The episode also discusses the implications of overreaching Department of Justice (DOJ) policies on law enforcement professionals and the LGBTQ+ community and discusses officer privacy double standards. David Mastagni highlights how the RIPA gender disclosure requirement contradicts the privacy standard Attorney General Rob Bonta declared regarding school teachers and parent notifications of a student's gender identity. The episode also discusses the regulation's implications and how the regulations infringe upon the constitutional rights of peace officers. An explanation of the legal intricacies surrounding PORAC's temporary restraining order against DOJ is also discussed.
Friday, May 3, 2024
MORE ON THE RIPA LEGISLATION: David Mastagni Joins PORAC's "On the Job" Podcast on "Standing Up for Officer Privacy Rights"
Wednesday, May 1, 2024
JUST IN: Permanent Injunction Issued Against the State of California Related to the RIPA Requirement to Disclose Gender Identity
On April 30, 2024, Judge Christopher E. Krueger of the Sacramento County Superior Court issued a Permanent Injunction against the State of California prohibiting the DOJ from enforcement of RIPA’s gender disclosure requirements set forth in section 999.226(a)(23) of Title 11 of the California Code of Regulation.
PORAC, the California Association of Highway Patrolmen, the California Police Chiefs Association, and the California State Sheriffs’ Association filed a legal action and obtained a TRO against the California DOJ to stop Attorney General Rob Bonta’s implementation of these forced identification regulations on January 22, 2024.
David E. Mastagni and Timothy K. Talbot appeared in Sacramento Superior Court to request issuance of a Permanent Injunction pursuant to stipulation with the DOJ on April 30, 2024. Today, the Court issued its order granting the permanent injunction which stated in pertinent part:
- “Defendants and their agents, employees, and representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing section 999.226(a)(23) of Title 11 of the California Code of Regulations, a regulation under the California Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (RIPA) that requires certain law enforcement officers to document their gender identity when performing a stop. (Gov. Code § 12525.5.)”
- “Defendants and their agents, employees, and representatives are permanently enjoined from requiring any individual required to comply with RIPA to provide the “gender of officer,” as defined in section 999.226(a)(23) of Title 11 of the California Code of Regulations, on any disclosures required by RIPA.”
The Court’s minute explained:
“The declarations submitted by
Plaintiffs with the application for the temporary restraining order, coupled
with the decision by Defendants State of California, California Department of
Justice and Attorney General Rob Bonta not to contest that evidence and to
stipulate to the injunction, provide sufficient factual and evidentiary basis
for the issuance of a permanent injunction. The Court will approve the
stipulation for final judgment.”
We are proud to have represented
law enforcement labor and management organizations to jointly protect the
privacy rights of the peace officers who protect us all.
For more on the RIPA legal battle, visit our previous blog post here outlining RIPA more fully.
Thursday, April 18, 2024
Third Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Sanctions Against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office for Misleading the Court About Conferring with Crime Victims
A federal court has ordered Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner and two supervisors from his office to apologize to the family and survivor of vicious murders. The DA’s Office made representations to the trial court that the office had consulted with the family before conceding the death penalty for the murderer.
The Case and Decision
In the mid-1980s, Robert Wharton terrorized the Hart family for months. Wharton burglarized the Hart’s home repeatedly, left threatening messages, and ultimately killed Bradley and Ferne Hart. Wharton turned off the heat to the home and left seven-month-old Lisa Hart to freeze to death in the cold Pennsylvania winter. By no small miracle, Lisa survived the encounter. Wharton was later convicted of these crimes and sentenced to death. Wharton was retried for the murders in 1992 and again found guilty.
Ultimately, Wharton filed a federal habeas corpus petition to have his death sentence overturned. The court determined that the last major issue was whether Wharton had adjusted well to prison and if his adjustment would have changed the second jury’s opinion of guilt. Wharton’s defense insisted that he had adjusted well to prison life, but Wharton truly did not. Wharton had attempted to escape from prison multiple times, racked up numerous prison misconduct charges and was caught—twice—with makeshift handcuff keys.
After nearly 30 years of dutifully prosecuting the case and opposing Wharton’s numerous appeals, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office suddenly decided to concede the death penalty issue. Specifically, the DA’s Office claimed they no longer sought the death penalty after “communication with the victims’ family” and their own internal review by their death penalty committee. The DA’s briefs and arguments lacked any mentions or evidence of his poor adjustment to prison.
The federal trial court was suspicious of the sudden concession and refused to accept it. After further hearings, the court reprimanded the DA’s Office. The Office had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) because the Office made “representations to the Court that lacked evidentiary support and were not in any way formed after ‘an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.’” As punishment for their conduct, DA Krasner was required to provide a written apology to the Hart family’s survivors and the DA’s Office was ordered to be more forthcoming in the future.
The DA’s Office (and two involved supervisors) appealed the District Court’s order finding they lacked candor in their representations to the court to protect their professional reputation. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions and findings of the District Court. In their decision, the Third Circuit noted:
“Though literally true, [the claim of communication with the victims’ family] was misleading. Our opinion remanding this case identified Lisa hart by name as the sole survivor of Wharton’s crimes. Any reasonable reader would expect, as Judge Goldberg did, that this phrasing meant Lisa had been contacted. Yet she was not. And any reasonable reader would expect, as Judge Goldberg did, that the Office had solicited the views of other family members. Yet the Office had not contacted anyone besides [the victims’] brother. Plus, when it reached him, it never told him clearly that it was planning to concede the death penalty.”
Discussion
This case is a prime example of an attempt to cover up poor performance with clever wording. The prosecutors were not technically being dishonest in their representations. But a reasonable person reading the court’s instructions and orders would interpret the claims in their contextual meaning, rather than literal.
Outside of the issue of candor by lawyers, there is also an issue of protecting victims of crime and their survivors. Pennsylvania has a Victim’s Bill of Rights codified in statute at Pa.C.S. §11.201, which is similar to the California Victim’s Bill of Rights. Both states require victims to be kept informed about the status of cases, including regarding hearings and proceedings that may result in the release of a defendant. While Wharton was seeking relief from his death sentence and not release from custody, the Hart family had a right to be notified of the true nature of the proceedings and be given a voice in the decision to concede.
This case serves as a reminder that prosecutors and other government agents should make reasonable efforts to involve victims in the justice process—both for moral reasons and from legal expectations set out in the Victim’s Bill of Rights.
Specifically for lawyers, the Third Circuit summed up their opinion well: “As officers of the court, lawyers must not mislead courts. So, before they state facts, they must investigate reasonably.”
For more than 30 years, the Lisa
Hart and her family have waited for justice to be carried out against Wharton,
only to have the DA’s Office mislead them about their plans to concede on the
death penalty. Hopefully, the Third Circuit’s decision and the apology by the
DA’s Office are steps towards finding that justice.
Images: AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly, Wall Street Journal
Thursday, April 4, 2024
California Supreme Court Rules that Pre-Shift and Post-Shift Work Must Be Compensated
On March 25, 2024, the California
Supreme Court ruled that time employees spent awaiting and during exit security
procedures was compensable as “hours worked” because the time was subject to an
employer's control. Huerta v. CSI Elec. Contractors, No. S275431, (Mar.
25, 2024) 2024 WL 1245291. The employer
required security checks of vehicles prior to beginning work each day and upon
leaving. The checks caused delays of up to 30 minutes.
The Court also provided guidance
regarding on-duty meal periods, holding that employees must be paid at least
minimum wage for “on-duty” meal periods when they can’t leave the premises.
However, the Court also held that an inability to leave the premises did not
render the meal period on-duty if they are otherwise free to spend the time as
they choose.
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals certified these questions to the California Supreme Court about the wage
order governing wages, hours, and working conditions in the construction,
drilling, logging, and mining industries and the scope of the term “hours
worked.”
This important ruling confirmed
that under California wage and hour laws, non-exempt employees must also be
paid for employer mandated pre and post shift activities. This ruling comports with FLSA requirements
that pre and post shift activities must be compensated where they are integral
and indispensable to their work.
While largely not applicable to
public safety employees, this ruling reinforces similar off-the-clock claims of
law enforcement officers and firefighters. For example, in Ketchum v. City
of Vallejo, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1161 (E.D. Cal. 2007), our firm obtained
a ruling that time spent by mounted officers preparing their horses and
equipment, including time spent traveling to pick-up their horses prior to and
after deployments, were compensable activities which were integral and
indispensable to officers' law enforcement duties.
Click here to read the California Supreme Court’s Opinion referenced above.
Friday, March 29, 2024
SCOTUS Watch: Law Enforcement Groups file Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court to Review Excessive CCW Carry Restrictions
On Monday, March 25th, 2024, the Peace Officers’ Research Association of California, the California Association of Highway Patrolmen, the California State Sheriffs' Association and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPPC) filed an amicus brief in support of a Petition for Certiorari to review the constitutionality of New York’s new concealed carry law, which severely restricts the places CCW permit holders may carry concealed handguns much like California’s Senate Bill 2 (SB 2).
The brief is in connection to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ivan Antonyuk, et al. v. Steven James, the Acting Superintendent of the New York State Police, et al. The case challenges New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA), a revised gun law adopted in New York in July 2022 – only days after the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen (Bruen).
In Bruen, SCOTUS struck down as unconstitutional New York’s concealed carry law that required an individual to provide “proper cause” existed before a concealed carry license would be issued. The court held that this “proper cause” requirement violated the 14th Amendment because it prevented law-abiding citizens who have ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Following Bruen, New York and California issued laws in an obvious attempt to evade the ruling.
In February, PORAC, the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), the California State Sheriffs’ Association (CSSA), and the Crime Prevention Research Center (CPPC) filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging California’s SB 2. The related amicus filed in Antonyuk similarly challenges the unconstitutional efforts to defy the mandates of Bruen. The brief seeks to enforce the Bruen ruling by safeguarding citizen’s self-defense rights in public.
New
York’s Revised Concealed Carry Law & Similarities to California’s Senate
Bill 2
Coined as the “Bruen Response
Bill,” the CCIA restricts gun access by making the licensing process more
onerous and expands the list of designated “sensitive places” where carrying
firearms is prohibited. In place of the “proper cause” standard that Bruen invalidated,
the CCIA requires an applicant to demonstrate “good moral character.” “Good
moral character” is defined as “having the essential character, temperament and
judgment necessary to be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner
that does not endanger oneself or others.” The CCIA demands character
references, information about cohabitants and adult children, a personal
“interview” with a licensing official, more than two full days of firearms
training, and a list of social media accounts.
For those that persevere through this process, the CCIA then restricts where in public a licensee may carry a firearm, declaring not just the “island of Manhattan” but virtually the entire landmass of New York a “sensitive place.” When asked where New Yorkers could carry under the CCIA, Governor Hochul responded “[p]probably some streets.” These so-called “sensitive locations” include 20 categories, including the most ordinary locations. Filling in the gaps, the CCIA also effectively names all private properties in New York as “restricted locations” unless the owner posts “clear and conspicuous signage” or gives “express consent.”
Like the CCIA, California’s SB 2
renders concealed carry permits effectively impossible to exercise by defining
nearly every location as a prohibited “sensitive place.” Both SB 2 and the CCIA
fail to adhere to the Bruen directive by expanding longstanding
sensitive place definitions to encompass nearly their entire states, other than
some streets and sidewalks.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs in the Antonyuk litigation
first challenged certain provisions of the CCIA in district court under the
First, Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court struck down
several provisions of the CCIA, barring enforcement of those provisions. The
Second Circuit then issued a stay effectively putting the district court’s
ruling on hold. And in December 2023, the Second Circuit vacated much of the
district court’s injunction, finding virtually all of the CCIA to be facially
constitutional under the 2nd Amendment.
In February 2024, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Second
Circuit’s December decision. The petition seeks review of two primary
questions: (1) the proper historical time period for Bruen analysis; and
(2) whether a “good moral character” requirement conflicts with Bruen.
Protecting Bruen & Public Safety
In Bruen, the Supreme Court
identified “settled” sensitive places (like legislative assembles, polling
places, and courthouses) where carrying a firearm is prohibited. The Court
concluded that laws restricting protected 2nd Amendment conduct must
be “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
As to whether there are special places where the right to carry might be
restricted without infringing on 2nd Amendment rights, the Court
explained that the “historical record yields relatively few 18th and
19th century ‘sensitive places.’” Likewise, the Court cautioned that
“expanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ simply to all places of public
congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement” is too broad of a
category and would essentially eviscerate the general right to publicly carry
arms.
In addition to the constitutional
challenges presented by SB 2 and the CCIA, the laws themselves make little
sense from a law enforcement perspective and do little to address lawmakers’
purported public safety concerns. CCW permit holders are some of the most
highly vetted, trained, responsible, and law-abiding citizens. Violent
criminals do not bother with CCW permits and simply carry illegally, and
criminals intent on murder will not be deterred by these “sensitive place”
designations. In actuality, criminals intent on committing a mass murder will
likely choose to do so in a “sensitive place” where he or she is less likely to
encounter armed citizens.
Again, these interests align with the research findings of renowned CPPC President John Lott, Jr., Ph.D. The Antonyuk brief cites his research concluding that right to carry laws actually reduce violent crime, especially murder and rape, whereas expansive restrictions on CCW permits may actually induce more violence.
Laws such as SB 2 and the CCIA encourage gun violence by constricting self-defense options and reducing risks to criminals. States sincerely desiring to reduce gun violence and promote public safety could – instead of infringing on 2nd Amendment protections and defying Bruen directives – enact laws and fund enforcement to keep guns out of the hands of prohibited persons and to impose meaningful consequences when guns are used in violent crimes.
The constitutionality of restrictions
on where concealed carry may be prohibited is a serious national concern,
particularly for the Sheriffs who issue the permits and the officers that must
enforce constitutionally suspect laws.
Forcing officers to potentially violate citizens’ civil rights will subject
officers to section 1983 liability and damages public confidence in law
enforcement. Moreover, officers have a
direct interest in protecting their own right to self-defense and concealed
carry in their retirement.
Attorneys David E. Mastagni, Taylor Davies-Mahaffey, and Timothy Talbot authored the brief.