In Atkins v. City of Los Angeles, the Court of Appeal ruled that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act applies to pre-probationary public safety recruits attending academy training. The City of Los Angeles used to allow recruits who were injured during training to temporarily fill light-duty administrative positions until they either healed or became permanently disabled. At some point, the department decided to cease offering these positions and told five recruits who were on light duty that they needed to get medically cleared to return to full duty or they would be terminated. None of the recruits were able to do so and they were terminated or forced to resign. They sued and won a total of $12.3 million in future wages from the date of termination through to a hypothetical date of retirement.
Under FEHA an employer may not discriminate against "qualified individuals" on the basis of their disability. A "qualified individual" is a person who can perform the essential job duties of a position. Here, the recruits could perform the essential functions of the light-duty administrative position, but not the police recruit position. On appeal the City argued that the Court must determine whether the recruits are qualified individuals with respect to the recruit position, not the temporary administrative position. The City also argued that it had no duty to accommodate pre-probationary trainees.
The Court of Appeal found there was no distinction in the FEHA between pre-probationary employees, probationary employees, and regular employees with regard to either discrimination or the duty to accommodate. Thus, the Court upheld the failure to accommodate claim. However, the Court agreed that the proper test in a discrimination context is to examine whether the employees were "qualified individuals" with respect to the police recruit position, not the temporary light duty administrative position. Accordingly, the Court found that the employer did not discriminate against them. Ultimately the City was still liable for failure to accommodate, but the court did reduce the damages as they were too speculative.
Showing posts with label City of Los Angeles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label City of Los Angeles. Show all posts
Saturday, March 18, 2017
Wednesday, September 2, 2015
Appellate Court Rules Los Angeles May Not Require Police Officers to Pay for Training
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District ruled in In Re Acknowledgment Cases the City of Los Angeles ("City") may not force former employees to pay for their academy training. The City had adopted an ordinance which required officers who quit to pay a pro rated portion of their training. These policies have been used throughout California as a tactic to prevent officers from transferring to other agencies. Some policies even demand repayment wages during probation. The Court of Appeal here ruled the City's policy violated California Labor Code section 2802.
The City requires all of its police officers to attend and graduate from the Los Angeles Police Academy. In early 1990, the City realized many of the police officers it trained left within a few years to join other agencies. To discourage employees from leaving, the City enacted an ordinance which required officers who left the City within five years of employment and joined another law enforcement agency within one year of leaving the City to reimburse the City for a portion of the academy costs. Former officers sued when the City attempted to recoup its training cost loses under this ordinance.
The officers argued Labor Code section 2802 and other wage protection statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, prevented the City from recovering the cost of training. Section 2802 requires an employer to reimburse its employees for any costs incurred by the employee as a direct consequence of his or her employment. A good example of this is a travel reimbursement. The question here was whether training is a reimbursable expense under section 2802.
The Court of Appeal concluded the City might be able to recover some training cost, but not all of the costs demanded. The court noted that no court had previously ruled on whether training costs were reimbursable under section 2802. However, the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") did issue an opinion letter concluding if the training was required by law, then the employee bore the cost of the training. However, if the training was just required by the employer, then the employer had to reimburse the employee for the training costs.
The Court of Appeal adopted the same analysis as the DLSE. The academy training consisted of 644 hours of statutorily mandated Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST") courses and 420 hours of training specific to the City. The Court of Appeal concluded the City could require reimbursement for the POST training, but could not require reimbursement for the City specific training.
In the end the Court of Appeal invalidated the entire reimbursement ordinance as the City failed to present evidence apportioning the costs. At trial, the case was tried on an all-or-nothing basis--either the reimbursement ordinance was enforceable or it was not. The Court of Appeal ruled no part of the acknowledgment could be enforced and invalidated the entire ordinance. Because the ordinance was invalidated, the court did not reach the officers' other claims, including that the acknowledgement violated the FLSA.
This case stands in contrast with Oakland v. Hassey where the court upheld a similar policy. To encourage police officers to stay with the department longer, Oakland entered into a MOU with the Oakland Police Officers' Association in 1996 authorizing the city to require those who went through training at its academy to reimburse the city for training costs if the person left the police department before completing five years of service. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal distinguished Oakland v. Hassey because that case did not consider the application of section 2802.
This case calls into question the legitimacy of similar ordinances and policies throughout the state.
The City requires all of its police officers to attend and graduate from the Los Angeles Police Academy. In early 1990, the City realized many of the police officers it trained left within a few years to join other agencies. To discourage employees from leaving, the City enacted an ordinance which required officers who left the City within five years of employment and joined another law enforcement agency within one year of leaving the City to reimburse the City for a portion of the academy costs. Former officers sued when the City attempted to recoup its training cost loses under this ordinance.
The officers argued Labor Code section 2802 and other wage protection statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, prevented the City from recovering the cost of training. Section 2802 requires an employer to reimburse its employees for any costs incurred by the employee as a direct consequence of his or her employment. A good example of this is a travel reimbursement. The question here was whether training is a reimbursable expense under section 2802.
The Court of Appeal concluded the City might be able to recover some training cost, but not all of the costs demanded. The court noted that no court had previously ruled on whether training costs were reimbursable under section 2802. However, the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") did issue an opinion letter concluding if the training was required by law, then the employee bore the cost of the training. However, if the training was just required by the employer, then the employer had to reimburse the employee for the training costs.
