Ninth Circuit Vindicates Second Amendment Rights in Two Recent Rulings: Ammo Background Checks & One-Gun-A-Month Law

Ninth Circuit Upholds Ruling Against California's Ammo Background Check Law

In a closely watched decision today, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that California's ammunition background check requirements, enacted through voter-approved Proposition 63 in 2016, violate the Second Amendment. The case, Rhode v. Bonta, brought by Olympic gold medalist Kim Rhode and other firearm owners, underscores ongoing tensions between state gun regulations and constitutional protections

Court's Decision

The majority opinion, authored by Judge Sandra S. Ikuta and joined by Judge Bridget S. Bade, applied the Supreme Court's framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) to evaluate the law's constitutionality. California's system mandates face-to-face purchases through licensed vendors, with background checks required for every ammunition transaction. Options include a quick $1 standard check for those with existing firearm records, a $19 basic check for others, or annual certificate verifications processes that the court found impose unnecessary fees, potential delays, and geographic restrictions on law-abiding citizens.

The panel determined that the Second Amendment's plain text covers the right to "operable arms," which inherently includes ammunition. They argued that the regime "meaningfully constrains" this right by creating barriers not just for casual buyers but for anyone needing regular access, such as competitive shooters or off-duty officers maintaining proficiency. Critically, California failed to provide sufficient historical analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras (focusing on 1791 and 1868 eras) to justify the repeated checks. Analogues like loyalty oaths, concealed carry permits, surety laws, and vendor licensing were deemed not "relevantly similar" in "how" (burden imposed) and "why" (purpose, e.g., public safety vs. disloyalty). No historical precedent for repeated background checks on every ammo purchase.

This facial challenge succeeded, meaning the law was deemed invalid in all applications, leading the court to uphold a permanent injunction against enforcement. The decision did not address related claims under the dormant Commerce Clause or federal preemption, focusing squarely on Second Amendment grounds.

Judge Jay S. Bybee dissented vigorously, arguing that the majority overlooked Bruen's endorsement of "shall-issue" licensing regimes with modest fees and delays. He pointed out that most checks under California's system cost just $1 and process in under a minute, hardly a "meaningful constraint" on access. Bybee warned that the ruling could undermine practical regulations that help ensure ammunition doesn't fall into the wrong hands.

Governor Newsom's Response

Governor Gavin Newsom, a prominent figure in national gun control efforts, quickly issued a statement criticizing the ruling as a setback for public safety initiatives. He emphasized the voter-approved nature of the law, stating:

“Strong gun laws save lives – and today’s decision is a slap in the face to the progress California has made in recent years to keep its communities safer from gun violence. Californians voted to require background checks on ammunition and their voices should matter.”

Conclusion

Many first responders value streamlined access to ammunition for training, home defense, or off-duty carry, viewing excessive red tape as an added burden in an already demanding profession. While supporters of the law argue it enhances community safety, critics contend it disproportionately affects responsible owners without clear historical precedent.

This ruling could prompt California to seek en banc review or Supreme Court intervention, especially given the split panel and Bruen's evolving application. In the meantime, this ruling removes a layer of regulation that some see as overly restrictive.

Ninth Circuit Declares California's One-Gun-A-Month Law Unconstitutional: Implications for Peace Officers and Public Safety

In a significant victory for Second Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down California's longstanding one-gun-a-month purchase restriction, ruling it facially unconstitutional. The unanimous decision in Nguyen v. Bonta, handed down on June 20, 2025, rejects the state's attempt to limit firearm acquisitions without historical precedent, emphasizing the plural nature of the right to "keep and bear Arms." For California peace officers and public safety professionals, this ruling not only expands access to firearms but also underscores the evolving landscape of gun regulations post-Bruen, potentially affecting training, personal protection, and enforcement duties.

The case challenged California's 1999 law, which prohibited most residents from purchasing more than one handgun or semiautomatic centerfire rifle within any 30-day period. Plaintiffs, backed by groups like the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and California Rifle & Pistol Association (CRPA), argued it infringed on the Second Amendment's core protections. The Ninth Circuit panel—Judges Danielle J. Forrest (Trump appointee), John B. Owens (Obama appointee), and Bridget S. Bade (Trump appointee)—agreed, finding no basis in America's founding-era traditions for such metering of constitutional rights. 

Judge Forrest's opinion dismantled the state's defenses. California claimed the Second Amendment doesn't protect acquiring multiple firearms, as the law allowed initial purchases. The court rebuffed this: "The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to 'keep and bear Arms,' plural," Forrest wrote. "This 'guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons.' And not only is 'Arms' stated in the plural, but this term refers to more than just guns." She drew analogies to other rights: "We are not aware of any circumstance where government may temporarily meter the exercise of constitutional rights in this manner... [like] limit[ing] citizens’ free-speech right to one protest a month." 

The state invoked historical analogues, such as colonial-era laws on arms sales to Native Americans or intoxicated persons, but the panel found them inapplicable. "Many of California’s proposed historical analogues impose no burden on an individual’s ability to acquire, keep, or bear arms," Forrest noted. Distinguishing from a Fifth Circuit case upholding enhanced background checks for young adults, the court highlighted that delay here was the purpose, not a byproduct of valid scrutiny.

Judge Owens concurred, clarifying the ruling doesn't preclude other measures against bulk or straw purchases if historically supported. The decision halts enforcement in Ninth Circuit states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.

Many first responders are already exempt from the limit, but retired officers may benefit from easier access for personal defense or training. The court's reasoning follow post-Bruen trends scrutinizing restrictions, potentially easing burdens on law enforcement implementing such laws.  

Gun-rights advocates hailed the win. "We have a right to buy more than one gun at a time just as we have a right to buy more than one bible at a time," FPC President Brandon Combs said. SAF echoed: "This is a unanimous decision... in favor of SAF and its partners." 

Governor Newsom called the decision a "slap in the face," while Attorney General Bonta emphasized that the ruling undermines the state's efforts to reduce gun violence. Bonta's office hasn't commented on appeals, but en banc review is possible.

Navigating "Great Bodily Injury" Disclosures under PC 832.7: CA Supreme Court's Cabrera Decision Raises the Bar

In the evolving landscape of police transparency laws, California's peace officers are facing a critical debate over what constitutes "great bodily injury" (GBI) under Penal Code Section 832.7. This provision, amended by Senate Bill 1421 in 2018, mandates the disclosure of personnel records related to use-of-force incidents that result in death or GBI. Without a clear statutory definition, agencies and courts have been left to interpret GBI, leading to a divide between broad and narrow views. A recent California Supreme Court ruling in In re Cabrera (2023) offers crucial guidance, suggesting GBI sets a higher bar than "serious bodily injury" (SBI), which could limit unnecessary disclosures and protect officer confidentiality.

The problem stems from SB 1421's push for accountability. Before the bill, officer records were largely confidential under Section 832.7(a), accessible only through Pitchess motions. Now, agencies must release records on specific misconduct, including force causing GBI, firearm discharges, sexual assault, or dishonesty. The lack of a GBI definition has sparked confusion. Some courts and transparency advocates favor a broad interpretation based on Penal Code Section 12022.7(f), which calls GBI a "significant or substantial physical injury" greater than minor or moderate harm. This could include bruises, lacerations, or abrasions—common in routine arrests.

Imagine an officer involved in a standard takedown where a suspect sustains a bruise or minor cut. Under a broad view, that incident's records might be disclosed via a Public Records Act request, overwhelming agencies with CPRA disclosures and inviting litigation. We've seen this play out in cases like People v. Cross (2008), where the Supreme Court held that GBI doesn't require permanent damage but can cover physical pain or contusions. Appellate decisions have upheld GBI for injuries like swollen jaws, sore ribs, or multiple bruises, as in People v. Corona (1989) or People v. Jaramillo (1979). Groups like the First Amendment Coalition argue this broadens transparency, aligning with the California Constitution's mandate to favor disclosure.

But this expansive approach creates real burdens. Agencies could be flooded with requests for records on everyday encounters, straining resources for redaction and review. For peace officers, it means more exposure, potentially chilling their ability to perform duties without fear of constant second-guessing.

Enter the narrower interpretation, which ties GBI to something at least as severe as SBI under Penal Code Section 243(f)(4). SBI includes loss of consciousness, concussions, bone fractures, wounds needing sutures, or serious disfigurement—harms that require medical intervention and pose substantial risks. Federal definitions in statutes like 18 U.S.C. Section 1365(h)(3) echo this, focusing on risks of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impaired function.

SB 1421's legislative history supports this view. Initially drafted with SBI, it switched to GBI to clarify a higher threshold, influenced by law enforcement groups. The ACLU even described the bill's intent as covering incidents where officers "seriously injure" the public. A broad GBI would undermine this by capturing relatively minor injuries and overwhelming departments with CPRA obligations.

The California Supreme Court's decision in Cabrera provides potentially game-changing relief. In that case, a defendant was convicted of battery with SBI (brief unconsciousness, a head laceration needing stitches, dizziness) but the jury deadlocked on GBI enhancements. The trial court imposed a GBI enhancement anyway, assuming SBI implied GBI. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that SBI and GBI are "essentially equivalent" but not interchangeable as a matter of law. Crucially, the Court noted that GBI requires a more demanding severity threshold. It cited examples like People v. Taylor (2004), where a bone fracture was SBI but not GBI because it was deemed moderate, and People v. Thomas (2019), involving a broken jaw with permanent damage—SBI yes, GBI no.

The Court emphasized that while overlaps exist, juries decide factually where injuries fall on a continuum. A hairline fracture might be SBI but not "significant or substantial" enough for GBI. This disapproved prior cases equating the two and essentially assumed that all GBI qualifies as SBI, but not vice versa. For Section 832.7, this means agencies may not have to disclose records unless injuries meet this elevated GBI standard, reducing the scope of mandatory releases.

The impacts for California law enforcement are profound. A narrower GBI interpretation eases administrative burdens, allowing agencies to focus on serious incidents rather than minor ones. It aligns disclosures with existing SBI reporting under Government Code Section 12525.2, promoting uniformity. For officers, it safeguards privacy in routine duties, preventing overbroad scrutiny that could deter necessary force. However, without appellate precedent directly on Section 832.7, superior courts have varied—some broadening GBI in non-binding rulings like Richmond Police Officers’ Association v. City of Richmond (2020).

Looking ahead, ongoing litigation, such as the First Amendment Coalition's 2025 suit against San Diego over a beanbag and dog attack incident, will test Cabrera's application. Agencies currently apply varied standards for responding to GBI request. Peace officers and unions can now cite Cabrera to argue for narrower lens in court and push for legislative clarity, perhaps defining GBI akin to federal standards: substantial risk of death, extreme pain, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.

This debate highlights the tension in striking the proper balance between transparency and functionality. Mastagni Holstedt, APC has been at the forefront, representing PORAC in analyzing bills like SB 1421. For a deeper dive, look for David E. Mastagni's upcoming full-length article in the PORAC Law Enforcement News and Review, where he'll unpack court rulings, agency practices, and advocacy strategies in detail.

Watch David E. Mastagni Testifying for AB 340: PORAC Sponsored Legislation to Protect Confidential Union Communications

    On July 15, 2025, David E. Mastagni of Mastagni Holstedt, APC testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of AB 340 (Ahrens), a vital bill sponsored by PORAC that codifies existing PERB precedent to protect confidential communications between public employees and their union representatives. This legislation closes a statutory gap, ensuring workers—from teachers and firefighters to peace officers—can discuss grievances, safety concerns, or discipline without fear of employer intrusion. It's particularly important for public safety officers, who depend on candid union advice to navigate high-stakes investigations while fulfilling their duties.

    AB 340 prohibits public employers from questioning or compelling disclosure of these confidential representational communications, enforceable as an unfair labor practice through PERB. It exempts criminal investigations and aligns with the Peace Officers' Bill of Rights (Gov. Code § 3303), balancing accountability with representation rights. No evidentiary privilege is created—civil or criminal proceedings remain unaffected. This bill levels the playing field across PERB-jurisdictional employers, fostering trust and reducing litigation over coercive inquiries that chill protected activities.

    During the opening statement, Mastagni emphasized the bill's role in codifying PERB precedent and addressed opposition claims, explaining that AB 340 does not hinder investigations like those under AB 218 for childhood sexual assault. He noted that schools can question witnesses about firsthand knowledge, as the bill protects only representation-related communications lacking evidentiary value.

    In the Q&A session, committee members inquired about how employers would recognize confidential communications and the consequences of accidental intrusions. Mastagni explained that confidentiality is obvious in 99.9% of cases, such as when employers ask what a member told their representative during interview preparation. If an employer accidentally intrudes, the representative or member must object. PERB liability typically only arises if the employer compels disclosure after such an objection.

    The video of the hearing Q&A session is available here: Watch the Testimony.

    The bill passed the Judiciary Committee 10-2 and now heads to Appropriations, chaired by Senator Caballero, who voted yes in Judiciary. This momentum is reflective of the strong support from public employees and their unions for this bill.

    Thank you to the Judiciary Committee for advancing AB 340 and Assembly Member Patrick Ahrens for carrying this bill on behalf of PORAC. Mr. Mastagni is grateful for the opportunity to assist PORAC and work with their legislative advocate Randy Perry in drafting and advancing this bill. To drive final enactment, contact your legislators and Governor Newsome to urge their support—California's public employees deserve this safeguard.

    The video of the entire hearing is available here: Watch the Full Hearing.

Michigan Jury Acquits State Police Sergeant in Off-Duty Accidental Firearm Discharge Case

 In a notable victory for law enforcement, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer of reckless firearm use charges stemming from an accidental discharge while she shopped off-duty at a Costco. The case highlights the challenges of proving criminal negligence in firearm mishaps, especially when officers follow departmental policies on off-duty carry. While this occurred in Michigan, it offers valuable insights for California peace officers on liability risks, training, and the importance of robust departmental protocols to defend against similar allegations.

Facts

In February 2025, Michigan State Police Sergeant Kellie Gillam-Shaffer was shopping off-duty at a Costco in Oshtemo Township, Kalamazoo County. As she checked out at the cash register, she placed her wallet back into her purse. At that moment, her department-issued Sig P365 firearm, which she carried in an Uncle Mike's foam holster inside the purse, discharged a round. The bullet passed through the holster, the purse, and the officer's hand. It then grazed another customer's ankle. Additionally, a third customer fainted due to distress from the loud noise and witnessing the injury.

Following an internal investigation and public outcry, the Kalamazoo County Prosecutor's Office charged Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer with Reckless Use of a Firearm Causing Injury, a misdemeanor under Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) 752.861.

In July 2025, a Kalamazoo County jury acquitted Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer. The jury concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding

The Constitution and relevant statutes require careful scrutiny in cases involving accidental firearm discharges by law enforcement officers. Michigan Compiled Laws 752.861 states: "Any person who, by carelessness, recklessness, or negligence, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause or allow any firearm under his immediate control to be discharged so as to injure or endanger any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

This statute criminalizes non-willful but negligent discharges that result in injury or endangerment. The key terms—carelessness, recklessness, or negligence—must be interpreted based on their ordinary meanings: carelessness as a lack of attention to safety, negligence as failure to exercise reasonable care, and recklessness as a conscious disregard of a known risk.

Michigan courts apply the plain meaning rule to statutory language. For conviction, the prosecution must show that the defendant's conduct deviated from what a reasonable person would do in handling a loaded firearm. The mens rea requires proof of fault beyond a mere accident, amounting to culpable negligence, as held in People v. Orr, 242 Mich. App. 694 (2000).

Law enforcement officers do not receive separate criminal immunity for off-duty carry in Michigan, but courts may consider professional training, expectations, and departmental policies in assessing reasonableness.

In this case, the prosecution argued that Sergeant Gillam-Shaffer was reckless because she entered a crowded store with a firearm lacking an external safety, carried a round in the chamber and a full magazine, and used a foam holster in her purse.

The defense countered that the Sig P365 and Uncle Mike's holster were department-issued. Michigan State Police require officers to carry firearms off-duty in approved holsters, loaded with a round chambered. The firearm features an internal safety preventing discharge without trigger pull. The defense portrayed the incident as a rare mechanical failure, not a foreseeable result of negligence.

The jury found that the prosecution failed to prove negligence under the circumstances. It entered a not guilty verdict, emphasizing that mere accident or mechanical issues do not suffice for liability. Although not precedential, this case is a reminder that prosecutors must prove a clear deviation from reasonable care. Accidental discharges tied to policy compliant carry may not meet this threshold.

Ninth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity to CHP officer Who Mistook Stroke for DUI: Must Officers Now Play Doctor? Implications for Officers' Medical Response Duties

 In a significant ruling for California law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of qualified immunity to a CHP officer who delayed medical care for a motorist suffering a stroke, after mistaking symptoms for drug impairment. D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol underscores officers' obligations to provide prompt medical aid to detainees showing signs of distress, regardless of suspected causes. In light of this decision officers should consider how they assess and respond to medical needs in the field.

Facts

On June 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., CHP Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo responded to a single-vehicle crash on a freeway onramp in Orange County. The driver, 55-year-old Steven D’Braunstein, had totaled his car in a near head-on collision with a concrete wall. D’Braunstein told the officer he "didn’t know what happened" and that "the car did something." He exhibited signs of distress, such as dry mouth, slurred and slow speech, profuse sweating, confusion, poor balance, slow reaction time, and constricted pupils. He struggled to answer simple questions and interjected random comments during their conversation.

Suspecting impairment, Officer Durazo conducted field sobriety tests, which D’Braunstein failed due to his condition. His breathalyzer showed a BAC of 0.00, and Durazo noted he had a serious condition. However, she was not a drug recognition expert and did not call for one. Instead of summoning an ambulance, she arrested him for suspected DUI and transported him to jail about 45 minutes after arriving on scene—roughly an hour after the crash.

At the jail, a nurse refused to admit D’Braunstein after examination. After two hours there (about 3.5 hours post-crash), Durazo took him to a hospital, where doctors diagnosed a stroke. The delay allegedly prevented timely treatment that could have mitigated brain damage. D’Braunstein spent weeks in the hospital and now resides in a long-term care facility, unable to care for himself due to lasting injuries.

D’Braunstein’s son sued Officer Durazo and the CHP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for deprivation of medical care. The district court found a constitutional violation but granted summary judgment and qualified immunity, ruling the right was not "clearly established."

Holding

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard for post-arrest care, which requires officers to seek necessary medical attention for injured detainees by promptly summoning help or transporting them to a hospital. This duty stems from the Constitution's requirement that state actors provide adequate medical care when confining individuals, as established in cases like County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998) and DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989). For pretrial detainees, it also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, but both use an objective reasonableness test.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find Durazo's actions objectively unreasonable. Despite the serious crash and D’Braunstein's symptoms (disorientation, profuse sweating, poor balance, and slurred speech), Durazo delayed care for hours. Her suspicion of drug use, unsupported by evidence, did not excuse the failure to act, as the crash and distress signals warranted emergency evaluation. The court emphasized, that the reason for the crash did not change the need for emergency medical evaluation.

On qualified immunity, the court rejected Durazo's argument that the duty applies only to injuries caused by officers. Existing precedent clearly establishes that officers must provide reasonable medical care for any serious medical need, regardless of cause. Citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco (2006) and others, the panel noted it doesn't require "unusual foresight" to recognize that a major accident victim showing distress needs prompt aid. Officers aren't expected to diagnose conditions but must assess if the situation calls for immediate help. The violation was clearly established, so qualified immunity was denied. The case was reversed and remanded.

Judge Lee partially dissented, arguing no clearly established law required distinguishing symptoms without obvious injury signs, but the majority held the duty was plain.

Takeaways for California Public Safety Employees

The Court found a broad duty to provide care. Officers must deliver objectively reasonable medical aid to detainees displaying need, irrespective of whether the issue stems from arrest, accident, or other causes. Mistaking medical emergencies for impairment won't shield from liability if signs of distress are ignored.

No diagnosis is required, but assessment is key. Officers don't need to pinpoint the ailment (e.g., stroke vs. drugs), but must evaluate if prompt medical attention is warranted based on observable facts like crash severity and symptoms.

This ruling may prompt agencies to enhance training on recognizing medical vs. impairment signs, encouraging earlier calls for paramedics or drug experts in ambiguous cases. The case highlights the risks in delaying care post-accident.

Expect more § 1983 claims challenging medical response delays. Document observations thoroughly and err toward summoning aid to demonstrate reasonableness.

This decision reinforces that protecting detainee well-being is paramount, even in high-pressure field scenarios.