In recent years, the practice of requiring police officers
to sign repayment agreements for academy and field training officer (FTO)
training has become increasingly common among public entities. This trend has
sparked significant legal debate, particularly in light of cases such as City
of Oakland v. Hassey and Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
County of Los Angeles. However, the introduction of Assembly Bill 692 (AB
692) could potentially reshape the legal landscape surrounding these agreements.
Understanding AB 692
AB 692 aims to address the fairness and legality of
repayment agreements imposed on police officers for training costs. The bill
seeks to ensure that such agreements do not violate labor laws or unfairly
burden officers who choose to leave their positions before a specified period.
The bill's provisions are designed to protect officers from being coerced into
agreements that may not align with their best interests or the public policy of
promoting fair labor practices.
Applicability to Public Entities
One of the critical questions surrounding AB 692 is whether
it will apply to public entities. Historically, public entities have enjoyed
certain immunities and exceptions under labor laws, as seen in the Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles case, where the
court held that certain labor code provisions did not apply to the county.
However, AB 692 explicitly targets the practices of public entities, suggesting
that it intends to close these loopholes and ensure that all employers,
including public entities, adhere to fair labor standards.
Potential Impact on Key Cases
City of Oakland v. Hassey
In City of Oakland v. Hassey, the court upheld the
city's right to require repayment of training costs, provided it did not
violate minimum wage laws. The court found that the repayment agreement did not
constitute an illegal covenant not to compete or violate wage laws, as long as
the deductions did not reduce wages below the minimum wage. AB 692 could
challenge this precedent by imposing stricter regulations on repayment
agreements, potentially rendering such agreements unenforceable if they are
deemed to coerce officers into staying or if they violate new statutory
protections.
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles
In this case, the court ruled that the labor code provision
prohibiting employers from collecting wages already paid did not apply to the
county, allowing it to recoup overpayments. AB 692 could overturn this decision
by explicitly extending labor code protections to public entities, thereby
prohibiting the recoupment of wages in a manner that violates the new standards
set by the bill.
Conclusion
AB 692 represents a significant shift in the legal
framework governing police training repayment agreements. By potentially
applying to public entities and challenging existing legal precedents, the bill
could provide greater protections for police officers and ensure that repayment
agreements are fair and equitable. Public safety unions and their members
should closely monitor the progress of AB 692, as its enactment could have
profound implications for labor practices within law enforcement agencies across
California.
In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit in Alvarado v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. vacated a district court's award of $312,429 in attorneys' fees and costs but affirmed that plaintiffs can recover fees for work on related class and PAGA claims under a section 998 settlement agreement. Given the remedial nature of wage and hour laws, the decision ensures aggrieved workers can receive representation, even if class certification fails.
Claudia Alvarado sued Walmart for Labor Code violations, including denied meal breaks, unpaid overtime, and unreimbursed business expenses. She brought individual claims, a putative class action, and PAGA claims. After the district court denied class certification, Alvarado settled her individual claims for $22,000 under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and dismissed her PAGA claims without prejudice.
The settlement allowed Alvarado to seek "reasonable fees and costs actually incurred... in pursuit of [her] individual claims... and recoverable by law." She moved for $591,044 in fees and $44,879 in costs, arguing under Hensley v. Eckerhart that her class and PAGA work was intertwined with her successful individual claims, making apportionment unnecessary. Walmart opposed, but the district court awarded $297,799 in fees (after Alvarado's voluntary reduction) and $14,630 in costs.
On appeal, Walmart argued the agreement barred fees for anything beyond strictly individual work. The Ninth Circuit rejected this, holding that section 998 agreements do not limit fees recoverable under California law unless expressly stated. Since the agreement referenced fees "recoverable by law," it permitted Hensley recovery for intertwined claims. The court vacated the award only because the district court failed to provide a clear explanation, remanding for reconsideration.
This decision benefits California workers and unions in several ways. First, it clarifies that settling individual claims under section 998 does not forfeit fees for related class or PAGA efforts. Plaintiffs' lawyers can pursue broad litigation without fear that a partial settlement will wipe out compensation for overlapping work. Second, it upholds Hensley's flexible approach, allowing fees where claims share common facts or theories, which is common in wage cases involving systemic violations. Finally, by requiring only a "concise but clear" explanation on remand, the ruling keeps the door open for substantial fee awards proportional to the litigation's scope, even with limited monetary recovery. For unions, this means stronger leverage in negotiations and contract enforcement.
On September 11, 2025, David
E. Mastagni, a partner at Mastagni Holstedt and counsel for the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), testified before the California
Senate Public Safety Committee in opposition to Senate Bill 627 along with Jonathan
Feldman, lobbyist for the California Police Chiefs Association. Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor
Gavin Newsom signed S.B. 627 into law on September 20, 2025. They explained how dangerous last minute amendments make the bill detrimental to public safety, by stripping important immunity protections for local officers who unintentionally violate the statute. Mastagni pointed out that because of the Supremacy Clause, this bill will not apply to federal officers, yet its severability clause means its restrictions and legal jeopardy will fall solely on California’s local peace officers, who don’t enforce federal immigration laws.
Despite opposition highlighting the bill's dangers, Governor Gavin Newsom signed the "No Secret Police Act" into law on September 20, 2025. In his signing message, Newsom stated: "I am signing Senate Bill 627, which prohibits law enforcement officers, including federal immigration officers, from wearing masks or other face coverings that conceal their identity while performing their duties in public, with certain exceptions. This bill is an important step toward increasing transparency and accountability in law enforcement, particularly in light of reports of federal immigration officers concealing their identities during operations that have caused fear and mistrust in communities.
Scope and Purpose of S.B. 627
S.B. 627, authored primarily
by Senator Scott Wiener, prohibits local and federal law enforcement officers
from concealing their faces with coverings during the performance of
their duties. Senator Wiener described the bill as targeting secret police tactics, particularly by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. He argued that routine masking fosters mistrust, instills fear, and emboldens officers to violate civil rights with impunity.
The bill defines prohibited facial coverings broadly to include
any opaque mask, garment, helmet, headgear, or other item that obscures facial
identity, such as balaclavas, tactical masks, or ski masks. The law includes narrow exceptions for certain safety equipment and circumstances, but they are vague and open to conflicting interpretations. Violations
constitute infractions or misdemeanors, with additional penalties including loss of immunities and statutory liability of $10,000.00 for
tortious conduct committed while masked.Under the bill, enforcement agencies must develop policies to ensure officers adhere to these provisions by July 2026.
Risks to Officer Safety and Operational Efficiency
In his testimony, Mastagni
that facial coverings serve crucial safety functions for law enforcement officers and federal agents. Masks and helmets are often integral to protecting identities during sensitive, undercover, or tactical operations. Such protective gear shields officers and agents from retaliation, threats, or targeted harassment.
He pointed out how the overly narrow and vague exceptions in the bill endanger officer safety and operational effectiveness.
For example, the bill's prohibition on motor officers wearing helmets unless using a motorcycle contradicts
standard training and roadside safety protocols. An officer could be exposed to fentanyl or other dangerous chemicals during a routine search of a car or home and need to cover their face with anything available in order to survive.
The bill also imposes burdens on local
agencies by requiring them to develop compliant policies by July 2026. Law enforcement groups, such as PORAC and CPCA, fear that theses heightened safety risks and exposure to liability will exacerbate California's police staffing crisis.