The Court of Appeal adopted the same analysis as the DLSE. The academy training consisted of 644 hours of statutorily mandated Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST") courses and 420 hours of training specific to the City. The Court of Appeal concluded the City could require reimbursement for the POST training, but could not require reimbursement for the City specific training.
In the end the Court of Appeal invalidated the entire reimbursement ordinance as the City failed to present evidence apportioning the costs. At trial, the case was tried on an all-or-nothing basis--either the reimbursement ordinance was enforceable or it was not. The Court of Appeal ruled no part of the acknowledgment could be enforced and invalidated the entire ordinance. Because the ordinance was invalidated, the court did not reach the officers' other claims, including that the acknowledgement violated the FLSA.
This case stands in contrast with Oakland v. Hassey where the court upheld a similar policy. To encourage police officers to stay with the department longer, Oakland entered into a MOU with the Oakland Police Officers' Association in 1996 authorizing the city to require those who went through training at its academy to reimburse the city for training costs if the person left the police department before completing five years of service. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal distinguished Oakland v. Hassey because that case did not consider the application of section 2802.
This case calls into question the legitimacy of similar ordinances and policies throughout the state.
Monday, August 3, 2015
Mastagni Holstedt, APC Protects Retirement Rights in the Court of Appeal
Mastagni Holstedt, APC
filed an amicus brief with the California Second Appellate District, Division
One. At issue are adjustable retirement health subsidies under the City of Los
Angeles’ retirement system. In 2006, the City of Los Angeles passed an
ordinance which allowed the Board of the Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension
System to provide an adjustable retirement health subsidy. This adjustable rate
would allow the City to increase contributions as costs increased over time.
However, in 2011, the City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance freezing future increases to the subsidy. Los Angeles employee organizations brought suit alleging this violated their vested right to a variable subsidy. The trial court agreed and ordered the City to increase the subsidy pursuant to the 2006 ordinance.
The City appealed the decision arguing it had plenary authority to modify the pension subsidy as it was a type of “employee compensation.” In its brief, Mastagni Holstedt, APC argues a pension subsidy is not salary, but is instead a vested benefit. The California courts have already held on numerous occasions a pension benefit, once vested, cannot be revoked. The California Constitution’s Contracts Clause prohibits such an action. Thus, the City cannot arbitrarily revoke a benefit by reforming it as “employee compensation.”
Mastagni Holstedt, APC thanks the employee organizations who joined the firm in fighting back against the destruction of employee benefits. Mastagni Holstedt attorneys David E. Mastagni, Isaac S. Stevens, and Ian B. Sangster represent the amici in the matter.
However, in 2011, the City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance freezing future increases to the subsidy. Los Angeles employee organizations brought suit alleging this violated their vested right to a variable subsidy. The trial court agreed and ordered the City to increase the subsidy pursuant to the 2006 ordinance.
The City appealed the decision arguing it had plenary authority to modify the pension subsidy as it was a type of “employee compensation.” In its brief, Mastagni Holstedt, APC argues a pension subsidy is not salary, but is instead a vested benefit. The California courts have already held on numerous occasions a pension benefit, once vested, cannot be revoked. The California Constitution’s Contracts Clause prohibits such an action. Thus, the City cannot arbitrarily revoke a benefit by reforming it as “employee compensation.”
Mastagni Holstedt, APC thanks the employee organizations who joined the firm in fighting back against the destruction of employee benefits. Mastagni Holstedt attorneys David E. Mastagni, Isaac S. Stevens, and Ian B. Sangster represent the amici in the matter.
Monday, November 24, 2014
Ninth Circuit's Opinion Granting Distress Damages in Officer-Involved Shootings Stands
On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review of the City's appeal of Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles. This upholds the Ninth Circuit's ruling allowing pre-death pain and suffering damages in section 1983 claims when the death was caused by a violation of federal law.
In Chaudhry, a jury found a police officer's shooting was unjustified despite the officer testifying the suspect lunged at him with a knife. The jury awarded $700,000 to the suspect's family for wrongful death and $1 million to the suspect's estate for pain and suffering based on an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. California law prevents a decedent's estate from recovering damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Federal law is silent on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit found California's limitation on damages conflicted with section 1983's goals of compensation and deterrence. The Ninth Circuit ruled preventing pre-death pain and suffering damages to a decedent's estate makes it more economically advantageous for the defendant to kill rather than injure. The court held the state-law limitation on damages does not apply in section 1983 claims if the death was caused by a violation of federal law. This ruling greatly increases potential liability for section 1983 defendants.
In Chaudhry, a jury found a police officer's shooting was unjustified despite the officer testifying the suspect lunged at him with a knife. The jury awarded $700,000 to the suspect's family for wrongful death and $1 million to the suspect's estate for pain and suffering based on an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. California law prevents a decedent's estate from recovering damages for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Federal law is silent on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit found California's limitation on damages conflicted with section 1983's goals of compensation and deterrence. The Ninth Circuit ruled preventing pre-death pain and suffering damages to a decedent's estate makes it more economically advantageous for the defendant to kill rather than injure. The court held the state-law limitation on damages does not apply in section 1983 claims if the death was caused by a violation of federal law. This ruling greatly increases potential liability for section 1983 defendants.
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