Ninth Circuit Rules Use of Deadly Force Objectively Reasonable to Stop Suspect Pointing a Replica Gun at Officers

    

    Amid increased scrutinization of deadly officer involved shootings, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently vindicated the objectionably reasonable standard in analyzing lawsuits involving the use of deadly force by peace officers. In Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County, 69 F.4th 614 (9th Cir. 2023)[1], the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they shot and killed Gabriel Strickland after he pointed a black airsoft rifle in their direction. The Court held that the responding officers’ use of deadly force was justifiable and objectionably reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, even though Mr. Strickland was in possession of a replica firearm.

 

    On January 1, 2020, dispatch received reports that a man was walking on a residential road with “what appeared to be a shotgun” slung over his shoulder. Officers from Grass Valley Police Department and Deputies from Nevada County Sheriff’s Office responded to the scene. The responding personnel recognized Strickland and knew he was homeless, suffered from mental health issues, and had been released from custody days before.

 

  The officers maneuvered their patrol vehicles around Strickland and surrounded him with service weapons drawn. The officers immediately ordered him to put down the gun. Strickland held the gun away from his body, said, “It’s a BB gun,” and then slapped the gun with his hand, making a noise that sounded more like plastic than metal. The officers continued to yell commands to Strickland to drop the gun and that they could not confirm the firearm was fake. Strickland pointed to the orange tip on the barrel. One officer responded, “You could have painted that…we don’t want to kill you.” Strickland replied, “I’m not doing nothing wrong.” Until then, Strickland stood with the barrel pointing at the ground.

 

    One officer tried tasing Strickland but failed to attach and disarm him. Seconds later, Strickland lowered the barrel toward the officers, who then shot and killed Strickland. Strickland’s Estate filed suit alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and California law.

    The Appellate Court considered whether the officers here employed an “objectively unreasonable” amount of force under the “totality of the circumstances.” See Brooks v. Clark County, 828 F.3d 910, 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court explained that this inquiry required balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). These factors included:

1.    “The type and amount of force inflicted.”

2.    “The severity of the crime at issue.”

3.  “Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.”

4.   “Whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

     The appellate court noted that other factors should be considered, including “the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given, and whether it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used force against was emotionally disturbed.” S.B. v. County of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017).

 

    The Ninth Circuit explained that of all the use-of-force factors, the “most important” is whether the suspect posed an “immediate threat.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Court stated that because this inquiry was about objective reasonableness, “the objective facts must indicate that the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer or a member of the public.”

 

    While it is “clearly established that shooting a nonthreatening suspect would violate the suspect’s constitutional rights”, the Court noted that it was well-settled under Ninth Circuit precedent that lethal force is justified if an officer has “probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”

 

    The Court also explained that officers can have reasonable but mistaken beliefs regarding the facts establishing the existence of an immediate threat, and “in those situations, courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). Thus, the Constitution even allows for an officer’s action that resulted from a reasonable “mistake of fact.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). When an officer’s “use of force is based on a mistake of fact, courts ask whether a reasonable officer would have or should have accurately perceived that fact.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).

 

    The pivotal moment occurred when Strickland pointed the replica gun in the officers’ direction. At that point, they had “probable cause to believe that Strickland posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury” to themselves, and it became objectively reasonable for them to use lethal force. The Court noted that when a suspect points a gun in an officer’s direction, “the Constitution undoubtedly entitles the officer to respond with deadly force.” Citing, George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013).

 

    The analysis remains the same regardless of whether the weapon turned out to be a replica, given the officers’ reasonable belief that Strickland possessed a real firearm. Even in the light most favorable to Strickland, he was carrying a replica gun, disregarded multiple warnings to drop it, and pointed it at the officers. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Strickland posed an immediate threat even though he only had a replica gun. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officers’ mistaken belief that Strickland possessed a dangerous weapon was reasonable, and they were justified in the use of deadly force when he pointed it at them.  

Practical Implications:

    Even in the current political climate in California, this decision upholds long-standing due process and self-defense standards pertaining to the use of deadly force. Thankfully, the appellate court recognized that officers do not have to wait until they are fired upon to confirm that a weapon is real, before they can respond to a perceived deadly threat.

Photo from ABC10's news coverage from January 24, 2020. 

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[1] Link to the Ninth Circuit Opinion in Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County 

David E. Mastagni Testified Against Bill (SB 519) Allowing “Local Detention Monitor” to Interrogate Peace Officers

On July 11, 2023, David E. Mastagni testified before the Assembly Public Safety Committee to oppose SB 519 on behalf of PORAC.  David focused the opposition on the powers this Bill would grant a newly created “Local Detention Monitor” to impair labor contracts and interrogate local peace officers regarding in-custody deaths without regard to their rights against self-incrimination.

As introduced by Senate President pro Tempore Toni G. Atkins, SB 519 would have provided that a board of supervisors may establish a department of corrections and rehabilitation to be headed by an executive officer appointed by the board and thus facilitate boards of supervisors cutting corners to reduce labor costs by supplanting sworn jail personnel and replacing them with lesser trained civilians.  SB 519 also provides that notwithstanding the general confidentiality of peace officer records or any other law, records relating to an investigation conducted by the local detention facility involving a death incident and any local detention facility personnel records shall not be confidential and shall be a public record.

PORAC opposed the sections of the Bill facilitating civilianization of local jails.  PORAC did not oppose the disclosure of records relating to an investigation conducted by the local detention facility involving a death incident, but did raise concerns with the language of this section. 

The Bill was amended on July 5, 2023.  These amendments addressed PORAC’s disclosure concerns and eliminated the provisions for civilianizing local jails.  However, the amendments replaced these sections of the Bill with new language establishing a statewide Local Detention Monitor with expansive powers including the ability to compel local employees to submit to interrogations without provision of their Constitutional rights.  The bill states, “[t]he Local Detention Monitor may require any employee or contractor of the local detention facility to be interviewed … Any employee or contractor requested to be interviewed shall comply….”

Thus, the Bill purports to force employees to waive their 5^th Amendment Rights by mandating cooperation with no option to exercise the right to remain silent.  By comparison, the peace officer licensing statute (SB 2) states, “the lawful exercise of rights granted under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law shall not be considered a failure to cooperate.” (Penal Code Section 13510.8(b)(8).)

At the Public Safety Committee hearing, David explained that PORAC does not oppose the establishment of a local detention oversight entity with the authority to review in-custody death investigations, and to issue reports and recommendations for improvements.  But PORAC does object to the authority granted the oversight entity because those powers impair its members’ labor and Constitutional rights.  David articulated PORAC’s concerns.

First, the Bill expressly provides for the impairment of existing labor contracts.

Second, the Bill purports to grant the monitor the power to compel union members to submit to interrogations without proper legal authority which is derived from the employment relationship or licensing authority.  The compulsion to cooperate in such investigations is based on the threat of discipline or loss of license.  The Monitor has no employment relationship nor licensing authority, and thus no power to compel cooperation or testimony.

Third, the Bill violates employees’ right against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment because in-custody death investigations often involve potentially incriminating questions. In Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822 (1985) our Supreme Court carefully balanced public employers’ need to investigate against public employees’ 5th Amendment rights by holding an employer can compel potentially incriminating questions so long as the employee is granted immunity.  Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 704, 725 clarified that public entities cannot require “as a condition of remaining on the job” that public employees “surrender his or her right against criminal use of [such] statements.”  

Chief Legislative Advocate Randy Perry, David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot intend to continue discussions with the author to address the concerns raised at the hearing.  The Public Safety Labor Blog will provide updates on this important legislation. 

You can view the entire hearing here: 

Assembly Public Safety Committee, Tuesday, July 11, 2023

The California Supreme Court Denies Police Officers Broad Immunity Claims in Negligence Suit Alleging Officers Left Dead Body Exposed for Hours

  On June 22, 2023, the California Supreme Court held Government Code § 821.6 does not provide broad immunity to police officers for allegedly negligent actions in the course of a law enforcement investigation. [Leon v. County of Riverside, 2023 WL 4112144]

In Leon, the spouse of a man shot and killed in his driveway sued the responding peace officers for negligent infliction of emotional distress for allegedly leaving his naked body exposed to the public for eight hours.  The Court confirmed that while other provisions of the Government Claims Act may confer immunity for certain investigatory actions, , section 821.6 of the Government Claims Act does not broadly immunize police officers or other public employees for any and all harmful actions they may take in the course of investigating crime.

 

           José Leon was shot and killed in a driveway near his home. Upon arrival at the scene, Riverside County Sherriff’s deputies heard additional shots. They moved Mr. Leon’s body behind a vehicle so that they could attempt to revive him but were unsuccessful. The movement caused Mr. Leon’s pants to drop to his ankles and expose his naked body. Mr. Leon’s body remained uncovered for approximately eight hours while officers searched for the shooter and investigated the shooting. The officers ultimately determined that the shooter had killed himself shortly after killing José. José’s wife, Dora Leon, sued the County of Riverside for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

 

 

           During summary judgment proceedings, the County of Riverside argued that its employees were immune under section 821.6 for “all conduct related to the investigation and filing of charges.” Because the suit arose from steps taken while investigating a homicide, the County argued, both the employees and their employer were immune from liability. More specifically, the County’s position was that injuries caused by police investigations qualify because of the close relationship between investigations and prosecutions. The trial court agreed and entered judgment for the County. The Court of Appeal affirmed that relying on a line of appellate cases that previously “consistently construed section 821.6 as immunizing a public employee from liability for any injury-causing act or omission in the course of the institution and prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, including an investigation that may precede the institution of any such proceeding.” 

 

Supreme Court Disagrees with Previous Court of Appeal Decisions Regarding Claims Act Immunity Under Section 821.6 of the Government Claims Act:

 

           The Supreme Court granted review and held that section 821.6 of the Government Claims Act protects public employees from liability only for initiating or prosecuting official proceedings, thereby disapproving the prior line of appellate cases. Due to the fact the provision of the Government Claims Act relied on by the County did not apply, the County was not immune from the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court reasoned that while many Courts of Appeal extended section 821.6 immunity to claims for injuries caused by official conduct other than the initiation or prosecution of a proceeding, including claims of harm stemming from police investigations, that conclusion is inconsistent with section 821.6’s text and history, as well as Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the language of 821.6 does not cover investigatory acts because an investigation does not constitute the initiation or continued prosecution of official proceedings. The Court also found that the Legislature recognized, and the courts should respect, the traditional distinction between mere investigation and the prosecution of legal action. The Court explained that the County’s argument that injuries caused by police investigations qualify because of the close relationship between investigations and prosecutions was at odds with the plain meaning of the statutory language. The Court also highlighted the fact that investigations often do not lead to the institution or prosecution of any proceedings, which is what happened in this case. 

 

           Finally, the legislative history also contains no suggestion that the statute was also designed to create broad immunity for police officers engaged in investigation. Thus, when a claim of injury does not stem from the initiation or prosecution of proceedings, section 821.6 immunity does not apply.  Due to the fact that section 821.6 prosecution immunity was the only defense addressed by the trial court and Court of Appeal, the decision did not address other immunity defenses raised by the County, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

 

          This ruling has limited impact given the legislative changes under Senate Bill 2, which became effective January 1, 2022.  Under S.B. 2, the state immunity provisions in sections 821.6, 844.6, and 845.6 of the Government Claims Act no longer apply to any cause of action brought against any peace officer, custodial officer, or directly against a public entity that employs them.     However, the decision is important as it demonstrates that the Supreme Court of California is inclined to take up issues that will narrow the immunities and protections previously available to public employees.

 Qualified Immunity and Deadly Force Warnings: Ninth Circuit Votes Sua Sponte to Rehear Denial of Qualified Immunity for Officer Who Shot Suspect Beating His Partner

The qualified immunity defense battle continues as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to rehear the case involving Los Angeles police officer, Edward Agdeppa, and his use of deadly force stemming from a 2018 fatal police shooting. Agdeppa faces a federal civil rights action filed by the decedent's mother, who argues that Agdeppa’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated the decedent's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Agdeppa has faced legal challenges concerning whether or not qualified immunity is an applicable defense protecting him from any personal liability in the matter.

Qualified immunity is a legal concept that is used to protect police officers and other governmental officials from lawsuits over harm caused while carrying out their official duties within the law. Qualified immunity protects government officers from § 1983 suits unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established.”[1]

The lower court ruled against Agdeppa denying a qualified immunity defense “because a jury could decide that Agdeppa’s use of deadly force violated clearly established law.”[2] Agdeppa appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, who issued a 2-1 decision upholding the denial of qualified immunity. The Court, however, agreed to rehear the case and ultimately tossed out their previous December ruling.

Facts of the Case: 

    The case begins in October 2018, when officers responded to a report of an aggressive trespasser that was assaulting staff at a Hollywood gym. Upon arrival, officers activated their body-worn cameras and met a combative, naked, and six-foot-one-inch, 280-pound Albert Dorsey in the gym’s locker room. The responding officers – five-foot-five-inch, 145-pound Officer Rodriguez and five-foot-one-inch, 145-pound Officer Agdeppa – confronted Dorsey, asking him to get dressed and leave. Dorsey refused, and a violent altercation ensued.

    Officer Agdeppa successfully secured one handcuff on Dorsey but failed to cuff the other wrist. The officers tried various tactical maneuvers to secure Dorsey, including using arm, finger, and wrist locks. The body-cam video shows that Dorsey used his size to thwart the smaller officers’ attempts to handcuff him. As the struggle intensified, the body-cams were knocked to the floor. The remaining encounter was not caught on video, but the cameras continued to record the audio. 

    Agdeppa alleges that the struggle turned more violent after the body-cams fell. Dorsey was repeatedly told to stop resisting, but broke free. Despite both officers deploying their tasers multiple times, Dorsey continued resisting. Agdeppa attests that Dorsey repeatedly struck him in the face and knocked him into a wall, disorienting him and causing him to drop his taser. A security guard witness corroborates that Dorsey repeatedly punched Agdeppa in the face. Agdeppa then witnessed Dorsey straddling Officer Rodriguez and “pummeling” her head with a “flurry of punches” while gaining control of her taser. Agdeppa drew out his gun and ordered Dorsey to stop, but Dorsey continued pummeling Rodriguez. It was at this point that Agdeppa fired five shots to stop Dorsey, who subsequently died from his injuries. 

    Following the shooting, Dorsey’s family sued Agdeppa and have been quick to accuse the officers of feeling threatened by Dorsey because “he was big and black.”[3] It’s no surprise that anti-police activists have used Dorsey’s death in their plea for police reform and in their efforts to pull back the scope of qualified immunity, which they see as being the single largest barrier to police accountability.[4]

Ninth Circuit Agrees with Lower Court, Rules Against Agdeppa – Limiting Scope of Qualified Immunity Defense 

    In December 2022, the Ninth Circuit rejected Agdeppa’s request for qualified immunity for two main reasons: (1) in the majority’s opinion, there were too many factual discrepancies surrounding the moments immediately before the shooting, and (2) Agdeppa – despite repeatedly ordering Dorsey to stop – failed to give a clear deadly force warning at a time when, in the majority’s opinion, it was practical to do so. 

    The majority opinion, written by Obama-appointed Judge Morgan Christen, argued that a reasonable jury could reject the officers’ accounts of the shooting because there were significant discrepancies between the officers’ accounts and other evidence in the record. The majority focused on one discrepancy involving a security guard witness, who had attested that Dorsey was holding Agdeppa’s arm when the shots were fired. This statement seems to contradict Agdeppa’s account of being six-to-eight feet away from Dorsey at the time of firing. This discrepancy could allow a jury to question Agdeppa’s credibility, and according to the Court, “summary judgment is not appropriate in a deadly force case if the plaintiff’s claim turns on an officer’s credibility.”[5] This is because “courts must take special care to ‘ensure that the officer is not taking advantage of the fact that the witness most likely to contradict his story – the person shot dead – is unable to testify.’”[6]

