Friday, July 18, 2025

Ninth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity to CHP officer Who Mistook Stroke for DUI: Must Officers Now Play Doctor? Implications for Officers' Medical Response Duties

 In a significant ruling for California law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of qualified immunity to a CHP officer who delayed medical care for a motorist suffering a stroke, after mistaking symptoms for drug impairment. D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol underscores officers' obligations to provide prompt medical aid to detainees showing signs of distress, regardless of suspected causes. In light of this decision officers should consider how they assess and respond to medical needs in the field.

Facts

On June 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., CHP Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo responded to a single-vehicle crash on a freeway onramp in Orange County. The driver, 55-year-old Steven D’Braunstein, had totaled his car in a near head-on collision with a concrete wall. D’Braunstein told the officer he "didn’t know what happened" and that "the car did something." He exhibited signs of distress, such as dry mouth, slurred and slow speech, profuse sweating, confusion, poor balance, slow reaction time, and constricted pupils. He struggled to answer simple questions and interjected random comments during their conversation.

Suspecting impairment, Officer Durazo conducted field sobriety tests, which D’Braunstein failed due to his condition. His breathalyzer showed a BAC of 0.00, and Durazo noted he had a serious condition. However, she was not a drug recognition expert and did not call for one. Instead of summoning an ambulance, she arrested him for suspected DUI and transported him to jail about 45 minutes after arriving on scene—roughly an hour after the crash.

At the jail, a nurse refused to admit D’Braunstein after examination. After two hours there (about 3.5 hours post-crash), Durazo took him to a hospital, where doctors diagnosed a stroke. The delay allegedly prevented timely treatment that could have mitigated brain damage. D’Braunstein spent weeks in the hospital and now resides in a long-term care facility, unable to care for himself due to lasting injuries.

D’Braunstein’s son sued Officer Durazo and the CHP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for deprivation of medical care. The district court found a constitutional violation but granted summary judgment and qualified immunity, ruling the right was not "clearly established."

Holding

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard for post-arrest care, which requires officers to seek necessary medical attention for injured detainees by promptly summoning help or transporting them to a hospital. This duty stems from the Constitution's requirement that state actors provide adequate medical care when confining individuals, as established in cases like County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) and DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989). For pretrial detainees, it also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, but both use an objective reasonableness test.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find Durazo's actions objectively unreasonable. Despite the serious crash and D’Braunstein's symptoms (disorientation, profuse sweating, poor balance, and slurred speech), Durazo delayed care for hours. Her suspicion of drug use, unsupported by evidence, did not excuse the failure to act, as the crash and distress signals warranted emergency evaluation. The court emphasized, that the reason for the crash did not change the need for emergency medical evaluation.

On qualified immunity, the court rejected Durazo's argument that the duty applies only to injuries caused by officers. Existing precedent clearly establishes that officers must provide reasonable medical care for any serious medical need, regardless of cause. Citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) and others, the panel noted it doesn't require "unusual foresight" to recognize that a major accident victim showing distress needs prompt aid. Officers aren't expected to diagnose conditions but must assess if the situation calls for immediate help. The violation was clearly established, so qualified immunity was denied. The case was reversed and remanded.

Judge Lee partially dissented, arguing no clearly established law required distinguishing symptoms without obvious injury signs, but the majority held the duty was plain.

Takeaways for California Public Safety Employees

The Court found a broad duty to provide care. Officers must deliver objectively reasonable medical aid to detainees displaying need, irrespective of whether the issue stems from arrest, accident, or other causes. Mistaking medical emergencies for impairment won't shield from liability if signs of distress are ignored.

No diagnosis is required, but assessment is key. Officers don't need to pinpoint the ailment (e.g., stroke vs. drugs), but must evaluate if prompt medical attention is warranted based on observable facts like crash severity and symptoms.

This ruling may prompt agencies to enhance training on recognizing medical vs. impairment signs, encouraging earlier calls for paramedics or drug experts in ambiguous cases. The case highlights the risks in delaying care post-accident.

Expect more § 1983 claims challenging medical response delays. Document observations thoroughly and err toward summoning aid to demonstrate reasonableness.

This decision reinforces that protecting detainee well-being is paramount, even in high-pressure field scenarios.