The Law Contradicts Established Federal and State Precedents: The Supremacy Clause
Mastagni addressed the bills
application to federal officers, citing Supreme Court precedent under the
Supremacy Clause, including Cunningham v. Neagle (1890), which protects federal
agents from state criminal prosecution when acting within their official
duties. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Court invalidated state laws
intruding on federal immigration enforcement. The same applies here. States cannot second guess
federal policies, such as ICE directives authorizing masks for officer
protection. The bill creates conflict preemption, as officers cannot comply
with both state and federal rules without compromising safety or mission
effectiveness.
Senator Wiener and supporters
of S.B. 627 often refer to an op-ed by Erwin Chemerinsky, dean and professor of
law at the UC Berkeley School of Law, to support the bill's constitutionality.
This argument fails. Professor Chemerinsky contends that S.B. 627 can regulate
federal agents' mask wearing because it is a law of general applicability that
applies to all law enforcement officers rather than specifically targeting
federal operations. Notably, he omits reference to the exclusion of California state peace officers. He compares the bill to federal agents' compliance with everyday
state laws like traffic rules.
Flawed Legal Justifications and Misinterpretations
Although written as a “general” law, it cannot be applied to federal officers if it interferes with federal operations. While appearing facially neutral, its
practical effect substantially interferes with federal law enforcement
operations in ways that traffic laws do not. Federal immigration enforcement
involves unique considerations, including officer safety from targeted
retaliation and protection of sensitive investigations that local law
enforcement typically does not face. This creates an undue burden on federal
operations that triggers intergovernmental immunity principles, protecting federal
activities from state interference even when laws appear neutral on their face.
Chemerinsky further asserts
that requiring officers not to wear masks does not constitute a significant
burden on federal activities and does not impede federal agents' performance of
their duties. This overlooks the fundamental differences between local policing
and federal immigration enforcement. Federal agents frequently operate in
sensitive contexts where identity protection is critical for both officer
safety and operational success. Even if only 10 percent of operations require
face coverings, that represents thousands of high risk federal operations
annually where agent safety would be compromised.
Courts typically defer to
federal determinations that prohibitions on face coverings create substantial
burdens on operations by compromising officer safety, operational security, and
effectiveness. The legislation seeks to second guess policy determinations that
federal agents, particularly in immigration enforcement, face unique threats
from targeted retaliation against them and their families through doxing and
harassment. The inability to protect their identities would significantly
impair their ability to conduct sensitive operations, gather intelligence, and
work undercover. These burdens are concrete operational impediments that
directly interfere with federal law enforcement functions.
Chemerinsky cites Ninth
Circuit precedent that states can prosecute federal agents criminally if their
actions are objectively unreasonable, suggesting this provides a pathway for
enforcement of S.B. 627 against non compliant federal officers. He primarily
relies on the vacated Ninth Circuit decision in Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359
(Ninth Cir. 2001), vacated at 266 F.3d 979 (Ninth Cir. 2001). The Ninth
Circuit's objectively unreasonable standard applies to federal agents who exceed
their authority or violate constitutional rights, not to agents following
lawful federal protocols. Wearing masks during legitimate operations is
standard procedure for many federal agencies based on assessed security risks
and operational needs. Criminalizing conduct that follows established federal
guidelines would allow state law to dictate federal operational procedures,
creating an impermissible state veto over federal law enforcement methods. This
directly conflicts with Supremacy Clause principles that protect federal operations
from state interference.
When asked if Legislative
Counsel had time to review S.B. 627 to determine if it would hold up in court,
Senator Wiener dodged the question. U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the
Central District of California stated that federal agents will not alter their
practices, calling the law unconstitutional and preempted by federal authority.
Local officers may face the impossible task of enforcing S.B. 627 against
federal personnel, risking claims of obstruction or false arrest if courts invalidate the
statute.
Threat to Immunities Local
Officers Need to Perform Their Duties
At the Public Safety
Committee hearing, Senator Wiener and his supporters erroneously claimed that the bills' “knowing and willful” violation language shields officers who make good faith mistake regarding whether an exemption applies from the bill's criminal penalties, including loss
of immunity. Mastagni pointed out that as drafted “knowing and willful” refer only to the intentional decision to cover an officer's face, not intentionally breaking the law. This general intent standard exposes officers to lawsuits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution with at least $10,000 damages, even with no actual harm. The bill’s “notwithstanding any other law” clause overrides basic protections for our officers like indemnification under Government Code 825. That exposes officers to personal liability for a good faith mistake about whether an exception applies. Mistake of law, such as erroneously believing conduct fits a legal exemption, is generally not a defense, as it does not negate the intent to commit the underlying act.
SB 627 removes critical immunities that protect officers when making good faith arrests, relying on probable cause, or exercising lawful discretion. The importance of immunity protections cannot be overstated. The California Legislature has enacted numerous civil immunities and privileges, which courts have carefully interpreted and applied for decades. These protections apply only to officers acting in good faith and are forfeited if officers break the law. The Legislature has consistently refused to weaken these protections because they are essential to public safety and enable officers to make arrests, execute search warrants, exercise reasonable discretion, and participate in prosecutions without fear of retaliatory suits.
The late addition of language stripping local peace
officers of immunity is the single most troubling aspect of S.B. 627. Officers
operate under carefully balanced immunities, including Civil Code section
43.55, Penal Code sections 836 and 847, and Government Code section 821.6,
which shield them from personal lawsuits when they act in good faith and within
the scope of duty. S.B. 627 overrides those protections solely because a face
covering is involved, regardless of intent.
The bill's exemptions are too
narrow and vague to adequately protect local officers, who do not enforce
immigration laws. State officers are exempt from the bill's provisions. The
severability clause ensures that if the law cannot apply to federal officers,
its restrictions will still bind local California law enforcement. This means
the Trump administration will likely have an easy win in court, invalidating
application of the law to federal officers through preemption challenges. The
severability clause in the bill leaves local officers bearing the full brunt of
the criminal penalties and loss of immunities.
Enforcement Concerns
California Senate Bill 627 introduces significant legal challenges for law enforcement officers, particularly concerning potential obstruction violations. The bill's provisions aim to enhance accountability by stripping qualified immunity and good faith defenses if officers are found to have acted with masked intentions. This legislative change underscores the delicate balance officers must maintain between executing their enforcement duties and adhering to the stringent requirements set forth by SB 627.
Federal law provides comprehensive protection for Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents through multiple statutory frameworks. Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, it is a federal crime to forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating penalties: simple obstruction carries up to one year imprisonment, while obstruction involving physical contact or intent to commit another felony increases the maximum penalty to eight years. ICE agents are covered under section 1114 as federal law enforcement officers. The statute imposes escalating imprisonment penalties.
Ironically, federal qualified immunity doctrine would likely protect local officers from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting masked ICE agents, even if the arrest later proves unlawful. The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity protects government officials unless the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. No clearly established federal law prohibits state officers from enforcing state identification requirements against individuals who refuse to identify themselves, even if those individuals are federal agents.
California immunity statutes would likely provide additional protection. California officers acting under state authority would have reasonable grounds to believe their actions were justified under California Penal Code Section 847(b)(1). The good faith immunity, which protects officers who act with a reasonable belief that their conduct is lawful, also faces limitations under the new bill. The removal of this defense in cases of masked actions places officers in a precarious position, requiring them to exercise heightened diligence and judgment in their interactions with the public.
Conclusion
The legal complexities introduced by SB 627 necessitate a thorough understanding of the bill's provisions and the potential defenses available. Officers must navigate these challenges while ensuring compliance with the law, a task that demands both legal acumen and practical wisdom. As the legal landscape evolves, the ability to effectively balance enforcement responsibilities with the mandates of SB 627 will be crucial for law enforcement professionals in California.
Watch the full Senate Public Safety Committee hearing on SB 627 below.
On September 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment against Jaren Michael Stennerson, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of methamphetamine and under § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. United States v. Stennerson, 2025 WL 2600006 (C.A.9 (Mont.), 2025). Stennerson argued both statutes violate the Second Amendment on their face and that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Forrest, rejected these claims, finding the statutes consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation under the framework set by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).
The court held that § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of or addicts to controlled substances from possessing firearms, survives facial challenge because it can be constitutionally applied in circumstances analogous to founding-era laws restricting arms from intoxicated individuals. Citing examples like Virginia's 1655 ban on shooting guns while drinking and post-founding statutes in states such as Kansas and Missouri barring carry while intoxicated, the panel reasoned these traditions support disarming those impaired in judgment, such as active drug users. The court noted alignment with decisions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits upholding the statute's facial validity, though it left open the possibility of successful as-applied challenges where the restriction exceeds historical analogues. On vagueness, the panel found Stennerson had clear notice, given his admitted daily methamphetamine use contemporaneous with possession, consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363 (1977), and United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (2001).
While the case involved methamphetamine, its reasoning extends to other controlled substances, including marijuana, which remains a Schedule I drug under federal law. This raises unresolved questions regarding the ongoing conflict between state protections for off-duty cannabis use and federal firearm restrictions. California's Assembly Bill 2188, effective January 1, 2024, amended the Fair Employment and Housing Act to prohibit employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on off-duty cannabis use or non-psychoactive metabolites in drug tests. Though untested by the courts, this law may apply to public safety personnel, including peace officers. Senate Bill 700 further reinforces these protections by barring inquiries into prior cannabis use during hiring.
These state laws offer job security for marijuana users, but federal law conflicts. Section 922(g)(3) categorically bars firearm possession by unlawful drug users, and marijuana's federal status makes even occasional users "unlawful" regardless of state legalization. Before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (2011), upheld this ban for drug users, including marijuana users.
The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed recreational marijuana under Bruen standards. Peace officers must often possess firearms off-duty. Yet using cannabis off-duty, even sporadically, could trigger federal prosecution under § 922(g)(3), as courts interpret "unlawful user" to include regular or prolonged use close in time to possession. Recent challenges in other circuits, like the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (2024), suggest as-applied relief might be available for non-intoxicated marijuana users, but no such ruling has emerged in the Ninth Circuit yet.
Officers considering off-duty cannabis use should consult legal counsel to weigh risks, including department policies and federal gun charges. This ruling underscores the need for caution when state law conflicts with federal prohibitions. The law surrounding these issues will likely evolve as further as-applied challenges are litigated within the Ninth Circuit.
We are pleased to announce that David E. Mastagni and Taylor Davies-Mahaffey have been selected for inclusion in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. This recognition highlights their work in Litigation - Labor and Employment, Labor Law - Union, and Employment Law - Individuals.
The Best Lawyers in America represents the top 5% of practicing attorneys in the United States, based on a rigorous peer-review process. Nominations come from leading lawyers outside the nominee's firm, followed by confidential evaluations from peers in the same practice areas and geographic regions. Only attorneys in good standing with their local bar associations are considered. For over 40 years, this process has identified lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill and integrity. As the announcement notes, "the best lawyers know who the best lawyers are." No fees or payments are involved in the selection, ensuring its credibility. More details on the 2026 awards can be found here.
This honor not only affirms our attorneys' expertise but also reinforces the value our firm delivers to clients. For unions facing employment challenges, such recognition signals reliable counsel grounded in proven success. If you have questions about labor or employment issues, contact our firm for a consultation.
In Cheairs v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that an officer’s deployment of a blast ball during a chaotic protest, which injured a nearby bystander, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscores the challenges officers face in managing volatile crowds and highlights key considerations for use-of-force policies in public safety operations.
Background
The case stems from protests in Seattle following George Floyd’s death in 2020. On June 7, demonstrators escalated actions by breaching police barricades, throwing projectiles, shining lasers at officers, and threatening to burn precincts. Seattle Police Department officers, equipped with less-lethal munitions like OC blast balls, issued multiple dispersal orders and warnings via public address.
Officer Carl Anderson, leading the chemical agent response team, threw several blast balls to protect officers and disperse the crowd. One device bounced off the pavement and struck Taylor Cheairs, a bystander filming from the sidewalk near the front of the protesters. Cheairs suffered serious injuries and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and First Amendment retaliation.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Cheairs appealed.
Legal Ruling
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Cheairs was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. Citing Torres v. Madrid, the court noted that force applied with intent to restrain can constitute a seizure. Here, a jury could find the blast ball’s use manifested such intent, given its design and deployment.
Turning to reasonableness, the court applied the Graham v. Connor factors: severity of the crime, immediate threat to safety, and resistance or evasion. The most critical factor—immediate threat—weighed heavily in favor of the officer. Video evidence showed protesters near Cheairs assaulting officers with rocks, bottles, fireworks, and lasers amid escalating violence. The crowd ignored dispersal orders, creating probable cause for arrests related to assault or failure to disperse.
The court balanced the intrusion (serious injury from a less-lethal device) against the government’s interest in protecting officers, citizens, and property. Officer Anderson followed department policy, throwing the device at the ground rather than at head height, reducing lethality risk. Under the totality of circumstances, viewed from the officer’s on-scene perspective, the force was deemed reasonable.
On the First Amendment claim, Cheairs failed to show retaliation for filming. No evidence indicated Officer Anderson knew Cheairs was recording or targeted him; the officer’s view was obstructed by the police line.
Implications for Public Safety Officers
This ruling offers valuable guidance for California peace officers and firefighters handling protests or crowd control. It affirms that less-lethal force can be justified when crowds pose objective threats, even if bystanders are inadvertently harmed. Agencies should review policies on munitions deployment, emphasizing ground-level throws to minimize injury risks, and officers should document threats via body cams and reports to support reasonableness claims.
If you have questions about this case or its application to your department, contact your representatives.
In the ever-evolving landscape of public safety labor law,
protecting the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records remains a
critical issue. A recent California Court of Appeal decision, Santa Ana
Police Officers Association et al. v. City of Santa Ana (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 296, limits the remedies available to public employees when such
records are improperly disclosed. This ruling exposes the rising tensions between CPRA transparency goals and the erosion of public employees' due process rights to protect their privacy. For public employee labor organizations, this ruling sets forth the procedural hurdles they face and the need for legislative reform to balance transparency interests with a meaningful process for employees to enforce their privacy rights.
A CPRA Response Gone Wrong
The case stems from a 2021 incident where the City of Santa
Ana inadvertently disclosed confidential personnel records of over 100 police
officers to the media outlet Voice of OC in response to a CPRA request.
These records included sensitive information about prior complaints and
disciplinary investigations that were not subject to disclosure under S.B. 1421 or 16. In fact, the materials were confidential under Penal
Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 (the "Pitchess"
statutes).
The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA), along
with anonymous "Doe" officers, sued the City, alleging violations of
these confidentiality laws, negligence per se, failure to investigate their
subsequent complaint about the disclosure (under Penal Code section 832.5), and
denial of a request for information relating to the disclosures in violation of the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The plaintiffs sought relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and mandamus.
The trial court sustained the City's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, delivering a
mixed bag of outcomes with significant labor implications.
Court Holdings:
The appellate court's decision, authored by Acting
Presiding Justice Sanchez, addressed several core issues relevant to public
safety unions and officers:
No Private
Right of Action for Improper Disclosure
The court held that Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence
Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not create a private cause of action for
officers or unions seeking damages or other relief for the unauthorized release
of confidential records. Rather, these statutes primarily establish procedures for
protecting against improper disclosures but don't
authorize lawsuits against public entities who violate the statutes and improperly disclose confidential material.
Related negligence claims were also dismissed, as they
relied on the same statutes for a "duty of care." This ruling effectively strips public employees of any meaningful remedy for violation of these statutes or the disclosure of sensitive materials that violate their right to privacy. The court recognized the violation of mandated confidentiality laws but limited the employees' remedies to administrative or mandamus relief rather than civil damages.
These remedies are woefully inadequate because at most they seek to prevent future violations. The CPRA does not contain any mechanism for retraction of improperly disclosed materials and once disclosed and publicized, and injection against further disclosures by the employer provides little comfort. Moreover, public employees often discovery improper disclosures once they are publicized, because public agencies often disclose the records without notifying employees or providing them an opportunity to object.
Even if afforded notice, filing an action to prevent the disclosure is costly and risky. If the court rules against the employee, the requester, typically a media entity, is often awarded attorneys' fees and cost. If successful, the employee still suffers litigation costs with no hopes of monetary damages. This system urgently needs rebalancing.
Anonymity
in Litigation: A High Bar
Officers suing anonymously (as "Does") must
obtain court approval after a hearing balancing their privacy interests against
the public's First Amendment right to access court proceedings. Here, the Doe
officers failed to seek such authorization, leading to dismissal of their
claims. Officers dealing with sensitive personnel matters can't assume
anonymity will be granted. They must proactively justify it, or risk procedural dismissal.
Mootness of
Injunctive and Mandamus Relief for Past Disclosures
Claims for injunctive relief to
prevent disclosure or mandamus to compel non-disclosure were deemed moot, as
the records had already been released years earlier in response to the CPRA
request. The court noted that once disclosure occurs, a public entity lacks the
ability to "undo" it, rendering such remedies ineffective.
Mandamus
Available for Failure to Investigate Complaints
In a win for the union, the court reversed on the cause of action for failure to investigate its complaints. Penal Code section 832.5 requires agencies to investigate
citizen complaints against personnel, including staff involved in
disclosures, and notify complainants of the disposition within 30 days. The
SAPOA adequately alleged the City never investigated or reported on their
complaint about the disclosure, creating a ministerial duty enforceable via
mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. This "win" still cannot undo the violation of the employees' privacy rights.
Exhaustion
Required for MMBA Claims
The cause of action alleging the City violated the MMBA by denying the union's information requests was dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court confirmed the SAPOA's associational standing to represent its members but dismissed the claims. While individual peace officers are exempt from PERB jurisdiction, unions like
the SAPOA are not.
Conclusion
This decision has many negative effects for public employee labor organizations. Unions must focus on prevention. With limited remedies post-disclosure, unions should bargain for protections against agency negligence to avoid accidental releases of exempt records. Procedures that require agencies to notify the recognized labor representative and employee before any personnel record is released would at least provide an opportunity to object or even commence a reverse CPRA action to prevent disclosure.
Legislation is also need to balance public employee due process rights. The state could mandate these pre-disclosure notification and process for the employee to object. The one-sided attorneys' fees structure in favor of requestors needs rebalancing so public employees can seek judicial relief without the fear of being subject to excessive attorneys' fees being awarded to deep pocketed media organizations.
Overall, Santa Ana narrows direct paths to
compensation for privacy breaches. While the SAPOA scored a partial victory on
the investigation front, the case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the limited protections of confidentiality
statutes.
The Sacramento Police Officers Association (SPOA) obtained an Interest Arbitration Award from Arbitrator John LaRocco effective August 8, 2025, adopting SPOA's last best offer on a 5% salary adjustment for all members retroactive to January 25, 2025. The Award runs through April 17, 2026, and also provides all unit members additional longevity at 10 years and 17 years of service, and well as an additional 4% increase for Dispatcher IIIs.
Binding under the Sacramento City Charter, this Award provides SPOA members substantial and immediate increases, while also allowing the parties to promptly return to negations to bargain over a long-term agreement. The City had initially refused to bargain, forcing the SPOA to file an unfair labor practice in December of 2024 and ultimately resulting in members working for over six (6) months without a contract. Unable to reach a long-term agreement, the SPOA and the City agreed to an expedited arbitration process of over a limited number of proposals. The issuance of this Award and its immediate financial relief illustrates the value of interest arbitration in resolving difficult negotiations.
The Interest Arbitration Process: Binding Impasse Resolution Under the City Charter
The Sacramento City Charter, Article XVIII, Section 503, mandates interest arbitration to break deadlocks in negotiations over wages, hours, benefits, and terms of employment. Unlike the advisory fact-finding under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), which often leaves disputes unresolved due to its advisory nature, impasse arbitration provides for a neutral arbitrator to select from the last best offer of each party that best matches traditional factors: consumer price changes, comparable compensation in similar classifications (based on the local market and similarly sized cities throughout the state), the City's financial condition and ability to pay, staffing/recruitment/retention data, and other relevant information.
Here, the parties stipulated to an expedited mediation-arbitration (med-arb) process before a single arbitrator, limiting the issues to salary, pay differentials for Dispatcher III, longevity pay, and term. This strategic move narrowed the scope of proposals and relaxed the arbitration procedures to allow for a swift award while preserving the ability to quickly return to formal negotiations to address additional proposals and seek a longer-term contract.
The Award
Arbitrator LaRocco selected a blend of proposals, favoring SPOA on core economic issues:
Salary Adjustments: Adopted SPOA's proposal for a 5% increase across all classifications, effective retroactively to January 25, 2025 (the expiration of the prior contract). The Award rejected the City's 2.5% offer without retroactivity, based on the parties' history of retroactive increases and SPOA's evidence showing City police salaries lagging below market comparators. Even the City's compensation survey (which used a controversial ERI cost-of-living adjustment for comparator cities) showed officers fell below market means and medians, as well as below Sacramento County deputies for the first time.
Dispatcher III Differential: Adopted SPOA's proposal to raise the salary benchmark from 17% to 21% above Dispatcher II top step, effective upon Award implementation. This proposal brings Dispatcher IIIs up to the sergeant-officer differentials and addresses chronic staffing problems within the dispatcher classifications.
Longevity Pay: Established new 1.5% incentive at 10 years of service and increasing the existing 3% at 17 years to 4.5%, effective July 1, 2025. Although the Award selected the City's Longevity proposal due primarily to the overall cost of the increases provided by the Award over a short amount of time, the arbitrator noted importance of increasing retention incentives for mid-career officers. The arbitrator suggested that future contracts should both increase longevity pays and provide them sooner.
Demonstrating the importance of interest arbitration, the City's submitted its first formal proposal to increase longevity in arbitration when faced with the prospect of the arbitrator adopting the SPOA proposal for a 3% increase at 10 and 17 years of service. Because the arbitrator selects the most reasonable offer, the City had to increase its proposals or risk losing on this issue.
Contract Term: The arbitrator selected the City's proposed term from January 25, 2025, to April 17, 2026, over the SPOA proposed term to January 24, 2026. The arbitrator reasoned that the City's proposal provided more breathing room for comprehensive negotiations on unresolved issues.
The award also incorporates four tentative agreements reached pre-arbitration and retains jurisdiction for implementation disputes.
City's Budget Deficit Claims
The City argued inability to pay, citing a structural deficit projected at $50 million for FY 2025-2026, escalating to $130 million by FY 2028-2029, driven by past policy decisions like expanded services funded by temporary revenues. The arbitrator acknowledged the deficit's ongoing nature but distinguished it from external shocks like recessions. The City admitted that its revenues were growing at a healthy rate, but argued that spending priorities were outpacing the revenue growth.
As detailed in the award, the City's Finance Director testified that "the City is experiencing a severe structural budget deficit of an ongoing nature" originating several years ago, with an initial February 2025 projection of "$62 million for fiscal year 2025-2026" updated to "$50 million" by July. The director acknowledged that "the structural budget deficit was caused by past City and voter decisions," including "long-run expenditure commitments based on one-time or two-time funding," resulting in a "continuing imbalance between revenues and expenditures." While "economic externalities, like inflation, contributed to the deficit," they "did not play a major role in causing the severe structural deficit."
Future projections included "$93.6 million for fiscal year 2026-2027; $110.1 million for fiscal year 2027-2028; and, $130.3 million for fiscal year 2028-2029." The City noted that "about 50% of City expenditures go toward employee salaries" and "every 1% salary increase for City employees costs $4.8 million," alongside unfunded liabilities like PERS contribution increases.
SPOA countered with expert analyses challenging these claims. Beacon Economics forecasted higher tax revenues, concluding "the City remains fiscally healthy because City employment, real estate transactions and business activities continue to thrive," with "property taxes will rise 4% to 8% over the next three fiscal years." Harvey M. Rose Associates reviewed historical data, finding that "for the past four fiscal years, the City projected General Fund deficits of $78.8 million to $160.5 million while the actual deficits were $5.6 million to $21.4 million." Applying this pattern, Rose estimated the FY 2025-2026 deficit at "approximately $34 million" and noted "the City has sufficient reserves to absorb the shortfall." Rose further observed that "the City's General Fund balance rose from $225.4 million to $326.4 million between fiscal year 2019-2020 and fiscal year 2023-2024," concluding "the General Fund is relatively healthy" and criticizing the City's "history of grossly overstating expected budget deficits."
The arbitrator acknowledged the deficits but found they did not preclude funding reasonable increases given the City's healthy reserves and the need for public safety. The arbitrator stated, "the City is experiencing a structural budget deficit and unfortunately, the evidence does not disclose how long the deficit might endure. It cannot be indefinite." However, he found the City's projections "exaggerated" even if SPOA's predictions were "overly optimistic," emphasizing that "if the City's projections are accurate, City inaction could prolong the deficit, which would precipitate fiscal chaos." Critically, he distinguished policy-driven shortfalls from external factors, holding that "a 5% wage increase cannot be nullified by diverse and contradictory evidence concerning the City's ability to pay." Employees "were not responsible for causing the deficit," and public safety "should be a top priority." With tax revenues expected to rise, the City "has the ability to fund a 5% salary increase."
Vacancies and Retention Challenges
The arbitrator noted the significance of the City's police officer vacancies, which were directly relevant to the parties proposals. The arbitrator noted, "the evidence reveals that the City's Police Department is confronted with a retention problem." The data presented revealed stark declines. "In June, 2025, there were 619 budgeted police officer positions, but only 470.5 were filled and only 373 were working. The number of working officers was just 60% of the budget positions." For context, "as of January, 2021, 94% (533.5) of the 569 budget positions were filled and 84% (479) of the positions were working." The arbitrator observed that "the percent of officers working as compared to budget positions had not been at or below 60% since 2015-2017" and that "except for a short upward bump in early 2022, the percentage of budgeted positions filled and working has steadily declined since 2021 indicating that police officer retention is a problem which must be addressed albeit, it cannot be cured in this agreement."
The arbitrator emphasized the importance of early longevity steps and competitive salaries. "Commencing longevity pay at 10 years will begin to alleviate the problem" by establishing "a foundation for possible greater longevity pay in future contracts, especially if the parties collect more data about the reasons for the retention problem and where the departing officers are landing." He suggested flexibility for future adjustments, noting "during their upcoming negotiations, the parties may find that it might be more beneficial to start longevity pay before 10 years of service as opposed to raising longevity pay at 17 years of service."
Future Impacts
This Award strengthens SPOA's position and provides the parties guidance to address the growing problem of officer vacancies by enhancing mid-term longevity as a retention tool. The arbitrator noted growing vacancies of 20% of authorized positions and declining fill rates of working officers from 84% in 2021 to 60% by June of 2025. He noted that starting longevity at 10 years lays the groundwork for expansions, potentially before 10 years if data shows earlier incentives curb attrition more effectively.
This Award also demonstrates the power of interest arbitration to provide binding decisions based on data-driven evidence and prevents endless stalemates. The analysis highlights the importance of comparable data, recruitment and retention data, and ability to pay evidence in any negotiations or impasse proceedings. Further, it provides insights regarding differences in how arbitrators view budget deficits cited as a basis to deny raises depending upon whether the deficit is policy driven , e.g. other spending priorities, or caused by external factors, e.g. recessions.
Mastagni Labor Representative Jose Cuervo was SPOA's lead negotiator during these negotiations and David E. Mastagni represented the SPOA during the Interest Arbitration.
Two new Court of Appeal decisions are chipping away at the confidentiality safeguards for peace officers' personnel files under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. These rulings expand disclosure requirements and limit protective orders, potentially exposing officers to broader scrutiny and misuse of sensitive information. For public safety unions and officers, this signals a shifting landscape where traditional protections are giving way to demands for transparency. Below, we break down the cases and their combined implications.
Schneider v. Superior Court (2025): Full Disclosure of IA Investigation if Brady Material, Not Just Witness Info
In Schneider v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 613, the Second District Court of Appeal addressed a murder defendant's motion for discovery of Brady material in the personnel files of six LASD deputies involved in the investigation. The trial court found Brady material in four files but limited disclosure to names, addresses, and phone numbers of complainants and witnesses—standard under classic Pitchess practice.
The appellate court reversed, holding that when material qualifies as Brady (favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment), the prosecution must disclose the full records, including documents, reports, and audio-visual evidence. This bypasses the usual Pitchess limitation, as Brady's constitutional mandate trumps officers' privacy interests in such cases.
The court reasoned that Brady materiality is higher than Pitchess relevance, so once identified, full access is essential for the defense to build a case. Protective measures like sealing transcripts still apply, but the ruling opens the door to verbatim records rather than summaries.
For officers, this means personnel files (e.g. IA investigations and disciplinary actions) containing impeachment evidence (e.g., dishonesty or excessive force) could be handed over wholesale in criminal cases where deputies are witnesses. What started as a targeted Pitchess motion now risks broader exposure, especially since most motions seek Brady-type material.
Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024): No Protective Order for Pitchess Disclosures of Serious Misconduct Records Deemed Public Records Under Penal Code § 832.7
The Second District's decision in Banuelos v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 542 further weakens Pitchess by eliminating protective orders for records made public under Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(C), which mandates disclosure of sustained findings of dishonesty.
Here, a murder defendant sought records of an Azusa PD officer's dishonesty finding via a CPRA request and a parallel Pitchess motion. The trial court ordered disclosure after an in-camera review but imposed a protective order under Evidence Code § 1045(e), restricting use to the criminal proceeding.
The appellate court vacated the order, ruling that since § 832.7 deems these records nonconfidential and subject to public inspection, no protective order applies, even if obtained through Pitchess. This builds on ALADS v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, which separated Pitchess from CPRA but didn't address overlapping disclosures.
The impacts are significant. Officers' records of sustained serious misconduct, such as dishonesty, can now be freely shared beyond the courtroom, blurring the lines between Pitchess disclosures and public record requests. Defense teams can now disseminate this subset of Pitchess materials widely, increasing risks of reputational harm.
Combined Impact: A Weakening of Privacy Rights for Peace Officers
Together, Schneider and Banuelos accelerate the erosion of Pitchess protections. By expanding Brady to require full documents and stripping protective orders for § 832.7 records, these rulings prioritize defendants' rights and police transparency over officers' privacy. These rulings will lead to much more invasive criminal discovery and the more wide spread use of those materials beyond the specific criminal case.
Ninth Circuit Upholds Ruling Against California's Ammo Background Check Law
In a closely watched decision today, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that California's ammunition background check requirements, enacted through voter-approved Proposition 63 in 2016, violate the Second Amendment. The case, Rhode v. Bonta, brought by Olympic gold medalist Kim Rhode and other firearm owners, underscores ongoing tensions between state gun regulations and constitutional protections
Court's Decision
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Sandra S. Ikuta and joined by Judge Bridget S. Bade, applied the Supreme Court's framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) to evaluate the law's constitutionality. California's system mandates face-to-face purchases through licensed vendors, with background checks required for every ammunition transaction. Options include a quick $1 standard check for those with existing firearm records, a $19 basic check for others, or annual certificate verifications processes that the court found impose unnecessary fees, potential delays, and geographic restrictions on law-abiding citizens.
The panel determined that the Second Amendment's plain text covers the right to "operable arms," which inherently includes ammunition. They argued that the regime "meaningfully constrains" this right by creating barriers not just for casual buyers but for anyone needing regular access, such as competitive shooters or off-duty officers maintaining proficiency. Critically, California failed to provide sufficient historical analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras (focusing on 1791 and 1868 eras) to justify the repeated checks. Analogues like loyalty oaths, concealed carry permits, surety laws, and vendor licensing were deemed not "relevantly similar" in "how" (burden imposed) and "why" (purpose, e.g., public safety vs. disloyalty). No historical precedent for repeated background checks on every ammo purchase.
This facial challenge succeeded, meaning the law was deemed invalid in all applications, leading the court to uphold a permanent injunction against enforcement. The decision did not address related claims under the dormant Commerce Clause or federal preemption, focusing squarely on Second Amendment grounds.
Judge Jay S. Bybee dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority overlooked Bruen's endorsement of "shall-issue" licensing regimes with modest fees and delays. He pointed out that most checks under California's system cost just $1 and process in under a minute, hardly a "meaningful constraint" on access. Bybee warned that the ruling could undermine practical regulations that help ensure ammunition doesn't fall into the wrong hands.
Governor Newsom's Response
Governor Gavin Newsom, a prominent figure in national gun control efforts, quickly issued a statement criticizing the ruling as a setback for public safety initiatives. He emphasized the voter-approved nature of the law, stating:
“Strong gun laws save lives – and today’s decision is a slap in the face to the progress California has made in recent years to keep its communities safer from gun violence. Californians voted to require background checks on ammunition and their voices should matter.”
Conclusion
Many first responders value streamlined access to ammunition for training, home defense, or off-duty carry, viewing excessive red tape as an added burden in an already demanding profession. While supporters of the law argue it enhances community safety, critics contend it disproportionately affects responsible owners without clear historical precedent.
This ruling could prompt California to seek en banc review or Supreme Court intervention, especially given the split panel and Bruen's evolving application. In the meantime, this ruling removes a layer of regulation that some see as overly restrictive.
Ninth Circuit Declares California's One-Gun-A-Month Law Unconstitutional: Implications for Peace Officers and Public Safety
In a significant victory for Second Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down California's longstanding one-gun-a-month purchase restriction, ruling it facially unconstitutional. The unanimous decision in Nguyen v. Bonta, handed down on June 20, 2025, rejects the state's attempt to limit firearm acquisitions without historical precedent, emphasizing the plural nature of the right to "keep and bear Arms." For California peace officers and public safety professionals, this ruling not only expands access to firearms but also underscores the evolving landscape of gun regulations post-Bruen, potentially affecting training, personal protection, and enforcement duties.
The case challenged California's 1999 law, which prohibited most residents from purchasing more than one handgun or semiautomatic centerfire rifle within any 30-day period. Plaintiffs, backed by groups like the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and California Rifle & Pistol Association (CRPA), argued it infringed on the Second Amendment's core protections. The Ninth Circuit panel—Judges Danielle J. Forrest (Trump appointee), John B. Owens (Obama appointee), and Bridget S. Bade (Trump appointee)—agreed, finding no basis in America's founding-era traditions for such metering of constitutional rights.
Judge Forrest's opinion dismantled the state's defenses. California claimed the Second Amendment doesn't protect acquiring multiple firearms, as the law allowed initial purchases. The court rebuffed this: "The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to 'keep and bear Arms,' plural," Forrest wrote. "This 'guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons.' And not only is 'Arms' stated in the plural, but this term refers to more than just guns." She drew analogies to other rights: "We are not aware of any circumstance where government may temporarily meter the exercise of constitutional rights in this manner... [like] limit[ing] citizens’ free-speech right to one protest a month."
The state invoked historical analogues, such as colonial-era laws on arms sales to Native Americans or intoxicated persons, but the panel found them inapplicable. "Many of California’s proposed historical analogues impose no burden on an individual’s ability to acquire, keep, or bear arms," Forrest noted. Distinguishing from a Fifth Circuit case upholding enhanced background checks for young adults, the court highlighted that delay here was the purpose, not a byproduct of valid scrutiny.
Judge Owens concurred, clarifying the ruling doesn't preclude other measures against bulk or straw purchases if historically supported. The decision halts enforcement in Ninth Circuit states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
Many first responders are already exempt from the limit, but retired officers may benefit from easier access for personal defense or training. The court's reasoning follow post-Bruen trends scrutinizing restrictions, potentially easing burdens on law enforcement implementing such laws.
Gun-rights advocates hailed the win. "We have a right to buy more than one gun at a time just as we have a right to buy more than one bible at a time," FPC President Brandon Combs said. SAF echoed: "This is a unanimous decision... in favor of SAF and its partners."
Governor Newsom called the decision a "slap in the face," while Attorney General Bonta emphasized that the ruling undermines the state's efforts to reduce gun violence. Bonta's office hasn't commented on appeals, but en banc review is possible.
In the evolving landscape of police transparency laws, California's peace officers are facing a critical debate over what constitutes "great bodily injury" (GBI) under Penal Code Section 832.7. This provision, amended by Senate Bill 1421 in 2018, mandates the disclosure of personnel records related to use-of-force incidents that result in death or GBI. Without a clear statutory definition, agencies and courts have been left to interpret GBI, leading to a divide between broad and narrow views. A recent California Supreme Court ruling in In re Cabrera (2023) offers crucial guidance, suggesting GBI sets a higher bar than "serious bodily injury" (SBI), which could limit unnecessary disclosures and protect officer confidentiality.
The problem stems from SB 1421's push for accountability. Before the bill, officer records were largely confidential under Section 832.7(a), accessible only through Pitchess motions. Now, agencies must release records on specific misconduct, including force causing GBI, firearm discharges, sexual assault, or dishonesty. The lack of a GBI definition has sparked confusion. Some courts and transparency advocates favor a broad interpretation based on Penal Code Section 12022.7(f), which calls GBI a "significant or substantial physical injury" greater than minor or moderate harm. This could include bruises, lacerations, or abrasions—common in routine arrests.
Imagine an officer involved in a standard takedown where a suspect sustains a bruise or minor cut. Under a broad view, that incident's records might be disclosed via a Public Records Act request, overwhelming agencies with CPRA disclosures and inviting litigation. We've seen this play out in cases like People v. Cross (2008), where the Supreme Court held that GBI doesn't require permanent damage but can cover physical pain or contusions. Appellate decisions have upheld GBI for injuries like swollen jaws, sore ribs, or multiple bruises, as in People v. Corona (1989) or People v. Jaramillo (1979). Groups like the First Amendment Coalition argue this broadens transparency, aligning with the California Constitution's mandate to favor disclosure.
But this expansive approach creates real burdens. Agencies could be flooded with requests for records on everyday encounters, straining resources for redaction and review. For peace officers, it means more exposure, potentially chilling their ability to perform duties without fear of constant second-guessing.
Enter the narrower interpretation, which ties GBI to something at least as severe as SBI under Penal Code Section 243(f)(4). SBI includes loss of consciousness, concussions, bone fractures, wounds needing sutures, or serious disfigurement—harms that require medical intervention and pose substantial risks. Federal definitions in statutes like 18 U.S.C. Section 1365(h)(3) echo this, focusing on risks of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impaired function.
SB 1421's legislative history supports this view. Initially drafted with SBI, it switched to GBI to clarify a higher threshold, influenced by law enforcement groups. The ACLU even described the bill's intent as covering incidents where officers "seriously injure" the public. A broad GBI would undermine this by capturing relatively minor injuries and overwhelming departments with CPRA obligations.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Cabrera provides potentially game-changing relief. In that case, a defendant was convicted of battery with SBI (brief unconsciousness, a head laceration needing stitches, dizziness) but the jury deadlocked on GBI enhancements. The trial court imposed a GBI enhancement anyway, assuming SBI implied GBI. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that SBI and GBI are "essentially equivalent" but not interchangeable as a matter of law. Crucially, the Court noted that GBI requires a more demanding severity threshold. It cited examples like People v. Taylor (2004), where a bone fracture was SBI but not GBI because it was deemed moderate, and People v. Thomas (2019), involving a broken jaw with permanent damage—SBI yes, GBI no.
The Court emphasized that while overlaps exist, juries decide factually where injuries fall on a continuum. A hairline fracture might be SBI but not "significant or substantial" enough for GBI. This disapproved prior cases equating the two and essentially assumed that all GBI qualifies as SBI, but not vice versa. For Section 832.7, this means agencies may not have to disclose records unless injuries meet this elevated GBI standard, reducing the scope of mandatory releases.
The impacts for California law enforcement are profound. A narrower GBI interpretation eases administrative burdens, allowing agencies to focus on serious incidents rather than minor ones. It aligns disclosures with existing SBI reporting under Government Code Section 12525.2, promoting uniformity. For officers, it safeguards privacy in routine duties, preventing overbroad scrutiny that could deter necessary force. However, without appellate precedent directly on Section 832.7, superior courts have varied—some broadening GBI in non-binding rulings like Richmond Police Officers’ Association v. City of Richmond (2020).
Looking ahead, ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition's 2025 suit against San Diego over a beanbag and dog attack incident, will test Cabrera's application. Agencies currently apply varied standards for responding to GBI request. Peace officers and unions can now cite Cabrera to argue for narrower lens in court and push for legislative clarity, perhaps defining GBI akin to federal standards: substantial risk of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.
This debate highlights the tension in striking the proper balance between transparency and functionality. Mastagni Holstedt, APC has been at the forefront, representing PORAC in analyzing bills like SB 1421. For a deeper dive, look for David E. Mastagni's upcoming full-length article in the PORAC Law Enforcement News and Review, where he'll unpack court rulings, agency practices, and advocacy strategies in detail.
On July 15, 2025, David E. Mastagni of Mastagni Holstedt, APC testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of AB 340 (Ahrens), a vital bill sponsored by PORAC that codifies existing PERB precedent to protect confidential communications between public employees and their union representatives. This legislation closes a statutory gap, ensuring workers—from teachers and firefighters to peace officers—can discuss grievances, safety concerns, or discipline without fear of employer intrusion. It's particularly important for public safety officers, who depend on candid union advice to navigate high-stakes investigations while fulfilling their duties.
AB 340 prohibits public employers from questioning or compelling disclosure of these confidential representational communications, enforceable as an unfair labor practice through PERB. It exempts criminal investigations and aligns with the Peace Officers' Bill of Rights (Gov. Code § 3303), balancing accountability with representation rights. No evidentiary privilege is created—civil or criminal proceedings remain unaffected. This bill levels the playing field across PERB-jurisdictional employers, fostering trust and reducing litigation over coercive inquiries that chill protected activities.
During the opening statement, Mastagni emphasized the bill's role in codifying PERB precedent and addressed opposition claims, explaining that AB 340 does not hinder investigations like those under AB 218 for childhood sexual assault. He noted that schools can question witnesses about firsthand knowledge, as the bill protects only representation-related communications lacking evidentiary value.
In the Q&A session, committee members inquired about how employers would recognize confidential communications and the consequences of accidental intrusions. Mastagni explained that confidentiality is obvious in 99.9% of cases, such as when employers ask what a member told their representative during interview preparation. If an employer accidentally intrudes, the representative or member must object. PERB liability typically only arises if the employer compels disclosure after such an objection.
The video of the hearing Q&A session is available here: Watch the Testimony.
The bill passed the Judiciary Committee 10-2 and now heads to Appropriations, chaired by Senator Caballero, who voted yes in Judiciary. This momentum is reflective of the strong support from public employees and their unions for this bill.