       The dissenting opinion, however, correctly pointed out what the majority glossed over – that based on video surveillance, the security guards were not even in the locker room at the time of firing, a fact that comes from the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners’ (BOPC) report. Moreover, two independent witnesses verified the officers’ account.[7] As the dissent correctly notes, the course of events presented in the BOPC report, of which the majority heavily relies on, largely conforms to the officers’ account. The key facts are not disputed. And although the majority relied “on portions of the BOPC report that criticize the officers…for failing to use de-escalation tactics earlier in the encounter,” the BOPC report still – as the dissent correctly emphasizes again – “unequivocally supports the officers” because it substantiates the claim that the officers’ belief “that there was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time of the [shooting] was objectively reasonable.”[8]  

On Agdeppa's Alleged Failure to Give a Deadly Force Warning 

    Disputed facts aside, the question still remains regarding whether or not it was clearly established that the officers in this situation were required by law to give a further warning before using deadly force; “remarkably, the majority says yes.”[9] The body-cam audio from the moments immediately before the shooting is muffled, and whatever is said by the officers in that moment is unclear. The majority concluded therefore that there was no evidence that Agdeppa warned Dorsey that deadly force would be used if Dorsey kept resisting.

    The majority noted that the court “has long held that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to warn before using deadly force when practicable.”[10] And in the majority’s view, it was practical for Agdeppa to give this warning. Agdeppa never argued that it wasn’t practical, and the fact that he had time to yell out other directives shows that he had time to warn Dorsey that he was resorting to deadly force. Ironically, the Court makes this argument while simultaneously recognizing that the officers’ actions should not be judged with 20/20 hindsight. The majority also ignores the repeated de-escalation attempts made by the officers prior to the fatal shots. What about Dorsey’s personal responsibility here? He was given multiple opportunities to stand down, and “a suspect in this situation either knows or should know what can happen next.”[11] Relatedly, the Court never specifies what type of deadly force warning would have been more appropriate, and as the dissent recognizes, the Circuit’s cases “certainly do not clearly establish the types of situations in which a warning is ‘practicable,’ what form the warning must take, or how specific it must be.”[12]

    The dissent noted that Agdeppa saw the suspect "pummeling" his partner with punches while she was laying in the fetal position and believed he would kill her unless stopped.  The dissent disagreed that it was practicable to warn that deadly force would be used and objected to the majority's requirement that the warning be so specific and precise that the suspect has no doubt deadly force is about to be used.  The dissent noted that the majority's standard could prevent officers from surviving such violent encounters by requiring officers to hit a "pause button" amidst an escalating confrontation to "recite some yet-undisclosed, court created warning script." As the dissent properly concludes, “the uncertainty the majority invites…could make the difference in whether officers like Agdeppa and Rodriguez make it out of a violent altercation alive.”[14]

Takeaways 

   Thankfully, the Ninth Circuit panel that heard this case voted sua sponte to grant panel rehearing, so the majority and dissent are withdrawn and a new decision shall be issued in the near future.

    The prior opinion had the potential to create rather ominous consequences and implied that the practicality of a warning will always be a question of fact. This creates an avenue to deny qualified immunity in every case in which an officer fails to give this warning. And the Court’s readiness to disregard the Supreme Court’s directive against viewing deadly force incidents with 20/20 hindsight is equally alarming. 

   The takeaways here are twofold: (1) judges may trend away from granting qualified immunity to officers when there are significant discrepancies in the record and especially when the officer fails to give a deadly force warning, and (2) officers should be hyper-aware of their pre-shooting conduct as that – rather than the suspect’s behavior – will be the focus of a legal action. 

To avoid second-guessing, officers should, if feasible, warn a violent offender prior to escalating to deadly force.[15] It is best if the officer can specify what kind of force will be used and that said force will be used should the suspect continue resisting.

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[1] Smith v. Agdeppa (9^th Circ., Dec. 30, 2022) 2022 WL 17999612 at page 41, citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018).

[2] Ibid at pg. 3.

