the State and Local 1319
appealed the decision. On Thursday, March 14<sup>th</sup>, the 6<sup>th</sup>
District Court of Appeals heard argument on what the appropriate remedy should
be.<o:p></o:p></span></p><h3 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: left;"><b><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></b></h3><h3 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: left;"><b><span style="font-family: times;">The
Backstory:</span></b></h3><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: left;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>Around 2010, the City of Palo Alto began
efforts to remove the Charter’s binding interest arbitration provision. Local
1319 immediately demanded to meet and confer with the City over the proposed
changes. From the beginning, the City adamantly refused. This resulted in Local
1319 filing an Unfair Practice Charge with PERB in 2011 alleging the City
violated section 3507 of the California Government Code. Section 3507 is part
of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), and provides in part: <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;">A public agency may adopt
reasonable rules and regulations after consultation in good faith with
representatives of a recognized employee organization or organizations for the
administration of employer-employee relations chapter…The rules and regulations
may include provisions for all of the following: … (5) Additional procedures
for the resolution of disputes involving wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>The MMBA requires public agencies to
engage in a “meet and confer” process with representatives of affected employee
organizations before adopting rules/regulations related to the subjects
mentioned above. Here, the Local argued it had been unlawfully deprived of the
meet and confer rights to which the Local is entitled under Government Code
section 3507. PERB ultimately found that the City violated the MMBA by failing
to consult in good faith with the Local over the elimination of binding
arbitration. And PERB ordered the City’s resolution referring to voters the
ballot measure and to rescind the binding arbitration void. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>Although PERB determined the City
violated the MMBA, it also held it could not overturn the election results repealing
the provision. PERB concluded a quo warranto action was the exclusive remedy
for this situation. A quo warranto action is a legal remedy used to revoke a
charter amendment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>As
such, the Local filed a quo warranto action in superior court asking the court
to determine whether the City’s charter amendment was invalid by reason of
noncompliance with the MMBA and whether the City was required to restore
binding arbitration. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>In February of 2022, the superior court issued its final
decision concluding the City’s resolution to submit Measure D to the voters was
an unlawful exercise of authority within the meaning of California Code of
Civil Procedure </span><span style="font-family: "TimesNewRomanPSMT",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%; mso-bidi-font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; mso-font-kerning: 0pt;">§</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"> 803. Although the court ruled in favor of
the Local on some issues, it did not grant their requested remedy of
invalidation of Measure D. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">Appeal to the Sixth
District Court of Appeals: What is the Appropriate Remedy? </span></b></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>Despite deeming Local 1319 the prevailing party, the
superior court’s remedy failed to provide meaningful relief. Instead of
invalidation, the trial court only enjoined the City from its unlawful action
until it (1) meets and consults and (2) reaffirms its repeal of binding
interest arbitration at a City Council meeting.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>On appeal, Kathleen Mastagni Storm argued the appropriate
remedy is invalidation of Measure D and restoration of the binding arbitration
provision. This is the only remedy that vindicates Local 1319’s rights and
effectuates the purposes of the MMBA. The trial court’s remedy creates a
dangerous precedent encouraging MMBA violations and weakening union rights. As
the trial court did not restore the status quo ante and left Measure D intact,
Local 1319 is left trying to recoup its losses at the bargaining table. It also
encourages the City to engage in surface bargaining.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span> </span>Invalidation of Measure D serves the public interest by
protecting and enforcing the MMBA. The public has an interest in ensuring
charter amendments are validly enacted in accordance with the law and securing
stable employer-employee relations. Failing to restore the status quo subverts both
the MMBA and the will of the Legislature while simultaneously ignoring the
public interest in promoting collective bargaining for the resolution of labor
disputes. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><br /><p></p></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-84009725853556335922024-02-26T18:23:00.000-08:002024-02-27T12:34:34.948-08:00Law Enforcement Amicus Brief Filed in the Ninth Circuit to Oppose SB 2's CCW Carry Restrictions<p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>On February 23, 2024, Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), the California State Sheriffs’ Association (CSSA), and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPPC) <a href="https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024-02-23-Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-Peace-Officers-Research-Assoc-of-CA-et-al.-ISO-Appellees-and-Affirmance-of-Preliminary-Injunct.pdf">filed an amicus curiae brief in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals </a>in the case <i><a href="https://michellawyers.com/may-et-al-v-bonta/">May v. Bonta</a></i>. Granting an injunction against the "sensitive places" restriction in SB 2, District Court Judge Cormac J. Carney repeatedly cited PORAC President Brian Marvel's declaration explaining that instead of focusing on law-abiding CCW permit holders, the State should focus on preventing crimes committed with guns by restoring accountability and consequences. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>The Amicus brief focuses on the State's unconstitutional efforts to defy the mandates of <i>New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Incorporated v. Bruen </i>while openly condoning the nonenforcement of sentencing enhancements for committing violent crimes with firearms and law against prohibited persons possessing firearms. These interests are aligned with those of the research and crime data studies of CPPC President John R. Lott, Jr., Ph.D. The brief cites his research and analysis concluding that right to carry laws actually reduce violent crime whereas expansive restrictions on where CCW permit holders may carry actually encourage gun violence in those areas. Notably, Lott's research debunked claims that California's gun restrictions were responsible for dramatic reductions in violent crime during the 1990s, when in fact the reductions were due to California’s tough three-strikes law, which increased the risks and consequences for engaging in gun violence staring in 1994.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>Legislature responded to <i>Bruen </i>by rashly introducing new gun legislation that unconstitutionally burdens law abiding gun owners, including some retried peace officers, while having no appreciable impact on individuals who commit crimes with firearms. S.B. 2 is effectively the Legislature’s message to Californians that you can have your permit to carry for self-defense, but good luck using it. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>SB 2 designates nearly everywhere a “sensitive place” where carrying a firearm is forbidden even with a CCW permit. <i>Bruen </i>recognized the lawfulness of certain restrictions on certain places, such as schools, government buildings, legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses, but warned against overbroad restrictions such as all places of public congregation. The California Legislature disregarded the Court’s warning against “expanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement” and “effectively declar[ing] the island of Manhattan a ‘sensitive place.’” </p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>For example, it bans carrying in private businesses unless they affirmatively post a sign welcoming people with firearms. Several federal courts have invalidated similar “vampire” statutes (you must receive permission before entering) noting the property owners must impose that restriction, not the State. Under SB 2, the only place where an individual could legally carry is some (but not all) streets and sidewalks, and businesses that post “guns allowed” signs. Such restrictions have no influence on armed criminals or mass shooters. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span> </span>This litigation is vital to protecting citizen's self-defense rights in public. Many retired peace officers are not subject to the restrictions of SB 2, but some must apply for permits in the same manner as private citizens. Moreover, vindicating Constitutional carry rights protects officers from future repeal of their carry rights under Penal Code section 25455.</p><p><a href="https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024-02-23-Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-Peace-Officers-Research-Assoc-of-CA-et-al.-ISO-Appellees-and-Affirmance-of-Preliminary-Injunct.pdf">Click this link to read the amicus curiae brief filed by David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot.</a> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj88rsQLze4ZV3erf8cDTGjy3CMfgmZnnLx8XDJawgxaAN2HwvZtlG8SIcoo_g3vofDAHmyv4yy3H5HMdQ8uXFkNexBJlg6DTWiyWqGz9toR4nYqv10Fna3LD1gWrqLG7dWE36SvtmF5fILqi2wKjJb3aESZFx0pSY-L5tiavNyc4obd_8YR8DCaoE3hLia/s1600/Ninth_Circuit_Seal_color_high_092223.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1600" data-original-width="1600" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj88rsQLze4ZV3erf8cDTGjy3CMfgmZnnLx8XDJawgxaAN2HwvZtlG8SIcoo_g3vofDAHmyv4yy3H5HMdQ8uXFkNexBJlg6DTWiyWqGz9toR4nYqv10Fna3LD1gWrqLG7dWE36SvtmF5fILqi2wKjJb3aESZFx0pSY-L5tiavNyc4obd_8YR8DCaoE3hLia/s320/Ninth_Circuit_Seal_color_high_092223.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-87273310076126501282024-02-20T11:22:00.000-08:002024-02-20T11:22:04.667-08:00California Legislative Updates for 2024 and 2025: Sick Leave Expansion, Reproductive Loss Leave, & Workplace Violence Prevention <p style="text-align: left;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtz7gbMw_1qBry0lvh6kr_SvBjRB2w8UivN61g9z0-tJwwkZB8597NNzNVzrmo2pddCRatBD1GYxvOp55DPkSI8sVxWDH2MZk44DTpKYzsg7pKcAz_8sMtsR6CJv9OslCi7Rz5qnbbQPm1zrkyArdKK6hTHgxzQb2uVobfhKsOP8YthIOFsonfS-6TAukd/s615/CA%20state%20capitol%20&%20flag.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="410" data-original-width="615" height="243" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtz7gbMw_1qBry0lvh6kr_SvBjRB2w8UivN61g9z0-tJwwkZB8597NNzNVzrmo2pddCRatBD1GYxvOp55DPkSI8sVxWDH2MZk44DTpKYzsg7pKcAz_8sMtsR6CJv9OslCi7Rz5qnbbQPm1zrkyArdKK6hTHgxzQb2uVobfhKsOP8YthIOFsonfS-6TAukd/w365-h243/CA%20state%20capitol%20&%20flag.jpg" width="365" /></a></div><p style="text-align: left;"></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> California Governor Gavin Newsom signed several new
employment laws impacting California employees. Unless otherwise specified,
those laws, which are summarized below, took effect on January 1,
2024. </span></p><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><h4 style="text-align: center;"><b><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">S.B. 616: Sick Leave Expanded from
Three to Five Days & Procedural Guarantees Extend to CBA Employees </span></b></h4><p style="text-align: left;">
</p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>Senate
Bill (S.B.) 616 amends the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014
(HWHFA), the statewide paid sick and safe leave law, by increasing the required
paid sick leave that an employer must provide each year from three days (or 24
hours) to five days (or 40 hours, whichever is greater). This means that an
employee working 10-hour days will be entitled to use at minimum 50 hours of
paid sick leave (this example assumes that the employee has earned or received
upfront their full amount of leave).</span></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>The new law keeps the requirement that leave must be
accrued at a minimum rate of one hour for every 30 hours worked and the
requirement for employers using an alternate accrual method that at least 24
hours of accrued leave be provided by the 120th day of employment. S.B. 616
adds an additional requirement that employers must provide at least 40 hours of
accrued sick leave by the 200th day of employment. </span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>Employers may still limit an employee’s annual usage of
paid sick leave, but the annual usage cap increased from 24 hours or three days
to 40 hours or five days. Existing law requires that accrued sick leave be
carried over, but allows employers to set accrual caps. Under S.B. 616,
employers may cap paid sick leave accrual at 80 hours or ten days (previously
48 hours or six days). </span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>S.B. 616
also extends some procedural protections of paid sick leave law to
nonconstruction industry employees covered under a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). The law previously excluded these CBA employees. Under the
amended law, these employees now must be allowed to take sick leave for all the
same reasons as covered employees (i.e., for the “[d]iagnosis, care, treatment
of an existing health condition of, or preventive care for, an employee or an
employee’s family member”). Employers cannot require these employees to find a
replacement worker and cannot retaliate against them for sick leave
usage. </span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>The new law however still excludes individuals employed by
an air carrier as a flight deck or cabin crew member (if they receive
compensated time off equivalent to paid sick leave law requirements). Other
exempt groups include retired annuitants working for governmental entities,
railroad employees, and construction employees covered by a CBA with specified
provisions.</span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>For more information about California's amended paid sick leave law, please consult the FAQ shared by the California Labor Commissioner's Office (</span><a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/paid_sick_leave.htm" style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;">located here</a><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;">, updated December 21, 2023). </span></p><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span></div><h3 style="line-height: normal; text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;"><b>S.B. 848: Five Days for
Reproductive Loss</b></span></h3><div><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>S.B. 848
expands existing bereavement leave law and requires employers to provide up to
five days of protected leave to employees who have: 1) worked for the employer
for at least 30 days and 2) suffered a “reproductive loss event.” A
“reproductive loss event” is defined as the day of a failed adoption, failed
surrogacy, miscarriage, stillbirth or an unsuccessful assisted
reproduction.” </span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>The five
days of protected leave are not required to be taken consecutively but should
be taken within three months of the event. If an employee experiences more than
one “reproductive loss event” in a 12-month period, the employer must provide
up to 20 days of leave within that period. The reproductive leave is not
required to be paid leave, but employees may use any acquired sick, vacation,
or other paid time off. </span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>The law
adds Section 12945.6 to the Government Code and applies to private employers
with five or more employees and to California public employers. The protections
extend to any person who would have been a parent had the reproductive event
been successful. Unlike existing bereavement law that carves out exemptions for
CBA employees, S.B. 848 provides no exemption for CBA employees. </span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>S.B. 848
explicitly characterizes reproductive leave loss as a “separate and distinct
right” from any right under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, which grants
legal protections from discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in the
workplace. Employers that retaliate against an employee because of the
employee’s exercise of the right to reproductive loss leave commit an unlawful
employment practice. S.B. 848 also makes it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to deny, interfere with, or restrain an employee’s request to take
reproductive loss leave. The new law also contains confidentiality provisions
intended to protect the privacy rights of employees experiencing reproductive
loss events. </span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>Previous to S.B. 848, the law
remained unclear as to whether reproductive losses qualified as a type of leave
protected under existing bereavement law. Existing bereavement law requires
employers to provide employees with at least five days of bereavement leave
upon the death of a family member (Gov. Code <span style="background: white;">§ 12945.7.)</span> Although the law defines “family member” to include “child,” Section
12945.7 makes no specific mention to reproductive loss being a qualifying event
subject to bereavement law protections. S.B. 848 clearly addresses this
question. </span></div><div style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><p style="text-align: left;"></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: left;">
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"></p><h3 style="line-height: normal; text-align: center;"><b><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: medium;">S.B. 553: Labor Union
Ability to Apply for Workplace Restraining Order</span></span></b></h3>
<p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: black;"><span> </span>Approved by the Governor in
September 2023 and commencing January 2025, S.B. 553 authorizes a bargaining
unit representative to seek a temporary restraining order (TRO) on behalf of a
bargaining unit member that has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat
of violence from any individual. Existing law already allows an employer to
seek a TRO under similar circumstances, and S.B. 553 expands that provision to
include unit representatives. At the discretion of the court, a bargaining unit
representative may also seek a TRO on behalf of any number of other employees
at the workplace, and if appropriate, on behalf of other employees at other
workplaces of the employer. </span></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: black;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>S.B. 553
also requires that before filing any petition seeking a TRO, an employer or
bargaining unit representative must provide the injured employee an opportunity
to decline to be named in the TRO. An employee’s request not to be named in the
TRO does not prohibit the employer or the unit representative from seeking the
TRO on behalf of other employees at the workplace or at other workplaces of the
employer. </span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>Existing law, the California
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973, imposes safety responsibilities on
employers and employees, including the requirement that an employer establish
and implement an effective injury prevention program and makes violations of
these provisions a crime. S.B. 553 requires an employer to establish, at all
times in all work areas, an effective workplace violence prevention plan. The
new provisions also require that the employer keep a violent incident log for
every “workplace violence incident,” that the employer provide effective
workplace violence prevention training, and that the employer maintain records
related to its workplace violence protection plan. </span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>The law defines “credible threat of
violence” as a “knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would
place a reasonable person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their
immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” “Unlawful violence”
is defined as “any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section
646.9 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or
defense of others.”</span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;">Please find links to the laws
discussed above here:</span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB616">SB 616</a></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB616"><span style="color: black;"><br /></span></a></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB848">SB 848</a></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB848"><span style="color: black;"><br /></span></a></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB553">SB 553</a></span></p><span style="font-family: arial;"></span><p style="text-align: left;"></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;">
</p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-40356374341040789262024-02-08T17:25:00.000-08:002024-02-20T11:26:25.935-08:00The PTSD Presumption: Covered Employees, Qualifying Injuries, and Related Compensation <h2 style="text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVCJPMXMI9YJsosI7TPg2aw4RF7JT97v9TTsH3vOkdkdn0i_l9TkRIWw9oL1TfSNvetWnEJQWGrP0nnZJaB0tygTp44_QA7tv_5sHw0jxdPONVJPNLaXSDiHi1CSm2YrtXDsR782am-1fvN0FD2bhqU9C5Lbizq4kTVk0vh4lirN0DNuvOwpU43V_PLnoc/s1000/2-8-24.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="643" data-original-width="1000" height="293" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVCJPMXMI9YJsosI7TPg2aw4RF7JT97v9TTsH3vOkdkdn0i_l9TkRIWw9oL1TfSNvetWnEJQWGrP0nnZJaB0tygTp44_QA7tv_5sHw0jxdPONVJPNLaXSDiHi1CSm2YrtXDsR782am-1fvN0FD2bhqU9C5Lbizq4kTVk0vh4lirN0DNuvOwpU43V_PLnoc/w455-h293/2-8-24.jpg" width="455" /></a></div><span><br /><span style="font-family: arial;">The History of the PTSD Presumption </span></span></h2><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">This blogger greets you again, but
with the topic of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Labor Code §
3212.15 (the PTSD presumption). The PTSD presumption under Labor Code § 3212.15
is distinct from general psychiatric injuries under Labor Code § 3208.3 and was
first introduced, passed, approved and chaptered in 2019 through Senate Bill 542
and was amended through Senate Bill 623 that was introduced, passed, approved and
chaptered in 2023 which amended subdivision (f) and added subdivision (g) which
extended its sunset expiration date to January 1, 2029 (previously January 1,
2025). Further, Senate Bill 623 added a reporting requirement on PTSD claims
filed by “public safety dispatchers, public safety telecommunicators, and
emergency response communication employees from January 1, 2020, through
December 31, 2023,” due no later than January 1, 2025. Also, it added a reporting
requirement on data regarding “the effectiveness of the presumption created by
this section” due no later than January 1, 2027. Senate Bill 623 has been the
only legislation changing Labor Code § 3212.15 (the PTSD presumption) since its
inception in 2019.<o:p></o:p></span></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">Prior Efforts to Change the PTSD Presumption
(SB 284, AB 597, AB 1107)</span></b></h2><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Senate Bill 284 attempted to expand
coverage to public safety dispatchers, telecommunicators, emergency response
communications employees, The State Department of State Hospitals, The State
Department of Developmental Services, The Military Department, The Department
of Veterans Affairs and various other sworn peace officers but Senate Bill 284 was
vetoed by Governor Gavin Newsom on September 29, 2022 who explained, “Expanding
coverage of the PTSD injury presumption to significant classes of employees
before any studies have been conducted on the existing class for whom the
presumption is temporarily in place could set a dangerous precedent that has
the potential to destabilize the workers’ compensation system going forward, as
stakeholders push for similarly unsubstantiated presumption.” Other proposed and
pending Assembly Bills include Assembly Bill 597 aimed to cover emergency
medical technicians and paramedics and Assembly Bill 1107 aimed to cover
additional Peace Officers. Each are in “Referred to Com. on INS.” status as of
01/04/2024 (AB 597) and 03/02/2023 (AB 1107). Based on the new reporting
requirements in Senate Bill 623, will the PTSD presumption come to an end? If
not, who will be covered next? And who is covered now? <o:p></o:p></span></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">Covered Employees</span></b></h2></div><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">For a list of employees covered under
the PTSD presumption, please review the most current version of Labor Code §
3212.15 subdivision (a) as this subdivision lists the classes of employees
covered. At the time of writing this blog (2024), Labor Code § 3212.15
currently applies to:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(1)
Active firefighting members, whether volunteers, partly paid, or fully paid, of
all of the following fire departments:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 1in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(A)
A fire department of a city, county, city and county, district, or other public
or municipal corporation or political subdivision.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 1in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(B)
A fire department of the University of California and the California State
University.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 1in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(C)
The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 1in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(D)
A county forestry or firefighting department or unit.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(2)
Active firefighting members of a fire department that serves a United States
Department of Defense installation and who are certified by the Department of
Defense as meeting its standards for firefighters.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(3)
Active firefighting members of a fire department that serves a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration installation and who adhere to training
standards established in accordance with Article 4 (commencing with Section
13155) of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 12 of the Health and Safety Code.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(4)
Peace officers, as defined in Section 830.1 of, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c)
of Section 830.2 of, Section 830.32 of, subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section
830.37 of, Section 830.5 of, and Section 830.55 of, the Penal Code, who are
primarily engaged in active law enforcement activities.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(5)
(A) Fire and rescue services coordinators who work for the Office of Emergency
Services.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “fire and
rescue services coordinators” means coordinators with any of the following job
classifications: coordinator, senior coordinator, or chief coordinator.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">Qualifying Injury</span></b></h2><div></div><span style="font-family: arial;"></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">What type of psychiatric injury is
covered under this presumption? Labor Code § 3212.15 subd. (b) explains
“injury” includes “post-traumatic stress disorder,” as diagnosed according to
the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association that that develops
or manifests itself during a period in which any person described in
subdivision (a) is in the service of the department, unit, office, or agency. Therefore,
this statute specially applies to PTSD which is a distinct diagnosis (a
critical factor). Another critical factor is whether the PTSD injury developed
or manifested itself during a period in which the covered employee was in the
service of the department, unit, office, or agency. Expert medical opinion
framed in terms of substantial medical evidence is required under this section. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">Compensation</span></b></h2><div></div><span style="font-family: arial;"></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">There are many technical rules
involving the PTSD presumption for example, compensation shall not be paid
pursuant to this section unless the person performed services for the
department, unit, office, or agency for at least six months (the six months of
employment need not be continuous); unless the injury is caused by a sudden and
extraordinary employment condition. Upon a finding of compensability regarding
the PTSD presumption, compensation includes full hospital, surgical, medical
treatment, disability indemnity, and death benefits. The rate of pay and amount
of pay (if any) are derived from a variety of factors and vary from case to
case. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;">Date of Injuries Covered</span></b></h2><div></div><span style="font-family: arial;"></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Labor Code § 3212.15 subd. (e)
states, “This section, as added by Section 2 of Chapter 390 of the Statutes of
2019, applies to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 2020.” And Labor
Code § 3212.15 subd. (g) states, “This section shall remain in effect only until
January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.”</span></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: large;">File a Claim – You Are Not Alone</span></span></b></h2></div></div><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">If you suspect you have an
industrial PTSD injury that developed or manifested itself during a period in
which you were in the service of the department, unit, or agency and are an
employee covered under the classes listed in Labor Code § 3212.15, subd. (a), file
a claim right away without fear. Whether you wish to file a presumptive claim,
or any claim in general, it is illegal for an employer to discriminate or
otherwise discharge, or threaten to discharge, or in any manner discriminate
against you because you filed or made known your intention to file a claim. See
Labor Code § 132a. So don’t fear discrimination for filing a claim. And for
PTSD in public safety, you are not alone. Senate Bill No. 542 Section 1
explained, “The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(a)
Firefighting and law enforcement are recognized as two of the most stressful
occupations. Only our nation’s combat soldiers endure more stress. Similar to
military personnel, California’s firefighters and law enforcement personnel
face unique and uniquely dangerous risks in their sworn mission to keep the
public safe. They rely on each other for survival while placing their lives on
the line every day to protect the communities they serve.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(b)
On any given shift, firefighters and law enforcement personnel can be called on
to make life and death decisions, witness a young child dying with their
grief-stricken family, or be exposed to a myriad of communicable diseases and
known carcinogens. Firefighters and law enforcement personnel are constantly at
significant risk of bodily harm or physical assault while they perform their
duties.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(c)
Constant, cumulative exposure to these horrific events make firefighters and
law enforcement personnel uniquely susceptible to the emotional and behavioral
impacts of job-related stressors. This is especially evident given that the
nature of the job often calls for lengthy separation from their families due to
a long shift or wildfire strike team response.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(d)
While the cumulative impacts of these aggressive, deadly events are taking
their toll, our firefighters and law enforcement officers continue to stand up
to human-caused devastation and nature’s fury, but they are physically and
emotionally exhausted.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(e)
Trauma-related injuries can become overwhelming and manifest in post-traumatic
stress, which may result in substance use disorders and even, tragically,
suicide. The fire service is four times more likely to experience a suicide
than a work-related death in the line of duty in any year.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;">
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0in 12pt 0.5in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;">(f)
It is imperative for society to recognize occupational injuries related to
post-traumatic stress can be severe, and to encourage peace officers,
firefighters, and any other workers suffering from those occupational injuries
to promptly seek diagnosis and treatment without stigma. This includes
recognizing that severe psychological injury as a result of trauma is not
“disordered,” but is a normal and natural human response to trauma, the
negative effects of which can be ameliorated through diagnosis and effective
treatment.”<o:p></o:p></span></p><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"></h2><h2 style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: large;">The PTSD Presumption v. the Good Faith Personnel Defense </span></span></h2><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: small;">How does the defense in Labor Code §
3208.3 subd. (h) come into play which says, “No compensation under this
division shall be paid by an employer for a psychiatric injury if the injury
was substantially caused by a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel
action. The burden of proof shall rest with the party asserting the issue.” For
example, what happens if your PTSD injury was substantially caused by something
your employer lawfully did to you (i.e. reprimanded you, threaten to fire you,
demoted you, suspended you on a lawful basis)? Assuming an employee demonstrates
by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were
predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury (which arguably
does not apply to the PTSD presumption but instead applies to other psychiatric
injuries), will the court find that the specific PTSD statute under Labor Code §
3212.15 controls over the good faith personnel action defense found in Labor
Code § 3208.3 subd. (h)? Afterall, it is well established that where a general
statute conflicts with a specific statute, the specific statute controls over
the general one. (See <i>Bates v. County of San Mateo</i> (2019) 84 CCC 648 at
page 656 (panel decision) citing <i>Fuentes v. WCAB</i> (1976) 41 CCC 42.
Therefore, it’s my legal position Labor Code § 3212.15 controls over Labor Code
§ 3208.3 which leaves the employer disputing the PTSD presumption only by
“other evidence” that must be reasonably certain in view of all the
circumstances. </span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: large;">Presumptive Injury Technicalities</span><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: small; font-weight: normal;">For presumptive injuries (heart
trouble, pneumonia, cancer, meningitis, blood-borne infectious disease, MRSA,
tuberculosis, hepatitis, Lyme disease, biochemical substances, hernia, lumbar
spine injuries, and yes, PTSD), this blogger disclaims a warning. Generally, no
presumption is conclusive and presumptions are controvertible (rebuttable) and
just because a presumption applies, that does not mean your presumptive claim will
be automatically accepted. Here is how it works - once the employee demonstrates
that the presumption applies, the burden shifts to the employer to negate it
and disprove that the injury was related to work. The law does not require
absolute certainty nor conclusive proof to overcome the presumption. All that
the law requires is proof that is reasonably certain in view of all the
circumstances. The evidence necessary to overcome a rebuttable presumption
depends on the character and circumstances of each case, and no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down other than that proof to a reasonable certainty, such as
would convince the mind of an ordinary person, must be presented. </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: small;">A common misconception of
presumptive injuries involves the mistaken belief that if a presumption applies,
the claim should be automatically accepted. But that is incorrect. Afterall, if
a claim is accepted (and not barred by the statute of limitations [see Labor
Code § 5405 where accepted claims can turn into time-barred claims]), the
employer could be responsible for a lifetime of medical care including other
benefits that can become very expensive. So, in most cases, before a claim is
accepted, discovery is allowed (typically while your claim remains denied)
which often involves a deposition, subpoena of records and evaluations by a
Medical-Legal Expert. But you don’t have to go through this process alone (and
you shouldn’t). </span></span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><b><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: large;">Get Help Right Away</span><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: small;">Our attorneys have built a track
record of success at trial and on appeal in state and federal courts across
California. Founded on attorney-client privilege, we have been assisting police
officers, firefighters and other safety workers for decades in matters ranging
from internal discipline and criminal defense to wage and hour, disability and
workers’ compensation claims. If agreed upon, our office can file your claim
for you, direct you to treatment, give you the best advice and see you through
your injury. This blog is for educational purposes only. This is
not legal advice. There is no substitute for competent legal advice tailored to
your specific circumstance. Call us at (877) 212-6907 and see how
our skilled attorneys can assist you or your organization. </span></span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><span><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: small;"><i>By Jonathan Drake Char, Esq. Jonathan Char is an Associate Attorney in our Workers' Compensation Department at Mastagni Holstedt, A.P.C. Jonathan's frank, full, and direct approach in litigation allows for an efficient, effective, and economic resolution of work-related injuries for all laborers including state and local public safety employees. He has been recognized as a Top Lawyer in Sacramento Magazine and a Rising Star Honoree with Super Lawyers Northern California. His aspiration to win demonstrates his commitment to our clients, and we are proud to have him as part of our team. </i></span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><br /></i></span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><br /></i></span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><br /></i></span></span></span></p><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p></div><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"></span></b></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-36129161786703028082024-01-23T12:43:00.000-08:002024-01-24T15:07:58.149-08:00Court Grants Temporary Restraining Order Halting Forced Gender Identification Requirements for California Peace Officers<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjUjW7kh-NjD3lg_sP46H7lywHkf_N8Wz9HLGtClpSuO7D9lqoMBax-eZ9y8fUBThlwFqukECDKbmBdObTaL2znWemBRRTQ1SuZcsfAJY9iEhzR6zJX_KlpzsMlCioKpJ2YPUK_a3qAcGeyV8wGgKk6Z-DElH3ohDdxPprC45BrQ2Tu9GgzXwRgps6MQKU7/s1080/TRO%2012324.png" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1080" data-original-width="1080" height="302" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjUjW7kh-NjD3lg_sP46H7lywHkf_N8Wz9HLGtClpSuO7D9lqoMBax-eZ9y8fUBThlwFqukECDKbmBdObTaL2znWemBRRTQ1SuZcsfAJY9iEhzR6zJX_KlpzsMlCioKpJ2YPUK_a3qAcGeyV8wGgKk6Z-DElH3ohDdxPprC45BrQ2Tu9GgzXwRgps6MQKU7/w302-h302/TRO%2012324.png" width="302" /></a></div><p>On January 1, 2024, new California Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) regulations went into effect, forcing police officers to disclose their own gender identity any time they submit a RIPA report to their employing agency. The new regulations required, among other new disclosures, that an officer disclose whether they are cisgender, transgender, or nonbinary on a form that is reviewable by other department employees. This aspect of the regulation not only violates employees’ right to privacy in their gender identity, but also places law enforcement agencies in the untenable position of choosing between incompatible laws. On January 23, 2024, Sacramento Superior Court Judge Christopher E. Kruger issued a <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1F7TM8T5pqQCJDR88VtHhqSNWVlhQvo9z/view?pli=1">Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) restraining the Department of Justice (DOJ) from requiring officers to disclose their gender identity and from enforcing that disclosure subsection of the new regulation. </a></p><p>Compliance with RIPA is a condition of employment for California peace officers and all of the RIPA reporting information must be submitted by officers to their employing agency, which must review, approve, anonymize, and then submit the information to the DOJ. The privacy safeguards in RIPA only allow agencies to remove the reporting officers' identifying information from the data reported to DOJ. Nothing safeguards the privacy of the officer's reporting to their employers when submitting RIPA reports.</p><p>As such, the gender identity disclosure requirement directly conflicts with the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) anti-discrimination laws and officers’ right privacy under the California and United States Constitutions. FEHA states, “it is unlawful for employers and other covered entities to inquire about or require documentation or proof of an individual's sex, gender, gender identity, or gender expression as a condition of employment.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11034(i)(1).) The Attorney General has openly admitted Californians possess a right to privacy in their gender identity. <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/Legal%20Alert%20re%20Forced%20Outing%20Policies.1.10.24_0.pdf">In a recent legal alert regarding gender identity privacy rights, the Attorney General stated, "forced disclosure policies violate students’ California constitutional right to privacy" and that "an individual has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in their sexual orientation or gender identity."</a> Paradoxically, his DOJ refused to afford peace officers these same privacy rights by enacting this regulation over objections. </p><p>PORAC, the California Association of Highway Patrolmen, the California Police Chiefs Association, and the California State Sheriffs’ Association filed a legal action seeking a TRO against the California DOJ to stop Attorney General Rob Bonta’s implementation of these forced identification regulations. David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot appeared in Sacramento Superior Court on January 22, 2024 to request the TRO. Today the Court issued its order granting the TRO and halting the DOJ's enforcement of the gender disclosure requirements pending a hearing set for March 19 on the issuance of a preliminary injunction. </p><p>“PORAC remains committed to protecting the rights of all our members to live as they wish, identify as they see fit, and to share that identity on their own terms,” said PORAC President Brian R. Marvel. “It is not fair or right to put officers in the untenable position of disclosing their gender identity before they are ready to do so and as a condition of employment.” <a href="https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Court-Grants-Temporary-Restraining-Order-Halting-Forced-Gender-Identification-Requirements-for-CA-Peace-Officers.html?soid=1104954099833&aid=C7qp9oKUheY">Read PORAC's press release here. </a></p><p>The San Francisco Chronicle issued an article on January 23, 2024 covering the case and quoting David Mastagni. <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/judge-halts-police-gender-law-18624248.php">You can read the full article on their website here. </a> <a href="https://www.officer.com/command-hq/news/53083357/judge-halts-calif-law-requiring-police-officers-to-disclose-gender-identities">Similar coverage on the case can also be found on Officer.com here. </a></p><p><br /></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-9573393683903360062024-01-09T10:30:00.000-08:002024-01-09T10:38:42.964-08:00Ninth Circuit Reinstates Injunction Against S.B. 2's Ban on Licensed CCW Authorization in Almost All Public Places <p>On January 6, 2024, a three-judge panel on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dissolved a stay of a district court’s injunction against Senate Bill 2’s near-total ban on CCW gun carry in the state. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit has largely restored the status quo prior to the SB 2 ban on licensed concealed carry in nearly all public places. Moreover, PORAC President Brian Marvel has been actively supporting the litigation, <i><a href="https://michellawyers.com/may-et-al-v-bonta/">Mays v. Bonta</a></i>, that obtained the issuance of an injunction against the carry restrictions in SB 2.</p><p>By SB 2’s plain terms openly admit “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to address the United States Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://casetext.com/case/nys-rifle-pistol-assn-inc-v-bruen-1"><i>New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen</i> (2022)</a>”, which held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect a private citizen’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home. SB 2 amends or creates thirty separate sections of the penal code in regards to firearms possessions and the process for private citizens to obtain CCW permits. </p><p>Prior to January 1, 2024, many private citizens vetted by a rigorous background check process and licensed by the state, regularly carried a firearm for personal protection. Some had done so for years. SB 2 uprooted longstanding rights of CCW holders to carry in the places now designated as “sensitive” and thus off-limits. In what has been termed the “Vampire Rule”, SB 2 even prohibits CCW holders from carrying on private property open to the public, unless the owner first posts permission. In short, SB 2 designates nearly every public place a sensitive area where carrying is prohibited. </p><p>The new statute and the implementing regulations also increased the costs and training requirements for obtaining a CCW, severely limiting the pool of eligible CCW instructors. </p><div><div>Although SB 2 currently has minimal impact on active or retired peace officers, PORAC President Marvel remains concerned that the Legislature will eventually extend these restrictions to retired officers. The Legislature has recently began clawing back peace officer exemptions to gun laws such as the Unsafe Hand Gun Act (SB 377) and outright refusing to exempt peace officers from other noxious gun legislation, such as SB 505 which would have imposed strict liability even on the justified use of a firearm in self-defense and required firearm insurance. President Marvel filed a <a href="https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-09-29-Dec-of-Brian-R.-Marvel-ISO-Plaintiffs-MPI2264427.1.pdf">declaration in support of the injunction against SB 2</a>, just as he had done previously in <i>Boland v. Bonta</i> to support an injunction against the Unsafe Handgun Act. (PORAC also filed an Amicus Curiae brief in the Ninth Circuit supporting the <i>Boland </i>injunction. The Ninth Circuit ruling on this appeal will be issued soon.) </div><div> </div><div>On December 20, 2023, Judge Carney enjoined SB 2's overly expansive sensitive places definitions banning carrying. The Order describing SB 2 as “sweeping, repugnant to the Second Amendment, and openly defiant of the Supreme Court.” The preliminary injunction essentially maintained the status quo with respect to the pre-SB2 “gun-free zones” such as courts and government buildings. President Marvel’s declaration was cited repeatedly in the Order, which explained that criminals will not abide the restrictions imposed on highly vetted CCW holders. Marvel advised that if the State is serious about addressing gun violence, the Attorney General should fulfill his Constitutional duties to ensure enforcement of gun crime enhancements and prohibitions on firearm possession by prohibited persons in jurisdictions where progressive prosecutors are nullifying gun laws that actually enhance public safety. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially issued a stay that allowed the state’s new “gun-free zones,” which cover most public places and even private stores, to go into effect while that appeal is being heard. Thankfully, on January 6, 2024, the Stay was dissolved and the injunction is now restored while the Attorney General appeals the ruling. Although SB 2 currently exempts peace officers, the outcome of <i>Mays </i>will likely establish the outer limit of restrictions the Legislature can constitutionally impose on retired peace officers. </div><div><br /></div><div> </div></div><div><br /></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-74959842666431520412023-12-27T10:36:00.000-08:002023-12-27T10:36:06.808-08:00Can Cops Smoke Weed? The Answer Remains Hazy<p>Effective January 1, 2024, AB 2188 amends Government Code section 12954 (Fair Employment and Housing Act “FEHA”) to prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee or applicant for cannabis use off the job and away from work. SB 700 further amends section 12954 to prohibit employers from requesting information from an applicant for employment relating to the applicant’s prior use of cannabis. This legislation establishes enhanced protections for marijuana use by elevating its use to a protected status under FEHA, which protects the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination based upon protected statuses. This legislation has created uncertainty as to whether law enforcement officers and their employing agencies are covered by this legislation. </p><p>The statutes cover state and local employees in California with no express exclusion of peace officers. The only professions expressly excluded from the statute are employees in the building and construction trades. (Gov. Code, § 12954(c).) Thus, the exclusion of building and construction employees creates a presumption that peace officers are not excluded unless subject to the other exemptions related to federal legal requirements.</p><p>The bill also excludes applicants or employees hired for positions that require a federal government background investigation or security clearance in accordance with regulations issued by the United States Department of Defense pursuant to Part 117 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, or equivalent regulations applicable to other agencies. (Gov. Code, § 12954(e).) </p><p>Some officers assigned to federal law enforcement task forces must undergo a federal government background investigation and are likely exempt, but most do not. Before hiring an officer, Penal Code sections 1029(a)(3), (a)(11), (c), and 1031(c) require a search of the National Decertification Index of the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training and, investigations of officers’ military discharge and local and nation criminal records fingerprint files. However, none of these investigations appears to be “a federal government background investigation,” which is not defined in the statute. Ultimately, this question will have to be resolved by clean up legislation or the courts. </p><p>The bill also provides that it does not preempt state or federal laws requiring employees to be tested for controlled substances, including laws requiring employees to be tested as a condition of receiving federal funding or federal licensing-related benefits. However, state and federal law generally does not require California peace officers to be tested for cannabis. Further, any drug testing policy would have to be negotiated with the officers’ labor representatives. </p><p>Officers may nevertheless be effectively excluded from the protections of these bills if they are required to lawfully possess a firearm as a condition of their employment. 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(3) prohibits the receipt or possession of a firearm by anyone "who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)." Cannabis is classified by the federal government as a schedule I substance and therefore a user of cannabis is banned from possessing a firearm. However, possession of firearms issued by and for the use by a public entity are not covered by this federal law. Thus, the Act covers officers who use their personal weapons on duty, but not firearms owned and issued by the employing agency. </p><p>Further, when anyone buys a firearm from or through a firearms retailer, they are required to answer questions on the federal “4473” form. In California, there are other state forms that must also be completed, including the Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) form. The 4473 form specifically asks if the firearm purchaser is an “unlawful user” of marijuana. Even if marijuana use is legal in a particular state, it is still illegal under federal law. In order to be truthful, the individual must answer “yes” to this question if they use marijuana. The 4473 form must be signed under penalty of perjury. Committing perjury is a crime. Federal law also expressly prohibits knowingly making any false statement on the 4473. Doing so is punishable by up to ten years in prison and up to a $250,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 924(b).</p><p>The Ninth Circuit has held that the firearm prohibition on cannabis users is constitutional, even in the context of those with medical marijuana cards, explaining that “these laws will sometimes burden—albeit minimally and only incidentally—the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are reasonably, but erroneously, suspected of being unlawful drug users. However, the Constitution tolerates these modest collateral burdens in various contexts, and does so here as well.” <i>Wilson v. Lynch </i>(9th Cir. 2016) 835 F.3d 1083, 1094-95. </p><p>However, Wilson was decided before <i>New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen</i> (2022) 142 S.Ct. 2111 and did not consider whether the ban was unconstitutional under our historical tradition of firearm regulation. Rather, it proceeded under the now-defunct tiered-scrutiny approach that gave the government far more deference. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hunter-biden-urges-judge-dismiss-gun-charges-2023-12-11/" target="_blank">Notably, Hunter Biden's legal team cited <i>Bruen </i>defending against similar charges by arguing the framers of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of problems caused by intoxication but there is no history of preventing substance abusers from acquiring firearms</a>. <i> </i>Post-<i>Bruen</i>, the lower courts are invalidating these prohibitions, but until the Ninth Circuit reverses <i>Wilson </i>or the Supreme Court addresses the issue, the efficacy of the federal firearm prohibitions are uncertain at best.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1mwQv5FHLPIaUpPydYEICnwuu0WHzrP9CjPexdEt6ov8kX5c7H47p6B_pDzfNGybpFGcwvWApfliIQnlhCcwIlcCTwue1MTRgyizVm1MuErnIbw6qJrqy5rs3hHaZqjqrPlEfEUMvd8_p38orh6Y4nMUm_oyiAAeLtEHq3kt-NrdDJyzcOEQ24UGzYzFM/s235/weed.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="215" data-original-width="235" height="215" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1mwQv5FHLPIaUpPydYEICnwuu0WHzrP9CjPexdEt6ov8kX5c7H47p6B_pDzfNGybpFGcwvWApfliIQnlhCcwIlcCTwue1MTRgyizVm1MuErnIbw6qJrqy5rs3hHaZqjqrPlEfEUMvd8_p38orh6Y4nMUm_oyiAAeLtEHq3kt-NrdDJyzcOEQ24UGzYzFM/s1600/weed.jpg" width="235" /></a></div><br /><p>In conclusion, the application of these laws to peace officers remains hazy. Given the uncertain legal ramifications at stake, officers should exercise caution all until clean up legislation is enacted or the courts provide greater guidance. If peace officers are determined to be covered, public safety unions cannot agree to waive FEHA protections for their members. This legislation goes far beyond legalization by elevating marijuana use to protected civil right. Ultimately, the employing agencies and individual officers must comply with all applicable laws.</p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-42188482787392636472023-12-19T17:43:00.000-08:002023-12-29T10:58:05.342-08:00Attorney General Bonta Clears Detective Tonn in the Shooting Death of Sean Monterrosa<p>Today California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced the California Department of Justice’s (DOJ) review of the shooting death of Sean Monterrosa cleared Detective Jarett Tonn of any criminal wrongdoing. Detective Tonn appreciates the careful and thorough review of this incident conducted by Attorney General Bonta, which confirmed that Detective Tonn’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. All human life is sacred and this incident was tragic for everyone involved. </p><p>The investigation found that substantial evidence supported Tonn's claim of self-defense, and that none of the evidence, including video footage, or witness accounts "contradict[ed] the essential facts of Tonn’s account." Report determined that the witness statements and the "video footage provide a largely uncontroverted account of the events" which is sufficient to establish self-defense even without Tonn's testimony.</p><p>The Report explained the objective reasonableness of Tonn's belief that deadly force was necessary. "California law requires consideration of all of the circumstances as they were known or appeared to Tonn. It is undisputed that six seconds prior to the shooting, Horton radioed the warning: 'It looks like they’re armed, possibly armed.' Horton’s words were qualified in nature, but Tonn, Wagoner, and Pittman all stated that they took this warning to mean that the subjects at the Walgreens were carrying firearms. ... [A] warning from an experienced senior officer that appeared to be based on personal observation would be taken very seriously by Tonn."</p><p>The Report noted the totality of the circumstances supported Tonn's belief that the suspect was armed with a firearm. "First, the hammer that Monterrosa carried in his pocket would have had the same effect on his gait and body mechanics as he ran that carrying a firearm would. The hammer was 14.5 inches long, and the hammer head was 6 inches wide." Tonn and other witnesses observed Monterrosa run in a manner that indicated he was holding something he did not want it to fall out of his waist band.</p><p>"Second, all of the witnesses who actually saw the shooting stated that Monterrosa was running away from the officers, suddenly stopped, and made a quick turn to face the officers’ truck immediately before the shooting." "[A]ll stated that Monterrosa had one of his hands in his torso or waist area when the shots were fired." In fact, a civilian witness stated that Monterrosa was fully facing Tonn at the time shots were fired. No witnesses contradicted this testimony. </p><p>The Report also noted that Tonn's decision to shoot from inside the vehicle corroborated his belief that he had to "shoot now or someone gets shot." This is because doing so is inherently dangerous for the officers in the vehicle. </p><p>The report explained the importance of an officers' state of mind:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">"Tonn’s knowledge and state of mind going into the incident must also be considered. In his statement, he discussed the facts that made him particularly concerned about encountering armed subjects on June 1, 2020. He was aware of reports of looters targeting gun stores in the days before June 1, 2020. He was aware of multiple firearms-related calls on June 1, 2020. In particular, 911 calls had been made that evening regarding armed looters. He also was aware of intelligence reports warning of violence directed at law enforcement and that a law enforcement officer had been shot and killed several days<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>earlier in a drive-by shooting in a nearby county."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The DOJ's expert "opined that the use of the deadly force against the 'unarmed, but perceived to be armed and dangerous, Sean Monterrosa was consistent with generally accepted policing best practices and VPD’s Use of Force Policy.'” The DOJ's expert "concluded that Detective Tonn’s actions, during the time when he believed that Mr. Monterrosa was armed and posed an immediate threat to him and others, 'were reasonable, necessary and proportional to any imminent threat he may have perceived and comported with law enforcement training with respect to using deadly force.'” </p><p style="text-align: left;">Noting that an officers' conduct cannot be considered with the benefit of hindsight and taking into account that officers are often forced to make quick judgments, the Report stated Tonn's tactics in the moments preceding the shooting were objectively reasonable.</p><p style="text-align: left;">The Attorney General concluded, "[b]ased on the totality of circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that Monterrosa was armed and reaching for a firearm." These findings affirm prior determinations that Tonn acted lawfully in self-defense and defense of others.</p><p style="text-align: left;">Detective Tonn was represented by Joshua Olander from Mastagni Holstedt, APC.</p><p style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/ois/report/2023_12_Monterrosa_Non-AB1506_Report.pdf">The full Report on the Investigation issued by the DOJ today can be found here</a>.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiz6H109-6CJtWTVI7xbX4nJAu95CbmUH7Im6RXu_i2pIAaMMlgZq5pyAG7SGP8tXOQ9RgYAIJlyuceXwppqNQPTXQoHn5UcF2U3AqiOD5Hq-JeNihhaIsTRkHQEWd0qQ-16e625Qe4bm8ruqFGYREoO6DRRO9y1w4iMuW6GmMxxMwJwGUXyq9Hn-A4_hoL/s200/doj-seal-header.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="200" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiz6H109-6CJtWTVI7xbX4nJAu95CbmUH7Im6RXu_i2pIAaMMlgZq5pyAG7SGP8tXOQ9RgYAIJlyuceXwppqNQPTXQoHn5UcF2U3AqiOD5Hq-JeNihhaIsTRkHQEWd0qQ-16e625Qe4bm8ruqFGYREoO6DRRO9y1w4iMuW6GmMxxMwJwGUXyq9Hn-A4_hoL/s1600/doj-seal-header.png" width="200" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: left;"><br /></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-59946516280224168302023-12-14T16:04:00.000-08:002023-12-14T16:04:42.425-08:00New RIPA Regulations Violate DFEH Laws By Requiring Peace Officers to Disclose Their Gender Identity<p>New regulations adopted by Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding RIPA, the California Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015, reporting requirements conflict with anti-discrimination protections afforded to all California employees. RIPA was enacted to address concerns of bias and discrimination through racial and identity profiling within law enforcement agencies. RIPA requires officers to report their perception of personal characteristics of the individuals stopped (e.g., age, gender identity, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity) along with the reasons for the detention/search, additional actions taken by the officer, and the outcomes of the stop. Officers submit this information to their employing agency, who then submits the data to the DOJ without the name or other unique identifying information of the peace officer involved. (Gov. Code § 12525.5.) The data submitted to the DOJ ultimately becomes a public record.</p><p>The RIPA statute also authorizes the Attorney General to issue regulations for the collection and reporting of data that specify all data to be reported, and provide standards, definitions, and technical specifications to ensure uniform reporting practices across all reporting agencies. <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-final-text-of-proposed-regulations.pdf">AG Bonta has enacted new regulations that require officers to report personal information about themselves, including their own gender identity beginning January 1, 2024</a>. </p><p>However, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) regulations, it is illegal for an officers' employing agency to <i>require an employee </i>to disclose that information. As a result, the RIPA regulation should likely have been rejected by the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for failing the “consistency” standard, which requires “being in harmony with, and not in conflict with or contradictory to, existing statutes, court decisions, or other provisions of law.” (Gov. Code § 11349(d).) The OAL is required to return any regulation that “conflicts with an existing state regulation and the agency has not identified the manner in which the conflict may be resolved.” (Gov. Code § 11349.1(d)(4).) </p><p><b><u>New Regulation</u></b></p><p>The new regulations were purportedly enacted to “enable the Board to determine whether there is a link between officer’s race and/or gender and (1) racial and identity profiling and/or (2) the decision making of the officer.” Paradoxically, the new regulations will force the most vulnerable officers to disclose their gender identity to their public employers. Under the regulation, “‘Gender of Officer’ refers to the officer’s identified gender. When reporting this data element, the officer shall select all applicable data values set forth in section 999.226, subdivision (a)(6)(A).” </p><span style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: center;">1. Cisgender man/boy</div></span><span style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: center;">2. Cisgender woman/girl</div></span><span style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: center;">3. Transgender man/boy</div></span><span style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: center;">4. Transgender woman/girl</div><div style="text-align: center;">5. Nonbinary person</div></span><div><p><b><u>Conflict with DFEH Employee Protections</u></b></p><p>Once that amendment becomes operative, there will be conflict between RIPA and FEHA. In 2017, amendments were made to FEHA regulations that prohibited employers from asking employees about their gender. Under FEHA, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 § 11034 Terms, Conditions, and Privileges of Employment:</p><p>“(i) Additional Rights</p><p>(1)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>It is unlawful for employers and other covered entities to inquire about or require documentation or proof of an individual's sex, gender, gender identity, or gender expression as a condition of employment.”</p><p>The new RIPA regulations effectively force an officer to disclose their gender to their employer, in violation of FEHA. The California Department of Justice (DOJ) justifies this requirement reasoning that Government Code section 12525.5, subdivision (e) authorizes the Attorney General to issue regulations to “specify all data to be reported” under RIPA. However, that provision does not give the Attorney General authority the nullify employee protections under FEHA by requiring disclosure of otherwise private information. FEHA clearly states, “[a]ny state law that purports to require or permit any action that would be an unlawful practice under this part shall to that extent be invalid.” </p><p>During RIPA’s Proposed Rulemaking Action comment period, concerns were raised about the conflict between RIPA and FEHA in requiring gender self-identification. The DOJ oddly responded addressing race and ethnicity, but not gender: “the Department has not identified any provision within the FEHA or within its implementing regulations that would prohibit the collection of race or ethnicity of an officer for purposes of stop data or other types of data.” (Emphasis added.) (The DOJ either misinterpreted or dodged another comment asking: “What if the officer does not identify with these limited categories?” The DOJ’s response discussed the requirement of reporting the perceived gender of the person stopped rather than of the officer. )</p><p>Furthermore, the collection of such data is easily distinguishable from forced disclosure. This conflict between an employer’s reporting requirements and an employee’s privacy rights arises in other contexts. For example, when employers must request information related to gender for legally required reporting, such as federal EEO-1 Reports, employee disclosure of that information must be voluntary. Employees can be asked to self-identify their gender, but if they decline to do so, federal law requires employers to identify the employee’s gender based on employment records or other reliable information. Similarly, here, an officer’s self-identification should be voluntary.</p><p>In support of its position that the California Legislature has required employers to provide demographic information to the state, the DOJ references California Government Code section 12999 which obligates “private employers of 100 or more employees to report to Department of Fair Employment and Housing pay and hours-worked data by job category and by sex, race, and ethnicity.” The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) states that “[e]mployee self-identification is the preferred method of identifying sex information. If an employee declines to state their sex, employers must* still report the employee according to one of the three sex categories, using current employment records or other reliable records or information, such as an employee’s self-identified pronouns.” </p><p>It is likely that RIPA could legally impose the same practice. However, as currently written, RIPA requires the employee to “select all applicable data values” and leaves no option for other methods of data collection.</p><p>Moreover, according to the CRD, “[u]nder the Gender Recognition Act of 2017 (Senate Bill 179), California officially recognizes three genders: female, male, and non-binary. Therefore, employers should report employees’ sex according to these three categories.” Accordingly, the RIPA data collection should not go beyond these categories.</p><p>The recent RIPA amendments added another data point requiring the self-identification of an officer’s race or ethnicity. However, there is no FEHA regulation related to race or ethnicity that is analogous to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 § 11034(i)(1) which prohibits any inquiry into an individual’s gender. </p><p>Still, the above-mentioned state and federal regulations related to pay data follow the practice of encouraging employee-self-identification, but, if that is not voluntarily provided, allowing the employer to identify the employee’s race or ethnicity based on employment records or other reliable information. Nevertheless, because there is no specific prohibition on inquiring about race or ethnicity, it is likely that RIPA could require such self-identification by an officer.</p><p><b><u>Conclusion</u></b></p><p>If an officer declines to voluntarily self-identify their gender to their employing agency, the agency could comply with the RIPA regulations by reporting based on employment records or other reliable information, as is the practice with state and federal pay data reporting requirements. However, uncertainty exists regarding whether the RIPA statute and regulations are permit such an arrangement. Thus, compliance with these regulations by ordering officers to disclose their gender identity creates significant potential liability for local agencies under California's antidiscrimination statutes. Public safety unions may wish to meet and confer with their employing agency regarding whether such disclosures are voluntary or mandatory. </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhd-AkUjOfBWYXouheh9JIGPakKylMxbGEO5MjsCK78KyFjPbQ1ykJgigxNGY0W0Vf4xktw5krfYFcOjXMy3kqPGnkXI939JO1Q5MpufEwiAOMJNIcrIe3rWCH8b8tPKcwkJOBWAsc0CXn1iYOHWlPKUQFn9qKwx0Nllm5_eCHweX7Av_CoKKa6H9b3XnPn/s300/images.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="300" height="168" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhd-AkUjOfBWYXouheh9JIGPakKylMxbGEO5MjsCK78KyFjPbQ1ykJgigxNGY0W0Vf4xktw5krfYFcOjXMy3kqPGnkXI939JO1Q5MpufEwiAOMJNIcrIe3rWCH8b8tPKcwkJOBWAsc0CXn1iYOHWlPKUQFn9qKwx0Nllm5_eCHweX7Av_CoKKa6H9b3XnPn/s1600/images.jpg" width="300" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><div><p> </p></div></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-15894136662183823142023-11-16T17:18:00.000-08:002023-11-16T17:18:11.675-08:00Terminated for Tweeting “All Lives Matter”: Eastern District Court Finds Political Retaliation Plausible and Allows Wrongful Termination Lawsuit Involving Sacramento Radio Host, Grant Napear, to Move Forward<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .2in; mso-para-margin-bottom: 1.2gd; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcXElBnFJmn3oV_Q34mq3OzipYXoSu2tExbNyGSZus4blEmOcCeWvexbcKyCFjA3s4YYEf5IorhwccF-vBGaZ0iuynmpClW2OiUNo6z6md2puGs_jNgXJ2pyTwEVvbmEBh8mNs2PNJa7n86MusD7l2CMwOkx5mB1blabBcmS0vaW_4kVjCJhs3C0PsBjEJ/s731/Screenshot%202023-11-16%20170815.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="716" data-original-width="731" height="456" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhcXElBnFJmn3oV_Q34mq3OzipYXoSu2tExbNyGSZus4blEmOcCeWvexbcKyCFjA3s4YYEf5IorhwccF-vBGaZ0iuynmpClW2OiUNo6z6md2puGs_jNgXJ2pyTwEVvbmEBh8mNs2PNJa7n86MusD7l2CMwOkx5mB1blabBcmS0vaW_4kVjCJhs3C0PsBjEJ/w466-h456/Screenshot%202023-11-16%20170815.png" width="466" /></a></div><br /> <span> </span><span> </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt;">The
case continues for former Sacramento Kings radio announcer, Grant Napear, as
the Eastern District Court rules that Napear’s wrongful termination lawsuit may
proceed under his political retaliation claim. Napear filed a wrongful
termination lawsuit against his former employer, Bonneville International
Corporation, who terminated Napear in May 2020 after he tweeted that “ALL LIVES
MATTER…EVERY SINGLE ONE” during the height of the George Floyd-inspired unrest.
Napear’s May 31, 2020 tweet responded to the question he received on Twitter
from a former Kings player: “What’s your take on [Black Lives Matter]?”</span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .2in; mso-para-margin-bottom: 1.2gd; text-align: justify;"></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .2in; mso-para-margin-bottom: 1.2gd; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Bonneville
terminated Napear on June 2, 2020, merely 36 hours after his tweet, under the
determination that Napear’s tweet could likely discredit the station’s
reputation. Bonneville terminated Napear for cause as defined in his employment
contract, which states that “the term ‘Cause’ shall be defined as any of the
following conduct by Employee, as determined by the Company in its reasonable
discretion:…Any act of materials dishonesty, misconduct, or other conduct that
might discredit the goodwill, good name, or reputation of the Company.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .2in; mso-para-margin-bottom: 1.2gd; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> Napear,
the plaintiff, filed a federal employment discrimination and retaliation
lawsuit against Bonneville in October 2021 alleging that Bonneville terminated
him due to his religion, race, gender, and political views. In April 2023, the
Court dismissed Napear’s complaint with leave to amend on the finding that
Napear failed to allege sufficient facts showing that Bonneville knew of
Napear’s religious beliefs, let alone that it had discriminated against him on
the basis of those beliefs. Napear filed an amended lawsuit in May 2023. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .2in; mso-para-margin-bottom: 1.2gd; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"> In
July 2023, the Eastern District Court ruled that Napear’s amended claim may
proceed on the grounds of retaliation, but tossed Napear’s religious
discrimination claim without leave to amend. Judge Dale A. Drozd ultimately
ruled that Napear sufficiently stated a plausible claim for retaliation under
California Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102, which limit an employer’s ability to
fire employees for their political activities. <o:p></o:p></span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><b><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">ON THE AMENDED SUIT &
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION </span></b></h3><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> In May, Napear filed an amended suit asserting three
claims: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2)
discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, California Gov. Code § 12940 (“FEHA”); and (3)
retaliation in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102. In the
Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed on May 11, 2023, Napear alleged that he
“periodically spoke with his coworkers…about his religion and his faith in
God.” He argued that his tweet was a “personal expression” of his “sincerely
held Christian religious beliefs,” that the tweet was a “self-evident
expression” of those beliefs, and that “[m]any people…including…[his]
coworkers” and “members of the public” understood the tweet to be an expression
of his “Christian religious beliefs.” <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> Bonneville, the defendant, filed a motion to dismiss
Napear’s SAC in its entirety and relatedly argued that Napear’s allegations
only suggested that his coworkers knew of his religious beliefs, not that any
person directly involved with his termination knew of those beliefs. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> The Court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss Napear’s religious discrimination claim without
leave to amend. The Court noted that the facts alleged by Napear “do not give
rise to the inference that [Napear’s] termination could have been based on
religious animus” and therefore, the Court concluded that Napear failed to
state a plausible claim for religious discrimination. Napear’s allegations do
not suggest that Bonneville knew of the purported religious nature of Napear’s
tweet nor that Bonneville knew of Napear’s religion more generally, before
terminating him. Moreover, the Court noted that there was nothing contained in
the tweet itself, such as a quotation to scripture or a reference to religion,
indicating that the tweet was in any way religious in nature. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">ON POLITICAL RETALIATION </span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> Next, the Court examined Defendant’s move to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims brought under California Labor Code §§ 1101 and 1102. These
sections serve to protect the fundamental right of employees to engage in
political activity without interference by employers. California Labor Code §
1101 provides that “[n]o employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule,
regulation, or policy: (a) forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or
participating in politics…[or] (b) Controlling or directing, or tending to
control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees.”
Similarly, § 1102 prohibits an employer from attempting to coerce or influence
its employees’ political activities through the threat of discharge. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> In its motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, Bonneville
argued that plaintiff failed to state a claim under §§ 1101 and 1102 because he
had not alleged that 1) Bonneville had a rule within the meaning of section
1101; 2) that the tweet constituted political activity; and 3) that defendant’s
motivation in terminating Napear was political. The Court remained unconvinced
by Bonneville’s assertion that it fired Napear as an apolitical business
decision. The Court noted that Napear did sufficiently allege a rule within the
meaning of § 1101. Napear met this standard by alleging that Bonneville used
his termination as a warning to other Company employees that anyone who
publicly criticized the Black Lives Matter movement (BLM) would be summarily
terminated. </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> On the issue of whether Napear’s tweet constituted
“political activity,” the Court considered Napear’s tweet to be facially
political in nature when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
The tweet contained the phrase “All Lives Matter” in response to the question
“What’s your take on BLM?”; was published by public figures; and was made just
days after George Floyd’s death. These allegations were sufficient to allege
that Napear’s tweet was political speech regarding a specific cause and could
plausibly constitute political activity under §§ 1101 and 1102. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> Napear’s amended claim also highlighted Bonneville’s
political motivations underpinning the termination. Napear’s termination came
swiftly, as did Bonneville’s public statement which noted that Napear’s tweet
did not reflect the views or values of the company and that Napear’s tweet “was
particularly insensitive.” Napear also contended that all seven individuals
involved in his termination objected to the political and/or religious nature
of his tweet and had expressed negative emotion in response to his “All Lives
Matter” statement. Collectively, these allegations, the Court concluded, were sufficient
to plausibly suggest that Napear’s political activity – which included posting
a tweet containing a certain message – motivated Bonneville to terminate him.
As such, Napear’s political retaliation claims under §§ 1101 and 1102 will move
forward. <o:p></o:p></span></p><h3 style="text-align: left;"><b><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">TAKEAWAYS</span></b></h3><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> Two lessons emerge from this ruling. The first is that an
employee claiming wrongful termination on the basis of religious discrimination
must prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive. This involves
showing that the employer knew of the employee’s religion, that those involved
in making the decision to terminate the employee were aware of the employee’s
religious beliefs, and that the employee was terminated due to those beliefs. A
tweet isn’t religious just because the person posting it says it is. </span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"> Secondly,
an employer’s use of a termination as a warning to other employees of
intolerable conduct may be construed as a rule under § 1101, and thus give rise
to a political retaliation claim. As
Judge Drozd noted, “defendant used [Napear’s] termination ‘as an example to all
other employees of the Company as an implicit warning that anyone that dared to
speak out publicly and criticize the politics of the Black Lives Matter
movement would be summarily terminated.’” This ruling serves as a warning to
employers of the perils of view point discrimination against employees whose
political beliefs differ from their own.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.caed.401956/gov.uscourts.caed.401956.65.0.pdf">You can access the full July 25, 2023 Court Order here. </a></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></p><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-39440416942697990652023-10-17T15:10:00.000-07:002023-10-17T15:10:37.525-07:00SIGN UP REMINDER: Lunch & Learn POST Class Tomorrow, Oct. 18 on "Demystifying the New Decertification Process Under S.B. 2" <p>Join us tomorrow via Zoom as our attorneys, David E. Mastagni and Joshua Olander, present a class on "Demystifying the New Decertification Process Under S.B. 2." Class starts at 11:30 A.M. and is expected to end around 2:30 P.M.</p><p>The class provides an overview of the national standards for licensing police officers and aims to familiarize students with the grounds for decertification with a focus on the current legislative fight in California over Senate Bill No. 2. </p><p>To register, you can go to our "Upcoming Events" page on our website. <a href="https://www.mastagni.com/upcoming-events/">Click here to be redirected to the event sign up webpage.</a> Click on the class (or classes) you wish to attend and enter in your contact information, including your POST ID. Once registered, you will receive a Zoom link. Alternatively, you can also email us at register@mastagni.com to register. </p><p>Please contact us if you are having issues receiving the Zoom link or if you have any questions about our course offerings. The full list of our Lunch and Learn classes can be found on our flyer below. </p><p>Thank you and we hope to see you soon! </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiasBzeFI7Y4mHZ-0dO-dYoq-lT4eoFw9Y01lNMpszQyI6U0RBCV-EddDkFKxWdCRsy1YlCGEFX0n-IhS2HGgeYOa0fH5G9eZ1Kz9yXVvr_wHjY4m-L9P_3WvOliqG2Hzdv-CIxS43izuvoDjnqi23RT70GYiHX5LS-_iWQ97tA0Sz2zWHSwdwNsv9DnVye/s915/Lunch%20&%20Learn%20Flyer%20Page%201%20.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="915" data-original-width="712" height="677" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiasBzeFI7Y4mHZ-0dO-dYoq-lT4eoFw9Y01lNMpszQyI6U0RBCV-EddDkFKxWdCRsy1YlCGEFX0n-IhS2HGgeYOa0fH5G9eZ1Kz9yXVvr_wHjY4m-L9P_3WvOliqG2Hzdv-CIxS43izuvoDjnqi23RT70GYiHX5LS-_iWQ97tA0Sz2zWHSwdwNsv9DnVye/w527-h677/Lunch%20&%20Learn%20Flyer%20Page%201%20.png" width="527" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzC9dLDT8LA-HNwvl-Py3CyoHA4QZj8ZtgnnCR7iVauNKdMl0nn6kpNdUKm82AFbiELYEO-r8wlo2y6YKpZ5c7RG4HldXPX0DhMRXbkqQwjTOdtOcIDay142CCECVS3C8kRdTcIXnSQ_YxdCBllnorpaY8jhm3gbfgaCkf42h_YC0zEuSt2HY5nqZ5NY6b/s915/Lunch%20and%20Learn%20Flyer%20Page%202.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="915" data-original-width="703" height="682" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzC9dLDT8LA-HNwvl-Py3CyoHA4QZj8ZtgnnCR7iVauNKdMl0nn6kpNdUKm82AFbiELYEO-r8wlo2y6YKpZ5c7RG4HldXPX0DhMRXbkqQwjTOdtOcIDay142CCECVS3C8kRdTcIXnSQ_YxdCBllnorpaY8jhm3gbfgaCkf42h_YC0zEuSt2HY5nqZ5NY6b/w524-h682/Lunch%20and%20Learn%20Flyer%20Page%202.png" width="524" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><p><br /></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-22774280730705629142023-10-09T17:08:00.001-07:002023-10-09T17:08:15.585-07:00The Ninth Circuit Establishes Broad Scope of Qualified Immunity in Case Involving Officer Who Shot Suspect Beating His Partner<p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFeAddaCCbP_Pl1JpxlgvF_XVeYhlpfKpjtOSVw_EZDFHuHqZgXsng2Mx_fxOhv_xeQY75V8I6wDaJLc12h5-ydqMH-rl_7O7LjRyRWNAKRQvsK1VynwdBftoiTG7Hd6FS71dG2s0yR3yBSCgNvei4xqjlycBGI534bhpC8rVpcOlH4V9h2VZBsxszCn8q/s1200/download.webp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="680" data-original-width="1200" height="208" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFeAddaCCbP_Pl1JpxlgvF_XVeYhlpfKpjtOSVw_EZDFHuHqZgXsng2Mx_fxOhv_xeQY75V8I6wDaJLc12h5-ydqMH-rl_7O7LjRyRWNAKRQvsK1VynwdBftoiTG7Hd6FS71dG2s0yR3yBSCgNvei4xqjlycBGI534bhpC8rVpcOlH4V9h2VZBsxszCn8q/w368-h208/download.webp" width="368" /></a></div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">In
an unusual and noteworthy move, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed itself
and granted qualified immunity to a police officer who used deadly force to
stop a suspect beating his partner. The Los Angeles police officer, Edward
Agdeppa, faced a § 1983 federal civil rights action filed by the decedent's
mother, who argued that Agdeppa’s use of deadly force was objectively
unreasonable and violated the decedent's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
Although Agdeppa faced multiple legal setbacks while defending his actions, the
Ninth Circuit has ultimately ruled that he is entitled to qualified immunity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Qualified
immunity is a legal concept used to protect police officers from personal
liability in lawsuits over harm caused while carrying out their official
duties. Qualified immunity applies unless (1) the officer violated a federal
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was
“clearly established.”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
lower court ruled against Agdeppa, denying his qualified immunity defense
because a jury might find that a reasonable officer would not have believed the
suspect posed an immediate threat. Agdeppa appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit, which issued a 2-1 decision in December 2022 upholding the denial of
qualified immunity. However, following the retirement and replacement of one judge,
the reconstituted panel decided to withdraw its ruling and rehear the case. On
August 30, 2023, the Ninth Circuit issued its new decision, holding Agdeppa is
entitled to qualified immunity because his actions did not violate clearly
established law.</span></p><p></p><p></p><h4 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Facts
of the Case</span></u></b></h4><p></p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
incident occurred in October 2018, when Officers Agdeppa and Rodriguez responded
to a Hollywood gym after receiving a report of an aggressive trespasser threatening
patrons and assaulting a security guard. Upon arrival, the officers activated
their body-worn cameras and were directed to the men’s locker room. There, they
encountered Albert Dorsey standing naked in the shower area, playing music from
his phone. Dorsey, 6'1” and weighing 280 pounds, towered over Agdeppa and Rodriguez,
5'1” and 5'5,” respectively, each weighing around 145 pounds.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">For
several minutes, the officers repeatedly ordered Dorsey to turn off his music,
put on his clothes, and leave the gym. Rather than comply, Dorsey danced and
raised his middle finger, taunting the officers. Agdeppa approached Dorsey and successfully
secured one handcuff on his wrist, but failed to cuff the other wrist. Dorsey quickly
became combative and a violent struggle ensued. The officers tried various
tactical maneuvers to secure Dorsey, including using arm, finger, and wrist locks.
The body-cam video shows that Dorsey used his size to thwart the smaller
officers’ attempts to handcuff him.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">As
the struggle intensified, the body-cams were knocked to the floor. The
remaining encounter was not caught on video, but the cameras continued to
record the audio. Agdeppa alleged that the struggle turned more violent after
the body-cams fell. The officers can be heard heard shouting, groaning, and
crying out in pain amidst sounds of banging and thrashing.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Dorsey
was repeatedly told to stop resisting. Despite both officers deploying their
tasers multiple times, Dorsey continued resisting and overpowered them. Agdeppa
attested that Dorsey repeatedly struck him in the face and knocked him into a
wall, disorienting him and causing him to drop his taser. Agdeppa then
witnessed Dorsey straddling Rodriguez and “pummeling” her head with a “flurry
of punches,” while also gaining control of her taser. Agdeppa drew out his gun
and ordered Dorsey to stop, but Dorsey continued beating Rodriguez. It was at
this point that Agdeppa fired five shots to stop Dorsey, who subsequently died
from his injuries.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><br /></span></p><h4 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Brief
Procedural History</span></u></b></h4><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Dorsey's
mother filed a § 1983 lawsuit against Agdeppa claiming he used unreasonable
deadly force in violation of Dorsey’s Fourth Amendment rights. Agdeppa moved to
have the case dismissed, arguing that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable
and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The lower court denied
qualified immunity, basing its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad
constitutional principle that “[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to
apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” The lower court
ruled that because a jury could find that a reasonable officer would not have believed
Dorsey posed an immediate threat, Agdeppa was not entitled to qualified
immunity.</span></p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Agdeppa
appealed only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis – whether his
conduct violated clearly established law. In December 2022, a Ninth Circuit three-judge
panel upheld the lower court’s decision, 2-1. However, in May 2023, a
reconstituted panel withdrew that opinion and announced it would reconsider the
case. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><br /></span></p><h4 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
Ninth Circuit Reverses Course and Grants Agdeppa Qualified Immunity</span></u></b></h4><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">In
its newly issued decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and ruled
that Agdeppa is entitled to qualified immunity because his use of deadly force
did not violate clearly established law. The court explained that such a
violation occurs only when it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
[officer] would understand” that his or her conduct violates the law. In other words, the
violation of law must be obvious and “beyond debate.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
Ninth Circuit explained that, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “clearly
established law” must not be defined at a high level of generality.<span class="MsoEndnoteReference"> </span>That is because a police officer may have
difficulty applying the abstract principles to the specific situation he or she
faces, especially in high-stress and diverse search and seizure contexts. The court
concluded that, unless it was obvious that the suspect did not pose an
immediate threat, judges should not use hindsight to second-guess officers’
real-time decisions made in rapidly evolving situations.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
plaintiff additionally claimed that Agdeppa was constitutionally required to
warn Dorsey before using deadly force. The Ninth Circuit again found that
principle too general to defeat qualified immunity. The court emphasized that
such a warning must be given “whenever practicable” and that it “is not a
one-size-fits-all proposition.” The court recognized that there is “flexibility”
in the warning rule, making it highly context-dependent. Therefore, the lack of
a warning, on its own, is not sufficient to overcome qualified immunity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Rather
than rely on general constitutional principles, a plaintiff must point to precedent
that “squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” While the plaintiff here offered
numerous cases, the court rejected each of them by identifying how the facts of
those cases differed from the one at hand. Because none of the cases were based
on closely related circumstances, the court found that there was no basis to
find that Agdeppa should have known that the use of force was obviously
excessive, or that a deadly force warning was required.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div id="edn1">
</div>
</div><p></p><h4 style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Takeaways</span></u></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">: <o:p></o:p></span></h4><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">The
Ninth Circuit’s new opinion highlights the uncertainty and intensity that
police officers face. In contrast to the lower court and rescinded opinions, this
decision reflects an appreciation of the split-second decisions that officers are
forced to make in high pressure situations. On one end of the spectrum, broad
constitutional principles are far too general to be applied in denying
qualified immunity. On the other end, decisions regarding specific factual
situations should be cabined to very similar circumstances. Combining these
concepts means that qualified immunity should generally be granted unless (1)
the use of force is so obviously excessive that it is beyond dispute, or (2) there
is binding precedent on highly analogous facts.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;">Nothing
in the opinion detracts from an officer’s duties to de-escalate when feasible and
give a deadly force warning when practicable. However, through this decision,
the Ninth Circuit creates a high burden for labeling conduct as violating
clearly established law, and establishes a broad framework for courts to find
that police officers are entitled to qualified immunity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p></p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/30/20-56254.pdf ">The full Aug. 30<sup>th</sup>
Opinion can be found here. </a><o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvTPfcCyLActOMNYFTkQVz5a_alhyvT2gddmf_NRquUKy5HjhI__pFQS-QneTLr8lCMIrGP0Gr24yhemE3mLqCMrb6qZRVsk18baJKRmHXwXc395yzOfAuwmzQ54-M18tEeIE7vPhOUdDNi1IWtof4cd6M8ocvWw4iiTaiAcPGr0P8P3j-EdsEziiA4yYr/s1810/iiif-service_pnp_highsm_10500_10518-full-pct_25-0-default.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1359" data-original-width="1810" height="270" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvTPfcCyLActOMNYFTkQVz5a_alhyvT2gddmf_NRquUKy5HjhI__pFQS-QneTLr8lCMIrGP0Gr24yhemE3mLqCMrb6qZRVsk18baJKRmHXwXc395yzOfAuwmzQ54-M18tEeIE7vPhOUdDNi1IWtof4cd6M8ocvWw4iiTaiAcPGr0P8P3j-EdsEziiA4yYr/w361-h270/iiif-service_pnp_highsm_10500_10518-full-pct_25-0-default.jpg" width="361" /></a></div><br /><h1 style="text-align: left;"><br /></h1>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-61112264657509969332023-08-31T15:52:00.002-07:002023-08-31T15:52:20.838-07:00Watch David E. Mastagni's Oral Argument in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on Behalf of Ventura County Deputies and Firefighters<p>In <i>Anthony Sanders, et al. v. County of Ventura</i>, current and former members of the Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (“DSA”) and the Ventura County Professional Firefighters’ Association (“PFA”) filed an FLSA lawsuit challenging the County's unlawful pay practice of imposing an involuntary deduction from the earnings of employees who waive health insurance in order to defray the benefit costs of other employees. The suit alleges the fee constitutes an illegal kickback of wages. The County unilaterally imposed this "Opt-out Fee", which subsumes most of the Flexible Benefit Allowance (“Allowance”) paid to the Plaintiffs as income. </p><p>On August 22, 2023, David E. Mastagni argued this case before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This appeal seeks reversal of the district court’s error in granting the County's cross-motion for summary judgment/adjudication based entirely upon its finding that the involved Flexible Benefits Plans were “bona fide” and the County’s cash-in-lieu payments were “incidental.” The bona fide dispute is not dispositive of the claims raised in Plaintiffs/Appellants’ lawsuit. </p><p>The County admitted that the opt-out fee is first paid to Plaintiff as gross income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 61 and reflected in Plaintiffs’ paystubs as earnings. David argued that because the full Allowance is paid directly to Plaintiffs prior to the deduction of an “Opt-out Fee”, the fee cannot be excluded from the regular rate of pay. In short, plaintiffs contend direct payments to employees who waive health insurance, the opt out fee cannot be excluded from the employee’s “regular rate of pay” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(4). <i>Flores v. City of San Gabriel</i>, 824 F.3d 890, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2117 (2017). </p><p>However, this action is primarily a dispute over whether the fee constitutes an unlawful deduction for which Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution. Because the FLSA involves overtime claims, the suit seeks restitution by alleging no overtime can be deemed paid until these Opt-out Fee deductions are repaid. The FLSA also prohibits deductions unless they are voluntary and the employer derives no benefit from the deduction. Here, Plaintiffs contend the deductions are involuntary and benefit the County by defraying its labor costs. Finally, the FLSA requires overtime rates to be calculated on a pre-deduction basis. 29 C.F.R. § 531.37(b). </p><p>Watch the oral arguments below:</p><p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="392" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/EPvlbreyUOQ" width="470" youtube-src-id="EPvlbreyUOQ"></iframe></div><br /><p><br /></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-76123764410008883402023-08-18T11:18:00.000-07:002023-08-18T11:18:41.742-07:00Mastagni Holstedt Partner Joins PERB Advisory Committee<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyka8ZA4FoaHrjLCmtcp1EK2fOz7PAhCHN134G61Pocbs-oOkTr10N1-zbf_zzJr4NubVsrLn0o-B-xjkJLX_muK_4oFkB7dryAt6R_e9M7ICoaRp7-PmD7butZ3mXMscU634L32g02bGJKs1orR743FEdwHg8JvreJgdQzvBlmJRy9hgetTQbxyXf5dPp/s300/Attorney_Kathleen_Mastagni.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="300" data-original-width="200" height="298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjyka8ZA4FoaHrjLCmtcp1EK2fOz7PAhCHN134G61Pocbs-oOkTr10N1-zbf_zzJr4NubVsrLn0o-B-xjkJLX_muK_4oFkB7dryAt6R_e9M7ICoaRp7-PmD7butZ3mXMscU634L32g02bGJKs1orR743FEdwHg8JvreJgdQzvBlmJRy9hgetTQbxyXf5dPp/w198-h298/Attorney_Kathleen_Mastagni.jpg" width="198" /></a></div><div style="text-align: left;">Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm, a partner in our Labor and Employment Department, has been asked to join the Public Employment Relations Board’s (PERB) Advisory Committee for its Panel of Neutrals Listing.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">PERB is a quasi-judicial administrative agency that administers and enforces collective bargaining statutes like the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and resolves claims of unfair labor practices. PERB also oversees the factfinding process, which involves a three-person panel that hears evidence on negotiation issues in dispute and provides findings of fact and recommendations for settlement. This process is similar to interest arbitration proceedings in that the panel can conduct investigations and hold hearings, but it is non-binding.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">PERB’s Advisory Committee for its Panel of Neutrals Listing reviews and provides feedback on applications from those wishing to join PERB’s list of neutral factfinders. The Advisory Committee is composed of both union and management representatives. Kathleen, a well-known union advocate at PERB, will have the opportunity to provide labor’s perspective on those seeking to serve as factfinders with PERB. Once approved, the factfinder may be chosen to serve on a factfinding panel.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Kathleen is honored PERB asked her to participate on the Advisory Committee and looks forward to being involved in the process and assisting in growing the list of neutrals with expertise and experience in labor law.</div><p></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2e_tvnSSmNNVFry9KsfAGqSDUEd5addeUwSUg-vUUtMF62XEfLgb5YdJ3jw-xsxfBY1lVml9uaFRB17g79SCH3AkIi0DvzLIWdFEoedtgOnBCv88M3Ku_MXvCpM1Wfoby6ihW2TByp9tpMnJwqDCn4x3y0VUwrek4tqYC2n3UZxwWhxvS3CHL4ZqtL_8B/s406/PERB-header-image.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="153" data-original-width="406" height="121" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2e_tvnSSmNNVFry9KsfAGqSDUEd5addeUwSUg-vUUtMF62XEfLgb5YdJ3jw-xsxfBY1lVml9uaFRB17g79SCH3AkIi0DvzLIWdFEoedtgOnBCv88M3Ku_MXvCpM1Wfoby6ihW2TByp9tpMnJwqDCn4x3y0VUwrek4tqYC2n3UZxwWhxvS3CHL4ZqtL_8B/s320/PERB-header-image.png" width="320" /></a></div><p></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-49829020577973196102023-07-26T16:41:00.001-07:002023-07-26T16:41:46.041-07:00Ninth Circuit Rules Use of Deadly Force Objectively Reasonable to Stop Suspect Pointing a Replica Gun at Officers<h1 style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUrovflDnAywyAAMKvc2cC0mdHJIi9k_QtPiUeleCzy1WICPl2RvBFGHZrbsxSro8aCPwWUmOw-Jpd6mJGLLNsv0UoHZ15oZebq7bQIWL3k0SmhLT5Quk8ujQ-2Snc6Q-kAHNyaP2TzQu6uL7t8IFtYvI9olhNs92Z7vuZt_PjkaamQkSgeH0K2FIZkp0Q/s533/Police%20Line%20Do%20Not%20Cross%203.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="299" data-original-width="533" height="189" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUrovflDnAywyAAMKvc2cC0mdHJIi9k_QtPiUeleCzy1WICPl2RvBFGHZrbsxSro8aCPwWUmOw-Jpd6mJGLLNsv0UoHZ15oZebq7bQIWL3k0SmhLT5Quk8ujQ-2Snc6Q-kAHNyaP2TzQu6uL7t8IFtYvI9olhNs92Z7vuZt_PjkaamQkSgeH0K2FIZkp0Q/w335-h189/Police%20Line%20Do%20Not%20Cross%203.jpg" width="335" /></a></div></h1><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 107%;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"> Amid increased scrutinization of
deadly officer involved shootings, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
vindicated the objectionably reasonable standard in analyzing lawsuits
involving the use of deadly force by peace officers. In <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/05/31/22-15761.pdf"><i>Estate of Strickland
v. Nevada County</i>, 69 F.4th 614 (9th Cir. 2023)</a><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 107%;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/05/31/22-15761.pdf">[1]</a></span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/070523%20Blog%20Post%20from%20BG/230726%20DEM%20Edits.docx#_ftn1" title=""><!--[endif]--></a></span>,
the Ninth Circuit </span><span style="background: white; font-size: 12pt;">affirmed the district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
state law, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they shot and
killed Gabriel Strickland after he pointed a black airsoft rifle in their
direction.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"> The Court held that the responding officers’ use of
deadly force was justifiable and objectionably reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances, even though Mr. Strickland was in possession of a replica
firearm.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>On January 1, 2020, dispatch received
reports that a man was walking on a residential road with “what appeared to be
a shotgun” slung over his shoulder. Officers from Grass Valley Police
Department and Deputies from Nevada County Sheriff’s Office responded to the
scene. The responding personnel recognized Strickland and knew he was homeless,
suffered from mental health issues, and had been released from custody days
before. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>The officers maneuvered their patrol
vehicles around Strickland and surrounded him with service weapons drawn. The
officers immediately ordered him to put down the gun. Strickland held the gun
away from his body, said, “It’s a BB gun,” and then slapped the gun with his
hand, making a noise that sounded more like plastic than metal. The officers
continued to yell commands to Strickland to drop the gun and that they could
not confirm the firearm was fake. Strickland pointed to the orange tip on the
barrel. One officer responded, “You could have painted that…we don’t want to
kill you.” Strickland replied, “I’m not doing nothing wrong.” Until then,
Strickland stood with the barrel pointing at the ground.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span> </span>One
officer tried tasing Strickland but failed to attach and disarm him. Seconds
later, Strickland lowered the barrel toward the officers, who then shot and
killed Strickland. Strickland’s Estate filed suit alleging excessive force under
42 U.S.C. section 1983 and California law.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"><span> </span>The
Appellate Court considered whether the officers here employed an “objectively
unreasonable” amount of force under the “totality of the circumstances.” </span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">See Brooks v. Clark County</i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">, 828 F.3d
910, 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court explained that this inquiry required
balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at
stake.” </span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">Graham v. Connor, </i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).</span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"> </i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">These
factors included:</span></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">1.<span style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">“The type and amount of force inflicted.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">2.<span style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">“The severity of the crime at issue.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">3.<span style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">“Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.25in;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">4.<span style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">“Whether the suspect was actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></p></blockquote></blockquote><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> <span> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">The appellate court noted that other factors
should be considered, including “the availability of less intrusive
alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given, and
whether it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used
force against was emotionally disturbed.” </span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">S.B.
