Dash Camera Video Not Part of Officer’s Personnel Record, Court Rules

A California appeals court ruled this week that dash camera footage is not part of an officer’s confidential personnel record, even though it was used in an internal affairs investigation against the officer. The Court of Appeal ruled in City of Eureka v. Superior Court (Thadeus Greenson) (1st Dist., July 19, 2016) that Pitchess statutes do not protect this kind of video footage from being released to the public.

Eureka Police Sergeant Adam Laird and other officers arrested a juvenile suspected of gang activity. After the incident, the Eureka Police Department opened an internal affairs investigation into Sergeant Laird’s conduct, eventually deciding to fire him. And the Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office charged Laird with misdemeanor assault by a police officer without lawful authority and making a false police report. Both investigations alleged that Laird used excessive force against the suspect, including pushing him to the ground and then kicking or stomping on him repeatedly.

A key piece of evidence in both of these investigations was the video recorded by the dash camera in another officer’s vehicle. This video apparently recorded the whole interaction between Sergeant Laird and the juvenile suspect. Experts hired by both the prosecution and Laird’s defense attorney determined Laird’s use of force was justified under the circumstances. The prosecution dropped the charges and the Department halted its termination of Laird.

However, a local newspaper reporter then filed requests for the video footage. The reporter claimed the video was a public record. A trial judge in Humboldt County agreed and ordered the City of Eureka to release the video. The City appealed the judge’s order, arguing the video was part of Laird’s confidential personnel file and could only be released through the procedures required by the Pitchess statutes.

The Court of Appeal rejected the City’s argument and affirmed the order to release the video. The Court ruled that because the video was recorded before any investigation had begun, it was an independent record and was not part of Laird’s personnel file. Because the video was merely considered during the investigation and was not generated by it, the video was not a record related to “employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline.”

The Court relied on the major decision by the California Supreme Court two years ago in Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (2014). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that Long Beach could not withhold the identity of a police officer who had been involved in a shooting, but must disclose it to requesting newspapers. Here, the Court of Appeal ruled that dash camera footage is similar to an officer’s identity and must be released to the public.

The Court of Appeal’s decision is a serious setback to the privacy interests of peace officers across the state. Under the ruling, potentially all dash camera and body camera footage could be subject to public release.

California Supreme Court Rules CPRA Requires "Particularized Showing" to Prevent Disclosure of Officers' Names After Shooting

On May 29, 2014 in Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach, the California Supreme Court held the California Public Records Act ("CPRA") requires a "particularized showing" of officer safety concerns to prevent disclosure of an officer's name after a shooting.  In this case, the Court found "vaguely worded declarations" and "general assertions" about officer safety risks was not enough to prevent disclosure.

On December 12, 2010, officers responded to a call about an intoxicated man brandishing a "six-shooter."  When officers arrived, the man pointed an object at them resembling a gun.  The officers opened fire and the man died.  It turned out the object he pointed at officers was a garden hose spray nozzle with a pistol grip.  A few days later, a reporter from the L.A. Times submitted a CPRA request for the names of the officers involved in the shooting, and the names of all officers involved in shootings from January 1, 2005 to December 11, 2010. 

CPRA section 6254 subsection (c) exempts from disclosure personnel or similar files if disclosure "would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  The Court refused to apply a blanket rule preventing disclosure of officers' names after a shooting in every circumstance.  Instead, the Court emphasized the public's interest in the conduct of its peace officers.  To overcome the public's interest and prevent disclosure, the City of Long Beach ("City") and the Long Beach Police Officers' Association ("Association") had to show disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of the officers' personal privacy. 

A particularized risk or threat to the officers' safety or their family's safety exempts officers' names from disclosure under the CPRA.  The Court stated "Of course, if it is essential to protect an officer's anonymity for safety reasons or for reasons peculiar to the officer's duties - as, for example, in the case of an undercover officer - then the public interest in disclosure of the officer's name may need to give way."  While the Association and the City submitted declarations describing the possibility of gang retaliation against officers involved in shootings with gang members, in the Court's opinion, the concerns were "general in nature."  The Court was quick to point out "We do not hold that the names of officers involved in shootings have to be disclosed in every case, regardless of the circumstances.  We merely conclude...that the particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure was not made here..." 

Justice Ming W. Chin disagreed with the majority's ruling and wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion.  In his view, the Association and the City presented ample evidence of the safety threat faced by police officers after a shooting.  He argued the City and the Association established officers' names should  be exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.  He concluded by stating courts should allow law enforcement agencies to protect their officers, because "They deserve at least that much for their brave service."