[3] Cindy Chang, “Fatal shooting by Officer at 24 Hour Fitness violated LAPD policy, Police Commission rules,” Los Angeles Times (September 17, 2019). See https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-17/fatal-shooting-at-24-hour-fitness-violated-lapd-policy-police-commission-rules

[4] Kevin Rector, “9^th Circuit rejects ‘qualified immunity’ as reason to toss LAPD gym shooting case,” Los Angeles Times (December 30, 2022). See https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-12-30/9th-circuit-lapd-gym-shooting-case

[5] Smith v. Agdeppa (9^th Circ., Dec. 30, 2022) at page 15.

[6] Ibid. 

[7] Ibid at page 24.

[8] Ibid at page 34. 

[9] Ibid. 

[10] Ibid at page 3, 5 citing Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 794 (9^th Cir. 2014). The Court also emphasized the U.S. Supreme Court standard from Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) which declared that under the 4^th Amendment, if practicable under the circumstances, a warning should be given that deadly force is going to be used.

[11] Ibid citing the dissent at page 47.

[12] Ibid citing the dissent at page 45. 

[13] Ibid citing the dissent at page 49.

[14] Ibid. 

[15] See also Mike Callahan, “Ninth Circuit in split decision rejects qualified immunity for LAPD cop…” Police1.com (April 12, 2023). 

PORAC Files Ninth Circuit Amicus Brief in Boland v. Bonta Supporting Injunction Against Unsafe Handgun Act

On June 2, 2023, Amici Curiae the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California State Sheriffs’ Association (CSSA), the California Police Chiefs' Association (CPCA), the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), and the California Reserve Peace Officers Association (CRPOA) filed a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Amici Curiae Brief in Boland v. Bonta. 

The Amici brief supports the district’s court injunction against the requirements of the Unsafe Handgun Act (UHA) banning semiautomatic handguns without chamber load indicators, magazine detachment mechanisms and microstamping technology. Amici argued the UHA’s 2006, 2007 and 2013 amendments violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by prohibiting the sale of handguns without these features and requiring the eventual removal of all grandfathered handguns currently on-roster. While the UHA purports to ban unsafe handguns, it actually bars members of the public from obtaining newer, improved, and safer generations of handguns already approved through California’s Roster of Certified Handguns (“Roster”).  

Since 2013, no new handgun has been added to the UHA Roster of approved handguns. However, the statute requires the Department of Justice to remove three grandfathered semiautomatic handguns per every one semiautomatic admitted that satisfies all its operative technological feature requirements.

The practical effect of the requirements under California’s definition has been to label nearly every semiautomatic handgun in the United States unsafe and to either immediately or eventually impose a ban. Thus, the UHA arbitrarily deems as “unsafe” the handguns that thousands of police officers in the state use to protect society and to protect themselves on a daily basis. In fact, most officers are issued newer generations of Glocks and Sig Sauers that are not on the Roster. S.B. 377 would double-down on this contradiction by prohibiting officers from personally purchasing the handguns they carry on-duty.  If these weapons were truly unsafe, Amici would never permit their issuance to their members.

Hypocritically, the UHA permits peace officers to carry handguns labeled as unsafe while on-duty, when the weapon is most likely to be used for self-defense. Modern semiautomatic handguns without chamber load indicators, magazine detachment mechanisms and microstamping technology, like the ones prohibited under the UHA, fit squarely within “the Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms.’”  

If California sincerely desired to reduce gun violence and promote public safety, the Legislature would enact laws and fund enforcement to keep guns out of the hands of prohibited persons and impose meaningful consequences when guns are used in violent crime. Unfortunately, the Legislature instead targets the self-defense rights of all Californians while reducing or eliminating sentencing enhancements for committing gun crimes.  These concerns over California’s lax enforcement of serious gun crimes were recently echoed by the Association of Los Angeles Deputy District Attorneys in “California Could Further Reduce Gun Violence. If Only We’d Do It.”

As the brief concludes, “It is critical to the safety of the public that we keep guns out of the hands of prohibited persons and disincentivize the unlawful use of firearms through both enforcement and criminal enhancements. The provisions of the UHA presented in this appeal do not further these common-sense goals.”

The Amici Curiae brief was filed by David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot.