In Alailima-Millon v. Los Angeles County Superior Ct. No. B326373, 2024 WL 3271129 (Cal. Ct. App. July 2, 2024), a California Court of Appeal issued a rare opinion reversing the penalty in a 1094.5 administrative writ of mandate proceeding. The appellate decision is notable because penalty determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, as opposed to the independent judgment typically applied to factual findings and conclusions.
Based on differing standards of review, a court is much more likely to reverse findings of misconduct culpability rather than a penalty. That is because, once misconduct is affirmed, the burden to reverse the penalty is a demanding one: “if reasonable minds can differ with regard to the propriety of the disciplinary action” the court will find no abuse of discretion.[i] Therefore, an examination of Alailima-Millon provides helpful insights and guidance for challenging an excessive penalty.
Joy Alailima-Millon has been employed by the Los Angeles County Superior Court (LASC) since 1990 and has been a Judicial Assistant since 2008. She consistently received positive performance reviews but had incurred a one-day disciplinary suspension in 2014 for failing to recall a bench warrant, which led to an individual's erroneous arrest and detention for one day.
In 2017, Alailima-Millon received a three-day unpaid suspension for preparing an incorrect commitment order that resulted in a criminal defendant being over-detained for six days. The error was due to an inaccurate comparison of pre-sentencing custody credits (calculated in days) and the sentence (calculated in months). The judge, as well as the defense and prosecution attorneys, also failed to realize the defendant should be released and had actually agreed that the calculations were correct. Nevertheless, it is a duty of the Judicial Assistant to determine whether a release should be issued and confirm with the court. The Manual of Procedure for Superior Court Clerks/Judicial Assistants specified, “Errors that deprive any person of liberty, jeopardize public safety, or delay the criminal justice process will subject the Judicial Assistant to disciplinary action.”
The mistake was eventually identified by defense counsel, who communicated the issue to Alailima-Millon. She immediately notified the judge, processed a release order for the defendant, and self-reported the situation to the court operations manager. She met with LASC performance investigators and provided a statement about the incident. She was served with a notice of proposed discipline, participated in a Skelly hearing, and was issued a final order of discipline with the three-day suspension. Alailima-Millon appealed to advisory arbitration.
Advisory Arbitration Recommends Suspension
At arbitration, LASC witnesses testified regarding the training and duties of judicial assistants, focusing on the responsibility to calculate custody credits and issue correct paperwork. They highlighted that over-detention is a significant error because it deprives a person of their freedom and impacts public trust. Additionally, based on Alailima-Millon’s prior one-day suspension, the three-day suspension was considered “progressive discipline for custody paperwork errors.”
By contrast, Judge Victor Wright came to Alailima-Millon’s defense. He testified that, in his courtroom, judicial assistants only prepare release orders when expressly instructed to do so. The judge also verified that both the prosecution and defense attorneys approved the incorrect calculations. In previous written communications to the court operations manager, Judge Wright explained Alailima-Millon “took the blame, somewhat unfairly,” and that she “handled the entire matter with grace and aplomb, and did not point the finger at anyone else, though she had every right to do so.” At arbitration, another judicial officer provided corroborating testimony that she had not calculated sentence credits as one of her job duties.
The arbitration hearing officer concluded the discipline and penalty were warranted because Alailima-Millon did not seek clarification from the court regarding the custody status. The hearing officer cited a failure to take responsibility for the error, the severity of the offense resulting in deprivation of liberty, the procedure manual's description of responsibilities and notice of discipline, and LASC’s use of progressive discipline. LASC adopted the hearing officer's decision. Alailima-Millon filed a petition for writ of mandate.
Superior Court Denies Petition for Writ of Mandate
The superior court denied the petition, finding there were no facts in dispute and that Alailima-Millon's undisputed conduct provided cause for discipline. Further, the superior court determined the three-day suspension was not an abuse of discretion given the seriousness of the error. Alailima-Millon appealed the superior court's denial of her petition for writ of mandate.
Court of Appeal Reverses Penalty
The Court of Appeal ruled the record contained substantial evidence to support the superior court's conclusion that the weight of the evidence supported the hearing officer's finding that LASC had cause to discipline Alailima-Millon. Accordingly, the court affirmed those findings.[ii]
However, its review of the penalty came to a different conclusion. A Court of Appeal independently reviews the agency's determination of penalty, without deference to the superior court's ruling, and decides whether the agency abused its discretion, i.e., whether the penalty is “arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive.”[iii] The court recognized that its “authority to review LASC's penalty for Alailima-Millon's misconduct is ‘quite limited’ and ‘exercised ... with great deference to the administrative agency's findings.’” In public employee discipline, “the overriding consideration . . . is the extent to which the employee's conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[h]arm to the public service.’ [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.”[iv]
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the seriousness of the error that resulted in the deprivation of an individual’s freedom and its impact on public trust. However, even applying the highly deferential review standard, the appellate court held the three-day suspension was an abuse of discretion. The court found that the arbitrator conflated Alailima-Millon's exercise of her right to challenge the discipline and penalty through the grievance, arbitration, and litigation process with denial of responsibility. The evidence showed that when she was notified of the error, she immediately notified the judge and self-reported to LASC management. The appellate court found her description of the circumstances to be reasonable explanations for her actions rather than an attempt to shift blame.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found there was no substantial evidence supporting progressive discipline or suggesting a likelihood of recurrence. Although the two relevant disciplinary actions were based on serious events affecting an individual's liberty, the court distinguished the level of culpability. The previous conduct of failing to follow a clear instruction to recall a bench warrant is “fundamentally different” than the “ambiguous circumstances” here.
The appellate court recognized a reviewing court cannot interfere with a penalty imposed by an administrative agency “because in the court's own evaluation of the circumstances the penalty appears to be too harsh.”[v] However, the court stated, “that does not mean the three-day suspension penalty imposed on Alailima-Millon was justified by the evidence before the arbitrator.” In sum, the Court of Appeal affirmed the determination that LASC had cause to discipline Alailima-Millon. However, it reversed the three-day suspension penalty and directed the superior court to remand to LASC to reconsider what penalty, if any, is justified under the circumstances.
Takeaways
Based on the infrequency of administrative penalty
reversals, Alailima-Millon should be analyzed closely. The court’s
dismantling of the penalty justifications related to blame-shifting and
progressive discipline can likely be applied in many disciplinary proceedings. Although
unpublished, the Opinion offers an understanding of the considerations and reasoning
of courts in reviewing penalty determinations.
The unanimous reversal also provides hope that despite the high legal
burden, penalty determinations can be successfully challenged under the right
factual circumstances.
[i] Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 37, 46.
[ii] Fukuda v. City
of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 810-811; Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(c).
[iii] Griego v. City of Barstow (2023)
87 Cal. App. 5th 133, 139.
[iv] Skelly v. State Pers. Bd.
(1975) 15 Cal. 3d 194, 218.
[v] Yazdi v. Dental Bd. of California (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 25, 46.