v. County of San Diego</i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">, 864 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017).</span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">The
Ninth Circuit explained that of all the use-of-force factors,</span><b style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"> </b><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">the “most important” is whether the
suspect posed an “immediate threat.” </span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">Bryan
v. MacPherson</i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010); </span><i style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">Mattos v. Agarano</i><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The
Court stated that because this inquiry was about objective reasonableness, “the
objective facts must indicate that the suspect posed an immediate threat to the
officer or a member of the public.”</span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">While
it is “clearly established that shooting a nonthreatening suspect would violate
the suspect’s constitutional rights”, the Court noted that it was well-settled
under Ninth Circuit precedent that lethal force is justified if an officer has
“probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a significant threat of death
or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”</span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">The
Court also explained that officers can have reasonable but mistaken beliefs regarding
the facts establishing the existence of an immediate threat, and “in those
situations, courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.” <i>Saucier v. Katz</i>, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001).</span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 14pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">Thus, the Constitution even allows for an
officer’s action that resulted from a reasonable “mistake of fact.” <i>Pearson
v. Callahan</i>, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). When an officer’s “use of force is
based on a mistake of fact, courts ask whether a reasonable officer would have
or should have accurately
perceived that fact.” <i>Torres v. City of
Madera</i>, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).</span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span><a name="_Hlk136782636"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The pivotal moment occurred when
Strickland pointed the replica gun in the officers’ direction. At that point,
they had “probable cause to believe that Strickland posed a significant threat
of death or serious physical injury” to themselves, and it became objectively
reasonable for them to use lethal force. The Court noted that when a suspect
points a gun in an officer’s direction, “the Constitution undoubtedly entitles
the officer to respond with deadly force.” <i>Citing</i>, <i>George v. Morris</i>, 736 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013).</span></span></a></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">The analysis remains the
same regardless of whether the weapon turned out to be a replica, given the
officers’ reasonable belief that Strickland possessed a real firearm. Even in
the light most favorable to Strickland, he was carrying a replica gun,
disregarded multiple warnings to drop it, and pointed it at the officers. Therefore,
under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the
officers to believe</span><b style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"> </b><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;">Strickland posed
an immediate threat even though he only had a replica gun. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the officers’ mistaken belief that Strickland possessed a
dangerous weapon was reasonable, and they were justified in the use of deadly
force when he pointed it at them. </span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Practical
Implications: <o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span> </span>Even in
the current political climate in California, this decision upholds long-standing due process and self-defense standards pertaining to the use of deadly
force. Thankfully, the appellate court recognized that officers do not have to
wait until they are fired upon to confirm that a weapon is real, before they
can respond to a perceived deadly threat.</span></p><p style="margin: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="color: #292929; font-size: 12pt; letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimlvUXxhzipcLIh_GteRdsQa_wsGK9lk07-hiZ03S192CPO6DKddGne6F4GvB2jdj-D-9NED-cXA39nVQ_vNe6rEwmiXC2ZfWXeAIun_T_rNS4TPUQgUsXo1VvETevE2ePVLyrXWVsKkYS27gfbf3mGF_SxUPCflrqfbeZ0jtPY_CtwDdv__lUCuzf2sFV/s775/Strickland%20BWC%20footage%20.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="395" data-original-width="775" height="273" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimlvUXxhzipcLIh_GteRdsQa_wsGK9lk07-hiZ03S192CPO6DKddGne6F4GvB2jdj-D-9NED-cXA39nVQ_vNe6rEwmiXC2ZfWXeAIun_T_rNS4TPUQgUsXo1VvETevE2ePVLyrXWVsKkYS27gfbf3mGF_SxUPCflrqfbeZ0jtPY_CtwDdv__lUCuzf2sFV/w536-h273/Strickland%20BWC%20footage%20.png" width="536" /></a></div><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><div style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: x-small; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial; font-size: x-small;">Photo from ABC10's news coverage from January 24, 2020. </span></div></span><p></p><p class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; mso-pagination: none; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><br /></span></p><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/070523%20Blog%20Post%20from%20BG/230726%20DEM%20Edits.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 11pt;"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 11pt;"> <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/05/31/22-15761.pdf">Link to the Ninth Circuit Opinion in <i>Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County</i></a> <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 11pt;"><br /></span></p>
</div>
</div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-70034846304663009832023-07-14T14:22:00.004-07:002023-07-17T14:05:09.282-07:00David E. Mastagni Testified Against Bill (SB 519) Allowing “Local Detention Monitor” to Interrogate Peace Officers<p>On July 11, 2023, David E. Mastagni testified before the
Assembly Public Safety Committee to oppose SB 519 on behalf of PORAC. David focused the opposition on the powers
this Bill would grant a newly created “Local Detention Monitor” to impair labor
contracts and interrogate local peace officers regarding in-custody deaths
without regard to their rights against self-incrimination.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="266" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wzdY1VCOoHk" width="320" youtube-src-id="wzdY1VCOoHk"></iframe></div><p>As introduced by Senate President pro Tempore Toni G. Atkins,
SB 519 would have provided that a board of supervisors may establish a
department of corrections and rehabilitation to be headed by an executive
officer appointed by the board and thus facilitate boards of supervisors
cutting corners to reduce labor costs by supplanting sworn jail personnel and
replacing them with lesser trained civilians.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>SB 519 also provides that notwithstanding the general confidentiality of
peace officer records or any other law, records relating to an investigation
conducted by the local detention facility involving a death incident and any
local detention facility personnel records shall not be confidential and shall
be a public record.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">PORAC opposed the sections of the Bill facilitating
civilianization of local jails.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>PORAC did
not oppose the disclosure of records relating to an investigation conducted by
the local detention facility involving a death incident, but did raise concerns
with the language of this section.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Bill was amended on July 5, 2023.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These amendments addressed PORAC’s disclosure
concerns and eliminated the provisions for civilianizing local jails.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the amendments replaced these
sections of the Bill with new language establishing a statewide Local Detention
Monitor with expansive powers including the ability to compel local employees
to submit to interrogations without provision of their Constitutional
rights.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The bill states, “[t]he Local
Detention Monitor may require any employee or contractor of the local detention
facility to be interviewed … Any employee or contractor requested to be
interviewed shall comply….” <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thus, the Bill purports to force employees to waive their 5<sup>th</sup>
Amendment Rights by mandating cooperation with no option to exercise the right
to remain silent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>By comparison, the
peace officer licensing statute (SB 2) states, “the lawful exercise of rights
granted under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or
any other law shall not be considered a failure to cooperate.” (Penal Code
Section 13510.8(b)(8).)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At the Public Safety Committee hearing, David explained that
PORAC does not oppose the establishment of a local detention oversight entity
with the authority to review in-custody death investigations, and to issue
reports and recommendations for improvements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>But PORAC does object to the authority granted the oversight entity because
those powers impair its members’ labor and Constitutional rights.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>David articulated PORAC’s concerns.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">F</span></span></span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">irst, the Bill expressly provides for the
impairment of existing labor contracts.</span></p><p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Second, the Bill purports to grant the monitor
the power to compel union members to submit to interrogations without proper
legal authority which is derived from the employment relationship or licensing
authority.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The compulsion to cooperate
in such investigations is based on the threat of discipline or loss of
license.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The Monitor has no employment
relationship nor licensing authority, and thus no power to compel cooperation
or testimony.</span></p><p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Third, the Bill violates employees’ right
against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment because in-custody death
investigations often involve potentially incriminating questions. In </span><i style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Lybarger
v. City of Los Angeles</i><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">, 40 Cal. 3d 822 (1985) our Supreme Court carefully
balanced public employers’ need to investigate against public employees’ 5th
Amendment rights by holding an </span><b style="text-indent: -0.25in;"><i>employer</i></b><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;"> can compel potentially
incriminating questions so long as the employee is granted immunity.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><i style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara</i><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;"> (2009)
45 Cal. 4th 704, 725 clarified that public entities cannot require “as a
condition of remaining on the job” that public employees “surrender his or her
right against criminal use of [such] statements.” </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span></p><p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Chief Legislative Advocate Randy Perry, David E. Mastagni
and Timothy K. Talbot intend to continue discussions with the author to address
the concerns raised at the hearing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Public Safety Labor Blog will provide updates on this important legislation. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">You can view the entire hearing here: </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" class="BLOG_video_class" height="266" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/GALWaS7K08g" width="320" youtube-src-id="GALWaS7K08g"></iframe></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><a href="https://youtu.be/GALWaS7K08g" target="_blank">Assembly Public Safety Committee, Tuesday, July 11, 2023</a><br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-57453780225394158372023-07-07T17:16:00.004-07:002023-07-07T17:17:36.040-07:00The California Supreme Court Denies Police Officers Broad Immunity Claims in Negligence Suit Alleging Officers Left Dead Body Exposed for Hours<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgRm49Q-bvHKZuWwLnOMc69ieYDLXQnrtxc1euHe0m6CEhxeG-NFQccwWGI41jSLP8x2N-MmK-BDUTYLu-JvRqTjAUY6CPkbOVlbQ_Kq_0r9WNqyqKkz6Ma2RQ47fZgaJwT6pi8GGv07uMLuMVxWkwd9joadwGzYFbZWoIX3M5pRy4UVMcWXEfBWafWipYU" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque" data-original-height="630" data-original-width="960" height="263" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgRm49Q-bvHKZuWwLnOMc69ieYDLXQnrtxc1euHe0m6CEhxeG-NFQccwWGI41jSLP8x2N-MmK-BDUTYLu-JvRqTjAUY6CPkbOVlbQ_Kq_0r9WNqyqKkz6Ma2RQ47fZgaJwT6pi8GGv07uMLuMVxWkwd9joadwGzYFbZWoIX3M5pRy4UVMcWXEfBWafWipYU=w400-h263" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p> <span style="color: #0e101a;"> On June 22, 2023, the
California Supreme Court held Government Code § 821.6 does not provide broad
immunity to police officers for allegedly negligent actions in the course of a
law enforcement investigation. [</span><span style="color: #0e101a;"><a href="https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S269672.PDF" style="font-style: italic;">Leon v. County of Riverside, 2023 WL 4112144</a>]</span></p><p><span style="color: #0e101a;">In </span><i style="color: #0e101a;">Leon</i><span style="color: #0e101a;">, the spouse of a man shot and
killed in his driveway sued the responding peace officers for negligent
infliction of emotional distress for allegedly leaving his naked body exposed
to the public for eight hours.</span><span style="color: #0e101a;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a;">The Court
confirmed that while other provisions of the Government Claims Act may confer
immunity for certain investigatory actions, , section 821.6 of the Government
Claims Act does not broadly immunize police officers or other public employees
for any and all harmful actions they may take in the course of investigating
crime.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;">
José Leon was shot and killed in a driveway near his home. Upon arrival
at the scene, Riverside County Sherriff’s deputies heard additional shots. They
moved Mr. Leon’s body behind a vehicle so that they could attempt to revive him
but were unsuccessful. The movement caused Mr. Leon’s pants to drop to his
ankles and expose his naked body. Mr. Leon’s body remained uncovered for
approximately eight hours while officers searched for the shooter and
investigated the shooting. The officers ultimately determined that the shooter
had killed himself shortly after killing José. José’s wife, Dora Leon, sued the
County of Riverside for negligent infliction of emotional distress.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;">
During summary judgment proceedings, the County of Riverside
argued that its employees were immune under section 821.6 for “all conduct
related to the investigation and filing of charges.” Because the suit arose
from steps taken while investigating a homicide, the County argued, both the
employees and their employer were immune from liability. More specifically, the
County’s position was that injuries caused by police investigations qualify
because of the close relationship between investigations and prosecutions. The
trial court agreed and entered judgment for the County. The Court of Appeal
affirmed that relying on a line of appellate cases that previously
“consistently construed section 821.6 as immunizing a public employee from
liability for any injury-causing act or omission in the course of the
institution and prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding,
including an investigation that may precede the institution of any such
proceeding.” <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><strong><u><span style="color: #0e101a;">Supreme Court
Disagrees with Previous Court of Appeal Decisions Regarding Claims Act Immunity
Under Section 821.6 of the Government Claims Act:<o:p></o:p></span></u></strong></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;">
The Supreme Court granted review and held that section 821.6 of the
Government Claims Act protects public employees from liability only for
initiating or prosecuting official proceedings, thereby disapproving the prior
line of appellate cases. Due to the fact the provision of the Government Claims
Act relied on by the County did not apply, the County was not immune from the
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court reasoned
that while many Courts of Appeal extended section 821.6 immunity to claims for
injuries caused by official conduct other than the initiation or prosecution of
a proceeding, including claims of harm stemming from police investigations,
that conclusion is inconsistent with section 821.6’s text and history, as well
as Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the language of 821.6 does not cover
investigatory acts because an investigation does not constitute the initiation
or continued prosecution of official proceedings. The Court also found that the
Legislature recognized, and the courts should respect, the traditional
distinction between mere investigation and the prosecution of legal action. The
Court explained that the County’s argument that injuries caused by police investigations
qualify because of the close relationship between investigations and
prosecutions was at odds with the plain meaning of the statutory language. The
Court also highlighted the fact that investigations often do not lead to the
institution or prosecution of any proceedings, which is what happened in this
case. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;">
Finally, the legislative history also contains no suggestion that
the statute was also designed to create broad immunity for police officers
engaged in investigation. Thus, when a claim of injury does not stem from the
initiation or prosecution of proceedings, section 821.6 immunity does not
apply. Due to the fact that section 821.6 prosecution immunity was the
only defense addressed by the trial court and Court of Appeal, the decision did
not address other immunity defenses raised by the County, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;">
This ruling has limited impact given the legislative changes under
Senate Bill 2, which became effective January 1, 2022.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Under S.B. 2, the state immunity provisions
in sections 821.6, 844.6, and 845.6 of the Government Claims Act no longer
apply to any cause of action brought against any peace officer, custodial
officer, or directly against a public entity that employs them. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the decision is important as it
demonstrates that the Supreme Court of California is inclined to take up issues
that will narrow the immunities and protections previously available to public
employees.<o:p></o:p></span></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-57056319945891406402023-06-16T16:00:00.003-07:002023-06-28T11:25:49.670-07:00<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: times;"> Qualified Immunity and Deadly Force Warnings: Ninth Circuit Votes Sua Sponte to Rehear Denial of Qualified Immunity for Officer Who Shot Suspect Beating His Partner</span></h1><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span>The qualified immunity defense battle continues as the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to rehear the case involving Los Angeles
police officer, Edward Agdeppa, and his use of deadly force stemming from a
2018 fatal police shooting. Agdeppa faces a federal civil rights action filed
by the decedent's mother, who argues that Agdeppa’s use of deadly force was
objectively unreasonable and violated the decedent's clearly established Fourth
Amendment rights. Agdeppa has faced legal challenges concerning whether or not
qualified immunity is an applicable defense protecting him from any personal
liability in the matter.</span></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span><span style="font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;">Qualified immunity is a legal concept that is used to protect police
officers and other governmental officials from lawsuits over harm caused while
carrying out their official duties within the law. Qualified immunity protects
government officers from </span><span style="color: #212121; font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;">§</span><span style="font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;"> 1983 suits unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly
established.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span></span></span></a></span></span></p><p style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">The lower court ruled
against Agdeppa denying a qualified immunity defense “because a jury could decide that Agdeppa’s use of deadly force
violated clearly established law.”</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[2]</span></span></span></a><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">
Agdeppa appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, who issued a 2-1
decision upholding the denial of qualified immunity. The Court, however, agreed to rehear the case and ultimately tossed out their previous December
ruling.</span></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"></p><p style="text-align: left;"></p><h2 style="text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQ9XPMlVajNiAzLIkkzZ4GsnJ61LNjqK5WjcY2emmJE9QEwvVGj2ER9xQOzM-mI144ul3LeAlmPu_geTURMrD8RKTu5gKF9s3oso3OowdIiSJ7QWYDOblrbJgMn0es64MVcQ1LY3RhzT2tf1rHJJUbC4dpzg9EFibwZOU6vy9KYqfv5XVSCrJ-Rj5QzQ/s840/Agdeppa%20Body%20Cam%20Photo.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="560" data-original-width="840" height="281" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQ9XPMlVajNiAzLIkkzZ4GsnJ61LNjqK5WjcY2emmJE9QEwvVGj2ER9xQOzM-mI144ul3LeAlmPu_geTURMrD8RKTu5gKF9s3oso3OowdIiSJ7QWYDOblrbJgMn0es64MVcQ1LY3RhzT2tf1rHJJUbC4dpzg9EFibwZOU6vy9KYqfv5XVSCrJ-Rj5QzQ/w422-h281/Agdeppa%20Body%20Cam%20Photo.jpg" width="422" /></a></div><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;"><h2 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Facts of the Case: </span></h2><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></div></span></h2><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>The case begins in October
2018, when officers responded to a report of an aggressive trespasser that was
assaulting staff at a Hollywood gym. Upon arrival, officers activated their
body-worn cameras and met a combative, naked, and six-foot-one-inch, 280-pound
Albert Dorsey in the gym’s locker room. The responding officers –
five-foot-five-inch, 145-pound Officer Rodriguez and five-foot-one-inch,
145-pound Officer Agdeppa – confronted Dorsey, asking him to get dressed and
leave. Dorsey refused, and a violent altercation ensued.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>Officer Agdeppa
successfully secured one handcuff on Dorsey but failed to cuff the other wrist.
The officers tried various tactical maneuvers to secure Dorsey, including using
arm, finger, and wrist locks. The body-cam video shows that Dorsey used his
size to thwart the smaller officers’ attempts to handcuff him. As the struggle
intensified, the body-cams were knocked to the floor. The remaining encounter was
not caught on video, but the cameras continued to record the audio. </span></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span><span style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>Agdeppa alleges that the struggle turned more violent
after the body-cams fell. Dorsey was repeatedly told to stop resisting, but broke
free. Despite both officers deploying their tasers multiple times, Dorsey
continued resisting. Agdeppa attests that Dorsey repeatedly struck him in the
face and knocked him into a wall, disorienting him and causing him to drop his
taser. A security guard witness corroborates that Dorsey repeatedly punched
Agdeppa in the face. Agdeppa then witnessed Dorsey straddling Officer Rodriguez
and “pummeling” her head with a “flurry of punches” while gaining control of
her taser. Agdeppa drew out his gun and ordered Dorsey to stop, but Dorsey
continued pummeling Rodriguez. It was at this point that Agdeppa fired five
shots to stop Dorsey, who subsequently died from his injuries. </span></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: times;"> Following the shooting,
Dorsey’s family sued Agdeppa and have been quick to accuse the officers of
feeling threatened by Dorsey because “he was big and black.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
It’s no surprise that anti-police activists have used Dorsey’s death in their
plea for police reform and in their efforts to pull back the scope of qualified
immunity, which they see as being the single largest barrier to police
accountability.<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[4]</span></span></span></a></span></span></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span><span style="line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></span></div><h2 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;">Ninth Circuit Agrees with Lower Court, Rules Against Agdeppa – Limiting Scope of Qualified Immunity Defense </span></h2><div><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>In December 2022, the Ninth Circuit rejected Agdeppa’s
request for qualified immunity for two main reasons: (1) in the majority’s
opinion, there were too many factual discrepancies surrounding the moments
immediately before the shooting, and (2) Agdeppa – despite repeatedly ordering
Dorsey to stop – failed to give a clear deadly force warning at a time when, in
the majority’s opinion, it was practical to do so. </span></div><div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: times;"> The majority opinion, written by Obama-appointed Judge
Morgan Christen, argued that a reasonable jury could reject the officers’ accounts
of the shooting because there were significant discrepancies between the
officers’ accounts and other evidence in the record. The majority focused on
one discrepancy involving a security guard witness, who had attested that
Dorsey was holding Agdeppa’s arm when the shots were fired. This statement
seems to contradict Agdeppa’s account of being six-to-eight feet away from
Dorsey at the time of firing. This discrepancy could allow a jury to question
Agdeppa’s credibility, and according to the Court, “summary judgment is not
appropriate in a deadly force case if the plaintiff’s claim turns on an
officer’s credibility.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
This is because “courts must take special care to ‘ensure that the officer is
not taking advantage of the fact that the witness most likely to contradict his
story – the person shot dead – is unable to testify.’”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[6]</span></span></span></a></span></span></div><div style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><span><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a></span><span style="font-family: times;"> The dissenting opinion, however, correctly pointed out what the majority
glossed over – that based on video surveillance, the security guards were not
even in the locker room at the time of firing, a fact that comes from the Los
Angeles Board of Police Commissioners’ (BOPC) report. Moreover, two independent
witnesses verified the officers’ account.<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
As the dissent correctly notes, the course of events presented in the BOPC
report, of which the majority heavily relies on, largely conforms to the
officers’ account. The key facts are not disputed. And although the majority
relied “on portions of the BOPC report that criticize the officers…for failing
to use de-escalation tactics earlier in the encounter,” the BOPC report still –
as the dissent correctly emphasizes again – “unequivocally supports the
officers” because it substantiates the claim that the officers’ belief “that
there was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time of
the [shooting] was objectively reasonable.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> </span></span></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: justify;">
</p><div><span style="font-family: times;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--></span><div><div id="ftn1">
</div>
<h2 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;">On Agdeppa's Alleged Failure to Give a Deadly Force Warning </span></h2><div><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>Disputed facts aside, the question still remains regarding whether or not
it was clearly established that the officers in this situation were required by
law to give a further warning before using deadly force; “remarkably, the
majority says yes.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[9]</span></span></span></a><span style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"> The
body-cam audio from the moments immediately before the shooting is muffled, and
whatever is said by the officers in that moment is unclear. The majority
concluded therefore that there was no evidence that Agdeppa warned Dorsey that
deadly force would be used if Dorsey kept resisting.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span> </span>The majority noted that the court “has long held that the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to warn before using deadly force when practicable.”</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[10]</span></span></span></a><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">
And in the majority’s view, it was practical for Agdeppa to give this warning.
Agdeppa never argued that it wasn’t practical, and the fact that he had time to
yell out other directives shows that he had time to warn Dorsey that he was
resorting to deadly force. Ironically, the Court makes this argument while simultaneously
recognizing that the officers’ actions should not be judged with 20/20
hindsight. The majority also ignores the repeated de-escalation attempts made by
the officers prior to the fatal shots. What about Dorsey’s personal
responsibility here? He was given multiple opportunities to stand down, and “a
suspect in this situation either knows or should know what can happen next.”</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[11]</span></span></span></a><span style="text-indent: 0.5in;">
Relatedly, the Court never specifies what type of deadly force warning would
have been more appropriate, and as the dissent recognizes, the Circuit’s cases
“certainly do not clearly establish the types of situations in which a warning
is ‘practicable,’ what form the warning must take, or how specific it must be.”</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[12]</span></span></span></a></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span> The dissent noted that Agdeppa saw the suspect "pummeling" his partner with punches while she was laying in the fetal position and believed he would kill her unless stopped. The dissent disagreed that it was practicable to warn that deadly force would be used and objected to the majority's requirement that the warning be so specific and precise that the suspect has no doubt deadly force is about to be used. The dissent noted that the majority's standard could prevent officers from surviving such violent encounters by requiring officers to hit a "pause button" amidst an escalating confrontation to "recite some yet-undisclosed, court created warning script." </span><span style="font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;">As the dissent properly concludes, “the uncertainty the majority invites…could
make the difference in whether officers like Agdeppa and Rodriguez make it out
of a violent altercation alive.”</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="font-family: times; text-indent: 0.5in;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[14]</span></span></span></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;">Takeaways </span></h2><div><span style="font-family: times; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"> Thankfully, the Ninth Circuit panel that heard this case voted sua sponte to grant panel rehearing, so the majority and dissent are withdrawn and a new decision shall be issued in the near future.</span></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span> </span>The prior opinion had the potential to create rather ominous consequences and implied
that the practicality of a warning will always be a question of fact. This
creates an avenue to deny qualified immunity in every case in which an officer
fails to give this warning. And the Court’s readiness to disregard the Supreme
Court’s directive against viewing deadly force incidents with 20/20 hindsight
is equally alarming. </span></span></div><div id="ftn3" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span><br /></span></span></div><div id="ftn3" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><span><span> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: times;">The takeaways here are twofold: (1) judges may trend away
from granting qualified immunity to officers when there are significant
discrepancies in the record and especially when the officer fails to give a
deadly force warning, and (2) officers should be hyper-aware of their
pre-shooting conduct as that – rather than the suspect’s behavior – will be the
focus of a legal action. </span></div><div id="ftn3" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;"><br /></span></div><div id="ftn3" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: times;">To avoid second-guessing, officers
should, if feasible, warn a violent offender prior to escalating to deadly
force.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="font-family: times;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; line-height: 107%;">[15]</span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: times;">
It is best if the officer can specify what kind of force will be used and that
said force will be used should the suspect continue resisting.</span></div></div></div></div><div id="ftn2"><div>
<div id="ftn1"><span style="font-family: times;"><br />
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div></div><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<span style="font-family: times;"><!--[endif]-->
</span><div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-56254/20-56254-2022-12-30.pdf?ts=1672419668"><i>Smith
v. Agdeppa </i>(9<sup>th</sup> Circ., Dec. 30, 2022) 2022 WL 17999612</a> at page
41, citing <i>District of Columbia v. Wesby, </i>138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[2]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>at pg. 3.</span></p><p class="MsoFootnoteText"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[3]</span></span></span></a> Cindy Chang, “Fatal shooting by Officer at 24 Hour Fitness violated LAPD policy, Police Commission rules,” <i>Los Angeles Times </i>(September 17, 2019). See <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-17/fatal-shooting-at-24-hour-fitness-violated-lapd-policy-police-commission-rules">https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-17/fatal-shooting-at-24-hour-fitness-violated-lapd-policy-police-commission-rules</a></span></p>
</div>
</div><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[4]</span></span></span></a> Kevin Rector, “9<sup>th</sup> Circuit rejects ‘qualified immunity’ as reason to toss LAPD gym shooting case,” <i>Los Angeles Times </i>(December 30, 2022). See <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-12-30/9th-circuit-lapd-gym-shooting-case">https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-12-30/9th-circuit-lapd-gym-shooting-case</a></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[5]</span></span></span></a> <i>Smith v. Agdeppa </i>(9<sup>th</sup> Circ., Dec. 30, 2022) at page 15.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[6]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid. </i></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[7]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid</i> at page 24.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[8]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>at page 34. </span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[9]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid. </i></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[10]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>at page 3, 5 citing <i>Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, </i>747 F.3d 789, 794 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2014). The Court also emphasized the U.S. Supreme Court standard from <i>Tennessee v. Garner</i>, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) which declared that under the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment, if practicable under the circumstances, a warning should be given that deadly force is going to be used.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[11]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>citing the dissent at page 47.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[12]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>citing the dissent at page 45. </span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[13]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid </i>citing the dissent at page 49.</span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[14]</span></span></span></a> <i>Ibid. </i></span></p><p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: times;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/swalters/Desktop/SAW%20RESOURCES/MANAGEMENT%20TASKS/Blog/Agdeppa%20Blog%20Post%20Draft%20(CT%20Edits).docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="line-height: 14.2667px;">[15]</span></span></span></a> See also Mike Callahan, “Ninth Circuit in split decision rejects qualified immunity for LAPD cop…” <i>Police1.com (</i>April 12, 2023). </span></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-355497698359355512023-06-02T18:43:00.003-07:002023-06-05T08:36:34.984-07:00PORAC Files Ninth Circuit Amicus Brief in Boland v. Bonta Supporting Injunction Against Unsafe Handgun Act<p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="line-height: 107%;"><br />On June 2, 2023<span style="font-style: normal;">, Amici Curiae</span>
the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California
State Sheriffs’ Association (CSSA), the California Police Chiefs' Association
(CPCA), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), and the California
Reserve Peace Officers Association (CRPOA) filed a <a href="https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/2023-06-02-Brief-of-Amicus-Curiae-Peace-Officers-Research-Assoc-of-CA-et-al.2251340.1.pdf" target="_blank">Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Amici Curiae Brief in <i>Boland v. Bonta</i></a>. <br /></span></p><p style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj21q2RRJroV8Yo4XH87hoNJ9LvQM_Egc_2M5aOyQnJ73yS0v1k7mDs6P3d_zKYxY5CBFWRNhVzt4C5HcUXi276bIeoxX_PhuCaCPiku-1FgXS805IkyjCdyZz-LfwFJxeRgqvnbRqeri82QOQ87K_69rCvn2JdcJDtLpVlPy4pwGJwDnevT-KEaIt0mA/s882/bonta%20with%20gun%20screenshot%20.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="436" data-original-width="882" height="260" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj21q2RRJroV8Yo4XH87hoNJ9LvQM_Egc_2M5aOyQnJ73yS0v1k7mDs6P3d_zKYxY5CBFWRNhVzt4C5HcUXi276bIeoxX_PhuCaCPiku-1FgXS805IkyjCdyZz-LfwFJxeRgqvnbRqeri82QOQ87K_69rCvn2JdcJDtLpVlPy4pwGJwDnevT-KEaIt0mA/w528-h260/bonta%20with%20gun%20screenshot%20.png" width="528" /></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">The <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Amici</span> brief supports
the <a href="https://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023-03-20-Order-Granting-MPI2240711.1.pdf" target="_blank">district’s court injunction</a> against the requirements of the Unsafe Handgun
Act (UHA) banning <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">semiautomatic
handguns without chamber load indicators, magazine detachment mechanisms and
microstamping technology</span>. </span>Amici argued the UHA’s 2006, 2007 and 2013
amendments violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, by prohibiting the sale of handguns without these features and requiring
the eventual removal of all grandfathered handguns currently on-roster.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">While
the UHA purports to ban unsafe handguns, it actually bars members of the public
from obtaining newer, improved, and safer generations of handguns already
approved through California’s Roster of Certified Handguns (“Roster”). <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">Since 2013, no new handgun has been added to the UHA Roster of approved
handguns. However, the statute requires the Department of Justice to remove
three grandfathered semiautomatic handguns per every one semiautomatic admitted
that satisfies all its operative technological feature requirements.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">The practical effect of the requirements under California’s definition
has been to label nearly every semiautomatic handgun in the United States
unsafe and to either immediately or eventually impose a ban.</span> <span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">Thus, the UHA
arbitrarily deems as “unsafe” the handguns that thousands of police officers in
the state use to protect society and to protect themselves on a daily basis. In
fact, most officers are issued newer generations of Glocks and Sig Sauers that
are not on the Roster. S.B. 377 would double-down on this contradiction by
prohibiting officers from personally purchasing the handguns they carry on-duty.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">If these weapons were truly unsafe, Amici
would never permit their issuance to their members.</span><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">Hypocritically, the UHA permits peace officers to carry handguns labeled
as unsafe while on-duty, when the weapon is most likely to be used for
self-defense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Modern semiautomatic handguns without chamber load indicators, magazine
detachment mechanisms and microstamping technology, like the ones prohibited
under the UHA, fit squarely within “the Second Amendment’s definition of
‘arms.’” <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">If California sincerely desired to reduce gun violence and promote
public safety, the Legislature would enact laws and fund enforcement to keep
guns out of the hands of prohibited persons and impose meaningful
consequences when guns are used in violent crime. Unfortunately, the
Legislature instead targets the self-defense rights of all Californians while
reducing or eliminating sentencing enhancements for committing gun crimes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These concerns over California’s lax enforcement
of serious gun crimes were recently echoed by the Association of Los Angeles
Deputy District Attorneys in “<a href="https://myemail.constantcontact.com/California-Could-Further-Reduce-Gun-Violence---If-Only-We-d-Do-It-.html?soid=1120011172453&aid=vfW6OhX3r28" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">California Could Further Reduce Gun Violence. If Only We’d Do It</a>.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;">As the brief concludes, “It is critical to the safety of the public
that we keep guns out of the hands of prohibited persons and disincentivize the
unlawful use of firearms through both enforcement and criminal enhancements.
The provisions of the UHA presented in this appeal do not further these
common-sense goals.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: normal; line-height: 107%;"><span>The <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Amici Curiae</span> brief
was filed by David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot.</span></span></p><p></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-70019541538379553902023-04-07T12:58:00.003-07:002023-04-07T14:15:41.792-07:00 Update on the POST Commission’s Implementation of SB 2 <div class="separator"><a href="https://pubs.porac.org/flipbook/porac-law-enforcement-news-april-2023/#flipbook-df_2247/1/" style="clear: right; display: inline !important; float: right; font-style: italic; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-align: center;"><img alt="PORAC Law Enforcement News – April 2023" class="entry-image" height="117" src="https://pubs.porac.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PORAC_0423_Cover.jpg" width="90" /></a></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"></p><i><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i>This article by David E. Mastagni was originally </i><i>published in the Legal Defense Fund update section of "</i><i>PORAC Law Enforcement News", April 2023,</i><i> pg. 37 & 38. </i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://pubs.porac.org/flipbook/porac-law-enforcement-news-april-2023/#flipbook-df_2247/37/">(</a><i><a href="https://pubs.porac.org/flipbook/porac-law-enforcement-news-april-2023/#flipbook-df_2247/37/">To read the article in the magazine click this link.</a></i><a href="https://pubs.porac.org/flipbook/porac-law-enforcement-news-april-2023/#flipbook-df_2247/37/">)</a></div></i><p></p><p> </p><p style="text-align: left;"></p><br /><div><br /></div><div>As most PORAC members already know, S.B. 2 requires the
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission to implement its
decertification process on January 1, 2023.
Given the short amount of time the Legislature afforded POST to enact
regulations on the process, hire investigators and begin applying such a
monumental change in law, many are asking how POST’s implementation is
progressing. We have some answers.</div><div><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In addition to amending the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, the
primary purpose of this Bill was to establish a POST licensing regime for peace
officers and decertification process that requires employee agencies to notify
POST of any allegations of serious misconduct by certified officers and the
outcome of the agency internal affairs investigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>POST must conduct its own investigation or
review of the agency investigation to determine if the officer’s license should
be suspended or revoked.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If action is taken,
POST must afford the officer multiple layers of due process. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To administer the decertification process, SB 2 mandates the
establishment of the Peace Officer Standards Accountability Division within POST.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Division must review investigations conducted
by employing agencies into serious misconduct and conduct additional
investigations as needed to evaluate whether potential grounds for suspension
or revocation of a peace officer’s certification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Division also reviews grounds for
decertification and makes findings as to whether grounds for action against an
officer’s certification exist. Affected officers are then notified their
findings and afforded the right to request review before the Peace Officer
Standards Accountability Advisory Board, comprised of 9 members.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Board holds public meetings and makes
recommendations to the POST Commission regarding any action against an
officer’s certification.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Ultimately, the Commission reviews the recommendations, the
entire investigatory record and any response from the officer before making a
final determination whether serious misconduct has been established by clear
and convincing evidence, and if so what action to take.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Any
suspension or decertification must be adopted by a 2/3rds vote of the Commission.
If action is to be taken against an officer's certification, the officer may
commence a formal evidentiary appeal which is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act.<o:p></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><b>Reporting</b></div>
<p class="MsoNormal">Within 10 days of receipt, agencies employing peace officers
must to report the allegations of serious misconduct to POST.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The notification duty may be triggered by a
misconduct complaint, finding from a civilian oversight body, sustained
disposition of an IA investigation, or civil judgment/settlement based on
alleged serious misconduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of concern,
many of the serious misconduct definitions, which are set forth in Penal Code
section 13510.8(b)(1)-(9), are vague and overbroad.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As a result, we expect that POST will be
deluged with notices of complaints and that agencies will construe the definitions
of serious misconduct disparately.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To date, POST has received approximately 3,500 case
notifications.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of those cases, about 68%
were retroactive cases. By July 1, 2023, agencies must report the above
qualifying events that occurred between January 1, 2020, and January 1, 2023.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>POST’s ability to suspend or revoke
retroactively based on serious misconduct that occurred prior to January 1,
2022 is limited to dishonesty, sexual assault, use of deadly force resulting in
death or serious bodily injury, or circumstances where the employing agency
makes a final determination regarding its investigation after January 1, 2022.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><img alt="Erik McGregor/LightRocket via Getty Images" border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="1000" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyJYbOrIeure1oRm8-NFy01siCLwF42AeE4IU0BOScKXWzF1ke-fW0lobZGDWC6bKnmfUNsSs5EN7sPFeDNWIGnbPis-znNGN_cuwB_g0-m1QO7B4uESj4uXwn0599EVSW2vgstULxcpeL8v8d-ha2UXL8Z0srK1VFfWQ3ZpzGs7Pw2hfaW-YVbzISwA/w400-h200/5ee534983f73704fca32b1a3.png" width="400" /></div><p class="MsoNormal">Although the POST investigation will still proceed, the Bill
permits officers to voluntary surrender their certificate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So far, POST has issued 1 Voluntary Surrender.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Two (2) former officers have been placed on
an ineligible status due to felony convictions, and twelve (12) Immediate
Temporary Suspensions (ITS) have been issued. ITS’s have been issued for
serious misconduct cases where there is a need to protect the public welfare by
placing the peace officer’s certification on a temporary hold while the full
adjudication process unfolds.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All
permanent decertification’s are required to be made available to the public and
can be found on the POST website at: https://post.ca.gov/Decertification-List.</p><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b>Investigations</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">SB2 has given POST the authority to review investigations
completed by law enforcement agencies and, as necessary, conduct additional
investigation into serious misconduct that may provide grounds for action
against a peace officer’s certification. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For now, POST will rely on the employing
agency to conduct the investigations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The employing agencies are responsible for conducting and completing
their internal investigations, as well as any complaints which POST receives
(POST will forward those complaints to the employing agencies).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once the investigations are completed and
findings issued, the information is forwarded to POST.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If additional investigation is warranted,
such investigation will be conducted after the conclusion of the agency
investigation. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">By statute, POBR only applies to the employing agency, and
so is not required to be afforded during the POST decertification
investigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While a legal concern, as
a practical matter the exclusion of POBR should not have a significant
practical impact.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The most applicable
section of POBR is Government Code section 3303, which sets forth the
procedural rights during an investigation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>These rights are afforded during agency investigations and POST appears
inclined not to conduct its own investigations for now.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Moreover, POST has stated it will provide
similar rights should it decide to interrogate an officer. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The appeal rights in POBR are unnecessary, as
S.B. 2 provides for fairly comparable appeal process.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">POST’s Legislative Liaison Meagan Poulos has advised that
currently, “POST is reviewing and analyzing Internal Affairs cases and felony
arrests, indictments and convictions received for serious misconduct.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In order to satisfy S.B. 2’s mandated
workload, POST is currently hiring law enforcement consultants who will be
analyzing cases submitted to POST to determine the extent of actionable serious
misconduct cases.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The State has approved
POST to hire 32 such consultants to staff its Peace Officer Standards
Accountability Division, as so far 14 of those positions have been filled.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ms. Poulos has indicated that POST is working
diligently to fill those positions as quickly as possible, but has experienced
significant challenges in hiring, as have agencies throughout the state. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>She further stated, “As an interim solution,
POST is hiring Retired Annuitants who meet the Law Enforcement Consultant
qualifications to help address the workload.”</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Presumably, if an agency investigation clears an officer,
POST should not take any action on the officer’s license.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The evidentiary standard applied by the
employing agency is preponderance of the evidence, whereas the evidentiary
standard for decertification is clear and convincing, which is higher.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, it would seem legally impossible for
POST to reach a contrary conclusion under a higher standard if the agency
investigation was properly conducted. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Another open question is how POST will treat allegations
that were sustained by the agency and then overturned in an administrative
appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Although the statute does not
directly address this issue, PORAC sponsored amendments to provide a tolling of
time limitation for POST to take action during the pendency of any
administrative appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The intent of the
amendment, coupled with an amendment requiring consideration of the entire
record not just the Board recommendation, was that POST consider the outcome of
any appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The same consideration of
the evidentiary standards applies to administrative appeals as well.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b>Advisory Board<u><o:p></o:p></u></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>The Board’s nine me</b>mbers are appointed by the Governor and
legislative leaders. The Board is comprised of: one current or former police
officer with command experience; one current or former peace officer with
management rank; two members of the public with experience working at a
nonprofit or academic institution; two members of the public with experience
working with community-based organizations related to police accountability;
two members of the public with strong consideration given to individuals who
have been subjected to wrongful use of force likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury by a peace officer or who are surviving family members of a
person killed by the wrongful use of deadly force by a peace officer; and one
attorney.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To date, there has been one appointment to the 9-member
Advisory Board that will recommend license revocations to the POST Commission
for consideration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The appointed Board
member is Lizzie Buchen. While serving as Director of Criminal Justice for ACLU
Northern California, she passionately strived to enact legislation on use of
force, as originally introduced in A.B. 931 and 392.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>During my advocacy on behalf of PORAC and its
membership I routinely met with Ms. Buchen and President pro Tempore of the
California Senate Toni G. Atkins to discuss our competing views on the force
legislation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>She was appointed to the position
for a person with experience working on police accountability with
community-based organizations.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">As the remaining eight positions are unfilled, anyone wishing
to <a href="https://www.gov.ca.gov/appointments/">apply for an appoint can follow this link.</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b>Serious Misconduct Definitions</b><u><o:p></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The Bill delegates authority to POST to further define
serious misconduct through administrative regulations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Several stakeholders, including PORAC, CAL
Chiefs, the ACLU and public defender organizations, have submitted competing
comments recommending narrowing and expanding the definitions set forth in the
statute.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>To date, the section 1205
regulations largely mirror the statute and POST has declined most of the
recommendations it received. (11 CCR § 1205)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">POST has added some important clarifications and criteria to
evaluate the appropriate response to sustained serious misconduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For dishonesty, POST will consider whether
the dishonesty related to material issue and whether the officer acted
willfully, with the intent to deceive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>While these clarifications are implicit in a dishonest finding some
commentators had urged POST to extend dishonest to unintentional mistakes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly for abuse of power, POST will
consider the extent to which the abuse of power was a knowing abuse of the
power and authority of a public office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>POST clarified that the bias definition does not limit First Amendment
rights.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIdGmbNJ1Z-VFz3OB9_16jPXVz3cXRB8UplXgvrfi7UEtbWsaUr5sjCpDCj20cG0afzSJWZStjkkyXlRysRHyeECt1MXPMeAMEUlzTVEy_EMM-CMd_mophks8c2akk8kRLN6Drr9pChL3uBt3PqfReOaB3S0vWyGQ3BN68l9_GeOOj1-3omyAn1hHKUg/s1920/criminal_justice-law_enforcement_program_page.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1920" height="141" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIdGmbNJ1Z-VFz3OB9_16jPXVz3cXRB8UplXgvrfi7UEtbWsaUr5sjCpDCj20cG0afzSJWZStjkkyXlRysRHyeECt1MXPMeAMEUlzTVEy_EMM-CMd_mophks8c2akk8kRLN6Drr9pChL3uBt3PqfReOaB3S0vWyGQ3BN68l9_GeOOj1-3omyAn1hHKUg/w400-h141/criminal_justice-law_enforcement_program_page.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />Regulation section 1213, titled, “Suspension and Revocation
of Peace Officer Certification” sets forth extensive criteria mostly advocated
by PORAC and other law enforcement advocates the Commission will consider in
deciding “whether to take action against a peace officer's certification, and
in considering whether a revocation or suspension is appropriate in light of
the facts of the particular case.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Significantly the Commission will consider mitigating or aggravating
factors and/or evidence of rehabilitation, disparate treatment, the severity of
the conduct, the intent of the officer, and whether the misconduct was
committed under color of authority, among many other factors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This regulation is of particular importance
given the overbreadth of several of the definitions, such as abuse of power and
physical abuse.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><p></p><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Post also set the outer limit of a suspension at 3 years.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><b>Conclusion</b><u><o:p></o:p></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The implementation of S.B. 2 and the administrative
regulations is still a work in progress.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Many of the regulatory proposals regarding the serious misconduct
proceedings before the Board and Commission have been amended and were considered by the Commission at its meeting on March 22, 2023.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">We do know several important aspects of the implementation
though.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First, the investigations into
misconduct are going to largely, if not completely, be conducted by the
employing agency.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>POST’s hiring
difficulties probably preclude parallel investigations at this time anyway. Regarding
the misconduct definitions, POST has taken a caution and balanced approach by
closely following the statutory definitions but also providing needed criteria
for evaluating degree of action to be taken.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Lastly, we know little regarding how smoothly the appeal process will
work, as no appeals are pending and the Advisory Board has not been fully
appointed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Stay tuned for updates as the
process is rolled out.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><br /></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comSacramento, CA, USA38.5815719 -121.494399610.271338063821155 -156.6506496 66.891805736178839 -86.3381496tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-49145266959766306792023-04-04T22:17:00.003-07:002023-04-04T22:17:45.224-07:00Mastagni Law Firm Won Ruling that Cathay Pacific Pilots Are Not Exempt “Professionals” Under California Wage and Hour Laws<p> In 2018, Mastagni Holstedt, A.P.C., filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of five pilots and other similarly situated individuals against their employers, Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. and U.S.A. Basing Ltd. (“Cathay”), seeking unpaid overtime wages, minimum wages, meal periods and rest break payments, waiting time penalties, and other penalties. While working for Cathay, these pilots flew transatlantic flights to and from Hong Kong out of their home bases in San Francisco and Los Angeles. They were required to perform pre-flight and post-flight duties throughout their employment without being compensated for their time. The pilots also did not receive overtime or double-time, despite the fact that their regular flight took approximately 14 hours. </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUWuEMBolwvt1dPeOuAw_TPol-utJz192046mQgStHD-LFrFNC1sjApb07Z8tq84Jtcx72rcSubOSv__XBm4uhV45j_9Q16pqztx6zLgejwZynNTkxab9ZChMSQ3VEPt35xHA0zRDuOXS-7Cp4AvEdh-VslihJMn0yuJKJpTHgQilM_TgXHIa2_KnnMw/s5476/mastagni%20pilots.jpg" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3651" data-original-width="5476" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiUWuEMBolwvt1dPeOuAw_TPol-utJz192046mQgStHD-LFrFNC1sjApb07Z8tq84Jtcx72rcSubOSv__XBm4uhV45j_9Q16pqztx6zLgejwZynNTkxab9ZChMSQ3VEPt35xHA0zRDuOXS-7Cp4AvEdh-VslihJMn0yuJKJpTHgQilM_TgXHIa2_KnnMw/w400-h266/mastagni%20pilots.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><p>In California, pilots’ compensation requirements are governed by Wage Order 9, which has adopted the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“D.O.L.”) Administrative, Executive, and Learned Profession Exemptions as were in effect in 2001. Previously, the Plaintiffs obtained published rulings that the Plaintiffs were subject to California labor law because they were home based in California, even as to work performed outside California’s borders. The California Supreme Court ultimately confirmed the District Court’s ruling.</p><p>On January 18, 2023, Cathay filed a motion for summary adjudication, based on its last remaining affirmative defense, claiming Plaintiffs were exempt from California’s Labor Code under California’s “Learned Professional Exemption.” The Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion arguing against the application of the exemption. In part, the Plaintiffs argued that the 2001 version of 29 C.F.R. § 541.301, is inapplicable because the exemption “customarily” requires attaining a college or advanced degree as a standard prerequisite to satisfy the first prong of the exemption. Neither Cathay nor the applicable licensing standards require even a high school diploma to be a pilot, notwithstanding the requisite technical skills typically acquired through flight experience and instrument ratings. Plaintiffs also argued Plaintiffs do not spend the majority of their time performing exempt tasks requiring intellectual learning or independent judgment.</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tBRHfeF2p93N8SfSNXdwKKfandCVgl5H/view?usp=sharing">On April 3, the Court issued its ruling</a>, granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication and denying Cathay’s. Through this ruling, the Court knocked out Cathay’s last major affirmative defense in this case. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs are not exempt from California’s wage and hour protections. The Court stated, “[n]o one disputes the importance of a commercial pilot’s work or the weight of their responsibility. Nor does anyone dispute that their expertise is highly technical and even specialized. But no reasonable juror could conclude that the airline pilots, in this case, meet the definition of a learned professional set forth in Wage Order 9 and 29 C.F.R. § 541.301.”</p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih8JgB36k8DHp0RFtZcLp3VgpVi1iY8A_5bATYasG7keR-N8knjpwELOu4rZ-Q72XBxxMMrg7q4H_BM9cggpNv83_jwlqBZm1eVCG9uv0357UsDb8F0ahw1vdaTqkTekjf1Ng_UbMTnkZaHnIZVgb-c23ve4LH4u1JX036ITO4vy1se80Ez80LMEEUtA/s5472/mastagni%20gavel.jpg" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3648" data-original-width="5472" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih8JgB36k8DHp0RFtZcLp3VgpVi1iY8A_5bATYasG7keR-N8knjpwELOu4rZ-Q72XBxxMMrg7q4H_BM9cggpNv83_jwlqBZm1eVCG9uv0357UsDb8F0ahw1vdaTqkTekjf1Ng_UbMTnkZaHnIZVgb-c23ve4LH4u1JX036ITO4vy1se80Ez80LMEEUtA/w400-h266/mastagni%20gavel.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that “learned professions are those that ‘customarily’ entails ‘an advanced academic degree [a]s a standard (if not universal) prerequisite.’ 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d) (explaining that the word ‘customarily’ is used to ‘meet a specific problem,’ that is, to account for the rare professional who attains the same level of knowledge as their peers through means other than the usual formal education).” The Court noted that neither the “Airline Transport Pilot License, the F.A.A.’s highest level of certification attainable by commercial pilots,” nor Cathay “require an advanced degree or even a high school diploma as a condition of employment.”<p></p><p>The Court concluded that pilots’ extensive training consists “primarily of flight hours and other practical experience, not extensive intellectual study.” Further, the Court determined Plaintiff’s job duties were “not primarily intellectual in character.” The Court concluded that “[a]lthough commercial pilots are occasionally called upon to exercise discretion and independent judgment, most commercial flights are routine if not largely automated.”</p><p>This ruling is significant because the dispute over the application of the Learned Professional Exemption is an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. A Circuit split over whether pilots meet the learned professional exemption exists between the Third and Fifth Circuits. While taking a position of non-enforcement, the D.O.L. has indicated in administrative guidance that the exemption does not apply to pilots. District Court Judge Vince Chhabria found the D.O.L. analysis more persuasive than the Fifth Circuit precedent, marking a significant win for airline workers in California.</p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-13523957915431100022023-04-03T08:00:00.001-07:002023-04-03T08:01:59.903-07:00A Decade of PEPRA: Bargaining for Classic and PEPRA<p> <span style="color: #0e101a; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0V_I2loH0H5uQx83hpWU9W56736gB3Zd6F7OrAOLBY9lj_dFyrysduMmmt4V3mrPGStRZoH6Ibtgfwj1xyOqgsU-oLBHEUPDLQYgXT6pRrN3MGzzc4sotVbF8n--lSIDEv-zvwD8XpwbgpYmaJpsjCDdJAYAl31ypv8LMA8of_-D8hyzwr-LDThDUQQ/s612/retirement.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="408" data-original-width="612" height="260" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0V_I2loH0H5uQx83hpWU9W56736gB3Zd6F7OrAOLBY9lj_dFyrysduMmmt4V3mrPGStRZoH6Ibtgfwj1xyOqgsU-oLBHEUPDLQYgXT6pRrN3MGzzc4sotVbF8n--lSIDEv-zvwD8XpwbgpYmaJpsjCDdJAYAl31ypv8LMA8of_-D8hyzwr-LDThDUQQ/w391-h260/retirement.jpg" width="391" /></a></div>January 2023 marked a
decade of the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA), which
changed the way CalPERS retirement and health benefits are applied and placed compensation
limits on employees who entered the pension system as PEPRA members.<p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">As
we have passed the ten-year mark since the implementation of PEPRA, we are
seeing the number of PEPRA employees in the workforce grow significantly. Many associations
are reaching a membership makeup of fifty percent or more of PEPRA-classified
employees, meaning the vote of the PEPRA membership is quickly becoming the
majority vote.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"><o:p> </o:p></span><b><i><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">Why is this significant?</span></i></b></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">
There are significant differences between the Classic and PEPRA
retirement benefits. PEPRA changed the retirement formula to require employees
to work till age 57 in order to maximize their retirement benefits. While some
employers contracted with CalPERS at a reduced PEPRA benefit, the maximum
benefit under PEPRA is 2.7% at 57. The minimum retirement age remained at 50.
However, PEPRA employees who retire at 50 with at least 29 years of service will
only receive approximately 58% of their 36-month average in retirement
payments. At the same time, Classic members who retire at 50 with 30 years of
service will receive 90% of the 12-month or 36-month compensation average. The
average for Classic members can vary from 12 months to 36 months, depending on
the employer’s contractual agreement with CalPERS. For PEPRA members to reach
the 90% range, an employee will have to work until they are 57 with 34 years of
service. For PEPRA employees to hit the 90% range and retire at age 57, as seen
with the Classic retirement formulas, a PEPRA employee will have to enter the
retirement system on or before their 23rd birthday. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Another significant difference between Classic
and PEPRA retirement benefits are the compensation limits. Gov. Code §7522.20
sets annual compensation limits for PEPRA members. The 2023 compensation limits
are $146,042 for employees who are Social Security participants and $175,250
for employees who are non-Social Security participants. This means any
compensation earned over the annual compensation limit is not reported to
CalPERS as compensable income to be calculated in the employee’s 36-consecutive
month employment period. Classic members’ reportable compensation limits are
set under IRC section 401(a)(17). The 2023 reportable compensation limit for
Classic employees is much higher than PEPRA members and stands at $330,000.</span><b style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"> </b><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Some
PEPRA public safety employees have or will start nearing the annual
compensation limits. Therefore, PEPRA members not only have to work longer with
a reduced retirement benefit, but are also more likely to hit the annual
compensation limits, which in turn further reduces their retirement benefits.</span><b style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;"> </b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">The
differences in retirement benefits can create a divide in interests within
association memberships. PEPRA public safety employees who are nearing the
annual compensation limit may begin to veer away from bargaining income
reportable to CalPERS in an effort to keep from exceeding the compensation
limit. However, this strategy negatively impacts the Classic employees, who
continue to benefit from increasing their reportable compensation.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><b><i><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"><span style="font-size: medium;">Bargainable Solutions </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> </span></span></i></b></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9E7Ojy3vTfLRs37KI5qj8FrsQgOMvIVjHWpRM7JOuKwYsZeD4QQyBNWZgUFH90eocJB5haffviErkf86EGFMdnXvuj_UG399AhoVPKqJQVTo7JUUiOZ86hXYhLQRdPNeyBT33Ig7eBX0J4RSewzOMScfQGjh5qyRq9r5cNXdKjnYvb6No89XhL5FSTw/s1920/PEPRA%20handshake.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1386" data-original-width="1920" height="289" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9E7Ojy3vTfLRs37KI5qj8FrsQgOMvIVjHWpRM7JOuKwYsZeD4QQyBNWZgUFH90eocJB5haffviErkf86EGFMdnXvuj_UG399AhoVPKqJQVTo7JUUiOZ86hXYhLQRdPNeyBT33Ig7eBX0J4RSewzOMScfQGjh5qyRq9r5cNXdKjnYvb6No89XhL5FSTw/w400-h289/PEPRA%20handshake.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>One way to address the compensation limits and
equalize retirement benefits is to bargain supplemental retirement benefits
such as deferred compensation plans and Retiree Health Savings Accounts. In
scenarios where the PEPRA employees are nearing their annual compensation
limit, consider bargaining deferred compensation plans for PEPRA members only
to deposit retirement contributions beyond the compensation limits. This will
encourage PEPRA employees to continue to bargain for reportable compensation as
it will provide alternative solutions for PEPRA members once they reach the
annual compensation limit.<span style="mso-no-proof: yes;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Another concept to consider is bargaining
enhanced benefits with CalPERS. Employers were provided multiple retirement
formulas to be adopted under PEPRA. Employers were required to adopt a formula
closest to, but lower than, the current formula offered to employees at 55
years of age (PERL § 7522.25 (e)). This resulted in a number of employers
adopting a retirement formula of less than 2.7% at 57. If your employer offers
a formula less than 2.7% at 57, you can bargain an increased benefit formula
prospectively. However, the retirement formula proposed and agreed upon must be
permitted under PERL Sections 7522.20 and 7522.25. The employer must request a
contract amendment with CalPERS, and CalPERS will ultimately determine if the
requested amendments are allowable.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; text-indent: 0.5in;">Lastly, consider proposals supporting
long-term health for both Classic and PEPRA employees. For PEPRA employees,
extending the retirement benefits to 2.7% @ 57 prolongs employees’ exposure (or
years) to the risks of a job in public safety. This further increases the
probability of a public safety employee sustaining some job-related injury or
death. This increases the risk of Workers’ Compensation claims for the
employer, reduces the likelihood of employees being able to work till
retirement age to maximize their benefits, and increases the risk of early death.
This also prolongs an employee’s exposure to critical incidents, negatively
impacting their mental health and well-being. Additionally, it creates an
environment where public safety becomes a less attractive job. This can be
addressed by bargaining for wellness programs, annual health evaluations,
baseline health measurements, exposure monitoring, critical incident
de-briefing, and increasing employee assistance programs.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">A
decade has taught us a lot about PEPRA’s short comings. It is important to remember
to stay united and that there are ways to strategically bargain benefits that
help all members.</span></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-63912093173714209852023-03-20T19:15:00.002-07:002023-03-20T19:59:14.833-07:00Federal Judge Cites PORAC President Brian Marvel's Declaration in Order Enjoining Unsafe Handgun Act<p></p><p><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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</p><p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">On March 20, 2023, Central
District Judge Cormac J. Carney issued a <a href="https://t.co/8kuF3RAsd6">preliminary injunction in <i>Boland
v. Bonta</i></a> barring enforcement of the deceptively titled "California's Unsafe Handgun Act (UHA)," ruling "Californians
have the constitutional right to acquire and use state-of-the-art handguns to
protect themselves." This ruling is of particular importance to California
Peace Officers, given the introduction of <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB377">S.B. 377</a>, which would eliminate the
peace officer exemption from the UHA, thereby prohibiting officers from
purchasing or selling the modern handguns they bear while on duty. Intuitively,
peace officers should have access to the newest and safest equipment, including
firearms.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">On behalf of PORAC, David E.
Mastagni assisted <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/19bcC_G0SKXhU3trhWembuuwpv99-TUYS/view">PORAC President Brian Marvel in submitting a declaration</a> in support
of the Plaintiffs, which was cited repeatedly by the Court in pointing out the
hypocrisy of the state's rationale for the roster. The Court explained:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 8.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0.5in 8pt;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: medium; line-height: 107%;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 8.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0.5in 8pt;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: medium; line-height: 107%;">"The government cannot credibly argue that handguns
without CLI, MDM, and microstamping features pose unacceptable public safety
risks when virtually all handguns available on the Roster and sold in
California today lack those features.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 8.0pt; margin-left: .5in; margin-right: .5in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 0.5in 8pt;"><span style="font-family: times; font-size: medium; line-height: 107%;">Similarly, if Off-Roster firearms were truly unsafe,
California would not allow law enforcement to use them in the line of duty when
the stakes are at their highest. But the substantial majority of California's
law enforcement officers use Off-Roster handguns in the line of duty. (Dkt.
57-2 [Declaration of Brian R. Marvel, President of Peace Officers Research
Association of California, hereinafter "Marvel Decl."] ¶ 5
["Most agencies issue officers the latest models of either Glock or Sig
Sauer handguns, which lack magazine safety disconnects, chamber load
indicators, and of course, microstamping."]; see id. ¶ 7 ["For
example, many officers are issued 4th or 5th-generation Glock pistols, which
are off-roster and lack magazine safety disconnects, chamber load indicators,
and of course microstamping."].) Indeed, the government's own witness, Special
Agent Salvador Gonzalez, testified that he uses an Off-Roster duty handgun
without a CLI, MDM, or microstamping capability. (Tr. at 243–44.) If CLIs and
MDMs indeed increased a firearm's overall safety, law enforcement would surely
use them. (Marvel Decl. ¶ 5.) But they do not. Instead, they use "newer,
improved and safer generations of handguns" that are Off-Roster. (Id. ¶
7.)"</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">In <i>New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen </i>("<i>Bruen</i>"),
the Supreme Court vindicated the "constitutional right to bear arms in
public for self-defense," a right which includes peace officers who place
their selves in harm's way to protect members of the public. This ruling also
affirmed the arguments we raised during the debate on the use of force
legislation. The Court held under <i>Bruen</i>, "to be constitutional,
regulations of Second Amendment rights must be 'consistent with this Nation's
historical tradition of firearm regulation.'" </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">The UHA barred the sale of
handguns that don't contain certain so-called safety features, which since 2013
has included theoretical microstamping technology. Judge Cormac noted,
"Since 2007, when the (loaded chamber indicator) and (magazine disconnect
safety) requirements were introduced, very few new handguns have been
introduced for sale in California with those features. Since 2013, when the
microstamping requirement was introduced, not a single new semiautomatic
handgun has been approved for sale in California."</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">The Court rejected the
State's historical analogies, explaining that laws to ensure guns operate as
advertised are not analogous to requiring the implementation of new safety
features. "These regulations are having a devastating impact on
Californians' ability to acquire and use new, state-of-the-art handguns,"
according to the Court.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;">This ruling should moot the
S.B. 377 elimination of the peace officer exemption to the UHA by allowing all
Californians access to state-of-the-art handguns for self-defense. The
preliminary injunction is set to go into effect in two weeks, so the State can
appeal the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is particularly
vital and affirmed PORAC's successful argument during the AB 392 debate that
the State cannot impinge officers' right of self-defense.</span></p><p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a; font-family: times; font-size: medium;"> </span></p><p style="margin: 0in;"><span style="color: #0e101a;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioQTCcLer8nnSLkzJoA_GcidPGqL_XvSPIh6ScfH6SZb36pjPhKMqzSOi1h_7l3Ng_P9Hm8OSkpB5K4nPhFAfMk3zSzopaUO-LP6rqRmQAk7WxSHRQomGq9Ry5ElOBPo0mGQHxx0RGZrPJbBaNQJd2Q5V95AzkXeN1XI14B-GzLtHZ_h9c9qk4z5CFhA/s682/FpxmnZ9aEAEGmS7.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="682" data-original-width="579" height="530" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioQTCcLer8nnSLkzJoA_GcidPGqL_XvSPIh6ScfH6SZb36pjPhKMqzSOi1h_7l3Ng_P9Hm8OSkpB5K4nPhFAfMk3zSzopaUO-LP6rqRmQAk7WxSHRQomGq9Ry5ElOBPo0mGQHxx0RGZrPJbBaNQJd2Q5V95AzkXeN1XI14B-GzLtHZ_h9c9qk4z5CFhA/w449-h530/FpxmnZ9aEAEGmS7.png" width="449" /></a></div><br /><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"> </span></p> <br /><p></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-13660260704772013372023-02-28T16:13:00.001-08:002023-02-28T16:13:18.782-08:00PERB Sides with Corrections Officers in Overtime Dispute with Fresno County<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">A recent Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) decision makes clear an employer's obligation to bargain over proposed changes to overtime sign-up and payment policies. In Service Employees International Union Local 521(Union) v. County of Fresno (County), the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decided in favor of the Union, finding the County committed an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) in violation of Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) provisions when it unilaterally changed both the overtime sign-up procedure for supervising juvenile correctional officers (SJCOs) and how it paid SJCOs when they worked more than eight hours in a period of continuous work that began before and ended after midnight, and by refusing to arbitrate grievances concerning both issues. However, the ALJ concluded that the Union failed to show that the County violated the MMBA with regard to its request for information.</span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjF1E-ImPQleIlIhSx_TGhgJvVAM71nwEaX7brPF_uK5HFAtNt59b9PIwFxAPSnqBHkLJaSWsFY2-eFqvtOikb6K_IBumc99wBOEzr9-xHrnGypeFNyyRb7hIXbXmFx1EoS21HCiiHlkAG1V6gml6y3qgWH_vfQPtDYWXK0-pLhLYrWCwUev4GoPrXOw/s1640/Blog%20Jan%205.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="924" data-original-width="1640" height="254" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjjF1E-ImPQleIlIhSx_TGhgJvVAM71nwEaX7brPF_uK5HFAtNt59b9PIwFxAPSnqBHkLJaSWsFY2-eFqvtOikb6K_IBumc99wBOEzr9-xHrnGypeFNyyRb7hIXbXmFx1EoS21HCiiHlkAG1V6gml6y3qgWH_vfQPtDYWXK0-pLhLYrWCwUev4GoPrXOw/w452-h254/Blog%20Jan%205.png" width="452" /></a></div><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">Fresno County's Probation Department runs the Juvenile Justice Campus, a 24-hour residential facility for juvenile offenders. The sworn staff includes Juvenile Corrections Officers (JCOs), Senior Juvenile Corrections Officers (Sr. JCOs), Supervising Juvenile Corrections Officers (SJCOs), and Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs). SJCOs manage JCOs, schedule shifts, act as watch commanders at the Juvenile Justice Campus, and are represented by the Union.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">From 2014 to 2018, a standing practice regarding priority for overtime opportunities was memorialized in a 2014 email from the then Assistant Director of the Juvenile Justice Campus. When the need for overtime in JCO and Sr. JCO shifts was known in advance, JCOs and Sr. JCOs had a window to volunteer for the shifts before SJCOs could reserve the remaining spots. Emails announcing overtime opportunities were typically sent out 21 days before the overtime shift, resulting in SJCOs having about 18 days to decide whether they wanted to take the overtime shift and make personal arrangements for that purpose. In May 2018, a memo was distributed by the Chief Probation Officer to the various corrections officers at the Juvenile Justice Campus modifying the overtime sign-up practices, resulting in SJCOs losing the ability to sign up for overtime until the day of. In effect, SJCOs no longer had advance notice to make personal arrangements to accommodate the overtime shift, and the amount of overtime worked by SJCOs decreased. The Chief Probation Officer failed to provide notice to the Union before distributing the memo based on the advice he received from a human resources employee working for Fresno County that interpreted the MOU's language to provide the unilateral ability to make such a change based on the management rights clause present in the MOU and the County's interpretation of the word "day" in the MOU to mean a period of time beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at 12:00 a.m.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">Additionally, as it pertains to overtime, the MOU states, "Overtime is authorized work performed by employees in excess of eight hours a day or over 40 hours in a work week." The longstanding practice adhered to by the parties was to pay SJCOs overtime for all time in excess of eight hours in a continuous period of work, even if part of the work occurred before midnight and part occurred after midnight. However, on June 8, 2018, a SJCO worked a double shift, beginning at 4:00 p.m. on June 8th and ending at 8:00 a.m. on June 9th, for a total of 16 hours. The SJCO claimed the second eight hours as overtime, per the terms of the MOU. When the SJCO was paid for that period, the County paid the second eight hours as regular time. When the Union questioned this practice, the County reiterated the SJCO was not entitled to overtime due to the SJCO working eight hours on June 8th and another eight hours on June 9th, which the County deemed to be two separate shifts on two separate days, rather than one continuous shift where the time in excess of eight hours would be categorized as overtime.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">In light of these two issues, the Union filed separate grievances on behalf of the SJCOs. Regarding the overtime sign-up grievance, following the Step 3 grievance proceedings, the Union asserted that the parties agreed to stay the grievance. At the same time, the involved personnel attempted to remedy the situation amongst themselves. Following the passage of 10 working days, the County moved to close the file claiming the Union failed to advance the grievance to Step 4 in a timely manner.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">As it pertains to the consecutive hours/overtime grievance, following Step 4 of the grievance process, the Union requested to move the grievance to arbitration. The County, however, claimed the Union failed to contact State Mediation for a list of arbitrators in a timely manner. Thus, their request exceeded the stated deadline, resulting in the County's refusal to arbitrate the matter.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">In support of the consecutive hours/overtime grievance, the Union sent the County an information request seeking records, policies, and documents regarding payroll and overtime encompassing the previous five years, to be produced within 30 days. The County acknowledged the request and indicated the day before they were required to produce the documents that, the volume and specificity of the information sought would require the County to collaborate with other departments and review extensive amounts of data, which required additional time. After approximately two months, the County produced a flash drive with the responsive information to the Union. The Union did not indicate if they were dissatisfied with the County's production. However, at some point during the hearing, the Union requested additional information specific to the SJCO's overtime payroll records. On the third day of the hearing, the County produced the requested records, which were subsequently introduced as exhibits. At that time, the Union indicated that their request was fully satisfied.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">Ultimately, there were three issues evaluated in the case at hand. 1) Did the County violate the MMBA when it changed a) the overtime sign-up procedure and/or b) when it changed how it paid SJCOs for work performed after midnight in a continuous period of work greater than eight hours? 2) Did the County violate the MMBA by refusing to arbitrate the Union's grievances on procedural grounds? 3) Did the County violate the MMBA by failing or refusing to respond to the Union's request for information? The County argued that the Union's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and additionally asserted two waiver arguments, specifically claiming that the contents of the MOU prevailed over the alleged practice and that the changes implemented by the County were permitted under the management rights clause provided in the MOU.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"> With respect to the statute of limitations argument, a charging party must generally file an unfair practice charge for violations of the MMBA within six months from when the charging party knew or should have known of the violation. The County contended that the Union's charge was untimely due to the filing occurring beyond the six-month threshold and that they failed to advance the two grievances to Step 5, thus barring their claims for untimeliness. The ALJ found that the Union's claims were equitably tolled due to the parties engaging in the interactive grievance process at the time, which was a contractually obligated attempt to remedy the situation before pursuing litigation. Further, the ALJ held that as it pertains to the overtime sign-up procedure grievance, the Union credibly proved that the parties agreed to suspend the timeline following Step 3 to attempt to resolve the issue. Therefore, the County's claim that they failed to advance the grievance to Step 4 promptly failed and that the statute of limitations for that charge was also equitably tolled.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"> The County's waiver arguments were similarly unpersuasive. The ALJ held that the County's belief that the MOU's language trumped the alleged practice was improper, given that the MOU did not specifically define the word "day." The County unreasonably relied on its salary resolution language, which defines a "day" as a period of time beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at 12:00 a.m. More specifically, the ALJ provided that the MOU's language did not clearly and unmistakably waive the County's duty to give the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain before changing what counted as a "day" for purposes of calculating overtime.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">Shifting to the County's refusal to arbitrate the grievances, the decision provides that the Union failed to show that the County's refusal to process the grievances was a change from prior policy or practice. Yet, it was determined that the County had a duty to present its procedural arguments about the grievance to an arbitrator, and its refusal to do so violated section 3505.8 of the MMBA, which governs the enforceability of an MOU's arbitration agreement. It provides in pertinent part, "An assertion that the arbitration claim is untimely or otherwise barred because the party seeking arbitration has failed to satisfy the procedural prerequisites to arbitration shall not be a basis for refusing to submit the dispute to arbitration. All procedural defenses shall be presented to the arbitrator for resolution."</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">However, the ALJ found against the Union in its request for information claim. The holding provides that when a union requests relevant information, the employer must supply it timely and explain its reasons for not doing so. A failure to provide the necessary and relevant information absent a valid defense constitutes a per se violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith. Here, it was found that the County engaged with the Union and communicated the burdensome nature of the information request and that it was doing its due diligence to obtain the requested information. Moreover, the County provided information responsive to the Union's request. If that information was deemed to be unsatisfactory to the Union, the Union had an obligation to express its dissatisfaction, which it failed to do. The County was also responsive to the Union's request for additional, more specific information regarding the SJCO's overtime payroll records on the third day of the hearing, thus, satisfying its requirement to produce relevant information and its duty to negotiate in good faith.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">Ultimately, the ALJ's proposed order required the County to rescind the 2018 memo and return to the overtime sign-up practices consistent with the 2014 email authored by the then Assistant Director of the Juvenile Justice Campus that provided SJCOs with advance notice of overtime opportunities. The County was also ordered to make the SJCOs whole by paying them for any overtime opportunities they lost as a result of the unlawful change and to resume paying overtime premiums to SJCOs for work after eight hours in a continuous period of work, even if that period of work crosses midnight, to include double shifts. Lastly, the County was required to pay the SJCOs backpay equal to the overtime premium for work after eight hours in a continuous period of work, including double shifts, with interest included at seven percent per annum.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">The Union also sought attorney's fees, which PERB awards only if the charge is both without arguable merit and pursued in bad faith. It was determined that while the County's primary positions lacked arguable merit, they were reasonably relied upon and not put forth in bad faith. Therefore, the Union's request for attorney's fees was denied.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">There are a number of practical implications from this decision. The failure to specifically define what constitutes a "day" is something that various employers may more stringently address in future collective bargaining, given the MOU's vagueness around that word in this particular matter and the County's reliance on that word to its own detriment. Moreover, when an employer attempts to change a standing practice to assign or sign-up for overtime, the need to bargain over such proposed changes seems like an explicit requirement based on this holding. Finally, suppose an employee's workday is going to pass midnight and exceed whatever the defined hours of a day are for that particular agency. In that case, employers should be particularly aware of such a scenario and ensure overtime is appropriately paid for the time worked in excess of the defined workday, consistent with its MOU, or they too can be held liable and required to pay a significant monetary penalty.</span></p>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8610339744920140200.post-61740912886696521952023-02-07T09:20:00.066-08:002023-02-09T11:51:13.059-08:00Ninth Circuit Provides Guidance on First Amendment Protections Afforrded Controversial Public Safety Social Media Posts<p><span style="font-family: inherit;">The phenomenon that is social media is not new nor novel in today's society. Yet, social media's impact on speech and its overlap with the First Amendment continues to evolve and present the American legal system with unique challenges and fact patterns that are separate and unique from more historical speech matters, particularly in the context of an individual's employment.</span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVYtnB7X05ZmYZtk1yOG7FM9_K3w1Xa0Qvjk1pXzItEl4Uu4Hu4myWyjgYUAWcmK9DWTlFSe3A4NGEsuPUW3Fs1kKAmceqG4Ll5A3iRPgGN3nRkxlO6QB8x6WsV0Q3vrpXFV8Hw0W4zs6SYUo9bf_SDGR5VR4z_9R04qFjn3sr67qWrP3__5G4Y1aS7Q/s610/social-media-law.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="324" data-original-width="610" height="205" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgVYtnB7X05ZmYZtk1yOG7FM9_K3w1Xa0Qvjk1pXzItEl4Uu4Hu4myWyjgYUAWcmK9DWTlFSe3A4NGEsuPUW3Fs1kKAmceqG4Ll5A3iRPgGN3nRkxlO6QB8x6WsV0Q3vrpXFV8Hw0W4zs6SYUo9bf_SDGR5VR4z_9R04qFjn3sr67qWrP3__5G4Y1aS7Q/w385-h205/social-media-law.jpeg" width="385" /></span></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">In <a href="New-MailboxFolder -Parent :\Contacts -Name $folderName" target="_blank"><i>Hernandez v. City of Phoenix</i>, the Ninth Circui</a>t Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing the types of posts that involve matters of public concern and therefore are protected by the First Amendment. </span><i><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">Hernandez </span></i><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">provides important guidance on what type of speech is protected under the First Amendment and how government agencies/employers can implement social media policies that are in compliance with the First Amendment.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">In 2013 and 2014, Sergeant Juan Hernandez of the Phoenix Police Department made a series of social media posts that denigrated Muslims and Islam. The posts were made off-duty, and Sgt. Hernandez did not directly create a nexus to his employment as a member of the Phoenix Police Department; however, other posts on his account did depict him in uniform. The posts did not create any controversy until 2019, when an organization called the Plain View Project obtained the posts and drew public and media attention to them. The Plain View Project monitors and collects certain law enforcement organizations' social media activity to create oversight and dialogue related to what they deem potentially problematic social media activity.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">Following the release of these posts by the Plain View Project and the subsequent backlash received from the public, the Department conducted an internal affairs investigation and determined that Sgt. Hernandez violated its social media policy, specifically finding his posts "potentially reduced or contributed to the erosion of public trust, were inflammatory to certain groups, and/or created dissension in the community by promoting hate, violence, racism, bias, or beliefs inconsistent with the Phoenix Police Department's Purpose Statement and Guiding Values." Before discipline could be imposed, Sgt. Hernandez sued in federal court because the Department retaliated against him for his First Amendment-protected speech and that the Department's social media policy was unconstitutional as it was drafted in an overbroad and vague manner.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">The federal district court granted the City of Phoenix's motion to dismiss, holding that the City of Phoenix did not retaliate against Sgt. Hernandez was in violation of the First Amendment because his speech did not constitute a matter of public concern. Additionally, the court concluded that the Department's social media policy was not overbroad or vague; Sgt. Hernandez then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, finding the district court erred in its dismissal of Sgt. Hernandez's First Amendment retaliation claim. Here, the Court employed the <i>Pickering </i>balancing test, where the government employee bears the initial burden of showing that he spoke on a matter of public concern in their capacity as a private citizen. If the employee successfully proves that requirement, the speech is entitled to constitutional protection, and the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. Then, the burden shifts to the government employer to show that it had the justification for disciplining the employee for their speech. In order to sustain its burden, the employer must show that its legitimate interests in performing its mission outweigh the employee's right to speak freely.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">The Ninth Circuit determined that Sgt. Hernandez's posts were, in fact, a matter of public concern, specifically holding that Sgt. Hernandez's posts "addressed matters of social or political concern that would be of interest to others outside of the Phoenix Police Department. Even if only 'a relatively small segment of the general public' might have been interested in the subject of Hernandez's posts, that is sufficient." Moreover, Sgt. Hernandez's posts were made on his own time, on his personal Facebook page, outside the workplace, and with an intended audience not just limited to fellow employees but the general public as a whole.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">With the Pickering balancing test in mind and the Court establishing that Sgt. Hernandez's social media posts constituted a matter of public concern; rather than analyzing the remaining steps of the balancing test, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court due to it dismissing Sgt. Hernandez's First Amendment retaliation claim at the motion to dismiss phase.</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">In its decision to remand, the Ninth Circuit provided the following guidance in regard to the content and value of Sgt. Hernandez's speech and the interests of law enforcement agencies' necessity to discipline an employee's speech in certain situations (citations omitted):</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-left: 40px; margin-top: 0pt;"><i style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">In remanding the case, we do not mean to suggest that the Department will face a particularly onerous burden to justify disciplining Hernandez for his posts, given the comparatively low value of his speech. Government employee speech that exposes wrongdoing or corruption within the employee's own agency lies at "the apex of the First Amendment" in this context. Needless to say, Hernandez's Facebook posts occupy a much lower rung on the First Amendment hierarchy, and indeed they touched on matters of public concern "in only a most limited sense." On the other side of the scale, a police department's determination that an officer's speech warrants discipline is afforded considerable deference and police departments may permissibly consider the special status officers occupy in the community when deciding what limitations to place on officers' off-duty speech. Speech by a police officer that suggests bias against racial or religious minorities can hinder that officer's ability to effectively perform his or her job duties and undermine the department's ability to effectively carry out its mission.</i></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><i style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></i></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">Regarding Sgt. Hernandez's challenge to the Department's social media policy, the Ninth Circuit agreed with most of the district court's decision as it relates to the Department's social media policy. The Court found the district court appropriately rejected Sgt. Hernandez's argument that the Department's social media policy was overbroad and/or vague by prohibiting posts that are "detrimental to the mission and functions of the Department,"; "Undermine the goals and mission of the Department or City,"; or "Undermine respect of public confidence in the Department." However, the Ninth Circuit found that the following provisions overbroad, "Employees are prohibited from using social media in a manner that would cause embarrassment to or discredit the Department in any way," as well as "Department personnel may not divulge information gained while in the performance of their official duties."</span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><br /></span></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: #0e101a; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;"><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">Under the Ninth Circuit's "public concern" analysis, social media posts public agencies consider problematic may nevertheless be </span><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">First Amendment protected </span><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">speech. Public agencies must prove how specific social media posts impact and disrupt the agency's ability to operate effectively and interact with the public due to the protections associated with such speech. </span><span data-preserver-spaces="true" style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">The Court did indicate hateful/bigoted speech receives a lesser degree of First Amendment protection and employers have an easier burden to prove disruption. However, agencies that fail to narrowly draft their social media polices may be barred from enforcing the policies through discipline and may also be subject to liability for civil rights violations.<br /></span></p></div>Mastagni Lawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04060508971668549922noreply@blogger.com