California Supreme Court: Arbitrators May Rule On Pitchess Motions

On December 1, 2014, the California Supreme Court held arbitrators may rule on Pitchess motions during peace officer administrative appeals. The court's decision in Riverside County Sheriff's Department v. Stiglitz ensures peace officers can get information to defend discipline cases.

In Stiglitz, the Riverside County Sheriff's Department terminated a deputy for allegations of falsifying payroll forms. The deputy appealed the discipline to arbitration. The deputy intended to assert a disparate treatment defense, arguing others had committed similar misconduct but were not fired. To prove this defense, the deputy sought redacted records "from personnel investigations of any Department employees who have been disciplined for similar acts of misconduct." She limited her request to events during the previous five years, and only sought incident summaries, the rank of the officer, and the discipline imposed. The department objected, arguing in part that the requested information was confidential and the arbitrator lacked authority to rule on Pitchess motions.

The court held arbitrators have the authority to grant Pitchess motions. Evidence Code section 1043 states the motion should be filed in the appropriate court "or administrative body." The court held this language specifically grants arbitrators the authority to rule on the Pitchess motions because otherwise, the Legislature would have authorized filing a motion in a body not authorized to rule on it. The court also noted the Legislature did not provide a mechanism to transfer a motion from an administrative proceeding to superior court. The absence of such a mechanism showed the Legislature's intent for arbitrators to make such rulings.

The court also held its conclusion is consistent with the purposes behind the Pitchess statutes and the Public Safety Officer Procedural Bill of Rights Act ("POBRA"). The Pitchess statutes reflect the Legislature's attempt to balance a litigant's discovery interest with an officer's confidentiality interest. These interests must be balanced whether the motion is filed before a court or an administrative hearing officer. Also, POBRA grants officers the right to administratively appeal an adverse employment decision and give the officer an opportunity to convince the agency to reverse its decision. Allowing discovery of relevant information to an officer's defense during the administrative hearing furthers these goals.

Stockton POA President, Officer Vindicated of Insubordination Charges

As reported in LRIS, an arbitrator reversed the suspensions of Stockton's POA president and a board member after the City retaliated against them for participating in a POA charitable fundraiser and ordered full back pay.  The decision vindicates the officers and makes clear they did nothing wrong.  Indeed, according to the Stockton Record, "the dispute ended with an arbitrator finding that [the chief] mishandled the situation."

In the lead up to Stockton's bankruptcy, the City and the POA engaged in several legal battles, including the City’s unconstitutional attempt to void the POA contract through a declaration of fiscal emergency.  As the city manager tried to discredit the POA and blunt their public relations efforts, his chief of police claimed POA members couldn't do charitable work because it violated the Department's outside employment policy. 

Then he issued a vague order to "SPOA members" to not "directly or indirectly" participate in the selling/bartending of alcohol. The POA fought back and went forward with a charitable fundraiser, having members' families sell beer instead of the officers.  Then, after the POA made a vote of no confidence against the chief, he suspended SPOA President Stephen Leonesio and Director Mark McLaughlin for insubordination based on their participation in the charitable fundraiser.

The arbitrator ruled the suspensions unjustified.  The arbitrator ruled the chief's order was vague and confusing.  The order did not spell out what counted as selling/bartending and what it could even mean to "indirectly" bartend.  The arbitrator found that "they attempted to comply with the order as they reasonably understood it based on Leonesio’s discussions with Ulring and the language of the order itself.  It bears repeating that, before the event began, SPOA recruited family members and friends to staff the booths and sell alcohol in the place of SPOA members."

The order also didn't make sense because the POA had served alcohol at several charitable events in the past and "In fact, [the chief] himself has served and purchased alcohol at such events."  “If [the chief] truly had the concerns, … he should have said so in clear and unambiguous language,” the arbitrator said. “Instead, he issued an ambiguous and confusing order."  Since the order was unclear and the officers made a reasonable effort to comply with it, they should never have been suspended.

“The taint the city tried to put on their careers has been erased,” David Mastagni said. “The city insisted on going forward with the discipline on these two guys. … It was certainly personal on the city’s end.”  Mastagni attorneys David E. Mastagni and Jeffrey R. A. Edwards represented Officers Leonesio and McLaughlin.

California Supreme Court: Charter Cities Can Have Binding Arbitration

In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Engineers & Architects Association) (June 20, 2013) --- P.3d ---, 2013 WL 3064811, the California Supreme Court ruled charter cities with binding arbitration cannot refuse to arbitrate contract grievances. The ruling overturns an earlier Court of Appeal decision that decided charter cities cannot “delegate” wage and hour disputes to arbitrators.

The case centered on the City of Los Angeles’ unilateral decision to implement furloughs in 2009. The Engineers & Architects Association was in contract and filed a grievance challenging the furloughs. But, even though the contract had binding arbitration, the City refused to arbitrate, claiming it had special powers to impose furloughs and the arbitration clause did not apply. The union sued and won at the trial court, but the Court of Appeal intervened and ruled it was illegal for the City to delegate its power to set wages to an arbitrator, citing cases that require the governing body of a city or county exercise its discretion to set employee wages.

The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal. The Court ruled that by ratifying the MOUs, the City made discretionary choices in the exercise of its salary-setting and budget-making authority and was therefore bound by the MOU. The Court also rejected the City’s claim it could not agree to an MOU which would impair its ability to take all necessary actions to carry out its mission in an emergency. The City also claimed that, because the mayor has to propose a budget annually, and the Council has to enact it annually, the MOU cannot restrict the choices available to the mayor and Council in later years. The Court quickly dispatched with this claim, pointing out that the City’s position, if correct, would make any multi-year deal with contractors, creditors, and vendors unenforceable.

Court of Appeal: Retirement Does Not Void Right to Arbitration

In Service Employees Intern. Union, Local 1021 v. San Joaquin County (3rd DCA, C066861) December 28, 2011, 2011 WL 6812543, the Court of Appeal found an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU.

The case arose after an employee was terminated from his job as a craft worker for allegedly stealing recyclable material. He then invoked a provision of the MOU and requested arbitration of the decision to terminate him. The employee also filed for retirement benefits. The County denied the employee’s request for arbitration, and the trial court found for the County by denying the union’s petition to compel arbitration.

On appeal, the County argued once the employee had retired from his job, he was no longer “an employee” under the MOU and had forfeited any rights to arbitration under the MOU. The Court disagreed, holding an employee’s retirement does not automatically void, or act as a waiver, of the employee’s contractual right to arbitration under an MOU. The Court found the employee appropriately invoked his right to arbitration and accordingly reversed the lower court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration.