On September 15, 2014, in Indio Police Command Unit Association v. City of Indio, the California Court of Appeal upheld a $102,900 attorney fees award to a police officer association. The association obtained an injunction against the City of Indio for violating the MMBA meet and confer requirements.
In City of Indio, the City notified the Indio Police Command Unit Association that it planned to implement a "strategic reorganization" of the Department's command structure. The plan eliminated the Captain and four Lieutenant positions. The plan also reduced command staff from five sworn officers to two sworn officers and one unsworn supervisor. The Department's legal counsel claimed the decision to reorganize was not subject to the MMBA meet and confer requirements. The City agreed only to negotiate the impact of the reorganization. The association obtained an injunction preventing the City from implementing the reorganization plan until it met and conferred in good faith. The City finally complied and the parties reached an agreement.
The court awarded attorney fees to the association based on the private attorney general statute. The court found the association enforced important rights affecting the public interest. The court also found the litigation benefited not only the association and its members, but all other employee associations within the City. Awarding attorneys' fees in such cases encourages employee associations to enforce the MMBA, even when the financial burden of filing a lawsuit outweighs any possible recovery.
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Tuesday, September 23, 2014
Court of Appeal Denies Unemployment Benefits to Employee Discharged for Dishonesty
On September 12, 2014, the California Court of Appeal in Irving v. California Uninsurance Appeals Board denied a school district employee unemployment benefits because he was discharged for misconduct. The court found the employee took excessive breaks on four occasions and falsified time records.
Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 disqualifies employees for unemployment benefits if the employee has been discharged for misconduct. Here, the employee admitted taking four different breaks exceeding the allowable 50 minutes. He also admitted falsely reporting his break time on the District's time records. The court disregarded that other employees had also taken breaks longer than 50 minutes. The court stated it is "legally irrelevant" that other employees may have engaged in similar misconduct when determining eligibility for unemployment benefits because of the dishonesty allegation.
Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 disqualifies employees for unemployment benefits if the employee has been discharged for misconduct. Here, the employee admitted taking four different breaks exceeding the allowable 50 minutes. He also admitted falsely reporting his break time on the District's time records. The court disregarded that other employees had also taken breaks longer than 50 minutes. The court stated it is "legally irrelevant" that other employees may have engaged in similar misconduct when determining eligibility for unemployment benefits because of the dishonesty allegation.
Thursday, September 11, 2014
Ninth Circuit Rules Peace Officer's ADHD is Not a Disability Under the ADA
On August 15, 2014 in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, the Ninth Circuit ruled a police officer's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder was not a "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court upheld the officer's termination for work-related problems caused by his ADHD.
In Weaving, the City terminated an officer for not getting along with peers and subordinates. The City alleged he "created and fostered a hostile work environment" and had problems with interpersonal communication. The officer argued his ADHD impaired his ability to work and interact with others, and qualified as disability under the ADA. He argued the City terminated him for his disability in violation of the ADA.
The court ruled his ADHD did not constitute a "disability" under the ADA because his condition did not severely impair his ability to work and interact with others. The court found he was a skilled police officer and supervisors had selected him for high-level assignments. Also, his problems interacting with others did not rise to the level of a disability. Asserting a disability on this basis requires such severe impairment that the subject is barely functional and essentially housebound. For these reasons, the court ruled his termination did not violate the ADA.
In Weaving, the City terminated an officer for not getting along with peers and subordinates. The City alleged he "created and fostered a hostile work environment" and had problems with interpersonal communication. The officer argued his ADHD impaired his ability to work and interact with others, and qualified as disability under the ADA. He argued the City terminated him for his disability in violation of the ADA.
The court ruled his ADHD did not constitute a "disability" under the ADA because his condition did not severely impair his ability to work and interact with others. The court found he was a skilled police officer and supervisors had selected him for high-level assignments. Also, his problems interacting with others did not rise to the level of a disability. Asserting a disability on this basis requires such severe impairment that the subject is barely functional and essentially housebound. For these reasons, the court ruled his termination did not violate the ADA.
Friday, August 29, 2014
6th Appellate District: Reversal for Wrong Standard Applied
In Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz, the Sixth Appellate District ruled against an order from the superior court denying a petition. The petition was filed by Josafat Rodriguez Jr., a former Santa Cruz police officer, who applied to the City of Santa Cruz for industrial disability retirement. He claimed a psychiatric disability due to post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After the City denied his application, he challenged the ruling by filing a "Petition for Writ of Mandate." This petition was subsequently denied by the superior court. In deciding against the court's ruling the appellate court held that the wrong standard of review had been applied.
The appellate court explained that in reviewing the City of Santa Cruz's decision, the trial court was required to use its independent judgment. This however, is not the standard that was actually applied. In lieu of applying its own independent judgment the court deferred to the findings of an Administrative Law Judge who decided on behalf of the City of Santa Cruz, that the petition was not credible and that his claim should be denied. In reviewing the statement of decision of the trial court, it was evident that instead of applying its own independent judgment, it rendered a decision on the grounds of its determination that there was sufficient evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding. In addition the trial court failed to articulate its independent findings in regards to key issues.
Ultimately, the appellate court ruled that while referencing a standard of independent judgment, this standard was not actually applied when determining whether to grant Mr. Rodriguez's petition. For that reason the order denying the petition was ruled against. This ruling emphasizes the importance of applying and adhering to the proper standards, as it relates to review.
The appellate court explained that in reviewing the City of Santa Cruz's decision, the trial court was required to use its independent judgment. This however, is not the standard that was actually applied. In lieu of applying its own independent judgment the court deferred to the findings of an Administrative Law Judge who decided on behalf of the City of Santa Cruz, that the petition was not credible and that his claim should be denied. In reviewing the statement of decision of the trial court, it was evident that instead of applying its own independent judgment, it rendered a decision on the grounds of its determination that there was sufficient evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding. In addition the trial court failed to articulate its independent findings in regards to key issues.
Ultimately, the appellate court ruled that while referencing a standard of independent judgment, this standard was not actually applied when determining whether to grant Mr. Rodriguez's petition. For that reason the order denying the petition was ruled against. This ruling emphasizes the importance of applying and adhering to the proper standards, as it relates to review.
Court of Appeal Enforces One-Year Discipline Limitations Period Even Though Officer's Identity Unknown
On August 25, 2014, the California Court of Appeal issued a decision in Pedro v. City of Los Angeles. The court held the department's ignorance of an accused officer's identity does not delay the one-year statute of limitations for disciplinary actions.
In Pedro, a man alleged an officer conducted private business on two occasions. He also alleged the officer treated him discourteously. The department charged the officer with using a city vehicle to inappropriately transport a member of the public, discourteous treatment of the public, and making a misleading statement to a supervisor. The department temporarily relieved the officer from duty more than a year after the man complained to the department.
The court granted the officer's writ of mandate challenging the allegations. The court found the allegations were time-barred. Under the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights Act, the one-year period begins to run when a person authorized to initiate an investigation discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, an allegation of misconduct. The court ruled the limitations period for the allegations of misusing a city vehicle and discourteous treatment began when the man complained to the department. Although the officer was not identified as the subject of the complaint until a later date, the court held the department could have discovered the officer's identity with reasonable diligence. The court also held the limitations period for the misleading statement began when the officer made the statement, not when the department determined the statement was misleading.
In Pedro, a man alleged an officer conducted private business on two occasions. He also alleged the officer treated him discourteously. The department charged the officer with using a city vehicle to inappropriately transport a member of the public, discourteous treatment of the public, and making a misleading statement to a supervisor. The department temporarily relieved the officer from duty more than a year after the man complained to the department.
The court granted the officer's writ of mandate challenging the allegations. The court found the allegations were time-barred. Under the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights Act, the one-year period begins to run when a person authorized to initiate an investigation discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, an allegation of misconduct. The court ruled the limitations period for the allegations of misusing a city vehicle and discourteous treatment began when the man complained to the department. Although the officer was not identified as the subject of the complaint until a later date, the court held the department could have discovered the officer's identity with reasonable diligence. The court also held the limitations period for the misleading statement began when the officer made the statement, not when the department determined the statement was misleading.
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