Thank you to the Judiciary Committee for advancing AB 340 and Assembly Member Patrick Ahrens for carrying this bill on behalf of PORAC. Mr. Mastagni is grateful for the opportunity to assist PORAC and work with their legislative advocate Randy Perry in drafting and advancing this bill. To drive final enactment, contact your legislators and Governor Newsome to urge their support—California's public employees deserve this safeguard.
In a notable victory for law enforcement, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer of reckless firearm use charges stemming from an accidental discharge while she shopped off-duty at a Costco. The case highlights the challenges of proving criminal negligence in firearm mishaps, especially when officers follow departmental policies on off-duty carry. While this occurred in Michigan, it offers valuable insights for California peace officers on liability risks, training, and the importance of robust departmental protocols to defend against similar allegations.
Facts
In February 2025, Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer was shopping off-duty at a Costco in Oshtemo Township, Kalamazoo County. As she checked out at the cash register, she placed her wallet back into her purse. At that moment, her department-issued Sig P365 firearm, which she carried in an Uncle Mike's foam holster inside the purse, discharged a round. The bullet passed through the holster, the purse, and the officer's hand. It then grazed another customer's ankle. Additionally, a third customer fainted due to distress from the loud noise and witnessing the injury.
Following an internal investigation and public outcry, the Kalamazoo County Prosecutor's Office charged Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer with Reckless Use of a Firearm Causing Injury, a misdemeanor under Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) 752.861.
In July 2025, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer. The jury concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Holding
The Constitution and relevant statutes require careful scrutiny in cases involving accidental firearm discharges by law enforcement officers. Michigan Compiled Laws 752.861 states: "Any person who, by carelessness, recklessness, or negligence, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause or allow any firearm under his immediate control to be discharged so as to injure or endanger any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
This statute criminalizes non-willful but negligent discharges that result in injury or endangerment. The key terms—carelessness, recklessness, or negligence—must be interpreted based on their ordinary meanings: carelessness as a lack of attention to safety, negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care, and recklessness as a conscious disregard of a known risk.
Michigan courts apply the plain meaning rule to statutory language. For conviction, the prosecution must show that the defendant's conduct deviated from what a reasonable person would do in handling a loaded firearm. The mens rea requires proof of fault beyond a mere accident, amounting to culpable negligence, as held in People v. Orr, 242 Mich. App. 694 (2000).
Law enforcement officers do not receive separate criminal immunity for off-duty carry in Michigan, but courts may consider professional training, expectations, and departmental policies in assessing reasonableness.
In this case, the prosecution argued that Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer was reckless because she entered a crowded store with a firearm lacking an external safety, carried a round in the chamber and a full magazine, and used a foam holster in her purse.
The defense countered that the Sig P365 and Uncle Mike's holster were department-issued. Michigan State Police require officers to carry firearms off-duty in approved holsters, loaded with a round chambered. The firearm features an internal safety preventing discharge without trigger pull. The defense portrayed the incident as a rare mechanical failure, not a foreseeable result of negligence.
The jury found that the prosecution failed to prove negligence under the circumstances. It entered a not guilty verdict, emphasizing that mere accident or mechanical issues do not suffice for liability. Although not precedential, this case is a reminder that prosecutors must prove a clear deviation from reasonable care. Accidental discharges tied to policy compliant carry may not meet this threshold.
In a significant ruling for California law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of qualified immunity to a CHP officer who delayed medical care for a motorist suffering a stroke, after mistaking symptoms for drug impairment. D’Braunstein v. CaliforniaHighway Patrol underscores officers' obligations to provide prompt medical aid to detainees showing signs of distress, regardless of suspected causes. In light of this decision officers should consider how they assess and respond to medical needs in the field.
Facts
On June 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., CHP Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo responded to a single-vehicle crash on a freeway onramp in Orange County. The driver, 55-year-old Steven D’Braunstein, had totaled his car in a near head-on collision with a concrete wall. D’Braunstein told the officer he "didn’t know what happened" and that "the car did something." He exhibited signs of distress, such as dry mouth, slurred and slow speech, profuse sweating, confusion, poor balance, slow reaction time, and constricted pupils. He struggled to answer simple questions and interjected random comments during their conversation.
Suspecting impairment, Officer Durazo conducted field sobriety tests, which D’Braunstein failed due to his condition. His breathalyzer showed a BAC of 0.00, and Durazo noted he had a serious condition. However, she was not a drug recognition expert and did not call for one. Instead of summoning an ambulance, she arrested him for suspected DUI and transported him to jail about 45 minutes after arriving on scene—roughly an hour after the crash.
At the jail, a nurse refused to admit D’Braunstein after examination. After two hours there (about 3.5 hours post-crash), Durazo took him to a hospital, where doctors diagnosed a stroke. The delay allegedly prevented timely treatment that could have mitigated brain damage. D’Braunstein spent weeks in the hospital and now resides in a long-term care facility, unable to care for himself due to lasting injuries.
D’Braunstein’s son sued Officer Durazo and the CHP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for deprivation of medical care. The district court found a constitutional violation but granted summary judgment and qualified immunity, ruling the right was not "clearly established."
Holding
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard for post-arrest care, which requires officers to seek necessary medical attention for injured detainees by promptly summoning help or transporting them to a hospital. This duty stems from the Constitution's requirement that state actors provide adequate medical care when confining individuals, as established in cases like County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) and DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989). For pretrial detainees, it also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, but both use an objective reasonableness test.
The court held that a reasonable jury could find Durazo's actions objectively unreasonable. Despite the serious crash and D’Braunstein's symptoms (disorientation, profuse sweating, poor balance, and slurred speech), Durazo delayed care for hours. Her suspicion of drug use, unsupported by evidence, did not excuse the failure to act, as the crash and distress signals warranted emergency evaluation. The court emphasized, that the reason for the crash did not change the need for emergency medical evaluation.
On qualified immunity, the court rejected Durazo's argument that the duty applies only to injuries caused by officers. Existing precedent clearly establishes that officers must provide reasonable medical care for any serious medical need, regardless of cause. Citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) and others, the panel noted it doesn't require "unusual foresight" to recognize that a major accident victim showing distress needs prompt aid. Officers aren't expected to diagnose conditions but must assess if the situation calls for immediate help. The violation was clearly established, so qualified immunity was denied. The case was reversed and remanded.
Judge Lee partially dissented, arguing no clearly established law required distinguishing symptoms without obvious injury signs, but the majority held the duty was plain.
Takeaways for California Public Safety Employees
The Court found a broad duty to provide care. Officers must deliver objectively reasonable medical aid to detainees displaying need, irrespective of whether the issue stems from arrest, accident, or other causes. Mistaking medical emergencies for impairment won't shield from liability if signs of distress are ignored.
No diagnosis is required, but assessment is key. Officers don't need to pinpoint the ailment (e.g., stroke vs. drugs), but must evaluate if prompt medical attention is warranted based on observable facts like crash severity and symptoms.
This ruling may prompt agencies to enhance training on recognizing medical vs. impairment signs, encouraging earlier calls for paramedics or drug experts in ambiguous cases. The case highlights the risks in delaying care post-accident.
Expect more § 1983 claims challenging medical response delays. Document observations thoroughly and err toward summoning aid to demonstrate reasonableness.
This decision reinforces that protecting detainee well-being is paramount, even in high-pressure field scenarios.
